Leitkultur and discourse hegemonies: German mainstream media coverage on the integration debate between 2009 and 2014

Abstract

This study analyzes the mainstream media coverage on Germany’s integration debate between 2009 and 2014, while detecting main debate actors, topics, discourses, key events and their relations to one another. Media representations of Muslims, integration, immigration, multiculturalism and creation of otherness are scrutinized, considering different political alignments of mainstream newspapers. Furthermore, the Sarrazin debate is contextualized within recent events such as right-wing populism and anti-Islamization movements. A quantitative content analysis revealed pragmatism and culturalism as the leading discourses in one-third of all left and right leaning newspapers, while integration, immigration and populist language in politics were the most discussed topics. Mainly, events and actors related to the Sarrazin debate were mentioned. We argue that the Sarrazin debate has encouraged a variety of actors to speak out in favor or against Muslims. Our findings suggest a personal network analysis combined with qualitative research, in order to identify more actors, ties and network alliances.

Keywords

Content analysis culturalism Germany immigration integration Islam mainstream media Muslims populism racism

Introduction

Former and recent research invariably has revealed that the mainstream news media in Europe tend to frame ethnic minorities in largely negative terms (Van Dijk, 1989). Poole (2002) provides a systematic analysis of the ways in which Muslims are represented in the British press. As a result of categorizations being used, minorities (the out-groups) are associated with conflict, drama, controversy, violence and deviance (e.g., d’Haenens and de Lange, 2001; Van Gorp, 2005; Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007).

Tensions between majority and minority populations in the aftermath of 9/11, dissatisfaction among specific groups within the majority population with the increase in numbers and visibility of Muslims across Europe, and impatience in adopting what parts of the majority populations see as shared values, have become a complex societal and political issue. Not all European countries, however, have equally shifted from multiculturalist to integrationist policies and practices (cf. Migrant Policy Integration Index, 2010; 2014). Consequently, political discourses on nation states and nationalism encompass various definitions of citizenship, which are reflected in the media portrayal of ethnic minorities, showing the relative occurrence of in- and exclusion strategies, negative representations of the other, using firm but fair rhetorics. A growing number of studies have tested the impact of these frames on public opinion and confirm that especially threat frames influence people’s perception of immigrants and the immigration issue (Brader et al., 2004; Igartua and Cheng, 2009; Merolla and Pantoja, 2008; Pratto and Lemieux, 2001).

Penninx et al. (2008) maintain that due to restrictions and control measures by EU destination countries, immigration has been increasingly criminalized. Moreover, international terrorism has transformed certain immigrants, such as Muslims, into the focus of security concerns. Within political agendas of northern EU countries (i.e., Denmark and the Netherlands), various social problems and threats have been connected to migration and of lack of integration, resulting in a self-definition as non-immigration destinations. Newcomers as a threat have initiated questions on social identities, while restrictive and selective immigration measures, such as admission tests and compulsory integration courses, have been launched recently (Penninx et al., 2008). Papademetriou and Heuser (2009) assert that host populations perceive recent immigration waves as loss of control concerning their community identity, creating lack of confidence in governmental competencies.

Background of our research is the growing politicization of the debate on ethnic-cultural minorities, such as Muslims and the multicultural society over the last decade, as opposed to a previously more neutral governmental stance on the matter. Emergent right-wing and populist political groups tend to claim the issue aggressively, eventually leading to more radical standpoints and polarization.

The Sarrazin debate

Current German Federal Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière, stated in 2014 that the discussion on integration and immigration topics has been intensified by the so-called Sarrazin debate, and in addition it has become more straight and less inhibited than ever before (Tretbar and Sirleschtov, 2014). In his book, Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany does away with itself), Thilo Sarrazin (2010) portrays Muslims as the alien other, considering tolerance towards this group and its backward culture as inappropriate. The delineation in his book draws on already existing anti-Muslim debates by populist parties across Europe, warning societies of a growing Islamization (e.g., Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, Front National in France, Lega Nord in Italy, Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands) and generating a common European fear of Muslims (cf. Ciftci, 2012; Taras, 2013). Hence, Sarrazin does not initiate an entirely new debate, but builds upon similar discourses, smoldering in Germany and Europe. Repeatedly, Sarrazin has distanced himself from right-wing parties and reacted only with incomprehension when confronted with xenophobic allegations. Although he was initially branded by his opponents as an arsonist of the integration debate, causing outrage, resentment and press furore (Fahrenholz, 2011; Kissler, 2010), we argue that his controversial views have generated a heated debate on the same disputed topics regarding Muslims in Germany, generating different opinion camps. Despite the clear evidence of stereotyping and in-group favoritism identified in Sarrazin’s depiction of Muslim migrants, his motivation also seems to be of a provocative nature. Therefore, we assume that Sarrazin may rather be also categorized as a deliberate enfant terrible of the integration debate than just as an ordinary racist.

In order to more fully comprehend the debate on German multicultural society, beyond leading personages such as Sarrazin, further in-depth analysis of the mainstream press is required. Previous research confirms the continued relevance of mainstream newspapers with regard to their influence as agenda setters in the political realm (Meraz, 2007, p. 199). Furthermore, previous results indicate that key events impact the attention towards immigration and integration of minorities in the news (Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden, 2007).

Our aim is to analyze the media representation of the debate about the German multicultural society initiated by Sarrazin's book publication, which we consider as a key event. For this purpose, the media portrayal of the debate on Germany’s multicultural society in selected German mainstream newspapers, considering their political affiliation, geographical coverage and circulation numbers will be analyzed. In this context, references to various actors (politicians, public figures, institutions, academics) in the Sarrazin debate are identified and patterns in their performances detected.

Contextualizing the Sarrazin debate

Interestingly, the emergence of the political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)¹ with its conservative Eurosceptic agenda and the recent anti-Islamization movement PEGIDA² (see also Rucht and Zajak, 2015; Sagener et al., 2015), is a thought-provoking development beyond the debate on the multicultural society, which could indicate the substantiation and institutionalization of the same debate sparked by Sarrazin in 2010. These recent developments are intriguing, because initially Sarrazin had pointedly distanced himself from populist parties. Anyhow, the connection between AfD's political rise and the lengthy Sarrazin debate in the mainstream media is yet difficult to prove, as AfD was only founded in early 2013.

We assume the Muslim otherness portrayed by Sarrazin and amended by German right-wing parties to have a purpose on the European level, namely to define a continent with limited tolerance (e.g., through sanctions of Islam's visibility as revealed in Swiss minaret bans and limitations of distinct veiling practices in France and Germany) and national borders (through restricted immigration policies), in order to boost the non-Muslim European identity and unity. Sarrazin attributes negative characteristics to Muslims, such as anti-Semitism, homophobia, misogyny and anti-modernism, from which the German Leitkultur (leading culture) desires to distance itself (cf. Habermas, 2010). Therefore, we imply that the strong anti-Muslim theme and the hype about the Muslim other in the course of the Sarrazin debate pursue the construction of a common and unifying German national identity (not least among different political beliefs), which has become fragile lately due to the country's increasing ethnic and religious diversity (Colvin, 2014; Foroutan, 2013; Foroutan et al., 2014).

The negative scenario Sarrazin draws in his book raises public fears and portrays Muslims as dangerous species, seeking to take over the society and its resources with higher birth rates and economic dependence. Therefore, it is assumed that the more apocalyptic the constructed scenario is, the more irrational both the reactions of German public and Muslims would be.

Interestingly, Sarrazin’s ethnocentrism theme contradicts the actual political agenda of most populist parties in Europe, which involves Euro-skepticism and anti-EU ideas (cf. Kepplinger, 2012). Although he favors an elitist social model, which excludes less productive citizens (including Germans), he succeeds in depicting himself as the voice of the (silent) masses across all socio-economic classes. In his long-term research on group-focused enmity (GFE), which describes a spectrum of prejudices against various minorities by hostile mindsets, Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2012) refers to economization of migrants, in which productivity and applicability have become the priority. Furthermore, he reckons that key events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks (contributing to Islamophobia), the launch of unemployment benefit Hartz-IV (fears of disintegration), various economic crises (existential fear) would lead to more racism, xenophobia and hostile attitudes towards minorities. In this study, we seek to examine whether and how discrimination and racism against Muslims and potential reactions have been covered by mainstream media during the Sarrazin debate.

The Sarrazin debate and related key events

Our study aims to find out which main debate actors (MDAs), discourses, topics and themes are associated with key events around the Sarrazin debate. Yildiz (2006) describes the German media discourses on immigration as stigmatizing and scandalizing, while emphasizing the responsibility of mainstream media to portray the social reality. Communication scholars Kepplinger and Habermeier (1995) argue that certain events lead to more coverage of similar events in the following period, even when the number of incidents has decreased compared to the period prior to the key event. According to Vasterman (2005), a key event can be a genuine event, independent of news coverage, but can also refer to an incident within the media arena. His research on media-hypes demonstrates that key events influence the prominence of the issue of violence for a longer period of time. However, after a while the effect wears off and attention to the issue returns to its initial levels (Vasterman, 2005). According to Brosius and Eps (1995), similar events are more likely to be covered than unrelated events. They suggest that similar events serve as prototypes for journalists. These prototypes are concrete images that represent schemes, finally being transformed into objects, persons and incidents. Media companies do not report continuously about immigration and integration topics. Instead they would flood the media recipients with instant coverage as far as dramatic events occur, before dropping the same events during ordinary periods. In this manner, they induce the public sphere to associate immigration topics with problems, conflicts and troubles (Triandafyllidou, 2012: 4, 12).

Aims and scope

To extend and complement previous research on Germany’s integration debate, our study aims to identify the correspondence between different positions and MDAs, constructing various attitudes towards Muslims in mainstream newspapers.

Our first research question (RQ) concerns the main topics, discourses, and key events discussed in the German media and their interrelations to one another. Therefore, incidents such as Sarrazin’s controversial interview with Lettre International magazine, his book publication and announcements by major German politicians such as Chancellor Merkel are included in our analysis. A second RQ deals with the connection between main topics and discourses and various aspects of Muslims’ portrayal in German media. For this purpose, a collection of Muslim related themes will be included in our analysis. A third RQ intends to detect the MDAs within the Sarrazin debate as well as the main discourses and topics these are associated with.

Methodology

In order to answer these RQs, we will first examine the occurrence and construction of four integration-related discourses and complement this with a relational discourse analysis (RDA), which will allow us to detect the meaningful relationships of MDAs, discourses and key events to one another.

Our content analysis examines the coverage of the Sarrazin debate in German mainstream newspapers, which are selected based on various criteria (circulation numbers, geographic spectrum, political alignment, publishing company, and publication numbers per year) encompassing a period of over four years. Mainstream newspapers were chosen, because they will most likely cover the Sarrazin debate and its response in the media elaborately. Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) claim that mass media can play a critical role in setting political agendas. But they also note that clear evidence on the media’s precise function at this is often mixed and contradictory, because media effects vary across political agendas, media outlets and policy domains. Moreover, Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans (2008) argue that the in-depth, complete and respective coverage of newspapers affects policy makers more than TV. In our study we select and analyze editorials (opinion articles) in mainstream newspapers, because they can be considered as influential opinion leaders. Furthermore, editorials provide interpretations on current issues and events, while their attribute agenda is being transferred from newspapers to the reading public (Meraz, 2007).

Sampling procedure

The primary focus of our selection will be on discussions of immigration and integration policies, (trans-)national identification and belonging and membership in social, political and religious groups. Our sample procedure starts with all articles published within the German indices Islam & Muslime (Islam and Muslims), and/or Einwanderung (immigration) and Editorials & Opinions were searched, using the German-language sources available in LexisNexis online archives. Furthermore, articles had to include Sarrazin’s full name (Thilo and Sarrazin) and have a minimum length of 500 words. The time frame encompasses Sarrazin’s first controversial interview with the German magazine Lettre International (September 2009) until the start of our study (April 2014). Furthermore, we decided not to include keywords such as Ausländer (foreigners), Einwanderer (immigrants), Einwanderung (immigration), Integrationsdebatte (integration debate), Islamophobie (Islamophobia), Migranten (migrants) and Migration (migration), because their LexisNexis results did not differ much from using Sarrazin’s full name only. Letters to the editor were excluded as proven irrelevant for our content analysis corpus sample. This resulted in 1,980 articles, before applying our newspaper criteria, such as circulation numbers,³ political alignment,⁴ geographical spectrum, editorial company and total publication numbers during the required time frame.⁵ Finally, we chose 10 mainstream newspapers (including some online versions), representing the abovementioned criteria. Consequently, the total sample size decreased to 683 articles, while we decided to code every other article only and to exclude duplicates, resulting in 333 coded news articles in total (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Sample of newspaper articles by publication, circulation numbers, political alignment, geographical spectrum, and articles selected (n = 333).

Publication	Circulation numbers (thousands)	Political alignment	Geographic spectrum	Articles selected (2009–2014)
Der Spiegel (including Online)	1065.00	Liberal-left	Berlin	49
Die ZEIT (including Online)	517.30	Liberal-left	Hamburg	33
Rheinische Post Düsseldorf	340.90	Conservative-right	Düsseldorf	9
Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger	222.60	Centre	Köln	14
Stuttgarter Nachrichten	190.30	Centre	Stuttgart	15
Die Welt (including Online and am Sonntag)	170.60	Conservative-right	Berlin	74
Berliner Morgenpost	121.10	Conservative-right	Berlin	34
Frankfurter Rundschau	120.10	Liberal-left	Frankfurt	41
Der Tagesspiegel	118.00	Centre	Berlin	48
Aachener Nachrichten	116.70	Centre	Aachen	16

Relational Discourse Analysis

The sociological definition of a discourse (Jacobsen, 2007) describes it as ‘a method of communication that conforms to particular structural and ethnographic norms and marks a particular social group by providing a means of solidarity for its members and a means of differentiating that group from other groups’. Uitermark (2012) describes a discourse as ‘a coherent ensemble of framing and feeling rules through which meaning and emotion are ascribed to material and social realities’, implying identifiable patterns in how a position on one issue corresponds with a position on another issue. Because a discourse is characterized as the correspondence of positions on seemingly disparate issues, it provides a solid concept for our analysis. In our study, co-occurring themes and subjects identified in Sarrazin's book (Abadi, d'Haenens & Koeman, 2016) and related literature (Bade, 2013) will be used in the content analysis of German mainstream media.

Coding procedure

Every other article from our LexisNexis corpus was assigned a number, leaving out duplicates and identifying the author and newspaper source.

The coder is supposed to detect pre-defined topics, discourses, key events, Muslim-related themes (MUS) and MDAs within the corpus sample. Among others, the coder will identify and allocate among four discourses, which have been previously defined by Uitermark in an analysis of dynamic power relations in Dutch integration policies: culturalism, anti-racism, diversity and pragmatism (Uitermark, 2012). We chose Uitermark’s discourses, because we found his definitions and approaches particularly relevant in the context of our case study in Germany. In order to facilitate the reading in our results section and analysis part, we labeled most variables with abbreviations and numbers.

Discourses (DSC)

The coder was asked to comply with discourse definitions provided below and code no more than two main discourses touched upon in the article. The dominant discourse was coded first and the other as second, if applicable. For this analysis, only the dominant discourse was used.

According to the first discourse, culturalism (DSC1), cultural differences are easily identifiable and relevant in analyzing integration issues. It claims that Western cultural practices are more valuable than other cultures, and that the latter require a moral evaluation. Furthermore, culturalism differentiates between superior and inferior civilizations, while their mixture would lead to national disintegration (Stolcke, 1995). Therefore, public policy should guide the integration of particular immigrant groups and control their cultural norms and values. According to culturalists, due to political correctness integration problems cannot be discussed in an open and honest way. Some movements within culturalism identify a general opposition and contradiction between Western and non-Western cultures.

Second, the anti-racism (DSC2) discourse is defined in an antagonistic relationship to culturalism. It promotes the idea that immigrants generally suffer from structural and symbolic violence (cf. Bourdieu, 1989; Galtung, 1990) and that cultural hierarchy presents a variant of racism and discrimination against them. Anti-racism suggests that symbolic violence should be identified through public debate. Furthermore, public policies should protect immigrants from discrimination and compensate them for suffered disadvantages due to stigmatization and economic marginalization.

Third, the diversity (DSC3) discourse resembles multiculturalism as it praises cultural diversity and considers a diverse society as a profitable asset. Although identifying integration issues is justified, public debated should rather focus on the positive qualities of a multicultural society. Immigrants should be viewed as individuals with bicultural identities, providing them additional expertise and capacities. Migration is considered as a natural and positive process in a globalizing world. Ethnic diversity can lead to problems, if it clashes with economic inequality, political exclusion and social isolation.

The fourth discourse of pragmatism (DSC4) acknowledges cultural differences, but these are viewed as too complex to be considered in analyzing integration issues. Accordingly, focusing on cultural differences may actually create integration problems. Public debate should rather focus on local problems, in order to overcome cultural differences and prevent polarization. This discourse argues that integration problems are not only cultural but also socio-economic and institutional. A number of measures are required to prevent integration problems from spinning out of control.

Besides discourses, our coding instrument also seeks the identification of topics, key events, MUS and MDAs within the corpus sample.

Topics (TOP)

The variable topic refers to the main topic discussed in the article, which had to be identified in the title and/or in the first paragraphs. We decided to pre-define numerous topics relevant to the Sarrazin debate and key events around it. The coder had to follow our pre-defined topics and code no more than two main topics mentioned in the article. The dominant topic was coded first and, the other second, if applicable. For this analysis, only the dominant topic was used. The topics included in our coding instrument after recoding were integration and immigration (TOP1), political correctness (TOP2), populist language in politics (TOP3), perception of Islam and Muslims (TOP4), violence by Muslims (TOP5) and discrimination of Muslims (TOP6).

Key events (KEY)

The variable key event refers to any event or controversial statement mentioned in the article. A selection of relevant incidents or debate landmarks is predefined, such as Sarrazin’s interview with Lettre International magazine in September 2009 (KEY1), Sarrazin’s book publication in September 2010 (KEY2), German chancellor Angela Merkel declaring multiculturalism as failed in October 2010 (KEY3), German president Christian Wulff declaring Islam as part of Germany in October 2010 (KEY4) and Heinz Buschkowsky’s book publication on Berlin-Neukölln in September 2012 (KEY5). These and similar events were selected, because we assume them to be influential in the context of the Sarrazin debate and the discourse on Muslim integration.

Muslim-related themes (MUS)

Our predefined MUS describe how Muslims are portrayed in the newspaper articles. In the following, their operationalization is described:

Muslims as a group (MUS1)

Describing Muslims as one homogenous group without any differentiation based on individual characteristics or/and the opposite case. The coding instrument allowed for descriptions of Muslims as one homogenous group without any differentiation based on individual characteristics or not. We paid attention to nominal presuppositions in the plural form within the article’s phrasing. The options of our pre-defined answers were Muslims mainly discussed as a homogenous group, discussed both as a group and individuals, and not discussed at all.

Muslims as a problem (MUS2)

Associating Muslims with problematic issues. The coding instrument distinguished between Muslims described or mentioned as a problem, a challenge or as a contrast to German/Christian people. The options of our pre-defined answers included lack of integration, exploitation of social welfare, cultural differences, troublemakers and proneness to crime.

Muslims as a gain (MUS3)

Connecting Muslims to positive social, cultural and economic aspects. The coding instrument distinguished between Muslims described or mentioned as a gain, enrichment or as an asset for the German/Christian society. The options of our pre-defined answers encompassed positive contribution to Germany’s social life, enrichment in Germany’s cultural diversity, a boost for German economy, positive example for a successful integration or a peaceful migrant.

Muslims as different (MUS4)

Describing Muslims or the Islamic culture as different from or alien to German/Christian/European culture. The coding instrument distinguished between Muslims (or the Islamic culture) described or mentioned as different from or alien to German/Christian/European culture. We outlined that this distinction is usually made by a comparison of pluralistic aspects, such as habits, cultural norms and values, Islamic lifestyle, history and tradition. Furthermore, we stated that typical articles have rather a focus on the Islamic aspect of Muslims’ lives than their participation in the German culture. The options of our pre-defined answers referred to Muslims as being described as entirely or partly different, entirely or partly similar and not differentiated at all.

Muslims as a threat (MUS5)

Describing Muslims as a threat, risk, burden or danger for the safety, culture or economy of Germany. Our coding instrument distinguished between Muslims described or mentioned as a threat, risk, burden or danger for the safety, culture or economy in Germany. Although the word threat or danger may not be used literally, on that score the context of the article clearly presents Muslims in a negative way. Typically, the topic of the article implies a threatening scenario for Germany or Germans, discussing Muslims in the context of violence, terror or exploitation of the social welfare system. The options of our pre-defined answers describe Muslims as a threat or danger to Germany’s/EU’s national safety, a threat or danger for the German/European culture, a burden for Germany’s/EU’s social welfare system or economy and Muslims not mentioned as a threat.

Main debate actors (MDA)

No more than two MDAs were mentioned in the article. Actors had to be mentioned explicitly and in the context of the Sarrazin debate, including precedent and subsequent events. Not only individual names but also ethnic or religious groups, political groups or institutions, civil society groups or organizations, media broadcasters and other collective terms could be considered as actors. Actor names were typed in manually and were then categorized and recoded.

Position of MDAs towards Muslims and Sarrazin

The analysis was also meant to identify the position of actors towards Muslims and Sarrazin based on the information provided in the articles. The pre-defined positions were pro, contra and neutral. We were particularly interested in this opinion as it provides a preliminary but explicit position within the Sarrazin debate, in which primarily Muslims are blamed for their lack of integration potential and Sarrazin is denounced or praised for his controversial statements.

Inter-coder reliability

Two coders were hired and trained based on our coding instructions and descriptions provided in the coding instrument. Inter-coder reliability was measured using Scott’s pi, which is considered as a conservative measure. Scores above .6 are viewed as ‘adequate’ and scores above.⁷ are considered ‘good’ (see Neuendorf, 2002). The Scott’s pi score for this coding procedure was .85 (90% agreement), comparing nine variables (each two main discourses and topics, and five Muslim-related variables).

Research questions

Considering described variables and their relations, we intend to answer the following RQs:

RQ1a: Which topics, discourses and key events are mostly discussed in the German mainstream newspapers, and does this depend on their political alignments?

RQ1b: How do these topics, discourses and key events relate to one another?

RQ2: Which topics and discourses are mainly linked to which Muslim-related themes in the German mainstream newspapers, and does this depend on their political alignments?

RQ3a: Who are the main debate actors in German mainstream newspapers, and does this depend on their political alignments?

RQ3b: Which topics and discourses are the main debate actors associated with?

RQ3c: What is the position of the main debate actors towards Muslims and Sarrazin?

Results

We analyzed which topics, discourses and key events are mainly discussed depending on the political alignments of German newspapers and how they relate to each other.

Frequencies

Overall, pragmatism (DSC4) is the most used discourse, amounting to almost half of the editorial pieces. It is covered equally across all newspaper alignments. Culturalism (DSC1) amounts to nearly one-third of all discourses and is discussed in more than one-third of all left and right leaning newspapers. Integration and immigration (TOP1) and populist language in politics (TOP3) are the most frequent topics in the German mainstream newspapers, each amounting to more than one third of all topics. Integration is discussed equally across all newspaper alignments. Populism is mentioned in nearly half of all left leaning German newspapers and in nearly one-third of all centrist newspapers. Expectably, the most dominant key event is Sarrazin’s book publication (KEY2), amounting to three-quarters of all events, followed by Wulff declaring Islam as part of Germany (KEY4) and Sarrazin’s interview with Lettre International magazine (KEY1). Less than half of all left leaning and one-third each of centrist and right leaning newspapers cover Sarrazin’s book publication. It is mentioned in nearly half of all pragmatism and almost one-third of all culturalism discourses, and it appears in nearly half of all populism and in one-third of all integration topics (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Frequencies of discourses, topics and key events.

	Newspaper alignment (in %)			Number of articles
	Left	Centre	Right	Number of articles
Discourses (N = 331)
DSC1	30.08	30.43	36.21	107
DSC2	17.89	10.87	11.21	45
DSC3	4.88	5.43	4.31	16
DSC4	47.15	53.26	48.28	163
χ² (6, N = 331) = 4.06, p = .669.
Topics (N=332)
TOP1	30.08	37.63	37.93	116
TOP2	4.88	6.45	7.76	21
TOP3	47.97	32.26	38.79	134
TOP4	4.88	8.6	5.17	20
TOP5	4.88	6.45	5.17	18
TOP6	7.32	8.6	5.17	23
χ² (10, N = 332) = 8.07, p = .622.
Key events (N=327)
Various	4.92	5.43	5.31	6
KEY1	5.74	7.61	14.16	30
KEY2	80.33	76.09	68.14	245
KEY3	0.00	1.09	0.00	1
KEY4	11.48	10.87	12.39	38
KEY5	0.82	3.26	2.65	7
χ² (10, N = 327) = 11.12, p = .349.

Furthermore, we analyzed how Muslims are portrayed in relationship with the main topics and as part of the main discourses across different newspapers alignments in Germany.⁶

Discourses (DSC) and MUS (see Table 3)

Muslims as a group (MUS1)

Table 3.

Relationship between Muslim-related themes, discourses, and newspaper alignments.

Discourses (N=331)	Newspaper alignment (in %)			Total counts
Muslims as a group (MUS1)	Left	Centre	Right	Total counts
Muslims as a homogenous group
DSC1	31.94	30.56	37.50	72
DSC2	53.33	13.33	33.33	15
DSC3	50.00	50.00	0.00	2
DSC4	31.25	26.56	42.19	64
Total	33.99	27.45	38.56	153
χ² (6, N = 331) = 4.88, p = .559.
Muslims as both a group and as individuals
DSC1	43.48	26.09	30.43	23
DSC2	36.84	36.84	26.32	19
DSC3	33.33	22.22	44.44	9
DSC4	32.69	42.31	25.00	52
Total	35.92	35.92	28.16	103
χ² (6, N = 331) = 3.32, p = .768.
Muslims not discussed
DSC1	33.33	0.00	66.67	12
DSC2	63.64	9.09	27.27	11
DSC3	40.00	40.00	20.00	5
DSC4	44.68	21.28	34.04	47
Total	45.33	17.33	37.33	75
χ² (6, N = 331) = 9.25, p = .160.
Muslims as a problem
References to various problematic issues
DSC1	33.80	23.94	42.25	71
DSC2	54.55	0.00	45.45	11
DSC3	25.00	25.00	50.00	4
DSC4	33.33	26.98	39.68	63
Total	34.90	23.49	41.61	149
χ² (6, N = 331) = 4.49, p = .611.
Muslims as a gain
Reference to various positive issues
DSC1	100.00	0.00	0.00	1
DSC2	50.00	12.50	37.50	8
DSC3	10.00	40.00	50.00	10
DSC4	32.00	36.00	32.00	25
Total	31.82	31.82	36.36	44
χ² (6, N = 331) = 6.40, p = .380.
Muslims as different
Muslims different from German culture
DSC1	28.07	28.07	43.86	57
DSC2	66.67	16.67	16.67	6
DSC3	100.00	0.00	0.00	1
DSC4	20.59	23.53	55.88	34
Total	28.57	25.51	45.92	98
χ² (6, N = 331) = 8.60, p = .197.
Muslims similar to German culture
DSC1	60.00	20.00	20.00	5
DSC2	41.67	33.33	25.00	12
DSC3	37.50	25.00	37.50	8
DSC4	36.00	44.00	20.00	25
Total	40.00	36.00	24.00	50
χ² (6, N = 331) = 2.53, p = .866.
Muslims are not differentiated
DSC1	40.00	24.44	35.56	45
DSC2	48.15	18.52	33.33	27
DSC3	28.57	42.86	28.57	7
DSC4	40.38	28.85	30.77	104
Total	40.98	26.78	32.24	183
χ² (6, N = 331) = 2.51, p = .868.
Muslims as a threat
Muslims a threat for Germany’s safety
DSC1	26.09	28.26	45.65	46
DSC2	50.00	0.00	50.00	4
DSC3	50.00	0.00	50.00	2
DSC4	31.58	26.32	42.11	19
Total	29.58	25.35	45.07	71
χ² (6, N = 331) = 2.82, p = .832.

Within culturalism nearly one-third of all newspapers, irrespective of their political alignment, equally portray Muslims as a homogenous group. Within pragmatism a bit less than half of right leaning newspapers portray Muslims as a homogenous group. Within anti-racism more than half of left leaning newspapers view Muslims as a homogenous group.

Muslims as a problem (MUS2)

Within culturalism and pragmatism nearly two-fifths of right leaning newspapers refer to Muslims as problems. Within anti-racism nearly half of left and right leaning newspapers refer to Muslims as problems.

Muslims as a gain (MUS3)

Within pragmatism nearly one-third of all newspapers, irrespective of their political alignment, equally provide positive references about Muslims. Within anti-racism nearly half of left leaning newspapers provide positive references about Muslims. Within diversity nearly half of right leaning newspapers provide positive references about Muslims.

Muslims as different (MUS4)

Within culturalism less than half of right leaning newspapers portray Muslims as different from German culture. Within pragmatism more than half of right leaning newspapers view Muslims as different from German culture, while less than half of centrist newspapers view them as similar to German culture. Within the editorial content adopting diversity more than one-third of left and right leaning newspapers view Muslims as similar to German culture.

Muslims as a threat (MUS5)

Within culturalism and pragmatism nearly half of right leaning newspapers view Muslims as a threat for Germany’s safety.

Topics (TOP) and MUS (see Tables 4 and 5)

Muslims as a group (MUS1)

Table 4.

Relationship between Muslims as a group, topics and newspaper alignments.

Topics (N=332)	Newspaper alignment (in %)			Total counts
Muslims as a group (MUS1)	Left	Centre	Right	Total counts
Muslims as a homogenous group
TOP1	23.53	31.37	45.10	51
TOP2	38.46	23.08	38.46	13
TOP3	39.66	24.14	36.21	58
TOP4	0.00	50.00	50.00	4
TOP5	28.57	35.71	35.71	14
TOP6	57.14	21.43	21.43	14
Total	33.77	27.92	38.31	154
χ² (10, N = 332) = 9.72, p = .465.
Muslims as both a group and as individuals
TOP1	36.11	36.11	27.78	36
TOP2	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
TOP3	40.54	32.43	27.03	37
TOP4	37.50	37.50	25.00	16
TOP5	50.00	25.00	25.00	4
TOP6	11.11	55.56	33.33	9
Total	35.92	35.92	28.16	103
χ² (10, N = 332) = 5.96, p = .819.
Muslims not discussed
TOP1	41.38	20.69	37.93	29
TOP2	14.29	42.86	42.86	7
TOP3	53.85	10.26	35.90	39
TOP4	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
TOP5	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
TOP6	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Total	34.00	13.00	28.00	75
χ² (4, N = 332) = 6.24, p = .182.

Table 5.

Relationship between Muslim-related themes, topics and newspaper alignments.

	Newspaper alignment (in %)			Total counts
Topics (N=332)	Left	Centre	Right	Total counts
Muslims as a problem (MUS2)
References to various problematic issues
TOP1	28.57	23.21	48.21	56
TOP2	30.00	10.00	60.00	10
TOP3	37.78	22.22	40.00	45
TOP4	36.36	45.45	18.18	11
TOP5	37.50	25.00	37.50	16
TOP6	54.55	18.18	27.27	11
Total	34.90	23.49	41.61	149
χ² (10, N = 332) = 8.77, p = .554.
Muslims as a gain (MUS3)
Reference to various positive issues
TOP1	30.43	39.13	30.43	23
TOP2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
TOP3	50.00	16.67	33.33	12
TOP4	16.67	33.33	50.00	6
TOP5	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
TOP6	0.00	33.33	66.67	3
Total	31.82	31.82	36.36	44
χ² (6, N = 332) = 5.22, p = .515.
Muslims as different (MUS4)
Muslims different from German culture
TOP1	25.00	22.50	52.50	40
TOP2	14.29	14.29	71.43	7
TOP3	31.82	22.73	45.45	22
TOP4	25.00	37.50	37.50	8
TOP5	33.33	33.33	33.33	12
TOP6	44.44	33.33	22.22	9
Total	28.57	25.51	45.92	98
χ² (10, N = 332) = 6.20, p = .798.
Muslims similar to German culture
TOP1	33.33	46.67	20.00	15
TOP2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
TOP3	52.38	23.81	23.81	21
TOP4	28.57	42.86	28.57	7
TOP5	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
TOP6	28.57	42.86	28.57	7
Total	40.00	36.00	24.00	50
χ² (6, N = 332) = 3.18, p = .787.
Muslims are not differentiated
TOP1	36.07	31.15	32.79	61
TOP2	35.71	35.71	28.57	14
TOP3	45.05	21.98	32.97	91
TOP4	40.00	40.00	20.00	5
TOP5	33.33	33.33	33.33	6
TOP6	42.86	28.57	28.57	7
Total	40.76	27.17	32.07	184
χ² (10, N = 331) = 3.29, p = .974.
Muslims as a threat (MUS5)
Muslims a threat for Germany’s safety
TOP1	30.00	20.00	50.00	20
TOP2	50.00	0.00	50.00	6
TOP3	19.05	28.57	52.38	21
TOP4	0.00	50.00	50.00	4
TOP5	33.33	33.33	33.33	15
TOP6	60.00	20.00	20.00	5
Total	29.58	25.35	45.07	71
χ² (6, N = 332) = 9.25, p = .509.

Within integration nearly half of right leaning newspapers view Muslims as a homogenous group. Furthermore, Muslims are viewed as both a group and as individuals equally across all newspapers alignments. Nearly two-fifths of left- and right leaning newspapers do not discuss Muslims in detail. Within populism more than one-third of left and right leaning newspapers view Muslims as a homogenous group. Furthermore, less than half of left leaning newspapers view Muslims as both a group and as individuals. More than half of left leaning newspapers do not discuss Muslims in detail. Within discrimination of Muslims more than half of left leaning newspapers view Muslims as a homogenous group. Furthermore, more than half of centrist newspapers view Muslims as both a group and as individuals.

Muslims as a problem (MUS2)

Within integration nearly half of right leaning newspapers refer to Muslims as problems. Within the topic political correctness nearly two-thirds of right leaning newspapers refer to Muslims as problems. Within populism and violence by Muslims, nearly two-fifths of left leaning and right leaning newspapers refer to Muslims as problems.

Muslims as a gain (MUS3)

Within integration all newspapers alignments nearly equally provide positive references about Muslims. Within political correctness, there are no references to the variable Muslims as a Gain. Within populism half of left leaning newspapers provide positive references about Muslims.

Muslims as different (MUS4)

Within integration more than half of right leaning newspapers view Muslims different from German culture. Furthermore, nearly half of centrist newspapers view Muslims similar to German culture. Muslims are equally not differentiated across all newspapers alignments. Within populism nearly half of right leaning newspapers view Muslims different from German culture. Furthermore, more than half of left leaning newspapers view Muslims similar to German culture. Nearly half of left leaning newspapers do not differentiate Muslims.

Muslims as a threat (MUS5)

Within integration and populism around half of right leaning newspapers view Muslims as a threat for Germany’s safety. Within violence by Muslims, equally one-third of the articles across all newspaper alignments view Muslims as a threat for Germany’s safety.

MDAs

Next, we detected the MDAs, while considering the political alignments of German mainstream newspapers. The most frequent actor is current borough mayor of Berlin-Neukölln Heinz Buschkowsky (MDA1), who is mainly mentioned by right leaning newspapers. Further frequent actors are current vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel (MDA2) and former German federal president Christian Wulff (MDA3), both mentioned by centrist newspapers mostly. Current chancellor Angela Merkel (MDA4) is predominantly referred to in left leaning newspapers. The same applies to a group recoded as Criticizing Muslims (MDA5), consisting of various Muslim actors critical of Sarrazin and his statements. Finally, we recoded residual actors to a diverse group called Various Actors. This group is equally distributed across newspaper alignments (see Table 6).

Table 6.

Relationship between main debate actors and newspaper alignments.

	Newspaper alignment (in %)			Total counts
Main debate actors (N=305)	Left	Centre	Right	Total counts
Various actors	36.91	26.18	36.91	233
MDA5	40.00	33.33	26.67	30
MDA4	62.50	25.00	12.50	8
MDA3	22.22	44.44	33.33	9
MDA2	20.00	50.00	30.00	10
MDA1	20.00	33.33	46.67	15
χ² (10, N = 305) = 9.87, p = .452.

Furthermore, we identified which topics and discourses MDAs are associated with (see Table 7). Buschkowsky, Gabriel and Criticizing Muslims are mainly mentioned within integration and populism topics. Wulff is mostly referred to in the context of integration. Buschkowsky is mainly mentioned in both culturalism and pragmatism. Gabriel, Wulff, Merkel and Criticizing Muslims are mainly mentioned within pragmatism.

Table 7.

Relationship between discourses/topics and main debate actors.

	Main debate actors (in %)						Total counts
	MDA1	MDA2	MDA3	MDA4	MDA5	Various actors	Total counts
Discourses (N=303)
DSC1	46.67	20.00	0.00	50.00	34.48	32.76	99
DSC2	6.67	10.00	0.00	0.00	17.24	13.36	38
DSC3	0.00	0.00	11.11	12.5	10.34	3.45	13
DSC4	46.67	70.00	88.89	37.50	37.93	50.43	153
χ² (15, N = 303) = 19.09, p = .210.
Topics (N=304)
TOP1	20.00	40.00	66.67	25.00	26.67	38.79	113
TOP2	6.67	10.00	0.00	12.50	0.00	6.47	18
TOP3	40.00	50.00	22.22	62.50	43.33	37.07	117
TOP4	0.00	0.00	11.11	0.00	13.33	5.60	18
TOP5	26.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.67	4.74	17
TOP6	6.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.00	7.33	21
χ² (25, N = 304) = 31.78, p = .164.

In this part, we identified the position of the MDAs towards Muslims and Sarrazin (see Table 8). The largest actor is the group Criticizing Muslims, which positions itself almost entirely as pro-Muslims and contra Sarrazin. Buschkowsky positions itself almost entirely against Muslims and pro Sarrazin. Gabriel and Merkel position themselves predominantly neutral towards Muslims and contra Sarrazin. Wulff delivers mainly pro Muslim and contra Sarrazin positions. A group coined as Various Actors was recoded out of numerous actors. Its position is mainly neutral, followed by nearly one-third contra Muslim positions and with nearly half contra Sarrazin positions.

Table 8.

Relationship between main debate actors and positions towards Muslims/Sarrazin.

Main debate actors	Pro	Contra	Neutral	Total counts
	Position towards Muslims (in %)
MDA1	0.00	93.33	6.67	15
MDA2	20.00	0.00	80.00	10
MDA3	77.78	11.11	11.11	9
MDA4	0.00	0.00	100.00	8
MDA5	96.55	3.45	0.00	29
Various actors	25.75	34.76	39.48	233
Total	31.91	31.91	36.18	304
χ2 (10, n = 304) = 117.80, p = .000.
	Position towards Sarrazin (in %)
MDA1	93.33	0.00	6.67	15
MDA2	0.00	100.00	0.00	10
MDA3	0.00	100.00	0.00	9
MDA4	12.50	87.50	0.00	8
MDA5	0.00	96.55	3.45	29
Various Actors	28.26	50.87	20.87	230
Total	26.58	56.81	16.61	301
χ2 (10, n = 301) = 75.24, p = .000.

Relational Discourse Analysis

The high frequency of the topics integration and immigration and populist language in politics across all newspapers alignments confirms their significance within the Sarrazin debate. Consistently, Sarrazin has been accused of populism and inciting xenophobia (ECRI, 2014: 20–21). Furthermore, our findings overlap with the main topics discussed in his book. Therein, he criticizes lack of integration among Muslims and calls for controlled immigration policies (Sarrazin, 2010: 264, 292, 369–372).

Pragmatism is the dominating discourse in nearly half of all newspaper articles. According to this discourse, integration problems are not only due to existent cultural differences, but also socio-economic and institutional factors matter. Furthermore, it recommends a public debate on local problems, in order to avoid polarization in the society. Hence, German mainstream media is mainly represented by a diplomatic and considerate discourse on integration and immigration problems. Nevertheless, culturalism still represents nearly one-third of all discourses. This finding implies that cultural differences are perceived as salient and considered as relevant for the current integration debate. Furthermore, German culture is perceived as superior (see also Leitkultur), and therefore policy makers ought to control and evaluate values of alleged inferior cultures.

The overwhelming media coverage of Sarrazin’s book publication as the most salient key event confirms its significance for our research on the integration debate. We assume that other key events do not receive corresponding media attention due to the controversial and provocative extent of Sarrazin’s statements and triggered reactions across the German society.

MUS

Muslims as a Group (MUS1)

The portrayal of Muslims as a homogenous group by right leaning newspapers within the culturalism and pragmatism discourse implies a lack of nuances in differentiating individual characteristics of Muslims, confirming conservative views on migration issues in general. Muslims are portrayed as individuals mostly within the pragmatism discourse of centrist and left leaning newspapers, proving a more nonchalant perspective among those discourses and political alignments. Similarly, the prevalent portrayal of Muslims as a homogenous group by right leaning newspapers within the topics integration and immigration and populist language in politics complies with our findings above.

Muslims as a problem (MUS2)

Right leaning newspapers associate Muslims with problems mainly within the culturalism discourse and the topic integration and immigration, confirming widespread critical views on Muslim integration and immigration. The high share within the pragmatism discourse among right leaning newspapers can be explained by existing nuances of conservative opinions on Muslims. Furthermore, conservative opinions might have changed in the course of the integration debate due to public condemnation of Sarrazin.

Muslims as a gain (MUS3)

Mostly within the pragmatism discourse and the topic integration and immigration positive references about Muslims are provided – and consistently across all newspaper alignments. This finding confirms the moderate view of pragmatism towards minorities and implies a rare consensus on this topic across political alignments.

Muslims as different (MUS4)

Muslims are portrayed as different from German culture mainly within the culturalism and pragmatism discourses and by right leaning newspapers. This finding confirms the relevancy of cultural differences for culturalists and the critical position of right leaning newspapers on migration issues. However, the high ratio of right leaning newspapers within the pragmatism discourse (55.88%) is surprising and could hint at a wide range of opinions among conservative authors. Similarly, Muslims are portrayed as different from German culture mainly within the topic integration and immigration in right leaning newspapers. This finding corresponds with the critical view of conservative authors on integration and immigration policies.

Muslims as a threat (MUS5)

Muslims are mostly portrayed by right leaning newspapers as a threat within the culturalism discourse, and the topics integration and immigration and populist language in politics. This finding is consistent with our further results, and not least because culturalism views non-Western civilizations as inferior and demands the control of their cultural norms and values.

Debate actor analysis

The variety of debate actors complicates the identification of group ties and alliances in our study. This high share results in the recoded group coined as various actors, amounting to three-quarters of total actors (N = 305). In turn, one quarter of various actors is of Muslim faith, constituting more than half of all Muslim actors (N = 74). This is surprising as one-third of this group shows anti-Muslim positions and nearly half are anti-Sarrazin, emphasizing the opinion variety within this group. We focused on actors with highest media mentions and our results include mainly prominent political figures. Beforehand, the political affiliation of our MDAs is worth mentioning: Buschkowsky and Gabriel are Social Democrats and SPD party members. Merkel and Wulff are Christian Democrats and accordingly members of CDU.

As a strong advocate of Sarrazin (93.33% pro positions), Buschkowsky is mainly mentioned within more conservative newspapers and discourses. Furthermore, he is the only debate actor regularly mentioned in the context of violence by Muslims, certainly concerning him as a mayor in Berlin.

Buschkowsky has been acclaimed in the public sphere since emerging as the borough mayor of Berlin-Neukölln in 2001, enjoying a good reputation and popularity in the same problem area portrayed in his books. Shortly after Theo van Gogh’s murder in 2004, he declared German multiculturalism (Multikulti)⁷ as failed (van Bebber, 2004) and warned of emerging parallel societies (Parallelgesellschaften).⁸ This term describes the self-organization of minorities, not complying with ideals and values prescribed by the German mainstream society and stigmatized as being mostly dependent on social welfare (Hartz-IV).⁹ In the course of the related Leitkultur debate, historian and migration researcher Klaus J. Bade has revoked the dangerous scenario of migrant subcultures and contended that it features elements of populism (Sternberg, 2004). The Leitkultur concept was first introduced by sociologist Bassam Tibi in 1998, referring originally to core values of a leading/guiding culture in the European context. In October 2000, the term became controversial as contextualized by conservative CDU politician Friedrich Merz, rejecting multiculturalism and demanding controlled immigration policies in Germany (Pautz, 2005).

Slogan analysis

We were interested in the frequencies of aforementioned slogans (Multikulti, Parallelgesellschaften, Hartz-IV, Leitkultur) within our corpus sample and found out that on average a third of all newspaper articles include one of them (N = 130). Mainly left and right leaning newspapers make use of these terms. They appear predominantly in the context of both culturalism and pragmatism discourses and are referred to mostly within topics related to integration and immigration and populist language in politics. Moreover, the buzzwords are largely mentioned within less favorable MUS – the profile of the more problematic, less profitable and homogenous people. This would hint at another negative association of Muslims in the context of the integration debate. Finally, half of all articles discussing Leitkultur contain culturalism as the main discourse and integration as the main topic.

According to our findings, within the integration theme the overall coverage of discrimination and racism against Muslims is relatively low (6.93%) comparing to other themes. Neither the advocate group Criticizing Muslims is strongly associated with this theme (10%) nor any political figure. Within the problem theme, this advocate group is mentioned in half of the associated articles, while within the security threat theme it only accounts for one-tenth of the articles mentioned (both N = 30).

We can confirm that Sarrazin’s book publication has sparked a heated debate on integration, populism and related topics in German mainstream media.

Future research

Overall, our study primarily sought to analyze contingent co-occurrences between actors, discourses, topics and themes than to identify precise connections and their backgrounds. Furthermore, any correlation or causality between the aforementioned variables cannot be identified based on our methodology. Considering the vast media attention described in our study, current repercussions of this debate should be scrutinized. We argue that the Sarrazin debate has encouraged a variety of actors to speak out in favor or against Muslims. The reason why rather prominent public figures than marginal network actors dominate the media coverage remains yet unanswered. As much as we can confirm the Sarrazin book publication has created a heated debate on Muslim integration, due to data and method limitations of this study, potential motives, strategies and opinion camps could not be identified. Unfortunately, detected Muslim comments and reactions were comparatively minor, considering that they are the core subject of our analyzed debate.

Our findings justify a further analysis to identify how political parties and actors construct and take ownership of themes related to Muslims, immigration and integration. This should be conducted by comparing three different discourses with each other over time – the political class (parliamentary protocols), the mainstream media (newspaper articles) and the public voice (social media). Based on the intermedia agenda-setting theory, discrepancies and overlaps within and across those three discourses could then be determined. Ideally, also indications of any type of media being a potential breeding ground for shifts in integration and immigration policies could be identified.

Moreover, a personal network analysis applied to an interactive social media environment could reveal patterns of relevant network communication, in order to obtain the overall picture. Finally, combined with qualitative research future analysis might reveal whether Islamophobia has become a surrogate for xenophobia and whether the Sarrazin debate has motivated the middle class to flirt with right-wing populism as recently surfacing in shape of parties and citizen movements (cf. Hoerner, 2015).

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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