Depoliticizing terror: The news framing of the terrorist attacks in Norway,22 July 2011

Abstract

This article analyzes how the Norwegian news media framed the terrorist attacks in Oslo and the island of Utöya, which killed 77 mainly young people on 22 July 2011. Did the news media favour or counteract the propaganda of the terrorist? After discussing earlier research about terrorism and media and presenting theories on news framing, results from a content analysis of 924 news articles in two major Norwegian newspapers during the first two weeks after the attacks are analyzed. The coverage of the attacks is found to be very descriptive, focused on the perpetrator as an individual, giving him questionable political exposure and not analyzing reasons and consequences on a political–societal level. The news framing functioned as a way of depoliticizing the terror attacks by portraying the attack as conducted by a lone lunatic in contrast to a politically motivated terrorist linked to right-wing extremism.

Keywords

Framing news journalism Norway propaganda terrorism

On 22 July 2011, a car bomb exploded at 3:25 pm in the center of the Norwegian executive national government in Oslo. The bomb exploded next to the Prime Minister’s office and other government buildings, killing eight people and wounding several others. Because of recent terrorist attacks (e.g. the attacks on the US in 2001, Bali and Russia in 2002, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and India in 2008) and Norway’s involvement in NATO-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was believed that Islamic extremist groups had carried out the attack. Two hours later, there was another attack on the island of Utöya, where the Workers Youth League had an annual camp. A man disguised as a policeman fired at the participants and killed 69 people. A few hours later, the perpetrator was arrested. A Norwegian right-wing extremist executed the bombing and the massacre.

The news media play a vital role in society’s opinion-making processes in connection to acts of terror by providing answers to basic questions such as what happened, who was to blame and how to solve the situation (Boin et al., 2005). One of the key questions is how the media reports on and relates to the perpetrators. The relationship between the news media and the terrorist is vital since, as once stated by the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, media exposure is the oxygen of terrorism (Wilkinson, 1997: 53). This places the news media in an awkward position as it is basically through them that terrorists get access to the public and decision makers in proclaiming their message (Nacos, 1994: 10). The news media can take on two fundamentally different positions according to Norris et al. (2003): Firstly, they can ‘err on the side of group terrorists, lending them legitimacy and credibility, as well as unintentionally encouraging further incidents through “contagion” effect’, or the media can choose to

err instead on the side of the governments, due to an overreliance upon the framework of interpretation offered by public officials, security experts, and military commentators, with news functioning ultimately to reinforce support for political leaders and the security policies they implement? (p. 3)

Keeping in mind these two roles, this article aims to describe and analyze how the Norwegian news media framed the 22 July terrorist attacks in relation to such dimensions as representation, journalistic frames and consequences for Norway as a society.

Our empirical investigation consists of a content analysis of 924 news articles published between 22 July and 5 August 2011 in two major Norwegian newspapers (Verdens Gang and Aftenposten). We begin the article by first discussing the contemporary terrorism threat and organizations as communicative entities, then describing the relationship between terrorism, frames and journalism. We base the analysis on news framing theory, which deals with the social construction of media content. We then deploy a quantitative news analysis with a special emphasis on which actors dominate the reporting, which journalistic frames dominate the coverage and how contextual–political factors are discussed.

Terrorism threats

The Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 led to an increased focus on terrorist threats worldwide. Following from this, the role of the media regarding terrorist attacks and terrorism has also received significant attention. Researchers (Norris et al., 2003: 4) argue that the changes and events that followed these attacks were, in the first place, based on ‘the American perception of the world terrorist threat more than the actual reality’. They then refer to statistics from the US government that show that actual terrorist threats decreased from 1993 to 2003. The development since then is different in different parts of the world, but a general assessment is that the number of terrorist attacks has increased on a global level since 2003. One possible assumption is that the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the wars that followed in Iraq and Afghanistan created increased polarization and radicalization. There are a variety of statistical sources based on different definitions of terrorism and different collection methods. But some trends are clear. In a review of terrorism statistics from the UN (Schmid, 2004: 67), it is noted that the number of international terrorist incidents declined in the 1990s and that there is a clear link between poverty and terrorism. A few years after the attacks in the USA in 2001, the number of terrorist incidents increased globally. The source for this claim is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) in the USA, which is an established open source database of registered worldwide events between 1970–2010. The database is based at the University of Maryland with support from the US Department for Homeland Security. GTD uses a broad definition of terrorism. The premise is that the terrorist act must constitute an assault or a threat of a non-state actor (i.e. state terrorism is not included). Two of the following three criteria must also be met: (1) the intention is to achieve a political, economic, religious or social goal; (2) the intention is to communicate a message to a wider public; and (3) the act violates regulations in international humanitarian law. GTD shows that the increase in terrorist incidents has mainly occurred in South Asia (maximum increase in Southeast Asia), the Middle East and North Africa. The number of terrorist incidents has also increased in Europe and the US, although this increase cannot be considered to be on a par with the increase in Asia or Africa. The types of events that have increased the most are bomb attacks and then armed attacks, both directed against private persons and property.

In the public debate and news media, terrorists are usually viewed as organizational members. But Schoenborn and Scherer (2010) note in a study on terrorist organizations that these organizations do not comply with the established organization types: hierarchical, network, or social movement. They share some characteristics with hierarchies, especially the authoritarian leadership and vertical communication processes. But they also share characteristics with network organizations because they are largely based on autonomy and situation-bound flexibility. Despite this, they are not networked organizations since there are often no actual connections between the actors. Terrorism actors are rather autonomous, acting with no actual contact with other actors. Clear examples of this are the groups that carried out the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2003 and in London in 2005; the groups did not have connections to other actors in a network of some kind (Beck, 2008: 1574). A third possibility is to consider terrorist organizations as social movements, but the problem then is that these require mass mobilization. Hoffmann (2004: 551) notes that al Qaeda ‘has become more an idea or a concept than an organization; an amorphous movement tenuously held together by a loosely coupled transnational constituency rather than a monolithic, international terrorist organization’.

Schoenborn and Scherer (2010: 24) argue that communication constitutes terrorist organizations and that organizations are created and consist of connected strategic communicative acts. This means that terrorist acts and the publicity or public attention they are given serves as internal communication between actors who have no other connection to each other. ‘Media reports on terrorism contribute to the communicative construction of the terrorist organization (e.g. Al Qaeda) as a collective actor.’ The media and journalists will thus end up in a very difficult situation. The terrorist tactical goal may be to create physical and human suffering, but their strategic goals are public attention through the media. The media thus become central for terrorists to gain new members, supporters and political influence. The Norwegian terrorist was very aware of this and concluded in his manifesto, which was published immediately before the attacks, that: ‘Your arrest will mark the launch of the propaganda phase’ (Manifesto 2011, our translation).

Framing terror events

The original theory of framing was developed by social psychologist Goffman (1956), and the notion of framing has been one of the most influential ways for understanding media and communication during the last decades, but from several analytical approaches. Framing theory is a ‘fractured paradigm’ as expressed by Entman (1993), which has resulted in framing analysis being applied to different types of media content with different analytical purposes. Despite its fractured nature, Entman argues for frames to have the following features in common:

Frames, then, define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects. (p. 52)

Frames can be understood as a struggle for meaning amongst involved actors. In connection to crises, as well as other communication situations, frames may match each other but they may also collide. Politicians or corporate leaders refer to established ideological frames, rooted in cultural norms, and communicate messages designed to adapt to public opinion. Journalists base their news production according to structural circumstances, media logic and established journalism narratives (including polarization, simplification and moral dichotomies). The public has common and different frames for understanding and interpreting a social event but is influenced by news media frames, which in turn are influenced by the framing strategies and tactics used by professional sources (Allern, 1997; Hallahan, 2001).

Framing analyses have been applied to a number of various studies throughout the years. An example of one such leading study in the field of media studies and political communication is Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) who argue that news media use five different frames when reporting events: attribution of responsibility frame, conflict frame, morality frame, economic frame and human-interest frame. Other influential studies are Iyengar and Kinder’s (1987) and Iyengar’s (1991) conceptualizations of thematic and episodic framing derived from content analysis of television newscasts. In the thematic frame, issues are presented in their broader societal context as, for example, general trends or as a matter of public policy. In contrast, the episodic frame focuses on individuals without societal contextual information. Previous research on media and terrorism tells us that the media, in general, apply both thematic and episodic frames, and that they both promote negative stereotypes and military actions (Papacharissi and De Fatima Oliveira, 2008: 58). For example, a study by McDonald and Lawrence (2004) on the first three days after the 9/11 terror attacks in American networks showed that episodic framing dominated the coverage. As such, it fits into the audience consumer pattern of news based on short intervals, and the economic concerns of the networks in question as well as a general norm promoting the breaking news formula. In all, the coverage resembled crime reporting, which tends to focus on the crime itself rather than on the social and political aspects. The authors suggest the implications are substantial in that this kind of reporting detaches citizens, both emotional and intellectual, from real-world events (p. 338).

Other scholars in the field have noted the news media’s tendency to rely on global macro frames, such as the cold-war-frame, when reporting on political conflicts. Similar to how Entman (1993) describes framing, such macro frames served to highlight ‘certain foreign events as international problems, identified their sources, offered normative judgments, and recommended particular policy solutions’ (Norris, 1996: 358). The cold-war frame depicted the world as being dominated by two major rivals where other countries were seen as either friends or enemies. In the wake of the terror attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, scholars have argued for the emergence of a new macro frame called the war-on-terror frame (Norris et al., 2003). Similar to the cold-war frame, it has the propensity to link local conflicts with global ones, in this case, to the Al-Qaeda movement. Governments, non-state actors and media have applied the war-on-terror frame to justify and explain political and military strategies, especially in dealing with state opponents (Reese, 2007; Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt, 2007; Ryan, 2004). However, Reese (2007) argues that, despite the almost hegemonic character of the war-on-terror frame, there is still room for it to be redefined in various contexts and adapted to specific circumstances (p. 67). In line with this, based on a study of terrorism reporting in India and the US, Roy and Ross (2011) found a common war-on-terror frame but also local differences which offered resistance to the dominating frame.

Macro frames, such as the war-on-terror frame, help journalists answer basic questions related to who, what and why. Terror attacks are often characterized by profound initial uncertainties regarding the terrorist’s identity and motives. This often leads to an information vacuum where journalists as well as the public want fast answers and, if they do not get any information, the risk for speculation and rumors increases. In the case of the attacks in Norway, there are examples of how experts and journalists speculated that al Qaeda was responsible.¹ This speculation was based on the fact that Norway is a member of NATO and was active in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was also based on the fact that several Islamic terror organizations communicated that they stood behind the attacks (e.g. Ansar al-Jihad al-Alami, quoted from the New York Times in Aftenposten, 22 July). For example, a Swedish terrorist expert said in an interview that: ‘It is probably al-Qaida that is behind the terror attack in Oslo’ (Aftenposten, 22 July, our translation) but changed his mind two hours later in another interview, saying that the attack on the island made him sure that it was not an Islamist terrorist attack.

One consequence of the frame is the simplification of terrorism coverage into binary opposition, centered on ‘us and them’ rhetoric. In short, some Islamist terrorists are portrayed as irrational and fanatics in contrast to rational and moderate Westerners (Thussu, 2006: 10). As a result, the earlier stereotype of ‘lone, disturbed individuals whose acts were the products of their individual pathologies, loveless lives, and unfulfilled ambitions’ has been replaced by frames that are more complex and linked to structures or political conflicts (Matusitz, 2013: 117). Thus, Powell (2011) argues, based on a study of US news media, that the lone disturbed individual still exists – but only in relation to domestic terrorism. In fact, Powell demonstrates significant differences between the two types of terrorism. In terms of agent, the domestic terrorist is portrayed as being intelligent but mentally unstable. Furthermore, he or she is personalized and given human descriptors such as being described as a family member. On the other hand, the international terrorist is an evil extremist linked to a much larger network driven by hate towards the US in the name of Islamic radicalism. Moreover, the domestic agent is much more complex and has individualized motives which usually belong to one of the following three reasons: creating fear, delivering an anti-government message, or seeking attention. In the case of international terrorists, future threats from Islamist extremists are enhanced whereas the domestic attack is seen as an isolated occurrence.

Below we will briefly present the method applied to the study before we move on to discuss the empirical results.

Empirical material and method

The sample consists of 924 news articles, published on the news web between 22 July and 5 August 2011, from the two major newspapers Verdens Gang and Aftenposten in Norway. The articles were collected by using a media database, Retriever, and the search words (bomb* AND Oslo) OR (Utøya OR Breivik). Verdens Gang (VG) is Norway’s second largest national print newspaper with a total print circulation of 211,600 and is the most read online newspaper with 1,728,000 daily readers (TNS Gallup, 2011). VG is owned by the company Schibsted and is politically independent. Aftenposten (AP) is a national daily and evening newspaper. It is owned by Schibsted and has an independent conservative opinion label. VG’s office was located opposite the government headquarters that were attacked and had to be evacuated to another place. Nobody was hurt at VG’s office but it meant that VG was in fact directly affected by the attack.

AP has a total print circulation of 337,500 (morning edition 236,000). The evening edition is only published from Tuesday to Thursday. In 2011, AP was Norway’s largest print newspaper and the third most read online newspaper with 554,000 daily readers (TNS Gallup, 2011). About 79 percent of Norwegians (9–79 years) read a print or online newspaper every day in 2011: 63 percent read a printed newspaper, 48 percent read an online newspaper (TNS Gallup, 2011).

The method applied in the study is a descriptive content analysis. In order to carry out the analysis, we developed a codebook with comprehensive code instructions for every item based on previous studies made on crisis and framing.² One coder was hired in order to code the material. In the following, we will account for the coding instructions related to each of the categories studied in the empirical section.

Which genres were applied in the coverage? Alternatives to be coded for were: news article, news analysis, chronicle, other, and not clear.

Which sources dominate the media coverage? Alternatives to be coded for were: the Norwegian prime minister, Norwegian ministers, the perpetrator, people related to the perpetrator, the police and the security police, Emergency services, victims, people related to the victims, experts, international politicians or royalty, the Norwegian church, the Norwegian Royal House and Norwegian opposition parties.

Which journalistic styles dominated the media coverage? Here we make a dichotomy between descriptive and interpretative journalism. Items were coded as interpretive if the news story was dominated by analyses, evaluations, or explanations of a situation. Descriptive style was coded for in instances where items were dominated by descriptions of what had happened or what someone had said and reported on in a straightforward manner with an emphasis on what, where, when, who.

How was the media coverage framed in terms of context? In this category we make a distinction between episodic and thematic framing. Episodic means that the item is primarily focused on a single event or a single person. The item does not move beyond the single event, person or action. Thematic frames, on the other hand, place the news in a broader context where its content is compared to other events, persons or actions, and aims at providing an understanding of general trends, tendencies and/or societal consequences. Thematic frames then place the item in a broader and more abstract context.

To what extent were references made to causes and effects? In this category we aim to explore the extent to which the item relates to the original causes of the attack and focus on the events preceding the attack. Items have been coded for in relation to how much such information is available, ranging from ‘major amount’, ‘minor amount’ and ‘not at all’. ‘Major amount’ requires that the item is dominated by discussions related to the background causes of the attacks. ‘Minor amount’ means that there is little discussion on background causes, that is, they are only mentioned in passing without being given particular attention. ‘Not at all’ means that background causes are not addressed at all in the item.

To what extent were references made to future effects on Norway? This category explores the extent to which references were made to possible future effects on Norwegian society. Similar to the category described above, this category is coded for in relation to how much such information is available, ranging from ‘major amount’, ‘minor amount’ to ‘not at all’. The difference between the alternatives relates to the amount of space provided to discussions related to potential effects of the terror attack on Norwegian society. To be coded for as ‘major amount’, the item has to be dominated by discussions about possible effects. ‘Minor amount’ means that there is no detailed discussion on possible effects rather than such information being mentioned in passing without being given particular consideration. The alternative ‘not at all’ means that no such information is available.

Results

The content analysis shows minor differences between the coverage in VG and AP; therefore, the material has been merged for presentation. Interesting differences are mentioned.

The content analysis is limited to the first two weeks after the attacks. It is a fact that the news media became more critical toward the crisis management, especially police actions, after those weeks. This critique was also directed toward the prime minister and the government. The focus in this analysis is on the first crisis phase since it is crucial for the establishment of frames. It is also the phase where the public’s need for information and the possibilities for influencing public opinion are at their highest level.

Genres and sources

In this section we will discuss the genres applied in the coverage as well as the number and types of sources. First we will look at the genres applied in reporting the terror events (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Medium and news genre frequency: Verdens Gang and Aftenposten, 22 July to 5 August 2011 (N = 924).

News article	News analysis	Chronicle	Other	Not clear	Total
841	6	8	63	6	924

The coding of this category is mainly based on the media’s own system of headings. ‘News article’ refers to all items that are placed in the news section with no headlines or layout that signal to the reader that the article in question is not a news article. ‘News analysis’ means articles explicitly telling the reader that the article contains an analysis. In case of doubt, the coding decision was made based on readers’ ability to determine if the article was an analysis or a news article. ‘Chronicles’ are personal chronicles with no news journalistic approach. ‘Other’ means articles that do not fit into any of the above categories, and ‘unclear’ consists of articles that cannot be placed in any of the other categories. The majority of the 924 articles are traditional news articles that report what has happened and what will happen, and focus on the most dramatic events. This is not very surprising. During the initial phase of a crisis, journalists focus on collecting information and transmitting it as soon as possible, following traditional media logic. Previous crisis studies tell us that, in times of acute and stressful situations, news media tend to focus on individuals and events rather than on social and contextual factors (Singer and Endreny, 1993). Further, crisis accentuates the classical conflict between speed and accuracy. Research on the topic seems to agree on the tendency for broadcasting media (and also today’s internet-based news) to broadcast everything that comes in due to an insatiable demand for information (Nord and Strömbäck, 2006; Quarantelli, 1989). In terror situations, this is obviously a vulnerable phase since the terrorists also have the opportunity to influence the news reporting. However, what is surprising in the Norwegian coverage of 22 July is that the acute crisis reporting style dominated the coverage for at least 10 days. This leads us to conclude that in this case it is not only a matter of initial uncertainties and shock but also a more systematic feature of the news coverage in question.

In the next category, we look at which official sources dominated the news coverage (see Table 2) and, in so doing, provide an opportunity to frame the news coverage in accordance with their interests. We have not measured the size of coverage.

Table 2.

Frequency of sources in Verdens Gang and Aftenposten, 22 July to 5 August 2011 (N = 924) (%).

Source	N
Police	179 (19)
Experts	92 (10)
Related to perpetrator	60 (7)
Victims, survivors	60 (7)
PM Stoltenberg	57 (6)
Other Norwegian Ministers	55 (6)
Perpetrator	49 (5)
Families of victims	45 (5)

Note: Source with a percentage below 1 has been excluded from the table.

The police were the primary source, which is logical since they had a key role in dealing with the attacks, together with medical and emergency personnel. According to previous research, news media usually adopt a ‘command post’ view in times of acute crisis, which means that they tend to lean on statements from emergency personnel in their reporting. According to Quarantelli (2002: 17), the reliance on official sources increases even more during acts of terror. Problems associated with relying upon a command post view are, firstly, that the emergency personnel seldom have a clear picture of the event, and, secondly, the reliance on one type of source often makes reporters miss out on other angles and activities undertaken by other actors (Scanlon, 2007: 83). It should thus be noted that in a governmental evaluation (Politidirektoratet, 2012) the Norwegian police were later criticized for their management of crisis communications: the need for professional communication personnel was not met; the communication plans were poorly updated; there were no uniformed spokespersons in place next to Utöya; the communication through social media was not proactive, and the police were late in disclosing information. Eggen et al. (2012) analyzed how the Norwegian television covered the crisis during the first 24 hours after the attacks. Most of the airtime was filled with press conferences and interviews with different studio guests. The primary sources differ somewhat from the newspapers, with the police as a primary source and emergency representatives as a secondary resource.

The second most dominant news media source was experts. These experts often had an affiliation to research institutions and were sometimes called ‘terror experts’.³ The use of experts is also common in news journalism during normal circumstances, but they have a special impact during acute crises since they are often used to speculate about whom and why, and may be sources of unconfirmed rumors. Experts may also be used for speculations about reasons. One such example is an article published in Associated Press on 27 July 2011, where the author links the attacks to violence in the entertainment industry (computer games and television series).

The number of times the prime minister and the perpetrator are used as a source in news articles is almost equal. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg is quoted in 6 percent of the articles; the perpetrator is quoted in 5 percent. People who are related to the perpetrator are quoted more often than families of victims. One may, of course, assume, even though this is not a qualitative study, that the perpetrator is not framed in a positive way but his opinions are still quoted. His manifesto, which anyone could download from the internet, is quoted many times. In this way, the perpetrator could communicate his political and extremist beliefs, confirming the statement he made about the arrest being the start of a propaganda phase. The fact that the perpetrator was Norwegian born probably also led to an increased focus on his individual biography. Grydeland (2012) analyzes how the attacks were interpreted in NRK (public service) and another newspaper (Dagsavisen) and makes an interesting observation: ‘terrorist attack’ was used as a concept 35 times until the perpetrator was arrested. From then on the word ‘terrorism’ was used only twice. Instead, words such as tragedy, massacre and disaster were used. The reason behind this language change is probably that the established war-on-terror frame in the Western world only views foreign Islamist terrorism as terrorism.

Other sources, such as the political opposition, the church, royals and international (mostly US President Barack Obama) representatives, were used to show their empathy and support in different ways. These sources were central for the ritual crisis phase, where the media has an important role to play, bringing people together and creating a sense of community (Dayan and Katz, 1992).

Journalistic styles and frames

In this section we will account for key framing strategies applied in research to political communication and news journalism.

Our first measure is descriptive or interpretative journalism (see Table 3) where previous research has noted a growing tendency for journalists to adhere to an interpretive style of journalism (Gulati et al., 2004; Neveu, 2002). Interpretative journalism goes beyond descriptive and factual based reporting and focuses on explaining why an event occurred rather than the other four classical journalistic ‘w’ questions; what, where, when, and who. In shifting focus to the why question, journalists turn into analysts rather than observers of political events and promoters of certain values rather than facts (for an overview, see Salgado and Strömbäck, 2012).

Table 3.

Descriptive and interpretative journalism: Dominant journalistic approach in Verdens Gang and Aftenposten, 22 July to 5 August 2011 (%) (N = 924).

Descriptive	Interpretative	Not possible to answer
91	8	1

The fact that most articles were news is linked to the balance between descriptive and interpretative approaches. An interpretative approach means that the journalists make their own interpretation of causes, reasons or effects. The results show that a vast majority of the coverage is descriptive. The small amount of interpretative news, such as comments and reflections, is surprising given the trauma caused to the nation by the terror attacks.

Secondly, we looked at so-called episodic and thematic frames, which also have their origin in political communication research (Iyengar, 1991) (see Table 4). An episodic frame is characterized by its focus on single isolated events or personal actions lacking contextual explanations. A thematic frame places the news event in a wider context by comparing it with other events, persons or collectives. A thematic frame tries to understand the event as an effect of general trends or tendencies in society, as well as the social, political, cultural and economic consequences.

Table 4.

Episodic or thematic frames: Dominant contextual framing in Verdens Gang and Aftenposten, 22 July to 5 August 2011 (%) (N = 924).

Episodic	Thematic
84	16

As can be seen from Table 4, episodic frames dominate the coverage of the Norway attacks. Considering the fact that the attack was a terrorism act, this is somewhat surprising. During the first days after the attacks it may be understandable (Singer and Endreny, 1993) since the focus at that time was mainly to transmit relevant information about what had happened. However, the perpetrator’s political motives, clearly stated and communicated from the beginning, did not establish any thematic frame of importance. The perpetrator’s individual story was focused on and the newspapers did not link the terrorist acts as expressions of national or international political extremism. One wonders if the framing would have taken the same shape if an Islamist group had committed the terrorist act. This content analysis is limited to the first two weeks but our impression, following the media reporting after these weeks (but not systematically), is that the news framing also focused primarily on individual rather than political dimensions. But, of course, there is a need for developed content analysis following the months after our analysis had stopped to confirm this. From a policy perspective, this framing gives the impression that the event was a one-off event not to be repeated by other actors in the future. This way of framing terrorism is in sharp contrast to the post 9/11 framing of terror, which was dominated by the war-on-terror frame, ultimately aimed at connecting single terror events to a much broader picture of Islamic terror. If we follow the qualitative approach, we could argue that, since the government and its representatives promote most of the frames, the issue of terrorism is not highlighted possibly for security and economic reasons. There seems to be a need to avoid projecting the image of racist or anti-immigration members of society.

References to causes and effects

Our last measures relate to original causes and effects on Norway (see Table 5). The first measure is the degree to which the news articles deal with the original causes of the terror events. By original causes, we mean, for example, the political conflict between Western liberalism and political extremism or terrorism as a political weapon, not the perpetrator’s individual biography. Major amount means that the article is totally focused on original causes, while minor amount means that original causes are mentioned in an article with another focus.

Table 5.

References to original causes: To what extent are original causes treated in the articles in Verdens Gang and Aftenposten, 22 July to 5 August 2011 (%) (N = 924).

Major amount	Minor amount	Not at all
3	2	95

The attacks were terrorist attacks – politically motivated violence. But the content analysis shows that the broader political causes and effects did not get much attention (see Table 6). Original causes are discussed in only 5 percent of the total coverage, and the general effects on Norway in 11 percent. The individual perpetrator was in focus and his propaganda messages were exposed, but the social and political media analyses were minor. One might have believed that the terrorist attacks would have led to the development of a thematic frame concerning right-wing and nationalist movements in society, of which the attacks were extreme expressions. This aspect differs from other terror attack coverage where, for example, American news media after the 9/11 attacks was dominated by discussions on whom to blame for the attack (which varied from individual to state level, e.g. Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaida or Iraq) (McDonald and Lawrence, 2004: 338).

Table 6.

References to effects on Norway: To what extent are the effects on Norway treated in the articles in Verdens Gang and Aftenposten, 22 July to 5 August 2011 (%) (N = 924).

Major amount	Minor amount	Not at all
3	8	89

In a similar manner, the newspapers were silent during the time period of our study when it came to the long-term effects on Norway, such as the consequences for democracy or societal trust. Given the traumatic nature of the experience, the lack of such discussions is quite surprising. Again, as inherent in the war-on-terror frame, if this had been an Islamic act of terror, the long-term effects and policies would have been in focus. Hence, in this case, the lack of discussion on both origin and effect fits with the single lunatic frame, which de-politicizes the attacks.

Conclusion

In this section, we will return to the question of how the media covered the 22 July 2011 attacks and how the perpetrator was depicted.

We can conclude that the news media took the perspective of the government and followed their depiction of the terrorist as a lone, evil and deeply disturbed individual. We found it interesting that, not only through the opinion and arguments they put forward, but also through the frames, styles and standards applied, the media de-politicized the attacks. Hence, the coverage was characterized by an extensive use of episodic framing that focused on the perpetrator as an individual. In doing so, the media ignored the perpetrator’s wish to be regarded as a politically motivated terrorist. In applying journalistic frames and standards which open up an understanding of the incident as a sole event conducted by a single perpetrator, origin and causes no longer need to be discussed at the societal level. In fact, the key issue in the following trial focused somewhat on the same question, that is whether the perpetrator was psychotic during the attacks or not. The perpetrator himself was keen to be declared sane. In a letter sent to several Norwegian newspapers shortly before his trial, he wrote about his fear of being sent to a psychiatric ward: ‘I must admit this is the worst thing that could have happened to me as it is the ultimate humiliation. To send a political activist to a mental hospital is more sadistic and evil than to kill him! It is a fate worse than death.’⁴ However, the perpetrator was declared sane and sent to prison.

The coverage made extensive use of a descriptive style of journalism yet it lacked references to both causes and effects. These features of the coverage provided an image of the perpetrator as a lone and disturbed individual rather than a politically motivated individual. Yet, this did not mean that the perpetrator, as an individual, was denied attention and space. Rather the media provided the terrorist with significant space in order to voice his opinions. In fact, the amount of space provided to the prime minister and the terrorist was almost equal. On the other hand, the police and various experts were provided with extensive coverage, reinforcing the view of the establishment. To depoliticize terror coverage through lack of contextual information is a clear break from the war-on-terror frame, which has been dominated over the last decade by Islamic-inspired terror attacks following September 11 2001, such as Madrid and London, which serve to link local attacks with terrorism and its political motivations on a global level. In light of this, it is interesting to note that, during the period studied, the media did not depict the attacks as political expressions that could be linked to the right-wing extremist movement in Norway and other countries. On the contrary, the news coverage focused on the non-linking and non-political aspects. One possible reason for this may be that the perpetrator was an ethnic Norwegian, which did not match the terrorist presumptions of our time. Another reason may be that the perpetrator was alone, which does not match the presumptions that terrorism is planned by more or less formal organizations.

In summarizing the findings, we found the media coverage of the attacks in Norway to be very descriptive, focusing on the perpetrator as an individual rather than a terrorist, giving him questionable political exposure and not analyzing reasons and consequences on a political–societal level. Taken together, the coverage differs from the framing of terror developed after 9/11 in the form of the war-on-terror frame with its global political character. We argue that the 22 July coverage functioned as a way of depoliticizing the terror attacks by portraying the attack as conducted by a lone lunatic in contrast to a politically motivated and strategic individual or group. Thus, our results are strikingly similar to the ones presented by Powell (2011) on media coverage of domestic terrorism in the US. This raises the question as to whether news coverage of domestic terror has the same universal character as international terror coverage: that is, not being linked to the war-on-terror frame but rather portraying terrorists as non-political motivated lone lunatics.

Footnotes

Funding

This article is the result of a governmental research project funded by Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.

Notes

Author biographies

Jesper Falkheimer is Professor of Strategic Communication at the Department for Strategic Communication at Lund University, Sweden. He is also Rector for Campus Helsingborg, Lund University. His research interests include crisis communication, public relations, media coverage of crises and conflicts, news management and place branding. He is author and co-author of several books and has published his research in journals such as International Journal of Strategic Communication, Public Relations Review and Journal of Contingiences and Crisis Management.

Eva-Karin Olsson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Crismart (Crisis Management Research and Training)/ the Swedish National Defence College. She holds a PhD from the Department of Journalism, Media and Communication at Stockholm University. Her research interests include crisis management and communication. Recent work has focused on issues related to political communication and management in transnational settings. She has published her work in journals such as Journalism, International Journal of Press/Politics, Journalism Practice, and Public Administration.

Address: Swedish National Defence College, Drottning Kristinas Väg 37, Stockholm, 11593, Sweden. [email: eva-karin.olsson@fhs.se]

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