Abstract
The impact of media industrialization on mediated religious expression all over the world has been substantial, and this study tries to understand the Indonesian case by looking at the intersections between commerce and Islamic expression. Focusing on Indonesian Islamic sinetron (soap operas), we shall see that contrasting ideological motivations among producers have resulted in particular narratives within their content. Despite these peculiarities, all narratives use Islamic teachings to address societal issues experienced by middle-class Indonesian Muslims. This, in turn, projects an image of Indonesian Islam that blurs existing political divisions in Indonesian society. This article argues that the sinetron plots are inherently a commercialization of da'wah (proselytizing of Islam).
Introduction
In Media and Religion, Hent de Vries contends that there is a ‘return of the religious’ on a global scale that contests the ‘often self-congratulatory narrative of Western, “secularist” modernity—whose hegemony has only been reinforced by current tendencies toward globalization and the almost unchallenged appeal of free market capitalism’ (2001: 3). Hent de Vries focuses on the complementarities and contradictions among religion, morality, authority, traditional values, and political ideology, which are recoding themselves in the new media system (Castells, 2000, cited in De Vries, 2001: 13). This new media system includes technological forms, discursive protocols, and market values of globalizing media infrastructure (Hirschkind, 2011: 90).
De Vries's reintroduction of Derrida's (2002) criticism on the ‘return of the religious’—which shows how religious expression takes on new forms in modern spaces—may seem at odds with Van Bruinessen's thesis (2011, 2013) of a ‘conservative turn’ in contemporary Indonesian Islam. De Vries emphasizes the connections with contemporary mediatizations of religious expression, demonstrating the historical situatedness of different manifestations, which according to us is where Bruinessen's thesis lies. Van Bruinessen begins with the assumption that Indonesian Islam, once celebrated by the ‘West’ as tolerant, has known a number of ‘conservative’ developments since the end of Suharto's authoritarian regime (1965–1998). In De Vries's frame, which sees religious developments in the long term, the ‘conservative turn’ is a moment in Indonesian history in which ‘various currents that reject modernist, liberal or progressive re-interpretations of Islamic teachings and adhere to established doctrines and social order’ (Van Bruinessen, 2013: 16) become mainstreamed by market capitalism. This is strengthened by Fealy and White's (2008) edited volume on how the expression of Islam is now embedded in Indonesia's economy. With such considerations in mind, this article delves into the ‘electronic materiality of spiritually transmitted habits’ (Castells, 2000, cited in De Vries, 2001: 13) by looking at how Islam is being mainstreamed in and by Indonesia's commercial television system. 1
From 1965 to 1989, Indonesia's sole televised information source was the state-owned Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI), whose portrayal of Islam stayed carefully within the religious plurality framework acknowledged by the authoritarian New Order regime. In 1990, Indonesia's first private television (RCTI) was founded. Around the same time, new media technologies (particularly satellite television and, earlier, video cassette rentals) performed an important role in cultural globalization, which challenged the regime's tight control over information (Kitley, 2000; Sen and Hill, 2000). With exposure to foreign television programs, the audiences’ demand for quality programs increased—more than TVRI could afford to produce. Thus, by 1995, RCTI was quickly followed by four others. By 2000, Indonesia had nine commercial stations and a highly competitive television landscape.
Compared to the 1980s and 1990s, when Islam was shown mainly for tokenistic purposes (Rakhmani, 2013), the 2000–2005 period saw a steady increase in the commodification of Islamic images. This occurred in parallel to the rise of Islamic expression among middle-class Muslims. We argue that religious expression is adjusting to a new system that includes the particular characteristics of television, its political discourses, market value, and media infrastructure (see De Vries, 2001; Hirschkind, 2011). With established television production standards, new strategies for efficiency and risk reduction are also practiced in the way Islam is portrayed in television programs. This blatant commodification of the religious triggered the Islamic zeal of a number of producers, who began to use television programs as a means to propagate Islamic orthodoxy (da'wah). 2 In an attempt to reach specific markets/congregations, the production process of Islamic television programs has required the cooperation of the producers and Islamic teachers (ustad) 3 to endorse/validate Islamic content. These new relationships and representations have resulted in an intermingling between Islam and television production and content.
Overview of Islamic sinetron
Under the former authoritarian rule, TVRI mostly avoided incorporating overt Islamic themes into its popular programming, opting instead to display tokenistic religious plurality. This avoidance went on after the end of the regime, but with the motive now shifting to avoidance of commercial risk. This risk avoidance is most apparent in the highest-rated television format: the sinetron. 4
The rise of Islamic themes in sinetron began in 2003 with the success of Rahasia Ilahi (God's Secret), a supernatural drama with gory representations of Islam. Moderate Muslim figures and scholars saw these portrayals of supernatural occurrences as misleading (Darmawan and Armando, 2008; Subijanto, 2011). Despite the criticism it received, Rahasia Ilahi launched a spate of prime time sinetron religi (Islamic sinetron), and its commercial success encouraged producers to incorporate Islamic themes in other shows.
The success of Rahasia Ilahi unleashed a torrent of similar supernatural dramas across television stations. Meanwhile, the success of the Islamic film Ayat-ayat Cinta (Verses of Love) sparked a trend in Islamic melodrama. Responding to such commodification, prominent director, producer, actor, and devout Muslim Deddy Mizwar set out to produce his own Islamic sinetron that portrayed everyday Muslims in a comedic setting. This, he says, was his own form of da'wah. And, hot on the heels of the supernatural drama and Islamic melodrama fads, Mizwar's hit Kiamat Sudah Dekat (The End of Nigh) also started its own trend. 5
Before 2003, no TV station ventured to incorporate Islamic content into a sinetron to avoid commercial risk, in particular owing to the exacerbated religious sensitivities of the 1990s. 6 The commercial success of Rahasia Ilahi (2003), Ayat-ayat Cinta (2008), and Kiamat Sudah Dekat (2003) gave precedence for further replication by television producers, leading to the ubiquity of Islamic sinetron on virtually all major television stations. By 2010, 335 Islamic sinetron titles had been aired on Indonesian television.
Between the 1990s and the year 2003, Indonesian sinetron was a variation on the classic soap opera format. In early 2004, inspired by Malaysian magazine Hidayah, a small production house called KEP Media initiated the phenomenon of Islamic sinetron. The drama's success baffled television producers with its juxtapositioning of supernatural occurrences and Islamic rituals, two things that are usually thought to be at odds with each other. Supernatural dramas portray two extreme poles of good and evil (Nazaruddin, 2008: 26). Essentially, a supernatural drama follows a formulaic story line in which sinners of all kinds (corrupt state officials, gamblers, a misbehaving son, etc.) are condemned by God to a very painful death (burnt in hell, consumed by flesh-eating worms, swallowed alive by the Earth, etc.) (Taufiqurrahman, 2005).
The format of the second cluster of Islamic sinetron, Islamic melodrama, is essentially very similar to conventional soap operas or popular melodramas. The success of the film Ayat-Ayat Cinta (Verses of Love) in February 2008 inspired TV producers to adapt its theme into the sinetron format (I. Kurniawan, 11 June 2011, personal communication). To ensure commercial success, production house MD Entertainment consulted with the Muslim organization Muhammadiyah to determine what was and was not permitted in an ‘Islamic film’ (‘Layar Ayat’, 2008). Not only was the film commercially successful, it also received positive feedback from state officials, moderate Muslim organizations, and scholars. The plot of an Islamic melodrama is generally similar to that of the popular melodrama, revolving around interpersonal relationships: friendly, familial, filial, or amorous. The difference lies in the presence of Islamic symbols. Such symbols are everywhere: in the clothing of the characters (headscarves for the females and baju koko—a Malayan-Chinese shirt often symbolizing Islamic piety—for males), in the settings (mosque), in the props (calligraphy), even in the way amorous relationships are resolved and legitimized through marriage.
Since the production houses that make Islamic melodramas also make popular melodramas, their actors and actresses star in both types of shows, with or without the headscarf and other Islamic fashion attributes. Such low-cost solutions have invited criticism from Muslim audiences who claim that the actors and actresses are not ‘Muslim’ enough, sometimes citing their personal lives that often feature in television gossip shows. Amid such ‘misleading’ portrayals of Islam, Mizwar felt that the content of Indonesian soap operas and film did not represent the social reality of its majority Muslim population (D. Mizwar, 24 May 2011, personal communication). He expressed his concerns that Islamic sinetron were condemnatory, extremely ‘black and white, and not educational’ (Amri and Syahid, 2010). His concern was shared by colleagues in theatre and film, as well as a number of prominent Islamic scholars. After consulting with well-respected Islamic scholars from State Islamic University Jakarta (UIN—Universitas Islam Negeri Jakarta), he decided to produce films and television series with religious substance that were also high in production quality and entertainment value. In contrast to most production houses that were established to answer the demands of television stations, Citra Sinema was founded to produce Islamic propagation sinetron and films (‘Lahir untuk Mengisi’, 2009).
Most of the sinetron produced by Citra Sinema reveal ‘the narrative of the struggle (jihad) of a Muslim in defining his piousness based on his level of piety and knowledge of Islam’ (Subijanto, 2009: 22), in which comedy is often used to normalize dissonances. The characters in Mizwar's sinetron often laugh at their own ignorance, which is then remedied by learning more about Islamic piety through the Quran and hadiths as well as from fellow Muslims. The storylines portray lower-middle-class families and communities trying to survive on a limited income, street hawkers, etc. Settings include urban villages, small alleys, shelters, etc.
Despite the different characteristics of each cluster, the sinetron industry's production processes make for several commonalities across clusters. However, the motives behind each cluster of Islamic sinetron determine the Islamic values and alliances that inform the production process. To understand the factors that influence the production process and their impact on content, we take a closer look at three Islamic sinetron titles, one for each cluster: Hidayah (God's Guidance), Munajah Cinta (Surrender to Love), and Para Pencari Tuhan (God Seekers).
Producing popular piety
Both Hidayah and Munajah Cinta were produced to emulate the success of another product. Hidayah was pitched by MD Entertainment in the hope of repeating the success of Rahasia Ilahi, while Munajah Cinta was pitched by another large production house, SinemArt, to replicate the commercial success of Ayat-ayat Cinta. In comparison to this, Para Pencari Tuhan was produced as part of an attempt to propagate Islam through the TV drama format. The first two commodify Islam to attract Muslim audiences, while the third uses existing commercial entities for da'wah purposes. This underlying difference determines the commonalities and constraints between clusters.
Religious authority
During the production process of Hidayah, Munajah Cinta, and Para Pencari Tuhan, Islamic teachers (ustad) were consulted with to validate the outcome. The reasons for such consulting, however, were different. In the production of Hidayah, MD Entertainment mostly sought to validate its Islamic content. Ustad K.H. Acep Nurhasan was not a celebrity preacher and he was never used for any other MD-produced television shows. Interviews revealed that the ustad's validation was sought to avert public criticism over inaccurate representations of religious practices because the production team was not confident about their comprehension of Islamic rituals. He mainly made sure that things such as the pronunciations of Arabic phrases, Quranic recitation, or Islamic funeral rituals were correct. Hidayah director Katili claimed that the Islamic teacher was not always present on set. When Nurhasan was unavailable, he consulted over the phone and sometimes sent his assistant to the set. This suggests that the ustad's validation was comparable to proofreading, as he corrected form rather than substance.
With Munajah Cinta the consultation provided was limited to viewing and validating the first episode only. The ustads were those previously involved in other SinemArt-produced television shows, with whom good contact had already been established. There was no selection process or ideological consideration in selecting them. ‘We worked with Neno Warisman 7 on Pintu Hidayah. With religious sinetron, we needed an ustad or ustazah to set the limits within which we could work (pakem-pakemnya sejauh mana). Ustad Mansyur was involved with Maha Kasih’ (D. Suryani, 11 June 2011, personal communication). However, unlike Hidayah, no ustad appeared in the credits of Munajah Cinta, and no ustad-inspired content change was made.
In the production process of Para Pencari Tuhan, the role of the ustad was substantial, comparable to that of a scholar. In contrast to Hidayah's cursory consultation by a single ustad or his assistant, and to Munajah Cinta's three ustad and ustazah who were only asked to validate the pilot, Para Pencari Tuhan's producers had no less than five Islamic scholars brought in to approve every script. While on Hidayah and Munajah Cinta Islamic scholars were content with ‘least objectionable’ situations (Klein, 1979), those involved in the production of Para Pencari Tuhan verified the validity of Islamic interpretations in the light of the Quran and hadiths. ‘They re-evaluated Para Pencari Tuhan's religious substance. Generally Indonesians are Muslims. Particularly, while Muhammadiyah Muslims might think something is valid, NU Muslims might think otherwise’ (W.H. Sudarmo, 19 May 2011, personal communication). Sudarmo was referring to the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, the liberal Muhammadiyah and traditionalist NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), which are often at odds on Islamic rituals. A classic case, which often provides fuel for casual jokes, is different Idul Fitri dates (the two organizations use a different calendar in relation with the end of the fasting month). Thus, the script was verified based on both sources as a conscious choice to step away from the political divisions in society and return to authoritative texts. Mizwar mentioned the book Al-Islam bila Mathahib or Islam without Madhabs (Muslim school of law), arguing that Indonesian Muslims have become too preoccupied with appearing more righteous than others instead of basing behaviors on authoritative text (D. Mizwar, 24 May 2011, personal communication). For Mizwar, Islamic orthodoxy is a means to reunite fragmented Indonesian Muslims.
Despite the differences in the way the ustads or scholars endorsed Islamic sinetron, in all production processes they were seen as a figure of religious authority. The endorsement of an ustad brings added value to a sinetron, whether as a marketing strategy or to give it the authority of scholarly Islamic interpretation. To a varying extent those involved in the production of Islamic sinetron—namely television station programmers and the production houses—treat them as religious promotion. . The producers of Munajah Cinta adapted Islamic content—in essence, polygamy—to market tastes. Hidayah enlisted the help of an ustad to ensure ‘accuracy’ of Islamic rituals in order to avoid controversy, whereas the Islamic scholars involved with Para Pencari Tuhan ensured accountable Islamic propagation. The Hidayah and Munajah Cinta producers court the Muslim market by avoiding inauthentic Islamic portrayals fraught with commercial risk, while the Para Pencari Tuhan producers focus on family viewers in the hope of drip-feeding Islamic teachings into their daily lives. While motivated by different factors, the various producers all approach Islamic sinetron as a balancing act between commercial interests and conformity with Islamic teachings.
Risk avoidance
A second shared commonality of the three Islamic sinetron is the producers' decision to self-censor to some extent. Although the government does regulate TV content, none of the producers referred to this when explaining why they skirted sensitive issues. ‘Our government is still feudalistic, conservative in terms of [content], which is expected to provide “good” lessons. Lessons are both good and bad. But our government, our censorship body, is not like that’ (I. Kurniawan, 11 June 2011, personal communication). Kurniawan alludes to Philip Kitley's description of ‘the audience as childlike’ (2000: 83) and therefore needing guidance. In contrast, Kurniawan posited the ‘audience as market’ (Kitley, 2000: 94).
The positioning of the audience as market determines which issues are too sensitive to be represented in Islamic sinetron. These include issues related to 'SARA 8 or those that are much too “confrontative” (memojokkan) of a religious group' (D. Rusmana, 23 June 2011, personal communication). The producers' view of the audience as market guides the production of each sinetron in different ways. With Hidayah, the producers avoided overtly sensitive issues to make sure it was unobjectionable. In preproduction, an ustad's approval was the first safeguard. However, in some cases, the director might ‘stray too far’ (nyeleneh) which then required censoring in the editing process (D. Rusmana, 23 June 2011, personal communication). Such postproduction content control suggests that this risk aversion manifests itself through several levels (Barkin, 2004; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996).
The production of Munajah Cinta was also guided by commercial interest. While Hidayah eschewed SARA issues altogether, Munajah Cinta had to find ways around depicting sexuality. There was a scene about marital relations but we had to show it visually to the audience. Beforehand, we discussed how we should represent it. We finally decided to set the characters on a bed, with the help of camera tricks. We moved the angle away. People would understand, so we wouldn’t need to picture it explicitly. (B. Hutabarat, interview, 10 May 2011).
In contrast to the Hidayah and Munajah Cinta producers’ view of the audience as market, the producers of Para Pencari Tuhan had a more pedagogical approach: the audience as pupils. Suspecting that audiences might take at face value whatever they heard on TV, scriptwriter Sudarmo argued that producing Islamic sinetron required content checking by Islamic scholars. If you want to write about politics, you would have to understand [politics]. I learned Islam through reading the Quran here and there. In writing, I'm not an expert. That's why Para Pencari Tuhan has high-quality content, because I am not the sole writer. I am not an Islamic scholar. I am supported by a team of qualified Islamic scholars who were hired because of their knowledge. (W.H. Sudarmo, 19 May 2011, personal communication)
Although previous observers of Indonesia's sinetron industry have argued that its prime motive was to make money (Barkin, 2004; Ida, 2006), we see that with Islamic sinetron it is not always the case. The religious packaging allows some leeway between Islamic orthodoxy and commercial interests. For instance, one strategy the Citra Sinema producers used to maintain both profitability and Islamic validity was product placement: sponsor's products (e.g., herbal medicine, motor oil, household goods) were given pride of place in the plots. Sudarmo said that they wrote their scripts around hadiths which lent themselves to product placement. He illustrated this with a first season episode in which an ustad turned down a cash payment after a sermon because a hadith forbade taking money in such circumstances. An ustad can receive pay, but he cannot set a fee. So usually when we invite an ustad, we'd say ‘Here you go, ustad. Not much, but enough to buy toothpaste’. Ustad Ferry, an ustad with integrity, discusses with his wife whether he really should buy toothpaste with the money he had received. Trying to be amanah (trustworthy), he buys one million Rupiah's [USD110] worth of toothpaste and distributes the stuff throughout the village. Enzim toothpaste was the sponsor. (W.S. Sudarmo, 19 May 2011, personal communication).
The politics of piety
Media texts can reveal competition of meaning among groups, or the ‘politics of representation’ (Barker, 2003). Based on this assumption, we studied 37 Hidayah episodes, 92 Munajah Cinta episodes, and 30 Para Pencari Tuhan episodes to understand how authority is maintained and challenged. In this section we examine the ‘struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it’ (Chilton and Schaffner, 2002: 5) within each Islamic sinetron by also being mindful of how they were produced.
Divine intervention
Based on our viewing of Hidayah episodes, the series seems to revolve around the personal experiences of Muslims set as binary, good vs. evil situations. All of the protagonists are tested by economic problems, either successfully returning to the righteous path or finally driven to their doom at the end of the episode. Economic issues are portrayed through relationships between social classes, with unfair treatment at the hands of other Muslims resolved through divine intervention.
At the end of each episode, characters who dared defy religious authority embodied in ustad, husbands, mothers, etc. are stricken by God with mysterious, incurable diseases or sudden death. This celebration of authority centers on the family as a religiously legitimate social institution, as well as on interclass relationships. In the case of family, marital relationships are patriarchal and filial relationships are matriarchal. In marriage, a husband rules his wife, and by defying her husband, a wife is defying God. In the case of filial relationships, a child that offends his/her mother defies God, as suggested by the hadith that says ‘Heaven lies under mother's feet’ (Surga di bawah telapak kaki ibu). Quoting a hadith gives religious authority to these figures, legitimizing their power. However, regardless of the nature of the conflict, the trigger for such defiance is often financial. The financial autonomy gained by a wife or daughter allows her to defy religious authority. This defiance is quickly thwarted by an authoritative figure regaining his/her power through supernatural occurrences.
Those mothers and husbands who lose authority over their children and wives are comparable to the many oppressed, lower-middle-class Muslims portrayed in TV dramas—the ‘poor.’ Such characters are all similar in that they are devout Muslims trying to stay on the righteous path. They finally get the justice they deserve through divine intervention—which suggests it could not happen any other way. When authoritative figures lose their power or the poor are abused by socioeconomic power, most often by members of the upper-middle class, it is a result of some disorder in the social structure, and to restore this order, divine intervention is necessary.
In this regard, Hidayah shows that official and/or state institutions are helpless in assisting the poor. In one episode, a company's struggles to preserve employee benefits are presented in the context of gasoline subsidy cuts which came into effect on 1 October 2005. In other episodes, hospitals are portrayed as lacking compassion toward patients who are unable to pay their medical bills, causing more suffering in their lives. In a system that does not side with the poor, divine intervention comes to the rescue of protagonists suffering abuse and neglect at the hands of unscrupulous, powerful people. A general distrust toward formal institutions drives the main characters to find solutions to their problems. The root cause of such problems, as in the case of family conflicts, is lack of financial autonomy or ‘poverty,’ which positions the protagonists as oppressed. Antagonistic characters consult healers (dukun) and protagonists consult ustad. Caught between the former and the latter, doctors and law enforcers have limited power to solve the problem.
Dukun and ustad are polarized in Hidayah as evil and good, respectively. Such a polarization was invented by the film industry in the Suharto years to avoid censorship (Van Heeren, 2007: 219). Interviews with Hidayah producers also suggest that the presence of ustad in the storylines owes much to commercial risk avoidance concerns. In other words, while textual constraints remain—what may and what may not be represented in the realm of the supernatural—they are now reacting to changes in ideological pressure.
Likewise, there is never an open battle between dukun and ustad. Instead, the battle between good and evil occurs between the main characters and their social surroundings. The dukun's black magic is considered shirk (idolatry) or polytheism or bid'ah (heresy) by liberal Indonesian Muslims (Mujani, 2003: 99; Mundayat, 2005), but in Hidayah, black magic is a response to institutional failures. This suggests that the role of the dukun relates to the moral panic sparked by fears that these institutions are ‘threats towards a functioning social system’ (Ferzacca, 2001: 223). The ustad, for instance, advises a protagonist to seek the advice of doctors, and if unsuccessful, to surrender to God. When this does not work, the protagonist goes to a dukun. The strained relationship between modern Islamic practice and old, ‘traditional’ ways is stabilized by a fictitious power that supersedes both ustad and dukun and is limited to the protagonists' individual and private religious experience.
The show, and many others like it, received praise from the highly conservative Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Muslim group. The group called the show is ‘a breath of fresh air’ compared to other sinetron. In fact, the good–evil polarization and unreal or improbable resolutions in Hidayah storylines are not novel sinetron devices. By resorting to such improbable solutions to the poor's plight and decaying social authority, the drama posits religion as the only means of salvation or escape. This notion is in line with senior television program director Harsiwi Achmad's explanation of Nielsen's 9 class C audience (lower-middle class) and ‘escapist’ content. While popular melodramas target lower-middle-class audiences thought to escape reality by losing themselves in the lives of fictitious upper-middle-class characters (see Rakhmani, forthcoming 2014), Hidayah offers up religious content through divine intervention as remedy to the social injustice its producers perceive to be part of the identity of their target audience. While narratively similar, supernatural dramas mainly differ from those sinetron that do not find favor with HTI in their obvious references to Islam.
Islamic piety
There are two major recurring themes in Munajah Cinta episodes. First, in various subplots, Islamic piety is often contrasted with a hedonistic lifestyle. In one scene, for instance, Muslims of both sexes have just returned from their umrah, or minor hajj (the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca). They are shocked to find that a karaoke bar and massage parlor has opened in front of the travel agency of main male protagonist Attar. The ensuing conversation between the pilgrims centers on the tainting of their great religious endeavor by their choice of a travel agent whose neighbors operate such shady businesses (commonly associated with illegal sexual practices).
In response to his customer's protests, Attar asks the neighboring business's owner to take down a provocative poster of a woman. Owner and main male antagonist Bakrie declines to do so and tells Attar that if he disapproves, he might want to move his travel agency to ‘Arabia.’ This scene and many others like it play on the frictions between Islamic piety and social practices that are permitted in Jakarta (although illegal). The dispute cannot be resolved and the karaoke bar becomes a recurring trigger for tensions between piety and ‘hedonism.’ The characters try to maintain the purity of their Islamic experience and as a result, their piety is challenged by politics and money. The pious characters thus pray to God to help them in this test, and their problem is resolved through acceptance (‘This must be Allah's grace’).
The second recurring theme in Munajah Cinta often plays on the degrees of piety between ustads. In one episode a kyai that is Attar's mentor has an argument with an anonymous ustad. Attar visits Maemunah, one of his two love interests, in her modest apartment (kost). Having had coffee accidentally spilt on him, he takes off some of his clothes, which leads nosey neighbors to think he is having an extramarital affair (zina). The couple is dragged to the police station on charges of adultery. They are imprisoned and interrogated. The witnesses and an anonymous ustad who recited a relevant hadith are interrogated as well.
The ustad claims that Islam prohibits a man and a woman from sharing a room unless they are married or muhrim, 10 further incriminating the couple. The police diligently type all statements made by the suspects, the witnesses, and the ustad. The kyai arrives and talks to the main protagonist, without giving him a straight answer, only quoting ambiguous verses from the Quran. On reflection, Attar decides to take his female friend as his second wife, provided his first one does not object. The charges are instantly dropped and the couple is released from prison.
The anonymous ustad is portrayed as a stereotypical, black-and-white religious zealot, whereas the kyai (a Javanese term for ‘Islamic teacher,’ in common use among traditionalist Muslims) is portrayed as a spiritual leader who helps the main protagonist find his own way of practicing religion. This difference is symbolized in their attributes. The anonymous ustad wears Indonesian clothing (peci and baju koko), and the kyai wears a turban, a scarf, and a gamis (Middle Eastern men's shirt) down to his knees (see Figure 1).
Different apparels on ustad to symbolize the degree of piety.
Such ‘Middle-Eastern’ references are often related to a character's degree of piety. It is not only the kyai's apparel that symbolizes his Islamic authority over the ‘local’ ustad, but praying scenes are often accompanied by Middle-Eastern music. Such songs never accompany the praying scenes of characters with lower degree of piety.
In the above-mentioned episode, the police detain a couple suspected of adultery until all testimonies have been checked, including those of the anonymous ustad who was there to testify as an expert. This conflict is resolved when Attar announces his intention to marry Maemunah and the police release them. In effect, the storyline turns the policemen into enforcers of Islamic tenets: they process the case as if it were an offence punishable by law. Although Indonesian law does not prohibit extramarital relations, the plot has policemen enforce Sharia on the two characters as a device to legitimize their romantic relationship. In this episode of Munajah Cinta, State officials are shown as subordinate to religious authority.
At a glance, this may seem like puritanism, reminiscent of Saudi Arabia-based Wahabism (Hadiz and Teik, 2011). However, the goal of Munajah Cinta's producers was to replicate the commercial success of Ayat-ayat Cinta, a film set in Cairo, Egypt. One may therefore see the uncritical adoption of ‘Middle-Eastern’ values less as a portrayal of ‘puritanism’ and more as the commodification of ‘Middle Eastern’ cultural attributes. The sinetron producers we interviewed claimed that Munajah Cinta was meant to portray a ‘pure, peaceful’ brand of Islam and to highlight the ‘sincerity’ of female Muslims in polygamous marriages, along the lines of the classic love triangle of popular melodramas (I. Kurniawan, 11 June 2011, personal communication). Such ‘purity’ is embodied through idealized, ‘Middle Eastern’ religious rules. The degree of piety portrayed in Islamic melodramas does not reflect Islamic ideology so much as the producers’ ideas of what may attract those pious, middle-class, upwardly mobile Muslim audiences who have been loyal popular melodrama viewers.
Political criticism through Islamic views
Islamic tenets as remedy to poverty and/or social injustice—such is the general tone of Para Pencari Tuhan. The focus in this section is how collective identity associated with Islam becomes a means to challenge the purportedly essentialist assumption that religious authority is only in the hands of the learned ustad. Centering on the everyday lives of the residents of a small urban village, this show is often used as a vehicle for criticism on two major issues. The first issue is the economy, usually in the form of the villagers' struggle against poverty. A particular scene portrays the main protagonist, bang 11 Jack, who is concerned that fewer and fewer people come to At-Taufik, the show's central, but small, mosque. This reinforces the larger context of Para Pencari Tuhan: criticism of a decrease in collective religious practice caused by an economic downturn. As an illustration, here is a scene where the main characters are waiting at the mosque for more people to join in prayer (shalat berjamaah). Bang Jack asks several passers-by to join them, but is rebuffed as they are all headed to work.
Bang Jack: People used to not visit our mosque because they were trying to save their families from poverty.
Barong: And now?
Bang Jack: Now they're still not visiting our mosque, because they're trying to save their jobs.
The second issue is related to everyday politics. Islamic tenets are usually invoked to challenge unquestioned traditions practiced in the village. In one episode, for instance, the villagers tell the richest man in the village, pak 12 Jalal, that they want to celebrate his birthday, in the hope of getting free entertainment on his dime. Pak Jalal's niece Kalila reminds everyone that the Prophet and his companions did not have birthday celebrations. Therefore, if there should be an event funded by pak Jalal, it should serve to strengthen the bonds between everyone in the village. Before pak Jalal agrees on a carambole competition, he wants to have a pole climbing competition, usually performed on Indonesia's Independence Day.
Bang Jack: Yes, but why do we have to have a pole climbing competition, pak Jalal?
Pak Jalal: What's wrong with a pole climbing competition?
Bang Jack: Pole climbing is a tradition inherited from the Dutch when they colonized us, pak Jalal.
Pak Jalal: Wow, that's cool!
Bang Jack: Not really. Natives were instructed to compete against each other, through pole climbing, to win prizes of clothes, cheese, sugar, coffee, etc., while the Dutch watched, laughed, and drank tea, looking at natives scrambling to outdo one another to win clothes and food.
Pak Jalal: Really? But it has since become our tradition.
Bang Jack: Pak Jalal, our society's traditions also needs correcting. For me, the pole climbing tradition can only degrade our nation's pride by perpetuating a colonizer's game.
Pak Jalal finally tells the committee that no matter what they suggest, the event should not include a pole climbing competition. This scene clearly shows that Para Pencari Tuhan is used to tell audiences that several traditions need to be questioned and that their current practices have roots in history. Here, pak Jalal listens to the religious advice of bang Jack, a man from a lower socioeconomic class. The episode about pak Jalal's birthday introduced the issue of dominance and national pride, with Islamic teachings becoming a means to challenge otherwise unquestioned traditions.
Similar social criticism is also apparent in another episode, where several villagers come to the mosque to pray together. Upon arriving, they are confused about whether to join in the congregational prayer: there is usually only one such prayer going on in a mosque at any given time, with latecomers joining in as they arrive. Here, however different groups are praying separately (see Figure 2).
Simultaneous congregational prayers in Para Pencari Tuhan.
Responding to the unusual situation, one of villagers says that maybe there are different prayers because each group follows a different schools of thought: one may be hardline (garis keras) and the other one more progressive (garis lembut). To avoid confusion, the newcomers join neither group and conduct their own prayer, stating that they would rather not be led in confusion ‘thus we should create our own [political] party that accommodates our aspiration.’ This implies that their religious ritual is comparable to religious–political affiliation. Finally, while the three congregational prayers are being held simultaneously in the mosque, the main characters chat in dumbfounded disbelief:
Bang Jack: This is just like our people (umat), we have too many political parties. The more flags we have, the less power each party possesses. Like bubbles in the sea, abundant but without force.
Azzam: Let's do our preprayer washing. Then we can start our own political party.
Bang Jack: No, we shouldn’t imitate them. This is an example of people conducting rituals without understanding why. We'll wait until they finish.
The multiple congregational prayer scene alludes to the dealignment (dealiranisasi) of Islamic political parties after Suharto stepped down (Tomsa, 2010; Ufen, 2006). The scene shows the villagers choosing to have their own congregational prayer rather than unwittingly following another prayer. An anonymous villager says that having their own authentic congregation is like having ‘a party that accommodates our aspiration.’ Bang Jack echoes the reference toward political parties. He states that political dealignment is what makes the umat or ummah (Islamic community) weak: because Muslims are fragmented into small, powerless groups. The scene occurs at the end of the episode, leaving the issue open-ended. The panjat pinang scene indicates that a dominant group may tear people apart by pitting them against one another. Such fragmentation is depicted negatively in the above episode, with Islamic views being used to further the notion of Muslim unity.
In both scenes Islamic views elucidate the ambiguity of everyday ethical problems that manifest themselves through Muslim politics. Despite the nontrivial issues, the humor blanketing social criticism helped the show become unobjectionable. Para Pencari Tuhan airs on SCTV (Surya Citra Televisi). Programming Director Harsiwi Achmad says that Mizwar's sinetron has been popular because its lower-class setting appeals to lower-middle and middle-class audiences while its realistic narratives appeal to upper-middle-class viewers, with its comedic packaging appealing to all three categories. This is a new strategy of television stations intent on widening their audiences. Therefore, while Para Pencari Tuhan's production process and content show this sinetron is intended for da'wah, it appeals to a market that transcends the Nielsen audience class that is not apparent in the first two clusters that were produced to repeat commercial successes. Citra Sinema adopted new creative strategies that followed the commercial logic of the sinetron industry while enlisting Islamic scholars to validate Islamic representations. The negotiations between re-contextualizing Islamic texts and remaining sellable suggest that the da'wah agency is working through the commercial space of television.
Concluding remarks: What brand of ‘Islam’ on Indonesian television?
This article studied the connections between the commerce of Islam and its expression in order to understand how religion, morality, authority, values, and ideology are recoding themselves in a system that involves market values and media infrastructure. The main findings draw a complex picture that challenges uncritical assumptions as to how the television industry may have commodified religious symbols in Indonesia. By looking at sinetron production processes and representations of Islam, we can argue on two levels that what is actually occurring is a commercialization of da'wah.
Firstly, in their early stages Islamic sinetron were meant to emulate the commercial success of other films or television series. Ustads were brought in to avoid commercial risks by ensuring that representations adhered to dominant Indonesian Islamic practices. As a result, the Islamic practices, symbols, and rituals portrayed are identified with previously monitored audience class types, thus constructing an Islamic identity that speaks to middle-class Muslims as stereotyped—and validly so, based on ratings—by the television industry.
Such ‘safe’ portrayals were thought to ‘cheapen’ Islam, thus prompting the agency of Muslim producers. By consulting with Islamic scholars to check conformity with the Quran and hadiths, they brought their sinetron into the realm of Islamic propagation, or da’wah. The irony is that such da’wah agents unwittingly commercialized their calling by ‘setting a fee for their sermons.’
On a second level, various ideological motivations resulted in particular narratives within Islamic sinetron. In supernatural dramas divine intervention saves oppressed lower-middle-class Muslims from the failures of social institutions, while Islamic melodramas coddle upwardly mobile, middle-class Muslims weary of half-baked Islamic rituals with representations of an imaginary, ‘pure and peaceful’ Islam fraught with ‘Middle Eastern’ values. The sinetron produced by da’wah agents criticizes the fragmentation of the ummah and appeal for unity. Despite these different dominant narratives, all three sinetron offered up a version of Islamic teachings in response to the perceived social concerns of their middle-class Muslim target audiences.
Based on these findings one may argue that what is currently occurring is a commercialization of da'wah through the televised delivery of ‘sermons’ to a Muslim audience. In Indonesia today, television has become a space for preaching: sinetron as sermon, audiences as congregation. And commercialization—or the creation of a relationship between advertising and audience—is the ‘new system’ within which da'wah works.
This raises the question: what kind of ‘Islam’ is it that we have on Indonesian television today? We would argue that owing to risk avoidance and audience targeting, the social divisions between Muslim groups in Indonesia (e.g., traditionalists, liberals, conservatives) become blurred in Islamic sinetron. Validated by both ratings and advertising, such portrayals take on a life of their own. In other words, such televised images of Islam are not an accurate reflection of religiosity in Indonesia today. What they are is a construct—an artificial, ‘Indonesian’ Islam born of the intersection of market capitalism and Islamic propagation.
Footnotes
Funding
This research formed a small part of the author's PhD thesis, for which she received a scholarship from the Australian Government through the Australian Leadership Awards (ALA).
