Civilianising specialist units: Reflections on the policing of cyber-crime

Introduction

Civilianisation is a term that refers to utlising non-sworn personnel across various roles within police organisations. It must be recognised that the civilianisation of policing is not a new development. Police organisations in the United Kingdom have a long history of employing civilians, dating back to the London Metropolitan Police in 1829. The vast majority of civilians employed in police organisations could be categorised as providing administration and support roles (Loveday, 2015; Loveday and Smith, 2015). More recent use of civilian staff has extended to roles such as intelligence analysts (e.g. Belur and Johnson, 2018). Recent developments have also unfolded in relation to roles such as Police Community Support Officers, first introduced in the early 2000s in the United Kingdom but which have extended, in various forms, to similar roles throughout Australia, for example. These are closer to a hybrid between civilians and fully trained sworn police, which tend to perform a variety of functions, where it is considered that fully trained – and therefore more expensive – police are not essential. In other contexts, such as North America, debates around the use of civilian employees have principally focused on the type and volume of ‘non-core’ policing roles that should be allocated to civilians, principally in relation to cost savings (e.g. Alderden and Skogan, 2014; King and Wilson, 2014).

While there are many arguments for and against civilianisation (e.g. Alderden and Skogan, 2014; Maguire et al., 2003; Skogan and Alderden, 2011), the wider literature tends to focus almost exclusively on the economic rationalities favouring the employment of civilian (unsworn) over police (sworn) staff. Civilian salaries are generally lower, and the ongoing training costs for police tend to be higher. These economic benefits tend to be a driving force behind the employment of civilian staff (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014). Another key benefit is the idea that utilising civilians for non-core roles free up police to perform more operational functions. However, research has identified significant constraints on civilianisation, including the ongoing need to place sworn police in non-operational positions, either temporarily or on a more permanent basis, which undermines these economic benefits (Kiedrowski et al., 2017). There are also concerns regarding career progression or mobility, morale and job satisfaction of civilian staff compared with sworn police, resulting in problems with retention and a much higher turnover than is ideal.

Many of the constraints concerning civilianisation have been explained in relation to ‘police occupational culture’ (see, for example, Cockcroft, 2012; Manning, 2007; Reiner, 2010; Whelan, 2017). As Alderden and Skogan (2014) note, ‘[a]n under-appreciated aspect of police culture is how it may shape the relationship between sworn and civilian employees of the same organization’ (p. 263). For example, sworn-civilian tensions can originate in police suspiciousness of ‘outsiders’ and the idea that only police can possibly understand the job. This is exacerbated by the fact that civilians do not have police training, and the training they do receive is often considered to be inadequate. It has also been suggested that police isolation and solidarity, long thought to be an element of police culture, and the visible distinction between police and civilians (i.e. the uniform, badges and insignia officers wear) could contribute to civilians being perceived as outsiders, even though they are members of the same organisation. Furthermore, many of the tasks traditionally performed by civilians, including administrative and analyst roles, are thought to be less valued in the police occupational culture than traditional policing activities.

A recent study by Kiedrowski et al. (2017) has echoed these findings. Their research identified various challenges of incorporating civilian staff in Canada, including (a) poor acceptance of civilians carrying out functions typically performed by police, (b) workplace agreements that make it difficult for civilians to replace police, (c) arguments against civilianisation by police unions and (d) difficulties in recruiting and retaining highly educated or skilled individuals due largely to their limited career mobility. They argue it is important to consider the ‘continued resistance coming from the sworn officer occupational subculture which has been slow to accept and integrate civilians’ (Kiedrowski et al. 2017: 17). Where civilianisation is pursued, Kiedrowski et al. (2017) find that the primary motivation among police executives is cost savings rather than intentionally complementing police expertise, particularly among ‘non-core’ police roles. Kiedrowski et al. (2017) note, however, that there is questionable evidence supporting the proposition that civilians are more cost-effective, an argument that they suggest almost certainly does not apply in areas such as cyber-crime, where salaries and benefits for highly skilled civilians can be higher than sworn police.

The central argument of this article is that in the case of cyber-crime, the circumstances underpinning civilianisation may be different. Similar to a very small number of crime types beforehand (the most obvious example being fraud and financial crime), arguments in favour of civilianisation are likely less about economic benefits and more about complementing police capacity. A growing body of literature is calling attention to the challenges police face in relation to preventing and responding to cyber-crime (e.g. Bossler and Holt, 2012; Cockcroft et al., 2018; Dupont, 2017; Gogolin and Jones, 2010; Hadlington et al., 2018; Harkin et al., 2018; Holt et al., 2012; Huey et al., 2012; Leukfeldt, 2017; Leukfeldt et al., 2013; Wall, 2007; Wall and Williams, 2007; Yar, 2013). Some have also focused more on specialised areas of policing, such as the challenges facing computer or digital forensic analysts (e.g. Holt et al., 2012; Vincze, 2016). In general, it is clear that the escalating volume and complexity of cyber-crime, and demands placed on digital forensics, are increasingly exceeding the capacity of most police organisations. Questions have been raised regarding the extent to which police organisations adequately understand and prioritise cyber-crimes and have the expertise required to deal with cyber offences.

This has indeed been recognised in the United Kingdom, for example, where there have recently been strong calls for police to recruit ‘cyber volunteers’ given their lack of expertise to prevent and respond to cyber-crime (Hitchcock et al., 2017), an idea that has some questioning its effectiveness (Loveday, 2018). ¹ In a recent Home Affairs Committee (2018) enquiry, the Met Police were reported to have said that ‘being able to tackle cybercrime, fraud and other crimes that take place in a non-physical environment requires a totally new skillset for our officers and staff’ (p. 59). It was also suggested that it is essential to ‘move past the current dichotomy between warranted [sworn] officers and police staff’ because civilians are ‘very much at the forefront of tackling crime and keeping the public safe’. This requires, it is argued, thinking differently about what is meant by ‘frontline policing’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2018: 59).

As such, it has been widely recognised that there is a growing deficit in police expertise and capacity to address cyber-crime, and that there is a role to play for civilians in contributing to address this deficit. However, research is yet to properly examine the opportunities and constraints regarding civilianisation in the area of cyber-crime, especially in the context of specialist cyber-crime units rather than policing in general (Harkin et al., 2018; Willits and Nowacki, 2016). Decisions as to the appropriateness of employing civilians into specific roles generally revolve around whether the position requires police powers, knowledge and skills and whether a civilian can effectively perform the requirements of any particular position (e.g. Griffiths et al., 2015). On the surface, at least, one can envisage few other crime types where civilians have as much scope to make an effective contribution to policing than in the area of cyber-crime. This is the first article to explore civilianisation in this context, thus contributing to the civilianisation and cyber-crime bodies of literature.

The article is based on original empirical research with three local anonymous specialist cyber-crime units in Australia. It proceeds as follows. First, we outline our data and methods, involving qualitative interviews with police and civilian members of cyber-crime units. Second, we turn to the perceived benefits of civilianisation, as perceived by our interviewees. Many arguments in favour of embedding civilians in cyber-crime units are canvassed in relation to improving police capacity rather than economic considerations, which we argue have assumed too central a focus at the expense of deliberate efforts to advance police expertise. Third, we consider the tensions associated with civilianisation in this context, particularly in the context of cyber-crime. We analyse these tensions in relation to a broader debate as to whether it is better to improve police capacity by (a) employing civilian experts and embedding them within specialist cyber-crime units, or (b) developing greater expertise on cyber-crime among sworn police. The article concludes by reflecting on the role of police occupational culture in appreciating the civilianisation of cyber-crime units and argues we need to know a lot more about the precise nature of cyber expertise required and the roles that civilians can perform within cyber units.

Data and methods

The data presented in this article come from exploratory case study (Yin, 2014) research involving three anonymous cyber-crime units in Australia as part of a larger research project focusing on the design and functioning of specialist police cyber-crime units. Each jurisdiction takes a distinct approach to organising and constituting their cyber units. For example, two of the units situate their digital forensics teams within the cyber unit, while one organisation places the digital forensics team elsewhere. In all cases, the digital forensics team service the whole police organisation rather than only investigations undertaken by the specialist units. One of the cyber units is responsible for investigating online child sex offences, whereas in the other two organisations this is the domain of another specialist unit. Two of the units were responsible for managing reports submitted to the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN), ² while in one case this responsibility resided in another independent unit. All of the units sit within their respective state’s Crime Command division alongside other specialist units, addressing areas such as sexual assault and organised crime. In short, this means that the specialist cyber units assume responsibility only for more serious offences involving a minimum threshold in terms of complexity and victim impact, as defined by each organisation. Many other cyber-enabled crimes not meeting these criteria are referred to regular police to investigate (or not). All of the units have a mixture of sworn and unsworn officers employed, although one particular unit has significantly fewer civilian colleagues than the others. Furthermore, the size of the units did vary but were between 20 and 40 staff, depending on how they were structured.

The project involves a mixed-methods approach, including surveys and semi-structured interviews. Data were collected from members of the specialist units during 2016–2017. A survey using Qualtrics was disseminated to all members of each agency’s cyber-crime unit. The survey was intended to collect baseline data on the design, composition and responsibilities of the units, and perceptions of members regarding a range of statements graded on a Likert-type scale. Upon completing the survey, participants were able to voluntarily arrange an interview with the research team, which was the principal means of recruiting interviewees. The research team then visited the offices of each cyber-crime unit to conduct face-to-face interviews. Interviews were semi-structured and not based on participants’ responses to survey questions. Interviews were used to gain in-depth knowledge of the functioning of the respective units and the perceived challenges faced by staff. For example, interviewees were asked to tell us about their role, the challenges they faced in carrying out their role and what they perceive to be the requirements for effective specialist cyber-crime units.

In this article, we focus exclusively on qualitative interview data. A total of 43 semi-structured interviews were conducted across the three specialist units, the majority of which (n = 35) were with sworn officers, reflecting the fact that the majority of staff employed in cyber units are police rather than civilians. The civilians interviewed were in digital forensics and crime or intelligence analysts. Interview data were coded and analysed using NVivo 11, where a thematic analysis was undertaken. A thematic analysis ‘is used to classify and organise data according to key themes, concepts and emergent categories’ (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 220) and is ‘useful in capturing the complexities of meaning within a textual data set’ (Guest et al., 2014: 10). Each transcript was initially examined with a number of broad themes/categories emerging and was subsequently re-examined and several sub-categories identified. Themes were cross-referenced across interviewees from each organisation and explored between organisations. To provide anonymity to the specialist units, each unit will be referred to as Case Study A, B or C. To ensure the anonymity of interviewees, respondents are referred to only as a member of the de-identified organisation. We do not draw attention to when we quote civilians in the article, because there are very few civilians employed in most units. It should be noted that it is the personal views of interviewees that are quoted, and these views are not necessarily representative of their respective organisations.

There are limitations with the data and approach. First, as with all case study research (Yin, 2014), generalising from the findings should be approached with caution. Nonetheless, the study has identified several themes across three major police organisations despite significant bureaucratic, technical and ideological differences between them that shape how they approach the policing of cyber-crime. As such, we believe many of the themes are likely to apply to most local policing organisations in a variety of contexts. Second, we should note that we have not considered federal law enforcement agencies such as the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and similar organisations (e.g. the National Crime Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation). These bodies have quite unique mandates, and so the findings of the study should be contextualised within the context of local policing. ³ Third, it should be noted that the debate between embedding civilians or upskilling police emerged serendipitously during our interviews. While the use of civilian staff to improve police capacity was a focal point of our research, we did not anticipate to find several of the tensions canvassed in the article. We were surprised to find a limited use of civilian cyber experts in the cyber units (outside of digital forensics). Many police we interviewed had limited experience working with civilian staff. We return to reflect on these limitations and what they mean for this and further research as we conclude the article.

We organise our data into two main categories. The first is the perceived benefits of civilianisation for specialist police cyber-crime units. Our interviewees identified various ways in which they suggest embedding civilians either does (in the case of some units) or can (in the case of other units) improve the effectiveness of cyber-crime units. The experience among our police interviewees working with civilian staff varied, particularly in relation to civilian experts in cyber-crime. However, many of our police interviewees strongly advocated for the greater use of civilian staff within their respective cyber-crime units. The second is the perceived constraints and tensions associated with civilianisation, which were particularly reported among sworn interviewees and most heavily expressed by interviewees from one of our specialist units in particular. Some of these tensions are likely to apply to civilianisation in general – although we argue are yet to be fully addressed in the civilianisation literature due to its overwhelming focus on economic considerations – but many are unique to the policing of cyber-crime.

Perceived benefits of civilianisation

Our interviewees identified a number of ways whereby they suggest embedding civilians can improve the effectiveness of specialist cyber-crime units. These are addressed under the categories of: civilians as experts, civilians as assistants, and the police–civilian mix.

Civilians as experts

One of the strongest arguments in favour of utilising civilians in cyber units was in relation to filling deficits in police expertise. The following quotes speak directly to this argument:

We need more people . . . And civilian specialists. . . . I don’t think that training detectives is the ideal solution. Because it is such a massive learning curve. . . . We have a three-year tenure. . . . It’s not a sustainable solution to train detectives. I think we need to be hiring civilians who have those skills already. We can pitch detectives training at a sustainable point where the average [is reasonable]. . . . We need to have a supporting civilian specialist to do the more technical things. (Interviewee, Case Study B)

If I could, I would have . . . unsworn staff that are experts in the field, experts in ethical hacking, working together with the police. That is the only way [with] this crime type. . . . It cannot be done with law enforcement alone. It’s impossible. (Interviewee, Case Study A)

Our interviewees put forward many explanations as to why they felt civilians were needed. Some interviewees suggest civilian experts could provide an educational role for police:

They [digital forensics] are sort of our civilian specialists. . . . So the police can refer to a somewhat of an expert who can not only educate cops but at least take them through this is what you should be looking for. . . . Cops are not specialists in this area. . . . We should have a broad knowledge. And in some cases we could have somewhat detailed knowledge. But we do not need to be experts. We’re never going to get to [the level of] expert evidence. We’re going to rely on civilians. So why don’t we have civilians with us? (Interviewee, Case Study A)

There are parts of the job that you cannot expect on the ground coppers to know. As an investigator, my job is not to know the ins and outs of how everything works. My job is to connect the dots. . . . There are people in this unit who have got training and experience in terms of technology . . . that you are just not going to get anywhere else. And so they are resources for the whole [organisation]. . . . If I need to understand something, that is where I need to go to help me understand. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

Another prominent reason behind the argument of employing civilian staff, however, was a problem that repeatedly emerged throughout this study: the rotation and turnover of police within specialist cyber-crime units (Harkin et al., 2018). Interviewees often emphasise that they lost considerable expertise as police left the units, either because they were required to after a set period of time or because it was the only way they could achieve a promotion. Given the time required to acquire such expertise, many interviewees suggest that by the time people had become most effective, they were often forced out of the units or, in other cases, required to sacrifice career advancement to stay in the units. Employing civilian experts was put forward as a solution to this problem:

We are not really utilising people who would be graduating from universities with technical knowledge and skills. . . . We are sort of trying to in-house up-skill people. . . . But police are at the beck and call of the posting cycles. . . . So you build the skills and then the next thing you know . . . there is a position at another field and there you go. And we lose that knowledge that has been built up. We are just kind of chasing that wheel again, constantly trying to retrain people to bring them back up to the knowledge just to lose them again. . . . I would have thought we would have benefited from having a couple of civilians to help. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

We are training investigators as that hacking expert, for example. But the downside is like. . . . He is on the promotion list. So if he decides to leave then you have lost the capability. That is a real risk. And as part of our succession planning, we should ensure we do not have a single point of failure. . . . I just don’t think that police can afford to train everyone up to that really high level. (Interviewee, Case Study A)

Civilians as assistants

While most of our interviewees discuss the idea of employing civilians as experts, some suggest that civilians could also aid with some of the more mundane tasks, a familiar argument raised in much of the existing civilianisation literature (e.g. Alderden and Skogan, 2014). For example, the following interviewee introduces the idea of having civilians as ‘sorters’, that is, assistants who can perform certain tasks to free up time for investigators:

We have what we call [unsworn staff] to help us. It’s a pretty good setup, because we have all the ACORN reporting. Our [unsworn] officers who then will go through all the jobs and identify anything . . . that could potentially be a serious offence or could draw a lot of media attention or what have you. We can then put our resources into all of that as detectives. But we are just there to investigate particular crimes that come under that. . . . So we filter it through first. . . . If I was, as a police officer, to deal with that system day in and day out, I would say it would be overwhelming. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

Following a similar theme, another interviewee suggests a benefit of employing civilians is to fulfil tactical or strategic functions, particularly in terms of criminal intelligence analysis (e.g. Belur and Johnson, 2018; Evans and Kebbell, 2012; Sanders and Condon, 2017; Sheptycki, 2017), which again creates more space for police to carry out operational functions:

Our civilians are our intel [intelligence] aids. So . . . I guess we try to move sworn officers away from the kind of in-support intel role. And I think that is a good thing because . . . you get more operational police doing operational requirements. And it is great that we have some very good civilian staff who have a lot of knowledge in relation to . . . cyber areas. . . . Other than that we do not really use civilians other than for . . . [digital] forensic analysis. (Interviewee, Case Study A)

Police–civilian mix

Incorporating both the arguments for civilians as experts, and utilising civilians in a range of non-core police duties, was raised in relation to the notion of an ideal ‘police–civilian mix’. One interviewee, for example, suggests that the size of cyber-crime units needs to increase along with the use of civilian experts to support investigations:

I know for a fact that some cyber-crime units around the world will have around 100 personnel. If we could get even half of that, 50, with investigators. That would be would be incredible for the unit. But at this stage I would even settle for 25, . . . who are really into it or have some computing background. . . . I know that internationally there are law enforcement agencies . . . that . . . have a number of investigators with an external [civilian] attached to them. That external being their expertise. (Interviewee, Case Study A)

Another interviewee from a different unit elaborates on this very idea, expressing the view that technical expertise is required to support investigators. At the same time, however, the interviewee suggests there are other functions civilians could perform in cyber-crime units:

They [new police joining cyber units] need to be super keen or they will not learn quickly. . . . I think we need a different model. I don’t think we need lots of technical detectives. I think we need a bunch with . . . basic hacking ability. But we need a civilian to back us up. . . . Our civilians are specialists in electronic evidence. They do not have the hacking training yet. But they . . . are experts in pulling data out of computers. And they are experts in the eyes of the court. (Interviewee, Case Study B)

Many interviewees express views that there would be opportunities to expand the use of civilian staff inside cyber-crime units, provided the ‘right’ blend of police–civilian staff was maintained. Some interviewees from one of our case study units in particular refer to the ideal of a 50–50 mix between police and civilian personnel:

I would say that you would need . . . normally a 50–50 split [between police and civilian staff] in digital evidence, but in cyber-crime operations [e.g., investigations, covert operations, etc.] it would need to be police officers predominantly. Covert online operations. . . . That is the newest business for policing. And it is still emerging. . . . We are very open-minded to the idea of having civilians working in that area. . . . The other thing you could do [is] mix them together. You need to interchange between policing skills and scientific skills because civilians cannot [legally] recruit someone. ⁴ (Interviewee, Case Study C)

The interviewee suggests the ideal would be for a 50–50 mix of police–civilian personnel, even in areas of digital forensic evidence which, in some police organisations, are almost exclusively civilianised already.

Interviewees did argue that the distinction between sworn and unsworn is important:

I think there would be more opportunities [to use civilian staff]. . . . I think they could definitely assist in the investigations. . . . It is, I suppose, that demarcation [between sworn and unsworn] is important, but that’s probably when it comes to the operational side. I think everything up until there can be a mixed. I think it’s probably better to have people that don’t just think like detectives. (Interviewee, Case Study A)

One interviewee reflects carefully on the police–civilian divide, again suggesting that civilians are needed to overcome the deficits in existing police expertise and the turnover of police within cyber units:

There is sometimes a divide between sworn and unsworn but it’s mostly in people’s heads. . . . I’ve found that [my unit] was pretty good. There was not really that much of a divide between the two. . . . Actually it’s a benefit to have . . . a higher number of unsworns because most of the unsworns have got a high technical understanding of things compared to the sworn side. . . . So they complement each other in a way. . . . You’d love an ideal officer, someone who’s got that technical capability and is a good investigator as well or good intel analyst, but it just doesn’t exist. So you need that combination of different qualities of people to come together. (Interviewee, Case Study B)

Overall, our interviewees argued for the need for civilians to complement police capacity in relation to cyber-crime and some of the functions they could perform. Perceptions of the ‘ideal’ civilian mix varied among units and individual participants. For some units, civilians already occupy the majority of roles in areas such as digital evidence, whereas in others this situation is reversed. In those units where the ideal of a 50–50 mix was put forward, this ratio was mainly expressed in relation to digital evidence. Other areas of cyber-crime policing, it is argued, need to be staffed primarily with police. Some of the reasons underpinning the view for a majority of police are explored below in relation to the tensions regarding the nature of cyber-policing expertise.

Perceived tensions of civilianisation

A number of tensions emerged in relation to the civilianisation of cyber-crime units. We refer to these tensions under three categories: recruiting and retaining civilians, investigations versus technical skills, and police or civilians as experts?

Recruiting and retaining civilians

Many of the same interviewees arguing for the greater use of civilian staff also express a significant degree of pessimism about being able to successfully recruit civilian experts in this field. Reasons for such pessimism vary from the perceived lack of experts available to the lack of funds within police to successfully compete with the private sector. One interviewee elaborates on this as follows:

I would like . . . civilians to work with us but . . . I know that realistically we do not have the money to pay for civilians. I mean, who is going to want to work with the police when all you will get is about 100,000 [Australian dollars per year] when you can work for a bank and earn three times that much? We have tried to come up with certain solutions to that. . . . For example, thinking of grabbing undergraduates before or just after they graduate, and hope that some will see working with the police will be a great experience. . . . Then they can go on and work for a bank, which they probably will do. (Interviewee, Case Study A)

A key challenge, for the interviewee, is not only to successfully recruit civilian experts but also to retain them. Some interviewees perceive that, given the lure of higher salaries in the private sector, civilian experts may only use their initial employment with police as a career-building activity before they leave for higher salaries elsewhere.

The key issue of retention emerged multiple times in this study. For example, as the following interviewees suggest, this is an issue not only with civilian experts but rather all staff working or intending to specialise in cyber-crime. Reasons for this include the fact that, in order for police to achieve career advancement, they invariably need to leave the cyber units because promotion opportunities within the units are very limited:

Retention of staff is the massive issue in this area. Training them, retaining them and then giving them a career path. They are your three biggest problems you have. (Interviewee, Case Study A)

We’ve got three vacancies at the moment that we’re trying to fill. Retention is an issue. . . . Probably the majority of people who have left the digital evidence area have gone to private industry. That is pretty much chasing . . . the mighty dollar. . . . The other reason [mainly for sworn staff] is the tenured policy. . . . I had one of my detectives leave early this year to get a promotion back in uniform. He wanted to stay here [but could not apply for promotion internally]. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

Investigations versus technical skills

A significant tension emerged in one of the case study organisations in particular around the question of what skill sets were most important for specialist cyber-crime units. Interviewees were emphatic that skills in both investigations and cyber-crime were needed, and that one cannot take precedence over the other. For example, one interviewee suggests that ‘to be an investigator is an art to itself’ (see also Innes, 2003; Westera et al., 2016):

There are a lot of people with computer science degrees, but it does not teach you how to investigate. . . . No one can teach you how to be an investigator, police officer, in the cyber world. There are people here, they come here with a science degree, but they lack the skills to incorporate those background skills. They require on-the-job type of job training. And being an investigator is a proper skill set. And you do not learn how to investigate from any tertiary qualification. . . . To be an investigator is an art in itself. (Interviewee, Case Study A)

Understanding the requirements of investigators is something that is often perceived to be unique to police and therefore not a skill that civilians easily acquire:

I understand what the investigators are looking for in terms of what is required for court. Whereas our civilian . . . has sometimes struggled with that and gone too deep when it is not required and got more stuff than what the investigator needs. . . . His technical knowledge is very good. So we benefit from his knowledge because he is an expert in the field. . . . I still get advice from him on things and he still comes to me for advice [that is] police-related. Both of us benefit. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

This general point about understanding investigations notwithstanding, interviewees were equally emphatic that cyber-crime requires ‘tech-savvy’ people. Currently, due to the limited use of civilian experts, most of these tech-savvy people are in fact police. As one interviewee suggests,

The detectives here, two of them anyway, have done cyber-crime courses and come through university. So they are training themselves and their understanding as a detective is high. . . . It is really important to have that. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

The debate over the different types of knowledge and skills required for policing cyber-crime is explained in some depth by the following interviewee:

Do you recruit police officers and train them, or do you get someone with science and technical skills? The answer is you need a combination of both. . . . There is no question that if you get police officers with aptitude and teach them those technical skills that you get a very high quality skillset. It has been very interesting to observe the specialist [civilian] people . . . and how they emerge in a policing context. The answer is in truth . . . not as well as police who have the [technical] aptitude and training. . . . And the reason why is because it is easier to teach aptitude for technology than it is to develop aptitude for policing. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

Police or civilians as experts?

The interviewee quoted above essentially argues that it is easier for police to acquire sufficient expertise in cyber-crime than it is for civilian experts to acquire a sufficient aptitude for policing. Although these views emerged in one case study organisation more strongly than the other two, this fundamental question is likely to apply in many contexts. One interviewee argues that cyber units should be staffed with a majority of police for this reason:

I know other acquaintances who are probably doing a similar job . . . and the prevailing opinion is that I should get civilians in this place. . . . It’s not as easy as that. Some people do not understand the work and what is required. . . . We deal with prosecutors a lot. A civilian may say, yes, we will do that for you. Whereas we [police] will challenge them and say why do you need this? You are asking for stuff that is not required, why not just do the stuff that is required? That is why I think policing presence is needed greatly in the area. You’ll probably hear that a 50-50 balance is good. But I think it should be a majority of police. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

One interviewee expands on this view in light of their learnings from visiting cyber-crime and similar units elsewhere:

I spoke to another [civilian] colleague from another country who is running a very large [digital] forensic facility. . . . His opening line to me was: ‘I don’t know much about policing’. . . . Every task that came in, they set a series of processes . . . which were then reapplied irrespective of the value to policing. If you look at the precedents involved in forensic evidence, there are consequences with that mentality. . . . Here, by comparison, when the task comes in the first thing that we do is define what the policing objectives are. And it’s not download this data . . . or something like that. . . . It’s identify who the witnesses are, . . . identify what happened on this day and time. That is the policing objective. And then you match that with your technical services. . . . The hardest part of it is defining the police objectives. That has caused us to rethink matters. . . . It has been very easy to observe and teach police the policing objectives. We have got unsworn people here . . . and they are good . . . but the ability to learn policing objectives? (Interviewee, Case Study C)

Once again, the interviewee essentially argues that it takes police to understand policing. Another interviewee elaborates on the perceived challenges of leveraging civilian expertise, inevitably coming to the view that even though there are tensions associated with employing civilian experts, a greater use of civilians is likely inevitable in the future:

There are pros and cons to having police officers and . . . just [civilian] analysts. Police officers know the job. . . . The downside is that generally there is not a lot of talent pool in the police force as a whole for that type of work, because you do not join the police to become a digital forensics analyst or investigator. . . . With regards to civilians, yes they have training to get into that role, or something quite similar, and the skills can be transferred to this area. And we need that. However, we have encountered the issue that they [civilians] do not understand what detectives or investigators need. (Interviewee, Case Study C)

Discussion and conclusion

While the civilianisation of policing has been examined from many perspectives, the extant literature has tended to focus on the economic rationalities in favour of outsourcing certain police (sworn) functions to civilian (unsworn) staff. The literature is yet to more fully consider those circumstances where civilians are intentionally sought out to improve police capacity. In the same context, while there have been many recent and comprehensive efforts to take stock of the current research on cyber-crime, including providing some very helpful suggestions for future research in this area (e.g. Holt and Bossler, 2016; Leukfeldt, 2017), outside of digital forensics the role of civilians in police responses to cyber-crime has so far been largely ignored. This article, we argue, fills an important gap in the civilianisation and cyber-crime bodies of literature. We have intentionally not focused on the potential (or otherwise) cost savings associated with civilianisation that have dominated the existing civilianisation literature (e.g. Alderden and Skogan, 2014; Kiedrowski et al., 2017; Maguire et al., 2003; Skogan and Alderden, 2011). We have instead undertaken exploratory case study research (Yin, 2014) with members of cyber-crime units, at managerial and operational levels, to identify opportunities and constraints for civilianisation as a deliberate approach to improve police capacity in relation to cyber-crime.

The perceived benefits of civilianisation for cyber-crime units were directed towards improving deficits in existing expertise. Civilian experts were presented as an ideal outcome for improving police knowledge and skills as well as overcoming structural factors that impede police capacity. One of the most pressing was the rotation of police through various units and the lack of career advancement opportunities for those wishing to specialise in cyber-crime units. We interviewed a number of police across all case study organisations who either had or were intending to specialise in cyber-crime and asked them what they would do if they were required to move out of the unit. Although some were unable to give definitive answers, a significant number did say that they would choose to stay in the cyber units and would even opt to stay in a civilian capacity should this option be available to them. We also interviewed a number of police with significant expertise in cyber-crime who had joined the police with the explicit goal of working in cyber-crime and had spent five or more years in general policing before having the opportunity to join the cyber units. We asked those people whether they would have been tempted to join the cyber units directly as civilians rather than police, if the opportunity were available for them to do so. Many indicated they would have seriously considered pursuing that option, and some gave an emphatic ‘yes’. These observations alone suggest there is a pressing need to look more closely at the arguments for civilianisation in the case of cyber-crime.

There were, however, many tensions identified in this research regarding the idea of civilianising cyber-crime units. The difficulties associated with recruiting and retaining civilian experts in cyber-crime units left many resigned to the belief that the ideal mix of police–civilian personnel would never eventuate in reality. Undoubtedly, such views are exacerbated by the widely discussed growing cyber-security skills shortage and the perceived lack of funds available for police to compete with the private sector. Some police who had experience working with civilian experts had rather mixed views about their experiences. For example, some reported that civilian experts were an invaluable resource for the unit as a whole but would go into too much depth because they had an insufficient understanding of police requirements. A number expressed a strong preference for upskilling police over recruiting civilians to improve the effectiveness of cyber-crime units.

It is not sufficiently clear whether and how such views are emblematic of an underlying occupational culture shaping a belief and attitude that only police can truly understand policing, as observed in the current civilianisation literature (e.g. Alderden and Skogan, 2014). Indeed, two of the three cyber units in our research strongly called out for civilian experts, which suggests that if the sworn-civilian divide is a manifestation of police occupational culture, there is clear variation among the cultures of the groups studied (Whelan, 2016). These calls were expressed by officers ranging from those who had considerable experience working with civilian staff, both prior to and since joining the cyber units, to those who had very little experience working with civilians, and everything in between. The concerns expressed by police about the use of civilian staff appear to be aligned with their perceptions about how well civilians could perform their role and the unique nature of cyber expertise required within cyber units. Nonetheless, although civilians were often recognised as different, this is not to suggest they were necessarily viewed as ‘outsiders’. Rather, the concerns put forward about civilians may be partly a reflection of the lack of internal training civilians receive about policing and police requirements, as is typical with the roles they perform (Burcher and Whelan, 2019; Western et al., 2019). Furthermore, a better understanding of the types of knowledge and skills required within specialist police cyber-crime units is needed for a fuller appreciation of the opportunities for civilianisation.

A limitation of this research is that there are currently relatively few civilian staff employed in cyber-crime units, and so we continue to know very little about the experiences of civilian personnel (e.g. Kiedrowski et al., 2017; McCarty and Skogan, 2012; Taylor et al., 2007). In order to reach civilians, however, it appears necessary to extend beyond specialist cyber-crime units, especially if the intention is to capture more than simply digital forensics. Further research is needed to understand the perspective of civilian staff, which is essential to better appreciate the question of whether it is better to train police to acquire expertise in cyber-crime or employ civilians with such expertise and develop their aptitude for policing. As cyber-crime continues to grow in both complexity and volume, the gap between existing police capacity and future requirements is likely to expand.

Civilianisation, we argue, is one essential area to be fully explored as a potential way to narrow this gap. It is an area of policing that requires much further research, particularly in the context of specialist units, along with police responses to cyber-crime more broadly. This study has called attention to the need to more fully appreciate the complex organisational dynamics of specialist cyber-crime units and the opportunities and constraints for civilianisation. It highlights, furthermore, police organisations and their members in a state of transition as they attempt to make sense of and better prepare for cyber-crime.