Building a global community of health for all: A positive discourse analysis of COVID-19 discourse

Abstract

‘A global community of health for all’ has become a dominant concept in China’s global health governance system. Although this concept has been investigated by several studies in different domains, little attention has been given to its discursive legitimation in China’s media communication from a linguistic perspective. To fill this gap, the present study employs positive discourse analysis to investigate how the aforementioned concept is legitimised via the predominant discourses associated with COVID-19 in state-run Chinese English-language newspapers. The findings show that the Chinese news media attempted to formulate the positive discourses, including cooperation as a win-win solution, people’s lives and well-being as the priority and science as the spirit, though the discourses may not resonate with some countries. The findings shed light on the use of language by the media in promoting official ideologies, projecting China’s national image and improving China’s international relations amid a global health crisis.

Keywords

A global community of health for all Chinese English-language newspapers COVID-19 discourse-historical approach positive discourse analysis

Introduction

The coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) was first reported in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and has infected millions of people across the world with an unprecedented spreading speed in human history (Withers et al., 2022). After several months of suppressing the pandemic inside the country, the Chinese government declared that the domestic spreading of Covid-19 was under control and called various local authorities for the resumption of work and production while preventing importing cases from foreign regions (State Council Information Office in China, 2020). However, the virus spreading outside China was out of control in various countries. It not only caused heavy casualties but also led to great loss in international trade and production due to severe restrictions on human movement imposed by governments under the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines (Dodds et al., 2020). The pandemic also posed serious challenges to the global health system (Dodds et al., 2020).

In response to the increasing global death toll and healthcare chaos amid the global health crisis, the Chinese English-language media, which is the official media mouthpiece of Beijing authorities, resorted to the vision of building ‘a global community of health for all’ (GCHA), which has risen to be a dominant concept in China’s vision of global health governance since the COVID-19 outbreak (Fang and Zhang, 2021). When China’s president, Xi Jinping, sent a message of condolences to France’s President Emmanuel Macron regarding the COVID-19 outbreak in France on 21 March 2020, he first proposed the new concept and initiative of building GCHA (Fang and Zhang, 2021). Since then, Xi Jinping has reiterated this initiative on various occasions, including the 73rd World Health Assembly in May 2020 (Fang and Zhang, 2021).

Global health governance is ‘the use of formal and informal institutions, rules, and processes by states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state actors to deal with challenges to health that require cross-border collective action to address effectively’ (Fidler, 2010: 3). The global health system has four essential functions: production of global public goods for research and healthcare, management of externalities across countries related to information sharing and surveillance, mobilisation of global solidarity and assistance and stewardship (Frenk and Moon, 2013). Good global health governance needs to ensure that the four essential functions are performed. The GCHA concept takes ‘health’ as its value appeal, and it is China’s systematic vision to deal with international public health problems. It not only reflects the positive changes in China’s global health governance outlook but also is an attempt by China to make up for shortcomings in global health governance with a transformative attitude. Similar to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promoted by the Chinese government (Chan, 2020), the GCHA concept can help promote a positive image for China. That being said, the GCHA concept may not appeal to other countries.

The GCHA concept in relation to COVID-19 has been investigated from different perspectives as follows, such as global public goods, philosophy and political science. For instance, from the perspective of global public goods, Yu and Tay (2022) proffer that China’s supply and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine are guided by the GCHA concept. From a sociopolitical perspective, Fang and Zhang (2021) argue that the GCHA concept challenges unilateralism on environmental and public health issues and promotes the value of multilateral cooperation. Similarly, departing from Marxist theories, Xiao and Kong (2021) contend that the GCHA concept contains the ethical implication of people first and lives first, provides guidance on ethical values to promote global cooperation, and assumes the common responsibility of maintaining human health and safety. There is not much research investigating the discursive legitimation of the GCHA concept promoted by the Chinese English-language media from a linguistic perspective. As such, this study explores how the GCHA concept underwent the process of legitimation through the discourses constructed in the COVID-19 news of the Chinese state-run media. To this end, the research questions are set as follows:

1 How is the concept of GCHA legitimised via the predominant discourses associated with COVID-19 in the Chinese English-language newspaper?

2 What discursive strategies are used to construct the predominant discourses legitimising the concept of GCHA?

3 What are the ideological implications of the predominant discourses legitimising the concept of GCHA?

Data collection

We used Factiva to retrieve relevant news articles from China Daily, People’s Daily Online, The Global Times, and Xinhua News Agency by searching the key phrases ‘Covid-19 AND Global Community of Health for All’, which must appear in the titles or leads of the news.¹ The period of those news reports runs between May 2020 and August 2021. While the starting date was the day when the first relevant news was published in the Chinese English-language newspapers, the ending date was the day when we began to collect data. During the duration of 15 months, 27 news articles (14,286 words) that are relevant to the GCHA concept were selected manually to include in the analysis. The target audiences of the Chinese English-language newspapers usually hold international backgrounds, such as expatriates residing in China, staff from foreign organisations or corporations, diplomatic officers and so forth. Since those newspapers are state-run and heavily influenced by Chinese officials, the ideologies promoted in the articles are what China attempts to convey to the international community.

Analytical framework and procedures

This study employed positive discourse analysis (PDA) proposed by Martin (2004), which is an expansion of the research paradigm of critical discourse analysis (CDA). PDA and CDA are conceptualised as dualism like yin and yang in ancient Chinese philosophy (Martin, 2004). PDA emphasises ‘possibilities for transformations capable of enhancing human flourishing and mitigating social ills’ (Hughes, 2018: 199), whereas CDA focuses on ‘ideologically driven discrimination with respect to gender, ethnicity, class and related social variables’ (Martin, 2004: 179). In other words, CDA centres around criticism of power, whereas PDA focuses on the constructive side. Martin (2004) indicates that ‘deconstructive and constructive activity are both required’ in studying the redistribution of power without struggle (p. 184). Therefore, PDA can be used alongside CDA to investigate the discursive legitimation of the GCHA concept in the reportage of the pandemic, and it focuses on solidarity and the collaborative side of power.

This study also employed analytic tools developed within Wodak’s (2015) discourse-historical approach (DHA). Its major characteristic is that it tries to incorporate known information about historical sources and the social and political context in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded. This study provides a model for doing DHA that connects global health governance in history with the current COVID-19 discourse created by Chinese authorities. Wodak (2015) defines discursive strategies as ‘a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices), adopted in order to achieve a particular social, political, psychological, or linguistic goal. Discursive strategies are located at different levels of linguistic organization and complexity’ (Wodak, 2015: 12). Three main discursive strategies were found to be useful throughout the analysis because of their prominence: argumentation (argumentative aspects or schemes), nomination (discursive construction of actors/objects/phenomena) and predication (actions, characteristics or qualities attributed to actors/objects/phenomena). Topos (plural topoi), which is part of argumentation, refers to the justification of claims based on prerequisite knowledge. An action/perspective/practice can be legitimised by the use of topoi, including authority (due to an authority in a high position), comparison (distinguishing the in-group from the out-group), history as teacher (learning from the past), numbers (due to sufficient numerical/statistical evidence) and threat (due to identified dangers or threats).

Martin’s (2004) PDA in combination with Wodak’s (2015) DHA was considered a suitable analytical framework because it can help address the research objective to find out the predominant discourses associated with the concept of GCHA and discursive strategies used to construct them from a positive perspective since this concept was made to encourage collaborative efforts in tackling COVID-19. Deriving from Martin’s (2004) work, here, our ‘positive discourse perspective’ entails solidarity and change.

The software QSR International’s NVivo 12 Pro was employed for data analysis. First, two authors discussed the possible discourses emerging from the data. Then they separately coded 30% of the data that were randomly selected and the inter-rater reliability rate (Cohen’s kappa coefficient: 0.80) showed high agreement (Cohen, 1960; Yu and Tay, 2020). After that, they further resolved their disagreement before consensus was reached and interpretation was standardised. The first author then finished coding the rest of the data. We coded the data based on their meanings in language or logic, and there was not a fixed unit for coding due to its ‘hermeneutic nature, a meaning-making process’ (Yu, 2022a: 718). The length of each coding depended on where its message began and ended, ranging from a sentence to a paragraph. To illustrate the analytical process, here below is a demonstration:

Xi’s vision for building a global community of health for all has been ‘pointing the way forward for China’s participation in global cooperation against COVID-19 and building the consensus that the international community should fight the virus in solidarity’, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi told reporters earlier this month in Singapore.

In this example, the Chinese media accentuated the importance of cooperation. The news chose to quote Wang Yi, who was introduced as ‘State Councilor and Foreign Minister’ and claimed that the GCHA was ‘pointing the way forward for China’s participation in global cooperation against COVID-19’ and ‘building the consensus that the international community should fight the virus in solidarity’. These verbal phrases are a form of predication strategy employed to portray the GCHA as a way of tackling the COVID-19 crisis. More importantly, Wang Yi attributed the vision of GCHA to China’s President Xi, reported by the news. Since Xi and Wang are the top Chinese officials who have powers to influence national policies, their statements carry weight in policy formulation and implementation. With Xi and Yi’s official titles, the topos of authority is employed in the statement to increase the legitimacy of GCHA. The journalists here can retain objectivity by relying on identified sources and using direct speech, but they can also choose what and whom they cover based on their editorial stance, which is obviously aligned with the State. In the end, this extract was coded as ‘cooperation as a win-win solution’, in which China enhances its international reputation through promoting the GCHA while countries which are willing to join such a ‘global community’ can be benefitted through the joint response to the public health threats.

Findings and discussion

This study finds that the diplomatic concept of building GCHA is legitimised by three dominant discourses: cooperation as a win-win solution (88 instances; 43.14%), people’s lives and well-being as the priority (68 instances; 33.33%) and science as the spirit (48 instances; 23.53%) in the Chinese English-language news media. These discourses are constructed by discursive strategies such as argumentation, nomination and predication, and we argue that they hold ideological implications for collectivism and humanitarianism.

Cooperation as a win-win solution

The most dominant discourse is cooperation as a win-win solution (88 instances; 43.14%). From the Chinese perspective, the vision of the GCHA is to build international solidarity to tackle the public health crisis and create a win-win situation. Through the process, China, as the initiator, can enhance its international reputation, while the countries supporting the GCHA can be benefitted through mutual assistance during the pandemic. Promoting cooperation is also a way of defusing politicisation during the crisis. When politicisation exists, there is a lack of trust among stakeholders for building consensus, and thus arguments tend to be aroused due to uncertainties and self-interests. Sometimes the motive of making politicised statements is to catch attention for enhancing a country/individual’s own popularity. As the first place hit by the pandemic, China’s initial practice in dealing with the virus was questioned by other countries. Politicisation can be reflected in the difficulties of building a strong consensus to handle the global health crisis and criticism of China in the international community. In order to prevent further politicisation, the GCHA is used to promote international cooperation and divert attention from the doubts about China (Examples 1–4).

1. Ambassador Qi said COVID-19 was a common enemy and building a global community of health for all was a common goal. ‘Unity and solidarity are the most powerful weapons fighting the pandemic, and vaccine sharing is the only magic solution to ultimately defeat the pandemic’, he said. (Xinhua News Agency, 26 May 2021)

2. An old Chinese saying goes that when brothers are of the same mind, they have the power to cut through metal. China and Africa, as good brothers sharing weal and woe together, have fought shoulder to shoulder on many international fronts and made their friendship a model for international relations and South-South cooperation. (Xinhua News Agency, 16 June 2020)

The Chinese media typically used a war-time rhetoric to amplify the danger of COVID-19 and heighten global readers’ emotional intensity so as to persuade them of the urgent need for cooperation and solidarity with implications for collectivism. Here, collectivism refers to placing more values on groups than on individuals. China attempted to coordinate joint efforts in the international community to strengthen the global health system, in which countries should aid those in need. Metaphors such as ‘enemy’, ‘weapons’, ‘fighting’ and ‘defeat’ can evoke an image of war-time hardship in a topos of threat (Example 1). The media labelled COVID-19 as ‘a common enemy’ of humankind with a personification effect making it more tangible and malicious, which can be seen as a nomination strategy (Example 1). The repetitive use of the adjective ‘common’ highlights that COVID-19 is a crisis shared by or affecting all nations of the world (Example 1). Echoing the findings of other studies, this study finds that ‘war’ metaphors are commonly used to describe COVID-19 (Oswick et al., 2020).

In the face of danger and threat posed by COVID-19, the Chinese media cast China and other nations in the role of allies, suggesting collectivism again. For instance, it used the partnership of China and Africa as a role model to highlight the importance of cooperation. Noun phrases such as ‘good brothers’ serve as a nomination strategy with a personifying effect, highlighting the bonding between the two countries (Example 2). Verbal phrases such as ‘have the power to cut through metal’, ‘sharing weal and woe together’ and ‘fought shoulder to shoulder’ evoke an image of brothers in arms fighting together in war and highlight their strong relationship of camaraderie and fraternity, fulfilling the function of predication (Example 2). When China and other nations are positioned in a war zone, ‘unity and solidarity’ are compared to ‘the most powerful weapons’, reaffirming the urgent need for cooperation and legitimising the vision of GCHA (Example 1).

3. Namely, it was the first country to share information on infections and its anti-virus experience with all parties, the first to provide other countries with large batches of anti-pandemic supplies, the first to provide developing countries with large-scale vaccine assistance, the first to send medical expert teams to foreign countries, and the first to propose the building of a global community of health for all. These ‘five firsts’, concrete actions in the global fight against COVID-19, show that China does not make empty promises and highlight its resolve to stand shoulder to shoulder with the international community in this time of crisis. (China Daily, 17 September 2021)

The Chinese media amplified China’s efforts in supporting other nations of the world during the pandemic, trying to construct a ‘selfless’ image for China in building a GCHA, though it can also be ‘self-preserving’ to divert attention from the doubts about China. By using the repeated structure beginning with the adjective ‘the first’ in parallelism, the Chinese media were able to strengthen their persuasive force, fulfilling the function of predication to construct China as a supportive nation coming before all others in times of crisis (Example 3). Altruistic actions such as ‘provide’, ‘send’ and ‘share’ are attributed to China, realising the function of predication with implications for humanitarianism (Example 3). Here, humanitarianism refers to charitable commitments in helping others. The news tried to persuade other nations to believe in China’s assistance without expectation of much in return. By representing China as a supportive ally, the Chinese media could build a positive national image for China and defuse the ongoing diplomatic tensions, especially when some foreign politicians accused China of the initial spread of COVID-19 (Yu, 2022b).

4. Removing ideological prejudices and breaking free from unilateralism, and replacing disputes and bias with unity and rationality, the world can build a strong power to fight the pandemic and achieve an early victory. On the contrary, politicizing the pandemic, stigmatizing other countries and the WHO, creating ‘political viruses’ and disseminating ‘infodemic’ are practices that reveal only unwisdom and ignorance, and are inhumane for the lives and health of all mankind. (People’s Daily Online, 22 May 2020)

The Chinese media argued that some foreign politicians, such as the former president of the United States (US), Donald Trump on public occasions, kept using the term ‘Chinese virus’ to politicise the pandemic in early 2020 (Yu, 2022b). As mentioned previously, politicisation is a process of arousing arguments due to mistrust and self-interests. From the Chinese perspective, the former US president’s practice of using the term ‘Chinese virus’ violated the WHO practice of naming infectious diseases. According to a WHO document, the naming of a disease should avoid causing offence to any cultural, national or regional groups (WHO, 2015). This is why the Chinese news used the verbal phrase ‘stigmatizing other countries and the WHO’ to show how the US did not respect the WHO guidelines and other countries (Example 4).

Furthermore, the politicised practices also include not building consensus to resolve problems. As what the former US president did in the incident of naming the virus, the Chinese news accused the US of ‘creating political viruses and disseminating infodemic’ (Example 4). The Chinese media attempted to criticise the US for spreading fear instead of building consensus and compared such practice to an infectious virus which can be transmitted widely. In the eyes of China, the US practices, which include making arguments based on mistrust and self-interests and not building consensus, were a form of politicisation. The Chinese news blamed that some countries, such as the US, occupied themselves with politics rather than tackling COVID-19, realising the function of predication (Example 4).

Phrases such as ‘unwisdom’, ‘ignorance’ and ‘inhumane’ also serve as a predicational strategy to amplify their decision which may cause harm to their own interest and the interest of humanity (Example 4). To distinguish the in-group from the out-group, phrases such as ‘Removing ideological prejudices and breaking free from unilateralism, and replacing disputes and bias with unity and rationality’ are used to establish the norm for the in-group via a topos of comparison (Example 4). The contrast between the cooperative and antagonistic deeds can be analysed as a membership categorisation mechanism to praise countries/people who cooperate and contribute to the fight against COVID-19 and denounce those who politicise the pandemic (Sacks, 1992).

Building global solidarity is one of the essential functions of the global health system (Frenk and Moon, 2013). As Dodds et al. (2020) indicate, the pandemic provides ‘a space to build solidarities and for collectives to work together. Being mindful of one another can and does contribute to care and welfare’ (p. 292). The dominant discourse, cooperation as a win-win solution, underlying the concept of building GCHA has manifested the importance of global solidarity.

People’s lives and well-being as the priority

The second most dominant discourse is people’s well-being as the priority (68 instances; 33.33%), which is used to promote a great sense of political responsibility to put people and their lives first, legitimising the vision of GCHA with implications for humanitarianism (Examples 5–8). As mentioned previously, humanitarianism refers to charitable commitments in helping others, and the target recipients would be people in China and in other countries who believe in the GCHA concept. Under the Chinese concept of humanitarianism, people’s lives are placed at the top priority.

5. The Covid-19 pandemic poses a huge threat to the lives, safety, health, and well-being of people throughout the world, creating significant challenges for global public health security. (China Daily, 11 January 2021)

The Chinese media amplified the danger of COVID-19, which is detrimental to people’s well-being and lives. Actions such as ‘poses a huge threat to the lives, safety, health, and well-being of people’ and ‘creating significant challenges for global public health security’ are attributed to COVID-19 serving as a predicational strategy to intensify its danger (Example 5). The Chinese media posited that COVID-19 poses a serious threat to people’s lives and health, and hence people-oriented policies that prioritise people’s lives involving stringent measures to lower the death tolls and the number of infectious cases, such as the ‘Dynamic COVID-zero’ strategy, are urgently needed, legitimising the vision of GCHA.

6. This is a war that humanity has to fight and win. Facing this unknown, unexpected, and devastating disease, China launched a resolute battle to prevent and control its spread. Making people’s lives and health its first priority, China adopted extensive, stringent, and thorough containment measures, and has for now succeeded in cutting all channels for the transmission of the virus. 1.4 billion Chinese people have exhibited enormous tenacity and solidarity in erecting a defensive rampart that demonstrates their power in the face of such natural disasters. (China Daily, 8 June 2020)

The Chinese media highlighted that China prioritises people’s lives and well-being with phrases such as ‘Making people’s lives and health its first priority’, realising the function of predication (Example 6). China’s efforts and success in containing the virus are described by phrases such as ‘launched a resolute battle to prevent and control its spread’, ‘adopted extensive, stringent, and thorough containment measures’ and ‘succeeded in cutting all channels for the transmission of the virus’, performing the function of predication (Example 6). However, China’s containment policy could not be sustainable due to the large-scale lockdowns at the expense of individual freedom and great economic loss (The Lancet Healthy Longevity, 2022). While the Chinese authorities lowered death tolls with stringent lockdown measures, the low vaccination rates in the older population were overlooked, leading to older adults becoming the majority group of infection and death (The Lancet Healthy Longevity, 2022). In the struggle against the pandemic, the Chinese media highlighted that China has fully demonstrated its value of ‘people first and lives first’, with implications for humanitarianism in the Chinese conception (Xi, 2021b). Again, the Chinese government equated the value of humanitarianism to the importance of people’s lives and efforts of stringent measures to lower death tolls, but such containment policy also brought side effects on economic development and social stability.

7. Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Gen. Tea Banh expressed his heartfelt thanks to China for donating the new batch of the vaccine, saying that it was another testament to the ironclad friendship between the two countries. ‘China is the leading country in providing vaccines to Cambodia in terms of both humanitarian donations and direct orders’, he said at the event. ‘The vaccine is essential for Cambodia to protect its people’s lives from COVID-19 and its variants’. (People’s Daily Online, 24 August 2021)

8. In his phone conversation with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in April, Xi said vaccines are used to prevent diseases and save lives, while stressing that China opposes the politicization of vaccines or ‘vaccine nationalism’, and stands ready to work with Germany and the international community as a whole to promote fair and reasonable vaccine distribution, support and help developing countries to obtain vaccines, and contribute to humankind’s common fight against the pandemic for an early victory. (People’s Daily Online, 18 May 2021)

One of the aspects that manifests China’s support to the international community in prioritising people’s lives and well-being is its contribution/provision of vaccines and opposition to vaccine nationalism, meaning ‘a situation where countries push to get first access to a supply of vaccines and potentially hoard key inputs for vaccine production’ (Hafner et al., 2020: 3). China always advocates deepening international cooperation on vaccines, ensuring the availability and affordability of vaccines in developing countries, and making vaccines a global public product (Xi, 2021b). By 21 May 2021, China had supplied 300 million vaccine doses to different developing countries in Africa, Latin America and so on (Anonymous, n.d.; Xi, 2021b). This was acknowledged by the Chinese media. For instance, China is identified as ‘the leading country in providing vaccines to Cambodia’ (Example 7). This recognition was acknowledged by Gen. Tea Banh, who is introduced as ‘Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister’ in his speech at an event (Example 7). Presenting his titles and institutional affiliations can show his credibility in a topos of authority. Actions contributing to vaccine equality such as ‘donating the new batch of the vaccine’, ‘opposes the politicization of vaccines or vaccine nationalism’ and ‘promote fair and reasonable vaccine distribution’ are attributed to China, fulfilling the function of predication and legitimising the vision of building GCHA with implication for humanitarianism (Example 7).

Lee and Kamradt-Scott (2014) suggest that ‘global health is defined in terms of the poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged, most often to refer to the health needs of the developing world’ (p. 6). Building GCHA involves humanitarian assistance to provide relief for developing countries. By constructing China’s humanitarian image as prioritising people’s lives and showing charitable commitments globally, the Chinese media are able to cast China in a positive light.

Science as the spirit

The third dominant discourse is science as the spirit (48 instances; 23.53%), which is used to depict that the spirit of science shall be upheld to handle anything related to the health crisis, including virus traceability (Examples 9–14). Under the Chinese conception, the spirit of science is to respect scientists’ opinions/findings, especially those from Chinese scientists due to the self-confidence in its own structure (Xi, 2021a). Although the scientific viewpoints from other places were also considered by the Chinese authorities, some countries questioned that only the points in favour of China were selected in the discourse construction of ‘science as the spirit’.

9. Epidemics are like a Pandora’s box that has been opened every now and then in the past thousands of years, threatening human existence and development. It is because of science and cooperation that the mankind is able to constantly make progresses. (People’s Daily Online, 22 May 2020)

10. Coronavirus is raging all over the world, and lives are being lost every day. Which route shall we take? Shall we uphold science and rationality, or shall we manufacture political disputes? Strengthen unity and cooperation, or seek isolation? Promote multilateral coordination, or pursue unilateralism? Every country has a choice to make. (People’s Daily Online, 9 June 2020)

The Chinese media argued that science assisted humankind to survive and progress in the past pandemics via the topos of history as teacher. In conjunction with this topos, the metaphor ‘a Pandora’s box’ (Example 9) is used based on Greek mythology. The ‘Pandora’s box’ refers to the source of many troubles, one of which is pandemics. In the history of humankind, the ‘box’ has been opened every now and then, meaning that pandemics occurred many times and caused the suffering of humankind. Only after the enlightenment of modern science did people start to explore the knowledge of infectious diseases through scientific observation and experiments under the empirical system, in which new findings are based on past known knowledge. Learning from history as a lesson, the Chinese media foregrounded the importance of science. For example, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), another coronavirus disease outbreak in 2003, provided knowledge on how to respond to such a highly contagious virus. As such, the scientific findings based on the SARS help scientists find better ways to tackle the COVID-19 crisis, reflecting the progress of humankind brought by empirical research and scientific methods. As Wodak (2015) states, ‘because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation’ (p. 11).

Additionally, the severity of COVID-19 is amplified by phrases/clauses such as ‘raging all over the world’ and ‘lives are being lost every day’ in a topos of threat (Example 10). To emphasise their point on science and collaboration, the media also used predicational phrases such as ‘uphold science and rationality’, ‘Strengthen unity and cooperation’, ‘Promote multilateral coordination’ in sharp contrast to ‘manufacture political disputes’, ‘seek isolation’ and ‘pursue unilateralism’ in the forms of rhetorical questions and parallelism (Example 10). What China did was to share its experience and scientific findings in tackling COVID-19 with other countries. Although weakness was found in the Chinese strategy, China believed that its experience could be learnt by others. The use of rhetorical questions makes science and collaboration appear to be a choiceless choice.

11. Science and technology are the sharp blade that humanity wields in the battle against disease. Such battles could not have been won without scientific advances and technological innovation. Confronted by Covid-19, a previously unknown virus, China has exploited the pioneering role of science and technology and fully applied the results of scientific and technical innovation in recent years. Top scientific research resources have gathered from around the nation to support virus control. (China Daily, 8 June 2020)

12. The novel coronavirus is unknown to mankind. It takes a process to study and understand it. As one of the first countries hit by the virus, China undertook a closed-book exam, which means developing effective prevention and control measures requires more careful research beforehand. Jumping to conclusions without research shows no sense of responsibility to science and to the people. (People’s Daily Online, 25 August 2020)

In response to the pandemic, the Chinese media constructed China as a country that upholds science as the spirit, leading to its early victory in putting COVID-19 under control. Activity phrases such as ‘exploited the pioneering role of science and technology’, ‘fully applied the results of scientific and technical innovation’, ‘Top scientific research resources have gathered’ and ‘undertook a closed-book exam’ are assigned to China, serving as a predicational strategy (Example 12). Furthermore, science and technology are compared to weapons that can defeat COVID-19 in a war-time rhetoric with phrases such as ‘the sharp blade that humanity wields in the battle against disease’ (Example 11). The Chinese media attempted to express that Chinese scientists are well equipped with the technical capacity to conduct local epidemiological investigations thoroughly and find a way to defuse the COVID-19 public health crisis. With the empirical knowledge of infectious diseases and the field data of local investigations, the Chinese scientists made an unprecedented decision – a large-scale lockdown in Wuhan. Since such containment measure was successful in suppressing the outbreak in Wuhan, the decision was viewed as one of China’s major scientific findings. On 24 March 2020, the Chinese government declared that it took about 2 months to reduce the number of daily new cases to single digits and about 3 months to achieve decisive results in the defence of China against COVID-19 (State Council Information Office in China, 2020). In 2020, the WHO officials also commented that China’s containment policy was effective in altering the course of the outbreak and preventing the circumstance of exponential growth (NIDA, 2020). The news media attributed the phased victory of China to China’s belief in and application of science and technology, legitimising the vision of GCHA.

13. Different scientists, including the WHO in its China-WHO Joint Research Report on the Traceability of COVID-19 issued on 30 March, have said the introduction of COVID-19 into humans through a laboratory is ‘very unlikely’. Zhang argued that the hype of the lab-leak theory intends to shift the blame of some Western countries’ failed pandemic responses. ‘This constitutes an affront to WHO-led origin-tracing study, a serious travesty of scientists and the spirit of science, and a major damage to the solidarity of the international community in the fight against the pandemic’, he added. (People’s Daily Online, 18 July 2021)

14. China has been carrying out in-depth and professional cooperation with the WHO experts with an open and transparent attitude, Hua said, urging the relevant countries to engage in the global origin-tracing effort in a positive, science-based and cooperative manner, to shoulder the due responsibilities for international cooperation on COVID-19 response and building a global community of health for all. (People’s Daily Online, 19 February 2021)

The Chinese media highlighted that COVID-19 might start not only in China but also in other countries based on some scientific reports in favour of China (Fongaro et al., 2021; van Dorp et al., 2020). China is categorised as ‘one of the first countries hit by the virus’, realising a function of nomination (Example 12). The plurality of ‘countries’ implies that China was not the only country where COVID-19 first emerged, and so virus traceability should not only target China (Example 12). Some scientific studies also confirm this point by showing that evidence of the virus can be found in other places, such as Santa Catalina, Brazil, before China officially issued an epidemic alert (Fongaro et al., 2021; van Dorp et al., 2020). However, those scientific reports in favour of China just represent a part of viewpoints in the international community. When the news tended to select the scientific findings in line with the Chinese official stance, its objectivity might be questioned by other countries.

To amplify the impossibility of the lab-leak theory hypothesising COVID-19 as a bioweapon leaked from the Wuhan laboratory, the Chinese media borrowed the voice of authorities, forming a topos of authority. These authorities are introduced with institutions such as ‘the WHO’ to establish their credibility (Example 13). Scientific reports such as ‘China-WHO Joint Research Report on the Traceability of COVID-19’ give additional weight to their voice (Example 13). The conspiracy ‘lab-leak theory’ is characterised as ‘a serious travesty’ that disrespects science (Example 14). The media attributed this stance to Zhang, who is the Chinese ambassador to Uganda, by quoting him (Example 13). Furthermore, the Chinese media cast China in a positive light in response to the issue of origin tracing. Positive evaluative attributions in the form of adjectives such as ‘open’ and ‘transparent’ are assigned to China, realising a function of predication (Example 14). Similarly, actions, such as ‘carrying out in-depth and professional cooperation with the WHO experts’, serving as a predicational strategy, show China’s cooperative manner in the handling of COVID-19 (Example 14). The Chinese media attempted to convey the message that China’s practices follow the GCHA concept. However, some scientists considered that China had hidden something related to the origins of the pandemic in the WHO investigation trip to Wuhan (Cohen, 2021). The reason that the Chinese media claimed such cooperation may be based on China’s interaction with the WHO officials in the process of investigation for the China-WHO Joint Research Report. In fact, the joint report cannot address all concerns of the members of the WHO origin commission (Cohen, 2021).

Conclusion

Drawing on PDA, this study has investigated the predominant discourses associated with a dominant concept in China’s global health governance system – building GCHA – during COVID-19. Three discourses are found to be prevalent: cooperation as a win-win solution, people’s lives and well-being as the priority, and science as the spirit.

These discourses are constructed by discursive strategies such as argumentation, nomination and predication. The discursive construction of building a GCHA in the Chinese English-language media is intertwined with the wider discursive and geopolitical contexts in China. The Chinese English-language news media served to bridge the communication gap between Beijing’s authorities and foreign countries by constructing positive images of China tackling the global crisis of COVID-19 with the GCHA concept. It framed COVID-19 as warfare, humanity’s greatest challenge, which the world should cooperate to overcome. It can help draw readers’ attention to China’s large-scale altruistic assistance to foreign countries instead of it being the region where COVID-19 was first detected in, giving an impression to the world that China prioritises people’s lives and well-being and upholds the spirit of science. However, these discourses contain weakness in enhancing China’s international image. Firstly, people may question if the motive of promoting a win-win solution is to divert the attention of criticism against China. Secondly, although the value of people’s lives is emphasised, the aggressive containment measures might cause other problems for social and economic development. Finally, although China followed scientists’ opinions/findings, especially those from China, other countries may criticise that it tended to select scientific findings in favour of itself.

On top of the discursive practice, the wider geopolitical contexts may also play a vital role in the discursive legitimation of the GCHA concept in the reportage of COVID-19 in the Chinese English-language news media. As Frenk and Moon (2013) indicate, ‘Global governance is distinct from national governance in one critical respect: there is no government at the global level’ (p. 937). Bahi (2021) also states, ‘The lack of leadership at the global level during an international crisis may cause the breakdown of the international order’ (p. 76). The concept of building GCHA may provide a solution to improve the global health governance system. COVID-19 will be controlled or coexist with humankind, but this kind of major public health emergency will not be the last one for the world. The pandemic is a test, reflecting the shortcomings of the global health governance system and exposing the inadequacy of human response to major public health emergencies. One of the obvious examples is that developing countries still have difficulties in access to enough medical resources to suppress pandemic outbreaks from time to time. From prioritising people’s lives and well-being to upholding science as the spirit, Beijing’s proposition attempted to send a signal of adhering to multilateralism and demonstrated a long-term vision for improving crisis response in the reportage of COVID-19 in the Chinese English-language news media. Through promoting such normative and enlightening ideas, China also tried to show its spiritual development and faith based on the state ideology (Wang et al., 2021). However, the GCHA appeal may not resonate with some countries due to their lack of trust towards China.

As mentioned previously, no research has investigated the discursive legitimation of the GCHA concept from a linguistic perspective. In this study, the literature vacuum is filled by exploring how the discourses were employed by the state-run Chinese English-language news media to promote the GCHA concept and to project a positive representation of China during the COVID-19 pandemic. This article also shows the advantages of applying PDA in the analysis of diplomatic concepts in the Chinese context.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for his/her very insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Declaration of conflicting interests

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Hong Kong RGC Postdoctoral Fellowship Scheme funding [grant number: PDFS2122-5H03].

Notes

Author biographies

Tayden Fung Chan is a Core Centre Fellow in the Institute of Policy Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong SAR. He obtained his PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Auckland, New Zealand. His research primarily focuses on the Hong Kong Studies and Chinese public administration. His publications appear on various academic journals including but not limited to Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, East Asia, and China: An International Journal.

Yating Yu is a postdoctoral research fellow in Department of English and Communication, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and a member of the Research Centre for Professional Communication in English (RCPCE). Her research interests are in gender studies, corpus linguistics, critical discourse analysis and metaphor studies. She has previously published in SSCI-indexed journals such as Social Semiotics, Gender and Language and Feminist Media Studies.

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