Wavering between profit-making and change-making: Private media companies in conflicts in Nepal

Abstract

Post-1990 Nepal is remarkable, not only for democratic political change but also for its mushrooming media industry; media companies have been influential actors in conflicts. To analyse their role and motives as private business actors in conflicts, this article explores the dynamics of media engagement, the implications of media companies’ actions and needs, and their motives as corporate actors. The authors focus on two conflicts – the anti-monarchy movement and the internal labour disputes in media companies – and the companies’ response to different conflict situations. Using a qualitative case study approach, the article concludes that media companies in conflict situations have inevitable social as well as commercial obligations. Balancing these two interests and maintaining political neutrality become challenges to media in conflict contexts. Evidence shows that media companies can either manipulate situations or be manipulated themselves by various actors’ interests, leading to unintended and sometimes undesirable conflicts.

Keywords

business conflict media company Nepal peace

Introduction

Not just society but also the media underwent a remarkable transformation in Nepal after 1990, the year that marked the end of the 30-year party-less Panchayat regime. Within six years, the country began to witness an 11-year civil war. With the introduction of a multi-party system, partisan journalism increased to an unprecedented level and media companies fell into controversies because of their roles. Some of their engagements were pro-peace, while others were conflict-provoking. This article assesses the role of the Nepalese media companies as private business actors in the transformation or exacerbation of conflicts.

The research undertaken seeks to promote a better understanding of the motives, interests and strategies of media companies in conflict situations in Nepal, as well as to generate valuable information for researchers and practitioners in understanding the role of media companies as business actors. There are three objectives in seeking to achieve this aim: (a) to facilitate learning regarding the dynamics of media companies’ engagements in different conflict situations; (b) to understand the implications of media company activities in exacerbating or transforming conflicts in politically fragile contexts; and (c) to identify the needs and motives of media companies in conflict situations.

The article is mainly based on a case study approach. Secondary data collected from journals, archives, newspapers and published reports contributed to the analysis process. To supplement the analysis, the researchers used information from participant observations and conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants who included media owners, media workers and independent analysts. Rather than highlighting individual opinions, the interview responses were divided into themes and validated against information in the literature. This qualitative study reveals specific cases of how media companies reacted to two different types of conflicts. The first case analyses media company responses to conflict at a national level (i.e. anti-monarchy movement) and contributes to an understanding of how they unite for action, and the merits and demerits of this unity. The second looks at responses to conflict at the corporate level (labour dispute in media companies) and shows how commercial and managerial interests are reflected in the response to internal organisational conflict.

Interface between the media and conflicts

As a private business entity, a media company has political vulnerability in a conflict context. In many cases, the ulterior motives of the media may differ from what appears below daily headlines. Due to commercial interests and nexus with power centres, the media may not be as unbiased as the public generally expects. Therefore, understanding the role of media in politically sensitive times requires an in-depth analysis. On the one hand, the media inform people about events and incidents, and prepare them for future occurrences; on the other hand, they may exacerbate mishaps and enrage their audience (Ghimire, 2006). Thus, they can influence both national and international agendas.

There are many examples of the destructive, as well as constructive, impact of the media. For example, Hitler manipulated the media, belittling and humiliating Jews and other groups, which triggered vehement disputes (Bratic and Schirch, 2007). Media companies elsewhere have played fundamental roles leading to social change. During the Christian–Muslim global controversy surrounding the cartoon of the Prophet Mohammad, the South African government forbade the media to circulate the comic strips representing him as a terrorist (Van der Vyver, 2011), in order to protect Muslims from being ostracised and labelled as dangerous.

When the media ignore ethics and underestimate their audiences, existing conflicts may escalate further. This could be linked to the case of the Balkans where media broadcasts described a certain community as the generators of antipathy and aggression (Bratic and Schirch, 2007). Similarly, Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda, with the current government support, credited one group and demonised the other, causing a serious rift between them, and it played a very negative role in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (Bastola, 2011). In contrast, in Sierra Leone, religious leaders relied on radio programmes to console affected people through a ‘mix of prayers’ and other religious messages. The leaders aimed to build trust among various religious groups through ‘information, song and reconciliatory processes’ (Comninos et al., 2002).

Carruthers (2000: 171–172) has pointed out that media ambivalence encouraged violent behaviour from Latin America to western Europe between 1968–1971 and 1973–1974. ‘Media silence’ describes the failure of mass media to bear any social responsibility that could contribute to reducing violence and promoting peace. Hamdan and Hanaysha (2011) assert that television channels in Palestine gave no coverage, even when they could have done so, to the potential for reconciliation. Given their widespread presence, television channels could have contributed considerably to promoting a culture of peace and reconciliation. But this did not happen. In practice, there are major political, social and even economic implications in the forming and manipulating of public opinion in conflict situations. An American style of presentation, often highlighting differences and divergences, is becoming increasingly global as news channels attempt to reach more viewers and dissuade their target audience from switching channels (Thussu, 2003: 127).

Media companies tend to report more on conflicts and wars because they perceive these topics to be sensational issues for their audiences. This trend results in competition between television channels to show sensational news around-the-clock, a culture also termed as ‘CNNization’ of news (ibid: 118). Broadcasting sensational features is also associated with successful business. Hess and Kalb (2003: 63) also term the effects of media in decision-making as ‘the CNN effect’. They write:

In 1992, President George H.W. Bush saw television images of starving children in Somalia, and he felt obliged to send U.S. troops there to distribute food and establish security. Less than a year later, President Bill Clinton saw television images of Somali fighters dragging the desecrated body of an American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, and he felt obliged to withdraw the troops (pp. 63–64).

The question is whether such media behaviour aims merely to disseminate information or tries to advertently influence decision-makers. As Hawkins (2011) argues, the other side of the CNN effect is that media companies cover conflicts selectively and disproportionately. Hawkins, as well as Salhani (2006), has provided examples of media influences directed at sensitive and military intervention decisions.

Media coverage is widely considered as part of an agenda-setting process because it forces action (Bahador, 2007; Livingston, 1997). But it sometimes inadvertently ignores genuine conflicts that deserve primary attention, thereby diverting policy priorities. Because of this, the media cannot be considered to be actors with homogeneous characteristics, but rather a concept within which varieties of actors involve themselves with varieties of interests. Recently, the advent of citizen journalism and technological advancements in social media have also contributed to diversity in media behaviour (Ali and Fahmy, 2013: 55–69). Such heterogeneous media behaviour limits its role of raising homogeneous issues. This reflects both the positive and negative attributes of media companies.

Conflict brings profits for the media, but cooperation does not. Van de Veen (2011) agrees that this profitability leads media companies to focus more on irreconcilable differences, extreme positions and threatening statements than on harmony, points of agreement and win–win options. This commercial characteristic of the media makes the events ‘news-worthy’ rather than ‘peace-worthy’.

Media companies in fragile contexts are different from those in developed economies. In fragile countries, why and when one invests in the media industry depends on the investor’s command of financial and political capital. Private media companies seek profit from news-making whereas state media suffer from their lack of operational independence. Therefore, the media represent the most vital yet controversial character in conflicts. Broadly, Hallin and Mancini (2004) assert that no media in any part of the world can be termed ‘entirely neutral’. Hattotuwa (2003) and Musa and Ferguson (2013) talk about coloured opinion, partisan biases and the practice of enemy framing while publicising coverage. In this context, the following section discusses two cases of media company bias in different conflicts.

The Nepal case

The context of the civil war

The context of civil war in Nepal was what Brown and Kanagaretnam (2005) described as fertile ground for internal wars: the eruption of civil wars can be traced to the interaction of economic motives and opportunities with long-standing grievances of society, inequitable distribution of resources, repressive politics and poor governance. The country witnessed a decade-long (1996–2006) Maoist insurgency. About 16,000 people lost their lives, 200,000 were displaced and an infrastructure worth billions was destroyed (Upreti, 2010). Human rights abuses were rampant, freedom of speech was restricted (Dahal, 2006) and investment security was very low. Several multinational enterprises (MNEs) were forced to withdraw from the country and local businesses suffered investment insecurity. Later, the triangular conflict between monarchy, political parties and insurgents became a duel between the monarchy and the rest. Political parties dethroned the king with overwhelming support from the people in 2006. They signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), agreeing to write a new constitution and integrate former combatants. Even though the latter promise has been successful, the former has not been. The transition was prolonged due to a political tug-of-war and a power-sharing dispute. This created security complications and revitalised the legacy of violence, manifested in the rise of the number of trade unions, industrial disputes and partisan youth clashes. For the media companies, the civil war was a bleak period with high censorship and suppression. Even now, the situation is far from trouble-free due to the nature of the actors, events and ideologies of the post-war period.

Media companies in Nepal

The evolution of mass media in Nepal began with the introduction of the hand-printing press in 1851. Rijal (2010) writes that the first newspaper (Gorkhapatra) under the state-owned media company (Gorkhapatra Corporation) was first published in 1901 and the first English daily The Rising Nepal in 1965. Nepal saw a steady increase in the number of private media companies – newspapers, radios and television channels – after the political change of 1990. The Constitution of Nepal–1991 facilitated this context as it emphasised freedom of expression. This favourable provision attracted private investment in the sector. Ghimire (2011) states that after Shyam Goenka established Kantipur and The Kathmandu Post in 1993, many others joined the race. By August 2011, 394 FM radios and 32 television channels had acquired licences from the Ministry of Information and Communication (MoIC, 2011a, 2011b). Ghimire (2011) also claims that registered dailies, weeklies, fortnightlies and journals numbered more than 3,300. Even though it seems that there are hundreds of media companies in operation, only a few have a profound influence on society and politics. Many of them are controversial either on legal grounds, or because of their nexus with power centres.

Media-related conflicts in Nepal

Key informant interviews with media people conducted during this study were dominated by two false extremities that the media are neutral actors and that they have been targeted because they speak the truth. Some media companies even opt out on the grounds that peace-building is a political agenda and therefore beyond their mandate. There has been hardly any scientific research discussing their role in mitigating or promoting conflicts.

Due to financial capital, political nexus and social influence, Nepalese media companies have been a part of change as well as conflict. Their capacity to create jobs, energise the economy and strengthen the right to information has facilitated the process of social transformation. But the media do not form a homogeneous group, nor are they heterogeneous in terms of what they offer (Ghimire, 2006). Thus, controversies and contestations have been a part of the media. The following are some examples of the relationship between media insensitivity and conflict escalation in Nepal.

The Hritik Roshan Scandal (26–27 December 2000) was an example of media insensitivity that saw the eruption of severe violence across the country. Hritik Roshan, an Indian movie celebrity, had reportedly expressed his dislike of Nepal and Nepalis. The media raised this issue as an attack on Nepali nationalism, while some political parties manipulated this public wrath for their own vested interest.¹ The protest led to violence between Nepalis and people of Indian origin in Nepal,² which resulted in the deaths of at least three people after police were compelled to shoot at demonstrators. To quell the protest, the government of Nepal banned all movies starring that actor, and issued a statement asking him for a public apology (Dahal, 2007). In response, he denied the alleged remarks and claimed he loved Nepal and its people. Unfortunately the protest had already incurred high costs, as well as loss of life.

The Mahara Tape Scandal in 2010 is notorious for another conflict inflamed by the media. The mainstream media had aired a controversial tape in early September 2010 in which the Maoist leader Krishna Bahadur Mahara was recorded asking for NPR500 million (about US$5.2 million) from an alleged Chinese official to ensure a Maoist victory in the prime ministerial election. This unverified coverage affected the then ongoing peace process as the Maoists were about to enter the government and China was a key foreign player.³ This scandal demonstrated the potential for media manipulation and its implications for the peace process. A number of such examples show that media companies amplify incidents, sensitise issues and exaggerate opinions for political and commercial interest. They are divided and biased by complicated interests in many critical incidents such as the dismissal of the former Chief of Army Staff Rookmangud Katwal, arms importing by the Nepal Army, and the criminal activities of ex-combatants inside their camps. In a nutshell, unhealthy, partisan and controversial presentations have helped the media to lose their credibility.

A study by Media Service International (MSI, 2003) on Nepalese media in the conflict suggests that

the media can contribute to the process of building greater public understanding of the conflict and its dimension and thereby help build public knowledge levels that can favour peaceful resolution, not only in the context of the ‘people’s war’ but also for addressing the other less-visible conflicts. (p. 7)

But ethical responsibility and conflict sensitivity often disappear from media practices while covering conflicts. UNESCO-Kathmandu (2011) documented that much of the media’s self-reflection focused on their own business. Chalise (2005) reveals that 84 per cent of the Kathmandu audience wanted television shows to broadcast constructive affairs. On the contrary, they broadcast shows of which 69 per cent were on political affairs and the ongoing war (p. 219). Hence, it is hard to disagree that the power of the media in Nepal has been used far less objectively or for the purpose of peace and transformation (Ghimire, 2011). In the light of such discrepancies, the next sections discuss two conflict contexts: the anti-monarchy movement and labour disputes inside media companies.

There is a political rationale behind selecting these two cases. Up until 1990, there were only limited numbers of media companies in Nepal. Then the Constitution of Nepal, promulgated in 1991, reintroduced democracy and freedom of expression after 30 years of the Panchayat regime. For the next 10 years, the media took the form of a considerable number of printing and broadcasting companies. Looking at the anti-monarchy movement is significant because, in 2005, King Gyanendra imposed the first restrictions on freedom of expression and limited the independence of media companies; such restrictions and censorship had not been experienced since 1990. The second case, an internal labour dispute in large media companies, is important because it was a reflection of the ideological legacies of the civil war. The disputes raised questions of the unjust distribution of profits and demanded fair treatment for employees in the workplace. It was also remarkable because such disputes were sometimes radicalised by the former rebel party. Therefore, the two cases have been especially selected to explore needs, interests and motivations of the media companies while responding to two dissimilar conflicts.

The media and conflicts in Nepal

Context 1: The anti-monarchy movement

Media companies were placed under strict censorship when King Gyanendra took over power in 2005, accusing the parliamentary parties of an inability to lead. He banned all news reports and the army arrested political leaders, influential civilians, media people, human rights activists and others who were considered a threat to the monarchy. Telephone and internet connections were cut. Ultimately, the king had imposed rules that kept people in the dark, deprived of the freedom of expression.

Despite constitutionally guaranteed press freedom, such restrictive ordinances prevented the media from publishing or broadcasting news and independent analyses (Dahal, 2006). During the king’s rule, media companies suffered the worst form of suppression. Seizure of technological linkage equipment from independent broadcasting companies such as Kantipur FM, Radio Annapurna and Radio Sagarmatha were an example of this. Later, parliamentary parties and insurgents joined forces to protest against the monarchy. With popular support from hundreds of thousands, they succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy after the 19-day April movement.

Response from the media companies:

Unlike before, the role of media during the anti-monarchy movement was interesting and inspiring. The media companies, including print and broadcast media, and their associations appeared courageously at the forefront, sometimes symbolically and sometimes directly defying the king’s rule. Rajendra Baidya, editor and publisher of Bimarsha weekly, staged a fast-unto-death in Dhaka and New Delhi, to attract the attention of the heads of states gathered in Bangladesh to attend the 13th SAARC summit. Afterwards, he moved to Rajghat, where the graveyard of Mahatma Gandhi is located, to continue his fast (Dahal, 2006). He called off his hunger strike after 17 days on the advice of doctors, family members and senior journalists.

Dhungel (2007) writes that FM radios, which were inexpensive and widely accessible, were first targeted by the royal government, but the print media companies raised no common objections as they themselves were not targeted at that stage. Later, media associations tried to influence and convince the royal government by lobbying, handing over memos and negotiating with those close to the palace. They also asked international media bodies to speak out on this matter (p. 144). After these ‘soft’ approaches failed, they resorted to street protests and a judicial solution to the problem. Towards this end, they created the ‘Freedom of expression movement fund’ in which almost 20 media-related associations⁴ were involved.

Such protests, hunger strikes, demonstrations and symbolic defiances were a regular feature during the 15 months’ active rule of King Gyanendra. In an analysis of the positions and interests of the media companies during that period, Ghimire (2006) writes, that as the government swooped down on the media, the latter responded in four ways:

State-led media companies and their private allies supported the takeover and suspension of fundamental rights, including freedom of expression.

All the broadsheet dailies adopted a policy of indifference – no support and no opposition to the royal action, although some later turned aggressively anti-monarchist in response to its repressive measures.

A large number of weekly and other periodicals initially made a symbolic gesture by keeping editorial and opinion space blank, adopting a more open anti-king posture later.

Some defied censorship and printed their opposition to the royal move in black and white.

Dahal (2006) champions the role played by the media. He claims that it was the Nepalese media companies that led the anti-monarchist freedom movement in 2006. The news and programmes on the media were designed to promote the people’s courage and will for a new era, a so-called ‘paradigm-shift to a republican age’. They not only echoed the voice for concerted action and national unity, but also challenged the restrictions of the over-ambitious and authoritarian regime. This heightened public consciousness, which acted as a catalyst for the final overthrow of the monarchy. Headlines encouraged people to turn out on the streets and local media drew attention to events and capitalised on the power of the people, which ultimately raised fear in their rulers.

Context 2: Labour disputes in media companies

The decade-long war, based on communist ideology, created class hostility and anti-capitalist sentiment that devastated the already hard-hit economy. Industrial disputes in the post-agreement phase shattered hopes of economic recovery. Even after the CPA in 2006, Nepal’s gross domestic product (GDP) remained continuously discouraging. One of its causes was the labour unrest in major industries, which also included the larger media companies.

Internal conflicts in media companies increased notably after the CPA. Between 2006 and 2007, most of the accredited publishing companies, if not all of them, had to suspend publication and distribution sporadically. Trade unionism as well as management hypocrisy infected many companies and giant media conglomerations such as Kantipur Publications, Himal Media, Kamana Publications and APCA Nepal suffered the most.

Eight years after its formation, Himal Media suffered serious labour unrest in early October 2007. Workers demanded the conditions that other media companies were demanding: job guarantees, provision of employment contracts and more favourable workplace conditions. Kamana Publications was unable to publish and distribute its paper (Nepal Samacharpatra) due to a workers’ strike from 20 to 23 June 2007.⁵ Similarly, workers disrupted distribution of The Himalayan Times and Annapurna Post – daily papers of APCA Nepal – from 11 to 15 August 2007. The demands were the same throughout the industry.⁶

Response from media companies:

Kantipur Publications had many issues relating to publications and broadcasting. The workers demanded guaranteed jobs, which the management refused, citing the instability of the industry and business conditions. Wage rates were erratic, and travel and daily allowances were also uncertain. The workers and journalists later accused management of ignoring their demands and halted publication and distribution of Kantipur and The Kathmandu Post in September 2007.⁷

The workers’ union submitted a letter to the management putting forth their 22 demands with a 21-day ultimatum to fulfil them (Adhikari, 2010). But the management did not take them seriously as it had already expressed its inability to fulfil such demands. Feeling ignored and angry, workers vandalised the Kantipur Publications offices. On 26 September 2007, the union restricted management from collecting advertisements for publication in the paper. Expressing their antipathy to such activities, Kantipur Publications itself stopped publishing papers for some days. However, talks in October 2007 helped overturn the decision, at least temporarily.

A similar case at Himal Media triggered many rounds of talks between management and union representatives but, instead of addressing the issues constructively, Himal published a front-page report that demonised union boss Shalikram Jamkattel (Bohara, 2008). This further intensified the conflict. Then the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist),⁸ which was supporting the union movement, was criticised for politicising the issue after a physical clash took place right at the negotiating table. The party then took on responsibility for facilitating the negotiation. As a result, in mid January 2009, the warring parties negotiated with the proactive engagement of the Maoist party.⁹ APCA Nepal and Kamana Publications followed the same approach in responding to disputes. They also used the strategy of ‘framing the enemy’ in daily coverage, rather than engaging constructively to settle disputes.

Analysis of the reactions

Needs of the media companies

Democracy encourages media autonomy. Political stability and legal protection help media companies run their businesses smoothly, which makes them feel obliged to settle conflicts at a national level. Independence and strength of the media cannot be achieved in the absence of democratic practices and institutions. This is why the media companies in Nepal struggled in the days of the anti-monarchy movement. Freedom of expression was a need, but so too was the freedom to do business, which could not have flourished with limited freedom of expression. The anti-monarchy movement succeeded due to concerted efforts. Media companies achieved the right to operate with self-esteem but, sadly, overlooked their workers’ rights to be employed with self-esteem.

During the anti-monarchy movement, radio broadcasters were the first to raise a voice for freedom, but interestingly were the last to actively protest at government suppression, mainly because they had to renew their licences annually and feared losing them. This indicates that business sector responses differ according to need, and radio broadcasters employed a coping strategy in order to sustain their business.

Protecting corporate interest is frequently a reason for responding selectively to problems. A symposium by the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) on editorial freedom cited corporate interference as one of the biggest threats to media freedom in Nepal (Ghimire, 2011). Commercial interest sometime biases opinion in its favour. Further, the media companies in Nepal, as shown in the literature review, lacked sensitivity towards peace. If media companies in Nepal had successfully and faithfully performed their duties, the peace process would have been more effectively on track. The constitution-making process might also have been executed at the desired pace.

In the case of internal labour disputes, media companies needed to safeguard their financial future as guaranteeing jobs to workers might well have cost more in the fluid and unpredictable market. As private business entities, they could not place ethical considerations above commercial interests. Thus they took the alternative route and demonised union leaders in order to maintain the support of the public.

Motives of media companies

Growth of media companies might signify a growth in freedom of expression. The more diverse the media, the more variety of opinion expressed to the people. Yet, the mushrooming of the media with 394 radios, 32 television channels and over 3300 print papers (see Ghimire, 2011) in Nepal indicates more than this. These statistics should be viewed against the growth of partisan journalism in the post-agreement period. Had commercial profit been the only target, there would not have been so many media companies to compete for limited advertising. It is also surprising in the context that Nepal has a 42 per cent adult illiteracy rate and a sluggish economic development with a less than 4 per cent average annual growth rate.

While associating with media is a way of feeling secure, some journalists threatened business owners with negative coverage (Ghimire, 2011). Political protection works perfectly in such cases and is the reason behind the exponential growth of partisan media companies in Nepal. Partisan support to media workers also encouraged ultra-unionism and consequently hindered the process of peace and transformation.

The Hritik and Mahara Tape scandals show that media companies want to be commercially competitive by appearing to be quicker and smarter. Sometimes, they want to appear independent by controlling or varying their expressed opinion. Such instances also reveal that giant media companies tend to be mere political pawns according to the need of the political parties with which they are most closely aligned.

In the above case of labour unrest, big media companies who mostly preferred a liberal market system, did not want to bow to other political ideology (here Maoism). Further, without flexibly hiring and firing employees, their business could not have been sustained in that fragile economic situation. The motive was to avoid financial risk and continue profit-making.

The major motive seen in Nepalese media companies is to be aligned with a political force. Some media companies have overtly been the mouthpieces of political parties while others show ideological alignment or opposition. This trend safeguards them in political and bureaucratic crises such as elections, states of emergency, taxation, registration, renewal, and import or export of machines and materials. To solidify political support, news headlines become politically manipulated. Placing of the news in papers (front, mid, last), timing of broadcasts and framing of public opinion easily affect national discourse. Thus, media companies have been focusing more on influence-setting than on information-setting.

Conclusions

Economic actors and their interests are associated with politics and conflicts. Such actors’ capacities to influence public agendas and politics can transform or exacerbate conflicts. Media companies as private economic actors have the potential to either derail or develop peace-building. They can work as an analytical workforce for peace but remain under pressure to work socially as well as commercially.

Conflict creates fear and insecurity in the private sector, which uses coping strategies to sustain its position. Apart from an investment-friendly environment, as private business actors, media companies seek political security to fulfil commercial interests. This makes a hidden collaboration with political actors unavoidable. Thus, needs and motives of media companies shift according to the socio-political context and commercial competition. The evidence shows that when there was a common political problem against media during the monarchy, they grouped together and acted in concert. But when there was labour unrest in major media companies, there was no immediate consolidated effort to address those issues and the problem was prolonged unnecessarily. Even though these two conflict situations are not comparable because of their context, nature and the actors involved, the responses from the media seem selective and unparalleled.

In contrast to public expectations, media companies have heterogeneous interests that make them a complex socio-political force. Hence, treating media as a homogeneous entity, and actors with a single interest, would be naive in analysing their behaviour. The Nepal case shows that media companies can manipulate a situation, or be manipulated from elsewhere but this may be specific to country and context.

In order to contribute to peace, the Nepalese media need to improve their capacity to understand conflict and differentiate fact from propaganda. Broad discussions on concepts such as ‘peace journalism’, ‘conflict-conscious reporting’ and ‘conflict-sensitive journalism’ may help to achieve this aim. Conflicts need to be understood in terms of causes, effects and means of peaceful resolution. Private media companies in Nepal appear to be freedom fighters for national causes and they have been seen to contribute to political transformations. But while taking care of national causes, private media companies also appear to have forgotten their own organisational harmony. Profit-making and change-making (both internal and external) need to be considered simultaneously in order to make the media socially responsible, professionally ethical and politically neutral.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

This paper was presented at the Joint Academic Workshop on ‘Money Makers as Peace Makers? The Role of Business in Conflict Zones’ at Basel, Switzerland from 13 to 14 November 2011. The authors thank the organisers (Swiss Peace Foundation, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, HSFK and the Centre for Security Studies ETH-Zurich) and the participants for their support and constructive comments.

Funding

The authors acknowledge support from the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, co-funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the participating institutions.

Notes

Author biographies

Safal Ghimire is a PhD Candidate in Centre for Peace Studies at University of New England, NSW, Australia. His research interests are in post-war recovery, critical security studies and actors in conflict transformation. He has recently co-authored a book Making Business Count for Peace (NCCR North-South and Kathmandu University, 2013).

Bishnu Raj Upreti is the Executive Director of Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research based in Kathmandu, Nepal. His research interests are in conflict transformation, peace processes and their impact on people’s livelihood.

Address: Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research, Ekantakuna, Jawalakhel, Nepal, PO Box No. 910, Kathmandu, Nepal. [email: bupreti@nccr.wlink.com.np]

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