Can models of organizational change help to understand ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in community sentences? Applying Kotter’s model of organizational change to an Integrated Offender Management case study

Recent Changes to Community Justice

Community justice has witnessed numerous changes in recent decades, prompting McNeill et al. (2010) to suggest that change in community sentences has, ironically, been one of the few constants. New arrangements and initiatives have led to (if not necessitated) changes to organizational structures, professional identities and occupational cultures (Deering et al., 2014; Faulkner, 2008; Gregory, 2010; Mawby and Worrall, 2011; Robinson and Burnett, 2007). The potential consequences and subsequent impact of these changes have frequently been reported negatively. For some, the increase in managerialism since the 1980s has been responsible for changing the dynamics of criminal justice, particularly with the advent of New Public Management (NPM) under the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s (Raine and Willson, 1995), which was further accentuated under the New Labour government in the early 21st century (McLaughlin et al., 2001).

The introduction of NPM in criminal justice had a number of potential effects, including a reduction in autonomy and the prominence afforded to efficiency as a performance driver (Raine and Willson, 1995). For others, the introduction of ‘what works’ and the Effective Practice Initiative (EPI) had particular impacts on the nature of community sentences and those who deliver them. Newman and Nutley (2003) argued that the introduction of ‘what works’ had shifted the relationship between the policy-maker and the frontline Probation Service in favour of the former. This resulted in service providers receiving greater direction within a top–down, technocratic environment. They also argued that the transformation of probation impacted on the nature of professional knowledge, but that probation staff were able to retain ‘old’ values in the way that they performed their roles (see also Farrant, 2006).

Others still have argued that wider organizational changes to the Probation Service had a negative effect on staff morale and commitment to the organization, albeit not a lack of commitment to service users or the role per se (Farrow, 2004). Finally, some have argued that, at least partly as a consequence of the various changes to the organization, structure and delivery of community sentences, we have witnessed the emergence of the ‘polibation’ and the ‘prisipolibation’ officer (Mawby and Worrall, 2011; Mawby et al., 2007; Nash, 2008), indicating a shift in occupational identities and a merging, or blurring, of professional roles. It is argued here that whether new initiatives within community sentences achieve their intended outcomes depends, to some extent, on how the accompanying process of organizational change is managed.

Managing Organizational Change in Community Justice

As the introduction of new approaches to community justice will frequently lead to organizational, professional or cultural changes, the achievement of intended outcomes is likely to be influenced by the way those changes are managed. Of course, outcomes could be influenced by a number of other variables, such as the engagement or compliance of the service user (Robinson and McNeill, 2008), or where practitioners resist new approaches (Gregory, 2010). That caveat aside, it is argued here that if organizational change is managed in an effective way then the likelihood of achieving intended outcomes is increased. McNeill et al. (2010), in their review of organizational culture and change, highlighted a number of problems associated with the management of change in community justice. They identified some key issues in relation to recent change initiatives, including: the scale and pace of change; performance management; and the degree of centralization. Furthermore, where these were not managed effectively, the overall change process was likely to be regarded in negative terms. However, they also found that engaging practitioners as active participants, the positioning of values and the development of clear objectives in the change process were likely to lead to positive outcomes.

The literature points to a complex set of relationships between organization change, organizational culture, occupational roles and professional identities (Dadich et al., 2015; Robinson, 2013; Whelan, 2015). In some instances this creates a contradiction between the nature of change and the existing culture and identity of the organization and its practitioners. Where this occurs there is a danger that practitioners may feel disempowered (Lynch, 2004), or become disillusioned with the organization itself (Farrow, 2004). In part, such negative outcomes may be a consequence of becoming fatigued by the constant change that has occurred within community sentences in recent decades (Robinson and Burnett, 2007), but they are also likely to be a consequence of change impacting on the everyday practices associated with the organization. Indeed, Stojkovic et al. (2012) suggest that change may be difficult within criminal justice organizations because of the importance attached to routines, which provide the framework of skills and values required to perform the role.

Hence, where organizational change alters routines, the skills and values that constitute a role are challenged. This is evident in the recent history of probation, as historical practices, such as reflection and professional autonomy, have been eroded by a shift towards a top–down, technocratic culture (Bhui, 2006; Burke and Collett, 2011; Faulkner, 2008; Nellis, 2002). It has been suggested that the plethora of changes to organizations and their practices have had negative consequences in terms of the deskilling of practitioners (Fitzgibbon, 2007, 2008; Gale, 2012), the nature of staff–service user relationships (Davies and Gregory, 2010) and the ability of practitioners to positively impact on service users’ lives (Deering et al., 2014).

This is not to argue that change should be avoided or resisted, as the broader business and management literature tells us change is both inevitable and necessary, but, when properly managed, it may be innovative, creative and lead to improved outcomes (Andriopoulos and Dawson, 2009; Paton and McCalman, 2008). McNeill et al. (2010) state that private sector strategies may be usefully applied to the public sector and, more specifically, to community justice, although they do caveat this by suggesting that the complexity of the public sector may make it more difficult to achieve. Hence, it is argued here that where changes do occur within community justice, the processes by which they are managed are of central importance because they will impact on service delivery for practitioners and service users.

The criminological literature to date has tended to focus on the outcomes from organizational change, as opposed to the processes that underpin that change. More specifically, this has typically focused on the difference between outcomes before and after the change has been implemented, often measured in terms of reductions in reoffending or reconvictions. Elsewhere, the concern has been with identifying the impact of change on practitioners, including the emergence of new forms of criminal justice practitioner (Mawby and Worrall, 2011; Mawby et al., 2007; Nash, 2008). Little attention has been paid in the academic literature to the processes of organizational change in criminal justice, ¹ and this is an area this article aims to address. The remainder of this article begins to fill this gap in knowledge by analysing the delivery of two new IOM schemes by applying a model of organizational change.

Applying a Model of Organizational Change to an IOM Case Study

The authors undertook an evaluation of two innovative IOM schemes operating in England. The schemes draw upon existing IOM structures, with police and probation taking lead roles and support coming from various partners, including drugs support workers, housing and employment agencies. Where the schemes differ is that they explicitly target prolific offenders who would otherwise likely face a lengthy custodial sentence. In return for demonstrating compliance and motivation, the individual is instead offered a three-year community order (following a bail assessment and sentence deferment period) consisting of various requirements and support ² tailored to the needs of the individual (see Baker, 2014 for an overview of the sentencing framework of the schemes).

The 12- and 24-month reconviction rates did not demonstrate significant improvements when compared to local reconviction rates, previously published studies and national reconviction rates, although the schemes did achieve notable reductions in the frequency of reoffending ³ (King et al., 2015). This is not to argue that the schemes were not successful – indeed, there have long been arguments around what should constitute success (Clarke, 2014; Humphrey and Pease, 1992; McNeill, 2001; Mair, 1991) – but the findings do indicate that the schemes may not have fulfilled their potential. The evaluation included interviews with 25 practitioners, including: probation officers; police officers; judiciary; members of the Criminal Justice Boards; and drug support workers. The interviews explored a range of topics which included the design, implementation and delivery of the IOM schemes in those areas, and it is the findings from those topics which this article discusses. We identified a number of possible explanations for the schemes not necessarily fulfilling their potential, some of which echo the existing literature on IOM (see, for example, Dawson and Stanko, 2013), while others revealed new insights. In particular, we found that the process of managing organizational change during the implementation and delivery of such initiatives is likely to impact on outcomes.

It is argued that a possible explanation for the somewhat modest outcomes outlined above may be due to difficulties in managing organizational change to support delivery. One of the most renowned models of change management is that offered by Kotter. Originally published in Harvard Business Review (1995) and later as the bestselling book Leading Change (1996), these two publications are among the most cited in the literature on change/transformational leadership (Hughes, 2016). Kotter’s central argument was that most organizational change efforts were not successful, but that attempts could be improved by following an eight-step model for change management. Though it has received commercial and academic support (Ansari and Bell, 2009), there is relatively little empirical evidence of its application. In large part this is due to the fact that few studies have explicitly attempted, or been able, to formally apply Kotter’s model to an actual change process. However, Appelbaum et al.’s (2012) literature review of change management found support for most elements of Kotter’s model and no evidence to refute its utility. They found that no studies had covered the model in its entirety, and they recommended consideration of contextual factors and other barriers to change. Pollack and Pollack (2015) also found support for Kotter’s model, arguing that it can be applied to an organizational change context, but that it is more nuanced and iterative than Kotter’s original model suggests. This article offers an application of Kotter’s model to examine the implementation and delivery of the IOM schemes, and to consider how such schemes could be improved if they followed a model of organizational change. Extracts from the interview data are used to illustrate how Kotter’s influential model could be applied to the management of change specifically in IOM, and to criminal justice more broadly.

Kotter’s Model of Organizational Change Management in IOM

Kotter argued that the basic goal of organizational change was ‘to make fundamental changes in how business is conducted in order to help cope with a new, more challenging market environment’ (1995: 59). There are parallels here with the rationale behind IOM. At the time of its introduction, the Home Office/Ministry of Justice (2009: 5) wrote that:

there has been a growing need to look at how resources can be spent most efficiently within the justice system. One of the drivers for IOM has been to look at how to build a case for more investment in community-based approaches for offenders, as an alternative to the revolving door of short-term custody […] In the drive to continue to reduce crime, the Government recognises that local delivery partners need to be better supported by having a clearer and more consistent framework for the management of offenders in the community. IOM provides a comprehensive and coordinated response, recognising that more coherent joint working can help partners to make the best use of their resources.

Thus, one of the goals of IOM was to make changes to the organizational structure and delivery of community justice in order to continue to make reductions in crime in a more challenging economic environment.

Kotter (1995: 59) wrote that while some companies had been successful at implementing organizational change and others had failed, the majority fell ‘somewhere in between, with a distinct tilt toward the lower end of the scale’. Others have quantified the rate of failure in change initiatives, suggesting that typically two-thirds of change initiatives fail and in some cases the rate is as high as 90 per cent (Burnes, 2011). One of the main reasons for this was that companies tried to instigate change too quickly, or would make ‘critical mistakes’ during any of the sequential phases of organizational change (Kotter, 1995). The eight requisite phases for successful organization change in Kotter’s model are as follows, each will be considered in relation to the evaluation of the two IOM schemes:

Establish a Sense of Urgency

The first phase concerns the need to highlight to staff that there is a need for change, often by identifying the discrepancy between performance and objectives. In the case of the IOM evaluation schemes, the rationale for change came from key local stakeholders who, having identified a small number of offenders who ‘badly’ wanted to change, recommended an ‘imaginative sentencing regime […] [to support] reform and rehabilitation’ (Baker, 2014: 51). There was, thus, a sense of urgency with regard to requiring an additional scheme specifically for these individuals and, in the absence of this, ‘the only consequence for these offenders would be a substantial prison sentence’ (Baker, 2014: 51). However, practitioners were asked about their thoughts on the implementation of the IOM scheme and it was observed that there were discrepancies regarding how the schemes were initially viewed. While most police and probation officers involved in the schemes were positive about them from the outset, other agencies appeared to be more sceptical of the schemes:

Certainly in the beginning, particularly with the drugs agencies, they were incredibly sceptical with what we were doing and what our motives behind it were […] [At the start of the scheme] we used to have very long, drawn out team meetings, multi-agency team meetings, they would go on for a few hours. Body language, people rolling their eyes and that sort of thing and actions, they [partner agencies] came to the table with very, very little, and that went on for a good number of years. (Practitioner 1)

It appeared that not all partners had ‘bought into’ the philosophy and objectives of the schemes. While it is possible that some were cynical because previous initiatives had failed, this may also indicate that a sense of urgency had not been established among all involved in the delivery of the schemes. To establish a sense of urgency, it is necessary to clearly communicate evidence to show that change is necessary (Kotter and Cohen, 2002), but this task is made more difficult due to the complexity of multi-agency partnerships. A sense of urgency needed to be established among police, probation, the judiciary, drugs support workers and other partner agencies. Moreover, in the case of the IOM evaluation schemes, a sense of urgency was required to convince practitioners that the existing IOM structures needed to be enhanced. The reticence among some to get involved offers an explanation as to why the subsequent phases of change also may not have been successfully achieved.

Form a Powerful Guiding Coalition

Kotter’s (1995) second phase involves the coming together of a core group of powerful individuals within the organization who share a commitment to change and work together to realize it. Typically this will include senior managers, but it may also include board members. Within the IOM evaluation schemes this might have included members of the Criminal Justice Boards in the local areas. Change is unlikely to be successful without strong leadership, yet the interview data indicated that, over time, the governance structures of the schemes had become unclear and that there was uncertainty over the nature of leadership within the schemes. It was apparent that there existed a stark contrast between perceptions of leadership among practitioners. One stated that ‘Probation are the lead agency’ (Practitioner 24), whereas a second practitioner who worked within the same scheme stated that ‘[The scheme] is police-led at the moment […] should it sit with police? I would argue probably not’ (Practitioner 22). The data also indicated that support for the schemes at a senior level had waned over time: ‘I think it’s fair to say that IOM was high on the [Criminal Justice] Board’s agenda two or three years ago […] but it has been neglected more recently’ (Practitioner 11). Interestingly, this practitioner was referring to the specific evaluation scheme, yet referred to this as IOM, which was the more general structure that worked with a wider offender population. Practitioners frequently used terminology such as prolific and priority offenders (PPOs) and IOM interchangeably which, while still relevant, predated the schemes being evaluated. This may suggest that in the absence of a powerful guiding coalition there was also a lack of brand identity, which has been shown to be of importance in schemes such as IOM as this helps practitioners to (re)construct their professional identities in the context of organizational change (Annison et al., 2015).

Of course, it may be difficult to establish a guiding coalition within IOM schemes given the potential cultural clashes between police and probation (Dawson and Stanko, 2013; Mawby and Worrall, 2011), and the Joint Inspection of IOM (HMIP/HMIC, 2014) found that in the majority of cases strategic management in IOM was led by the police. We found there to be clearly identifiable operational managers in both evaluation areas whose roles were dedicated to the delivery of the new IOM schemes, which has been identified as being closely related to the positive assessment of an IOM scheme (see HMIP/HMIC, 2014), and we also found substantial support from the judiciary. This may be indicative of there being guiding coalitions at different levels and with responsibility for different activities. It may be the case that successful change management in criminal justice is dependent on there being multiple coalitions at various levels within relevant organizations (see also Pollack and Pollack, 2015).

Create a Vision

The third phase concerns clearly establishing what the change will entail and what it will lead to. This moves beyond plans, procedures and quantifiable targets, and instead involves a compelling message about what the change is intended to achieve (Kotter, 1995). Hence, central to this phase of the model is the need for clear change objectives, a philosophy or ‘brand identity’ and an understanding of what will be delivered to service users. We found that unanimously participants recognized the need to change, and so there was a shared vision that alternative approaches to working with offenders were necessary. However, the interview data also revealed a general lack of strategy, as one practitioner explicitly commented: ‘With hindsight, I think we could have had more of a strategic vision and strategic revision […] we also could have had a re-branding exercise, given things a bit more “oomph”’ (Practitioner 23).

However, there were also more nuanced indications that a clear vision was lacking. It is argued here that part of the vision for IOM schemes should include a clear understanding of roles within the structure and delivery of IOM. As has been found in previous IOM evaluations (see, for example, Senior et al., 2011), the interview data suggested some blurring of roles: ‘There are some strange crossovers, with too many police officers trying to do rehabilitative work, whilst probation went a bit native and became the enforcers’ (Practitioner 25). The Joint Inspection of IOM (HMIP/HMIC, 2014) similarly found examples of police officers delivering rehabilitative interventions and that this was not the most effective use of police skills; instead, the key roles for the police in IOM structures should be to gather intelligence and coordinate restriction/enforcement activity. The interview data in our research also found discrepancies among police officers about what their primary role was, with some indicating that their role was to obtain intelligence whereas others referred to themselves as ‘offender managers’. Inconsistencies in understanding what the role entailed and what it was designed to achieve may be indicative of lacking a clear vision.

We would further argue that where there was evidence of a vision this was somewhat unrealistic. A leaflet was produced to communicate the vision of the schemes to service users, outlining what the schemes were and what would be involved, including potential benefits and consequences for service users. The leaflet for service users states that: ‘it is realistic to expect that if you keep to your side of the bargain, in six to twelve months [sic] time, you will be free from crime, in stable accommodation, employed and altogether in a much happier situation’. Given the plethora of research evidence surrounding the accommodation and employment experiences of offenders (Gojkovic et al., 2012; Linney, 2013; Metcalfe et al., 2001), and the likelihood of intermittent offending for a persistent or prolific offender during the journey towards desistance from crime (Baker et al., 2015; Carlsson, 2013), such an expectation is far from realistic. This may further indicate a lack of a clear vision and, moreover, communicating this to service users may establish unrealistic expectations that cannot be met.

Communicate the Vision

The fourth phase cautions that ‘without credible communication, and a lot of it, the hearts and minds of the troops are never captured’ (Kotter, 1995: 63). The goal of effective communication is to enable as many people as possible to work towards realization of the vision (Kotter and Cohen, 2002). One of the key themes to emerge in the interview data was a general lack of communication about the schemes to the wider police and probation personnel. There appeared to be a perception that the schemes were not ‘traditional’ police work and many officers reported some degree of antagonism from non-IOM officers: ‘We need to get our message across to the police officers down there because, they coin the phrase “hug a hoodie” and we say “no, it’s not like that”’ (Practitioner 8). In part, this may be a consequence of ineffective internal communication about the schemes: ‘there’s a misunderstanding about what [the scheme] is actually delivering, […] so there’s an internal communications issue because there’s quite often a misunderstanding, so we have to justify its existence internally’ (Practitioner 18). Hence, it was suggested that non-IOM officers were sometimes quite ignorant with regard to the schemes and this had negative implications in terms of how service users were treated by uniformed officers in the community:

Often it’s over-zealous uniforms [who cause tensions with service users], all the PPOs are known and they’re a big deal […] so some of them [officers] just want to make a stop and pull someone over and find out what they’re up to and there might not be any need for it because we might have just done all of that. (Practitioner 5)

Ineffective communication about what the schemes entail and what they are intended to achieve may breed cynicism or pessimism (Kotter and Cohen, 2002). By not communicating effectively to those who operate within the broader institutional structures, but at a distance from the specific schemes, this may have the effect of reducing support, as those furthest away from decision making are least likely to support change (Patten et al., 2015). This, in turn, may undermine the credibility of the schemes and what they are attempting to achieve.

Empower Others to Act on the Vision

The main objective in the fifth phase is to remove obstacles to achieving the new vision. Obstacles are often tangible, but in some instances they may be psychological. Either can prevent individuals from performing their roles within the new vision. Crucially, individuals need to be empowered to achieve the vision in order to maintain the credibility of the changes being introduced (Kotter, 1995). The schemes brought together a small team of police officers, two probation officers and a drugs support worker. A crucial factor in the effective operational delivery of the schemes was the co-location of various partners:

How can you operate without co-location? […] Everyone’s managing that offender […] how can you manage that if you’re not operationally involved? […] If you’re remotely working it might go on a spreadsheet or in an email […] but with people who are operating on the edge […] that day they can go and get drugs or reoffend […] and that’s one of the big positives of [the scheme]. (Practitioner 18)

Co-location has also been found to be an element of good practice in the delivery of IOM more generally (Senior et al., 2011), but there appeared to be additional benefits in terms of the co-location of the drugs support worker in one area:

There’s always a drugs worker, always a support worker […] if things are going well that’s great, if they’re not going so well then they know there’s that support network around them. Every single person in that team knows that case as well as you do. (Practitioner 5)

The drugs support worker in this area contributed to team meetings, the decision-making processes around who to accept onto the scheme, judgements concerned with instances of breach of conditions and, crucially, was able to offer one-to-one support for service users, co-located in the same building as the police and probation staff. This helped practitioners to develop stronger and more effective relationships with one another, but also appeared to encourage more effective work with service users. By contrast, in the area where the drugs support workers were not co-located, practitioners identified various obstacles to working effectively with service users:

We’re forever chasing their tails to get a constant contact […] the lads are like, ‘my key worker’s changed again’ some of these guys have six key workers, how do you build a relationship with someone if every couple of weeks they’re changing? (Practitioner 2)

[The scheme] worked pretty well because we were completely entrenched with police and probation […] to have it as total co-location really helped with that […] I think where we had some difficulties was with our drugs service, but it wasn’t for want of will or wanting to make it work […] it was with their processes. (Practitioner 19)

In this regard, a clear obstacle to delivering the scheme, given its emphasis on those with an addiction, had not been removed in one area and the negative consequences of this had been recognized by practitioners. The data also revealed some psychological barriers to realizing change among some practitioners. Typically, these related to cultural differences between police and probation and this was often manifested in the perception of benefits gained from the schemes: ‘The police do seem to get the bigger benefits in terms of improving their detection rates whereas Probation are measured in binary terms [success/failure in reconvictions]’ (Practitioner 23). While others commented on how service users perceived the different roles performed by police and probation:

Sometimes there’s a clash between police and probation cultures […] the police spend more time with the offenders […] some people even see the police as ‘their mate’ which is surprising because most have had bad experiences with the police but on [the scheme] they get on better […] probation are actually seen as the ‘bad guys’. (Practitioner 24)

These psychological barriers may reflect the reality of how the schemes operated, which might be expected given the existing literature on occupational cultures within police and probation (see, for example, Mawby and Worrall, 2011; Mawby et al., 2007), but even if they do not then the consequences of psychological barriers existing are likely to be to the detriment of the schemes achieving their goals. Kotter (1995) makes clear that not all barriers can be removed in the first half of the change process, but recognition that obstacles still exist should prompt further action and change.

Plan for and Create Short-Term Wins

The sixth phase is concerned with maintaining momentum through actively creating short-term wins. The emphasis is on establishing goals that can be achieved within 12-month periods (Kotter, 1995). As described above, the goals for police and probation were regarded differently by practitioners. The former appeared to be more concerned with previously undetected crimes, while the latter were focused more on reducing rates of reoffending. One possible consequence of this is that more service users were accepted onto the schemes in order to achieve one set of goals, to the detriment of the other:

In the early days of [the scheme] the resources were small. For example, one offender per month was coming on to the programme. Suddenly 10 people would come on to the programme and this was driven by the ‘target driven culture’ of the police. There was a link between greater numbers of people coming on the programme and being encouraged to ‘cough’ and the need to improve police clear up rates. This worked because in the early days of [the scheme] the police had one of the top clear up rates in the country. It was a way of ‘managing a target driven culture’. (Practitioner 23)

Where this becomes particularly problematic is when different partners are working towards discrete goals, with no overarching strategic objectives in place:

Probation want someone in the community who won’t re-offend, so they’re looking at their reoffending figures, their rehabilitation, they don’t really care whether the crimes are cleared up really and I wouldn’t say we don’t really care if they reoffend because of course we do, so there is a crossover, but primarily for us it’s about clearing up jobs and for them it’s about rehabilitation. (Practitioner 19)

This quote may indicate a lack of synergy in the working practices of the two main agencies, maintaining an ‘us and them’ mentality. Of course, within multi-agency schemes there will necessarily – perhaps desirably – be different goals that each agency sets out to achieve, but where one goal leads to a significant increase in the number of service users, in the absence of additional resources this may undermine the achievement of other goals. There is also the factor of how to measure success with schemes such as these. The schemes essentially lasted for four years (a bail assessment, deferment period and a three-year Community Order), making completion rates ineffectual as a short-term goal. Moreover, ‘creating short-term wins is different from hoping for short-term wins’ (Kotter, 1995: 65) and schemes such as these should ensure that short-term goals are built into strategic plans from the outset. Short-term goals could be, for example: the number of individuals retained on the scheme at six- and 12-month intervals; the number of individuals who secure accommodation; and the number of individuals in gainful employment.

Consolidate Performance and Produce Still More Change

The main issue with not establishing clear and achievable short-term goals is that it makes it very difficult to achieve the seventh phase, which is concerned with maintaining momentum by using short-term achievements to drive longer-term change (Kotter, 1995). If short-term goals have not been clearly defined then there is less credibility to the changes being made and arguments that they should continue are less compelling. If there have been short-term achievements, if these are not communicated effectively then an opportunity to enhance them is lost. In this instance, there was little evidence that short-term achievements on the schemes had been recorded and communicated, as one practitioner, who started to work on the scheme some years after it had been implemented, noted: ‘I was a bit of a cynic at first […] probably because there wasn’t enough pushed about the successes of it […] internally’ (Practitioner 21). In the absence of internal communication about successes, it is less likely to garner support and additional resources to ensure further successes. One practitioner described the overall aim in the following terms: ‘The scheme wants you, ideally, to be drug free, crime free and be in full time employment making a contribution to society’ (Practitioner 19). This will not be achievable for all and, even for those for whom it is, it will take many years to do so, probably longer than the four years under supervision. Thus, to maintain motivation and a sense of urgency over this period, drawing upon and communicating short-term achievements is essential. Furthermore, short-term wins need to be clearly related to the overall direction of change (Kotter, 1996) but, as highlighted above with the increase in numbers enrolled on the schemes, this was not always the case. Similarly, some evaluations of the Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) found that the impetus to achieve tangible results led to inflated and unrealistic targets to enrol large numbers onto programmes (Maguire, 2004). One effect of this was that it: ‘probably tended to undermine the fit between offenders’ needs and programmes and contributed to increasing attrition and non-completion, which in turn reduces the overall impact of the programme if non-completers reconvict more’ (Raynor, 2004: 312).

The original aim of the IOM schemes appeared to be to reduce crime through the intensive reform and rehabilitation of prolific acquisitive offenders. However, this may have been supplanted by the short-term achievement of increased detection rates, indicative, perhaps, of a failure to implement what was intended (see also Maguire, 2004). Findings from the CRP suggest that the impetus to consolidate performance through establishing short-term wins should be tempered by a realistic understanding of what the initiative could achieve, as well as a clear understanding of what it is intended to achieve.

Institutionalize New Approaches

The final phase occurs when the new processes become ‘“the way we do things around here”’ (Kotter, 1995: 67). New approaches need to become rooted in the norms and values of the organization – in this instance, not only within the small teams who operate within the schemes, but also within the wider IOM and police/probation structures. The primary factor in ensuring that this occurs is through consciously communicating that new behaviours and processes have improved performance. We found little evidence that the successes of the schemes were communicated and, as indicated above, they seemed to have been somewhat neglected at a senior management level. One practitioner described a very cautious approach to how details of the schemes were communicated: ‘we are very careful around anything we release […] so we don’t make a huge song and dance about it’ (Practitioner 18).

One issue around communicating details of the schemes was raised around the number of partners involved and the requirement that they all approve of the message being communicated: ‘You have to get the buy-in and scrutiny of all partners involved […] sometimes you can send it around so much and it gets sanitized so much that it’s not worth putting out’ (Practitioner 19). If the new schemes are not embedded within the behaviours and norms of the wider institutions, then it is perhaps less likely that they will continue to be supported if new pressures, objectives or priorities emerge which require a different approach to community justice.

Discussion and Conclusion

Change in community justice is often approached with a degree of cynicism, albeit for seemingly valid reasons (Bailey et al., 2007; Lynch, 2004; Robinson and Burnett, 2007). It is also apparent from the literature that IOM schemes have achieved only modest improvements in terms of reducing reoffending (Dawson and Stanko, 2013). There are a number of possible explanations for this (Senior et al., 2011), but another may lie in the approach taken to managing change in terms of the introduction of a new initiative. The impact of managing organizational change within new community justice initiatives has received scant attention in the existing research literature. This article has offered an analysis of the implementation and delivery of two new IOM schemes by applying Kotter’s (1995, 1996) model of organizational change, which may explain the achievement of relatively modest successes within the two schemes and, perhaps, IOM more generally.

McNeill et al. (2010) suggest that, due to the increased complexity of public sector organizations, private sector strategies may be usefully applied in a public sector context, but that they may be more difficult to implement and there is no certainty of impact. Models of organizational change, such as Kotter’s, may offer an example of a private sector strategy that could be usefully applied in a community justice context. Although other models do exist (see, for example, Graetz and Smith, 2010; Grundy, 1992; Hammer and Champy, 1993; Kanter et al., 1992; Pugh, 1978), Kotter’s has been highly influential in the business and management literature, and it offers a structured framework for analysing processes of organizational change and in identifying areas of deficit in managing these processes.

In the case of IOM, although there is potential for numerous partners to be involved, the schemes are typically dominated by police and probation (Home Office, 2013). This in itself presents a potential obstacle to the successful delivery of IOM, as success or otherwise will be dependent on the reconciliation of at least two organizational cultures, each with its own set of distinct assumptions, behaviours and values. To make matters even more complex, within each organization there are likely to be multiple occupational cultures, as highlighted in the research on probation cultures (Mawby and Worrall, 2013). The long-term success of IOM may be dependent on the emergence of a new form of occupational culture, with its own assumptions, behaviours and values premised on the guiding principles of IOM (see, for example, Home Office/MoJ, 2009, 2010, 2015a, 2015b). In the short term, however, this article has shown that the possible tensions between occupational cultures could be mitigated through some of the early phases of Kotter’s (1995, 1996) model.

McNeill et al. (2010) also caution that change readiness is crucial to the success of new community justice initiatives. However, ‘change readiness’ may be difficult to achieve within a climate of ‘change fatigue’ (Robinson and Burnett, 2007: 332). Kotter’s (1995, 1996) model, or others like it, may help to alleviate some of the tensions caused by ongoing change and provide practitioners with a sense of security and direction that may have been absent within other recent changes in community justice. This article makes an important and original contribution to the literature on community justice by applying a theoretical model of organizational change to a criminal justice context. In applying this model empirically, we have shed new light on the reasons why IOM may not fulfil its potential. This is not to argue that addressing issues of organizational change management will be sufficient to lead to successful outcomes. Indeed, the existing literature indicates that ‘managing implementation’ is just one of multiple factors that can influence the successful delivery of new criminal justice initiatives (Nutley and Homel, 2006). Financial restrictions, poorly designed initiatives, high staff turnover, rushed timescales and tensions emerging from the wider political climate have all been shown to impact on the successful implementation of crime reduction initiatives (Hope, 2004; Maguire, 2004; Nutley and Homel, 2006; Raynor, 2004). It is likely that there were similar wider contextual, political and financial factors that influenced the implementation of the schemes in our evaluation. It is also unlikely that a broad change management model, such as Kotter’s, can be followed in a linear sequence to effect change (Hughes, 2016), and given the complexities of delivering multi-agency community sentences this may not be desirable. However, we conclude that Kotter’s model could provide a framework within which organizational change can be managed in an iterative process, and with consideration given to the specific contextual factors that might affect change (Pollack and Pollack, 2015). Further consideration should be given to the processes of organizational change when introducing new criminal justice initiatives, and further research exploring the nature of organizational change in a community justice context would be welcomed.