Abstract
This study combined the key findings of a dozen empirical studies with an original qualitative investigation aimed at understanding the dynamics of conflict journalism in Pakistan. The author devised an original contextual model and tested its applicability in five different conflicts of varying intensity. The study found that conflict journalism is dependent on the interaction between two key factors: the journalistic assessment of a conflict in terms of its seriousness of threat to national security and the resultant flak that stems from various sources that significantly influence professional reporting. The article concludes that journalists working in the semi-democratic, conflict-marred settings of Pakistan adopt a more vigilant and independent stance if they perceive a conflict to be posing an enormous threat to national security, for example the Taliban conflict, and that their critical stance erodes to a more compromising position in the case of a medium-level threat in conflicts such as the one in Balochistan and the ethno-political conflict in Karachi; their reporting further diminishes to a more sensational stance in the case of a low-level threat conflict due to the preponderance of the commercial interests of media industries.
Keywords
Introduction
Since its inception as a free state in 1947, Pakistan has been mired in various violent and non-violent conflicts. Unfortunately, these ethno-political and religious conflicts have intensified with the passage of time and have currently turned more deadly. According to an annual report by the Conflict Monitoring Center (2015), the deadliest conflicts in Pakistan are the Taliban conflict, ethno-political conflict in Karachi, sectarian conflict and the Balochistan conflict. Although the exact number of casualties in most of these conflicts have been unaccounted for, only in the Taliban conflict has it been estimated that as many as 80,000 people have been killed (Express Tribune, 2015). These conflicts have done irreparable harm to the body-politic of Pakistan. Many researchers attribute key problems such as political instability, economic downslide, religious intolerance, illiteracy, institutional imbalances and socio-cultural degradation to the continuation of these and other conflicts (Haqqani, 2005).
As this study mainly focuses on exploring the important factors that determine conflict reportage in the Pakistan news media, it is pertinent here to briefly discuss the key issues in these conflicts. Other important aspects in these conflicts are highlighted in the findings section. Many researchers have already provided excellent commentaries on these conflicts including Hussain (2014, 2015a, 2015b), Hussain and Lynch (2016), and Siraj and Hussain (2012), to mention a few (see Table 1).
Summary of key findings from available literature.
In addition to the huge numbers of casualties, the Taliban conflict has incurred a debt of $118 billion dollars by the national exchequer in the past 14 years (Dawn, 2016). Since 2005, the Balochistan conflict has turned deadly and so far thousands have been killed and hundreds of people have gone missing (Herald, 2014). In Karachi, the ethno-political conflict became more serious from 2007 and 2015 and as many as 15,000 people have been killed in the past decade (Dawn, 2015). The sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia sects turned violent between 2008 and 2015 and, according to media reports, the casualty figures reached 5000 (The News, 2015). The non-violent political conflict between the top judiciary and the federal government lasted from 2011 until 2014 on a controversial ordinance which the former feared would introduce institutionalized corruption into the country. The row was so severe that two Prime Ministers were disqualified and the ruling party was voted out in the 2013 elections.
The war–media nexus
Although the nexus between the media and wars is centuries old, a more reliable and detailed literature on conflict journalism has been available since the start of the 20th century (Allan and Zelizer, 2004; Bernays and Miller, 1928; Carruthers, 2000; Gans, 1979; Hallin, 1989; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Knightley, 2004; Lasswell, 1927, Mueller, 1973; Taylor, 1992; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Thussu and Freedman, 2003, amongst others). These and other researchers have identified an array of factors that influence conflict journalism, particularly in Westernized settings.
Fortunately, many of these researchers have been able to categorize their findings into topics such as propaganda theories (Glasgow Media Group, 1986; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Kellner 1992; Lasswell, 1927; Taylor, 1992), press–politics nexus theories (Bennett, 1990; Entman, 2004; Hallin, 1989; Mueller, 1973; Robinson, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Zaller, 1992), peace journalism theory (Galtung, 1998; Kempf, 2003) as well as general criticism (Hamelink, 2011; Hanitzch, 2004, 2007a). Although these approaches are based on different epistemic and axiological lines, one key commonality is a critique of existing conflict journalism practices that compromise the journalistic profession and serve the interests of warring parties.
The propaganda approach mainly focuses on how Western countries use the mass media for achieving certain strategic interests during wars (Laswell, 1927; Taylor, 1992). Two important exponents of this approach – Chomsky and Herman (2002; Herman and Chomsky, 1988, 2010) – have extended their scholarship on propaganda approach to include times of peace and they have developed a manufacturing consent model to discuss how the capitalist media serve elite interests. They argue that powerful groups use the media through a mechanism of five filters to ‘mobilize an elite consensus, to give the appearance of democratic consent, and to create enough confusion, misunderstanding and apathy in the general population to allow elite programs to go forward’. On the other hand, the media and politics approach, developed by researchers such as Bennett (1990), Entman (2004), Hallin (1989), Robinson (2000) and Wolfsfeld (1997) highlight the interaction between the media and the policymaking process during crisis situations. Although they agree that politicians usually determine the nature of media content, they have been able to discover situations where the media may take an independent stance, such as at times of elite dissensus (Hallin, 1986), policy uncertainty (Robinson, 2000), cultural dissonance (Entman, 2004) or significant changes in political environment (Wolfsfeld, 1997). These models found substantial support from other researchers such as Mermin (1999) and Zaller and Chui (1996). Finally, the peace journalism approach promises an alternative approach to existing standards of conflict journalism. The advocates believe that peace journalism ensures a more professional and transparent reporting of conflicts (Lynch and McGolrick, 2005). The theory of peace journalism initiated serious academic debates about its philosophical consistency and methodological accuracy. After many academic exchanges between the exponents (notably Kempf, 2007, and Lynch, 2007) and critics (Hanitzch, 2007), further refinements were suggested and now a broad consensus is emerging on the thematic and strategic outlines of peace journalism (Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 2015; Lynch, 2013).
Issues with extending the available scholarship to the Pakistani milieu
Although a thematic critique on the existing scholarship on conflict journalism is beyond the scope of this study, excellent analyses are available in the works of researchers such as Hallin (1994), Lynch (2013), Robinson et al. (2010), Street ( 2010), Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al. (2015) and many others. This study is mainly concerned with developing a more specific and contextual model for the war–media nexus in the Pakistani milieu due to the inadequacy of many aspects of the universal models. In fact, many scholars have identified limitations in the existing models for studying journalism across cultures.
Hanitzch (2004) was probably the first to have found the inapplicability of Westernized scholarship on conflict journalism in Islamic and Asian settings. According to journalism researcher Kai Hafez (2009), the journalistic profession is varyingly influenced by political, economic, social, technological, cultural and legal factors. As most of the countries in Asia and Africa, including Pakistan, are significantly different from Western countries in terms of these factors, the journalistic culture that developed there is also different from their culture. In fact, many researchers working on international journalism have found significant differences in journalistic practices across cultures (Deuz, 2002; Hanitzch, 2009; Wasserman and De Beer, 2009). According to Wasserman and De Beer (2009), a key fallacy in the existing scholarship has been the consideration of the Western democratic model as a normative ideal by which journalism in non-Western societies is measured. They argue that such an approach has minimized the chances for better understanding journalism cultures in Asian and African continents. This problem is particularly acute in the case of conflict journalism because many of the journalistic routines become irrelevant during conflict reporting (Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 2015). Specifically to the Pakistani milieu, the following factors limit the extension of the existing scholarship on the war–media nexus.
First, the subject matter is different. The theoretical models developed by Western scholars mainly deal with conflicts in which the Western countries are the aggressors. The majority of Western researchers have conceptualized the war–media nexus during the occupations of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, more specifically by the US alone. As these conflicts were never staged on US soil, the journalists did not feel the enormity of the threat to national security and hence could ‘afford the luxury of opinion without being subjected to patriotic penalty’ as noted by Moorcroft and Philip (2008). It has been concurred that reporting a war on one’s own doorstep is more difficult than reporting someone else’s war. In case of conflicts where foreign groups are involved, it becomes easy to fix responsibility on the enemy groups and adopt a more patriotic approach. However, the problem becomes more complex when the conflicting parties belong to the same country and the policymakers, media and people remain indecisive about key questions such as whom to support and to what extent.
Second, the existing theoretical models are developed in national settings where there are stable democracies, strong institutions and unanimity on key national issues. So, it would not be feasible to extend these models to Pakistani settings where democracy is fragile, institutions are weak and dissensus exists on important issues. As this study reveals, many of the important national issues that should have been resolved institutionally lingered on and degenerated into violent conflicts. On the other hand, established democracies have been able to resolve most of their issues amicably.
Third, the state system in the Western world is based on the ethos of public welfare. Pakistan, on the other hand, has remained a security state from the very outset. Since its creation in 1947, it developed an enmity with India over the Kashmir region and fought four wars against India. Similarly, its relations with two Western neighbors including Iran and Afghanistan have remained sour since the 1980s (Haqqani, 2005). All these developments have badly affected the growth of democratic discourse in Pakistan and have promoted a securitized ideology (Yousaf, 2016). Issues about national security are always prioritized in the Pakistani milieu and people are persuaded to believe that security comes first and foremost. US-based Pakistani analyst Hussain Haqqani (2005) agrees with this analysis and believes the ‘securitized perspective dominates the whole socio-politico spectrum in Pakistan’. The media are equally imbued by this strong sense of patriotism and are expected not to go against the considerations of national security. Any laxity on issues relating to this undefined national security is highly unpopular (Siddiqua, 2006). Therefore, keeping in view all these factors, the researcher proposes a new model to investigate the dynamics of conflict journalism that significantly complements the existing scholarship and is grounded in the contextual milieu of Pakistan.
The proposed contextual ‘Field–Flak Interaction Model’
The Field–Flak Interaction Model builds on the existing literature that examines how journalistic agency (field) and structural factors (flaks) are combined in varying forms to generate narratives about conflicts. Specifically, two important factors in the Pakistani context – the assumption of the seriousness of threats to national security and the resultant flak associated with conflict(s) – must be considered while analyzing the media’s role in conflicts. As explained in Table 2, a set of specific factors in a conflict determines its severity to national security (and hence the journalistic assessment) from where certain flaks emanate that influence key narratives about conflicts. Therefore, different conflict scenarios will lead to different conflict narratives. Embedded in the philosophy of critical pragmatism (see Calder, 2010; Hammond and Calcutt, 2011), this model gives due importance to agential power in generating news narratives. However, like Bourdieu’s (2002) field theory, it concurs that agential power is conditioned by flaks emanating from various sources such as the military, the government, other powerful organizations, public opinion and commercial interests. Table 2 sheds light on the important aspects in this model.
The proposed Field-Flak Interaction Model.
The key assumptions in the model are briefly explained below and are put to exhaustive analysis in the findings section.
First scenario (high-level security conflict)
As shown in Table 2, journalists consider that a conflict possesses a high-level security threat to national security if the casualty rate is high or if one of the groups in the conflict is considered an enemy with whom they have ideological differences, or one that can be accused of causing the country to disintegrate. In this type of scenario, journalists become highly sensitive to the considerations of national security. They openly campaign against the anti-state group and do not claim to remain objective and impartial in the conflict. They readily eschew their journalistic independence and openly side with the state against the enemy. They believe that their profession should not lag behind other national institutions when it comes to serving core national interests and readily offer their services as patriotic journalists. Scholars have found that media remained patriotic and nationalistic during wars ‘born out of a sense of national purpose’ (Bennett and Paletz, 1994; Carruthers, 2000; Thussu and Freedman, 2003; Glasgow Media Group, 1985; Knightly, 2004; Leibes, 1997; Maltby and Keeble, 2007). These researchers agree that the patriotic sentiments of journalists make them inclined to support ‘their’ side during a war. The US media showed a noticeable reluctance to investigate events leading to the Iraqi invasion and the Abu Ghraib scandal due to the lopsided notion of national interests. Jeremy Tunstall (2007) has found sufficient evidence to argue that British and American journalists were aware of the massive human cost of the air bombardment during the Second World War but kept quiet due to self-censorship and patriotism.
Institutional flak
The flak associated with high-risk security conflict comes from the journalistic institution itself. Journalists in the securitized milieu of Pakistan are wary of national security and deem it important to come forward against the state enemy. They fear if they do not fulfill their national responsibility, their patriotic credential would be challenged. The most manifest form of such a flak would be the fear of being labeled unpatriotic, a traitor, and debunked culturally and socially. Researchers such as Carruthers (2011), Curran (1978) and Knightly (2004) have found that conscientious objectors during the Second World War, Vietnam and the Iraqi invasions were ridiculed and dubbed as less masculine. To avoid this flak, journalists have to carry out self-censorship, strictly follow the guidelines to remain vigilant against enemy propaganda and keep a critical view of the affairs of the elites who manage the war with the enemy group. So, to summarize, the first assumption to be explored in this study is:
Second scenario
Journalists usually consider a conflict possesses mid-level threats to national security if the casualty rate is less, the fighting groups being considered belong to the same country, no serious ideological differences exist and groups are not accused of serious territorial ambitions. In such a scenario, journalists relinquish their vigilance and rely on elite institutions for information about the conflict. Researcher Gabi Wolfsfeld (1997) has documented instances of British journalists who became ‘faithful servants’ to the army during the Falkland Islands conflict. Similarly other researchers have found that after the Vietnam invasion, as in other military adventures in the underdeveloped world, the US media remained dependent on the military and rarely exhibited a critical stance (Kellner, 1992).
Elite flak
The flak associated with mid-level security conflicts comes from the elite groups – military, government, or other powerful groups. The most obvious form of elite flak could be death threats to journalists and their families, injuries inflicted on non-conforming journalists, threats to terminate their contracts, warnings by the powerful groups, and burning media offices or putting the media out of contact. Through a carrot and stick policy, elite groups easily control the media and restrict its much-needed editorial and journalistic freedom. Dorman (2006) has documented the history of war reporting and found that after the Second World War, in all other major invasions including the Bay of Pigs, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, the Gulf Wars and now the war on terror, the US media have simply supported the government even though the journalists knew these invasions were illegal and were instigated by greed and bloodthirstiness. So the second assumption to be explored in this qualitative study is:
Third scenario
Finally, if the presumed threats to national security are minimal or non-existent in some conflict scenarios, commercial interests take precedence and journalists start sensationalizing events in order to attract larger audiences (Wolfsfeld, 2004). Journalists usually consider a conflict possesses lesser threats to national security if the casualty rate is low or has incurred no deaths, all the groups involved belong to the same country, no serious ideological differences exist and no group is accused of having territorial ambitions. Given the ratings-driven environment in which the news is packaged and conveyed, journalists frequently exploit the personality, sensationalism, drama and conflict of stories (Bennett, 1996; Sparrow, 1999). In the words of Allen and Seaton (1999: 22), ‘rapid fire, bullet point summaries of events are presented.’ The events are explained in the shallowest of terms and no effort is made for a deeper understanding. Although they are free to do so, the media do not provide an objective commentary but rather confirm as fact the statements issued by jingoistic politicians for local consumption.
Commercial flak
In the case of non-violent conflicts, the flak comes from the commercial necessities of media industries to create more drama to attract audiences. In the case of Pakistan, I believe the issue is amplified by two additional factors. First, although the country has a vibrant and huge media industry (about 100 TV channels, hundreds of newspapers, FM channels and online media), the whole industry is dependent on meager advertisement budgets that make the market more competitive. Second, Pakistani society is highly politicized and, as the media are aware of this reality, they would not neglect any opportunity which they can take advantage of. So the third assumption is:
Methodology
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 60 conflict reporters and editors of leading media outlets to investigate the key determinants of conflict journalism in Pakistan. Just one media outlet from the 10 most popular media companies was selected.
The interviewees were the actual beat reporters who were covering the five conflicts. For each conflict, 10 beat reporters from the leading news media outlets were interviewed (making a total of 50 interviews) to discuss a host of factors including ideological, professional and organizational issues that influence conflict journalism. Similarly, for the analysis of broader socio-economic and political factors, 10 editors of the same media outlets were interviewed.
All these interviews were conducted at the respondents’ offices except for the few that were conducted at press clubs and tea houses. These interviews were conducted in Urdu language and then transcribed into English. Having been a journalist who has covered all these conflicts and travelled to these areas in the capacity of a journalist and then as a trainer, the whole process was comparatively easier for me to carry out.
All these five conflicts have different epicenters; therefore, between January and April 2016, I travelled to all these different geographical zones in order to conduct face-to-face interviews. The interviews on the Taliban conflict were conducted in Peshawar, on the Balochistan conflict in Quetta, on ethno-politico conflict in Karachi, sectarian conflict in Lahore and political conflict in Islamabad. Although the length of the questions put to the respondents varied in each interview, the key questions were derived specifically from the number of case studies conducted on these five conflicts as outlined in Table 2 and more generally from the available scholarship on conflict journalism. As conflict reporting is considered the most important assignment, the bureau chiefs in the four provinces were also responsible for covering the different conflicts. It was only in Islamabad that reporters other than the bureau chiefs covered political conflict.
This study addresses three main assumptions that were not confined to research questions. The aim is to attain the broadest possible explanation for these assumptions and not to impose certain interpretations. I do not claim that the key concepts in the model are linked in just one direction and would have made adjustments if the study data suggested this was necessary.
Research findings
The research findings are presented in the form of addressing the three main assumptions that I developed during the course of the study.
1. If the journalists assess a conflict as having an immediate and enormous threat for national security, institutional flak will determine the media coverage and journalists will produce more securitized discourse about the conflict.
1. The Taliban conflict
All the journalists interviewed for this study considered the Taliban conflict to be the most dangerous conflict that Pakistan was facing. They rated it as the highest security threat level conflict that is challenging state sovereignty. This is in line with previous works where researchers have found that the Pakistan media treat the Taliban conflict as the most dangerous conflict (Hussain, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Hussain et al., 2016; Malik and Iqbal, 2011; Siraj and Hussain, 2012). Fakhar Kakakhel, Bureau Chief at Aaj TV, said that the Taliban posed an ‘existential threat to the security of Pakistan’ and needed to be eliminated with maximum military force. Ali Akbar, Bureau Chief of Dawn TV, said that the Taliban were enemies of the state who were ‘hell-bent on destroying everything that Pakistan stood for’. He was of the opinion that the Taliban militia wanted to impose their rigid view of Islam, which was completely unacceptable to the majority of Pakistanis. Others agreed that the Pakistan military must eliminate the Taliban with full force and said they were prepared to fight side by side with the army. ‘This is the existential war for Pakistan and we as a journalist community have no qualms about serving our nation and military against the Taliban extremists’, said Mehmood Jan of Geo TV. The editor of Urdu daily Nawae Waqt, while summarizing the state of Pakistan media’s readiness to stand against the Taliban said that the news media industry is an important national institution that should openly support the state in times of crisis: Media all around the world rally behind the military when there are threats to national security. The Taliban are the sworn enemy of the Pakistani state and have killed thousands of innocent citizens. In this scenario, it is incumbent on us to stand for Pakistan and do whatever we can to save our homeland.
The journalists were concerned that if the Taliban became stronger, it would jeopardize the development of the country and reduce it to the status of a ‘pariah state’ in the world community. Just to get a glimpse of how the Pakistan media report on the Taliban conflict, consider this typical story reported on Dunya TV on 16 May 2016: The Pakistan security forces have detained four terrorists during a pre-dawn raid on a house in Peshawar. During the raid, a suicide vest and heavy explosives along with weapons have been seized. These terrorists wanted to kill common people but fortunately the brave Pakistani soldiers have arrested them and saved the precious lives of many people.
In addition, the journalists interviewed for this study openly declared that the Taliban should not be given any opportunity to use the media for their advantage. A reporter said that he primarily considered himself a patriotic Pakistani and then a journalist. ‘The Taliban should have absolutely no access to news media to propagate their obnoxious agenda’, said Mohammad Tahir of the daily newspaper Jang. When asked about journalistic objectivity, respondents said these principles were not applicable in this conflict. This line of thinking echoes the famous words of Max Hastings (2000) ‘when a nation is at war, reporting becomes an extension of the war effort.’ All the 10 reporters and 10 editors agreed that they exercised self-censorship to protect national interests and eulogize the sacrifices of the Pakistan army. For example, the daily Express reported the military operation in Kurram Agency in which both Taliban fighters and military personnel were killed. The report says: Four brave Pakistani soldiers have embraced shahadat while fighting the Taliban terrorists. The martyred soldiers inflicted huge loss on the extremists before embracing shahadat. The whole country is indebted to their services and will always remain faithful to their gallantry and sacrifices for the motherland.
When asked why the plight of common people who are suffering in this conflict is ignored, they argued the issue was deliberately downplayed as it could undermine the logic of war on terror. Mohammad Arif from the daily Tribune said, ‘We are often discouraged to report on refugees and their problems due to the fear that it may challenge the logic of this war that common people are suffering in the offensive.’ Others agreed that winning this war was crucial and the nation had to make sacrifices for larger interests. A reporter who later requested anonymity said: The problem with the displaced tribal people is that they [wrongly] believe that they are displaced due to the military operation. So the majority of them are against the Pakistan army. We do not interview them and highlight their problems because they speak against the army. Also, it would not give a good impression if we report that they are facing certain problems while remaining in camps run by the military,
An editor of a TV channel said that issues of common people were less important for him when the military was engaged in an all-out war against the enemy group.
Institutional flak
This extravagant patriotism and nationalism among journalists comes from a strong institutional flak which emanates from the journalistic agency itself. This flak has set strict guidelines for journalists to exhibit strong antipathy toward the Taliban and to never allow them favorable coverage. Anyone disagreeing with this line of thinking has to relinquish their job or acquiesce to the editorial guidelines. All the reporters and editors interviewed for this study agreed that the punishment for violating the institutional flak was so strong that even leaving the profession was no alternative. ‘You will be judged as unpatriotic, a Taliban sympathizer and a traitor if your actions are deemed as not serving the national interests’, said a reporter who requested anonymity due to a fear of backlash from fellow journalists. Another reporter said that he once used some neutral words for the Taliban and immediately received a call from head office, warning him ‘not to be lenient towards the Taliban’. The available scholarship on conflict journalism lends credence to the above assertions. Researchers such as Moorcraft and Taylor (2008) and Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2007) have found many instances of US media proclivity toward wars and a tendency to ignore the death and destruction during invasions of Latin American states.
This discussion, however, does not mean that the Pakistan media is free from the army’s influence in reporting this conflict. In fact, this war is being fought in the north west of the country where the media is barred from reporting independently. However, editorially, the Pakistani media have always been very clear on this conflict: the Taliban are the enemy group and present a complete antithesis to what Pakistan stands for and so the media should never be soft towards them (Hussain, 2016). So when, in 2013, all the political parties and the army decided to sign a peace accord with the Taliban, the media came out openly against this arrangement and severely criticized the military and politicians for ‘compromising’ the security of the state (Hussain, 2014). Thus the elite consensus (Hallin, 1986) or policy uncertainty (Robinson, 2000) or intimidation by the military could not pressure the media to follow a lenient policy toward these peace agreements. Although the media is dependent on the military for information, they narrativize the reports differently. These findings challenge the perspective of theorists such as Bennett (1990), Hallin (1986) and Wolfsfeld (2004) and support the position of Philip Knightly (2004) who found that the majority of British journalists spearheaded war messages even though the government was reluctant to declare war on Germany at the start of the two World Wars.
2. The Balochistan conflict
All the journalists interviewed for this study categorized the Balochistan conflict as posing medium-level threats to national security. Although they were concerned about the casualties in this conflict, they trusted the state institutions and hoped normalcy would return to this province. This type of assessment is consistent with previous findings (see Hussain, 2015a; Hussain and Haseeb, 2015; Prakash, 2013). The dominant view about this conflict among journalists is noted as follows: ‘The present setup has the potential to resolve the Balochistan conflict, but it can also degenerate into extremely violent conflict if it is not properly handled’ (Hussain and Lynch, 2016).
Unlike the Taliban conflict where the journalists are extra-vigilant about the government handling of the conflict, the Balochistan conflict is not considered a very serious conflict that can challenge the sovereignty of the state. ‘The Baloch nationalists are not Taliban-like terrorists. They are Pakistanis and their demands can be met easily’, said Saleem Shahid, Bureau Chief of the daily Dawn. Other journalists opined that the Baloch movement was more of a political movement than a guerrilla movement and hence could be easily resolved with threats to national integration of less concern.
Unlike the Taliban conflict where journalists are at the forefront against the ‘enemy’ and vigilant about government policies, journalists in this conflict are less concerned. However, the reliance on the state system to deal with the conflict puts the journalistic institution at the mercy of the military which dictates terms to the media (Hussain and Lynch, 2016). As journalists consider this conflict to have more of a political nature (and thus is easily solvable), they are less critical of the government or army and hence acquiesce to elite dominance. ‘Over the years, the army has tightened its grip on media in the province. We are now reporting only the military messages to the rest of the country’, said an editor of a daily who requested anonymity. Relevant to this phenomenon, albeit to a varying level, researchers have found that during times of conflict, militaries prevent journalists from accessing the troubled areas and feed them with a diet of propaganda (Bagdkian, 2004; Fawcett, 2002). These researchers believe that through mechanisms such as embedding journalists, information management and propaganda, governments and militaries successfully thwart alternative perspectives.
Elite flak (flak from the military)
The interviews revealed complete unanimity among the journalists about the existence of the elitist flak that determines media reporting. When asked to explain how the military controlled information about this conflict, a reporter said: When I get some story about the conflict, first I analyze it through the military perspective. If it goes against the army, no question of reporting it. In case of confusion, we consult our editor. However, the rule is simple: Do not offend the army with negative reporting about this conflict.
The views of other reporters were not very different from this assertion. When asked about the consequences of violating the elitist flak, almost all of the reporters remembered certain instances. ‘One of our colleagues was killed and another got a warning as they were collecting information about the people who are illegally detained by the army’, said a reporter from a famous TV channel who did not want to have his name included in this study. ‘You can get killed, your family members can get kidnapped, you can get terminated from your job if you violate the restrictions set by the army’, another reporter said. These findings are quite consistent with the work of other researchers on the same conflict who found that the Pakistan media contained less critical information such as the case of missing people, military operations in several districts and numbers of people in jails (Hussain, 2015b; Hussain and Rehman, 2015). Similarly, when violent incidents occur in Balochistan, the media usually allocate little space to these events and avoid giving important information.
However, there have been certain instances when the news media objectively reported on the conflict. For example, when the Supreme Court took notice of the disappearances of Baloch youth, the media gave due coverage to the event and criticized the military for highhandedness. The journalists agreed the elitist flak can be disturbed when other powerful institutions such as the Supreme Court, mainstream political parties or the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan intervene in this conflict. ‘These institutions are important and provide us with the much-needed leeway to report on the other perspectives’, said Khan Wali of ARY News TV.
3. Ethno-political conflict in Karachi:
Journalists covering the ethno-politico conflict in Karachi believed it posed a mid-level threat to national security. Other researchers came to the same conclusion that the Pakistan news media framed the ethno-politico conflict in Karachi as a serious but very imminent threat (Hussain et al., 2016; Kiani, 2015; Yusuf, 2012). As in the case of the Balochistan conflict and unlike the Taliban conflict, journalists are not taking a very vigilant position in this conflict and rely on other groups for information. This agential passivity leaves a void which is filled by the Mutahidda Qomi Movement (MQM), the largest political party from the city, which is also supported by its military wings.
Elite flak (from the MQM)
While in the Balochistan conflict, the elite flak is exercised by the army, in the conflict in Karachi, the MQM dictates the media narrative. All the reporters interviewed were unanimous in their assertions that they were prevented from reporting stories against the MQM even if they were responsible for violence. The flak exercised by this party is so stringent that not a single reporter wished to be identified for this study. Interestingly, the majority of reporters covering the Taliban conflict had no reservations in publishing their names in this study, which points to the enormity of pressure that the MQM employs over the journalists. Non-compliance with party directives often results in media offices and publications being burned and death threats to journalists. The reporters are aware of forbidden subjects and avoid issues that can put the media in conflict with the MQM. Here is an excerpt of an interview of a senior journalist from a previous study: We are always monitored and are expected not to offend the MQM. They are very powerful. No reporter can claim to be free while covering issues in that city. Even the editors and owners will edit information that can bring the displeasure of the MQM. (Hussain and Lynch, 2016)
To get evidence of how the Pakistan media has become a mouthpiece of the MQM while reporting on this conflict, consider the following story from the daily Dawn.
The ruling party of Karachi city, the MQM, has threatened to boycott the proceedings of Parliament if it did not get a positive response from the authorities. ‘We are picking up bodies every day. If this is what has to happen to us, there is no use sitting in the house’, said MQM’s Dr Abdul Qadir Khanzada before leading the walkout in the National Assembly.
All the journalists agreed that they feared the MQM office and the media owners had told them in clear terms to avoid incurring the wrath of this party. ‘We know that the military wing of the MQM has been responsible for killing political opponents but you cannot discuss it. If you are reporting Karachi, you must know how not to offend the MQM’, said a news director of a leading TV channel. They remembered some of their colleagues who were killed by the groups affiliated with the MQM but were tightlipped on divulging further information. However, there are exceptions when the news media challenged its control. For example, at present, the Pakistan army has launched an operation against the criminals in Karachi and rounded up many workers of the MQM for killings, arson and other incidents of a severe nature. The Pakistan media is showing these ‘unprecedented events to the people’ to quote from a senior journalist of an Urdu daily. Even now, however, the journalists confided that the MQM had some control over the Pakistan media. ‘The media have failed to tell the whole truth about this conflict, such as the criminal activities of the MQM’, said another reporter of a TV channel. However, they agreed that when the military and federal government are in action in the city, they enjoy relative freedom.
4. Sectarian conflict
All the 10 reporters and 10 editors interviewed for this study agreed that the sectarian conflict between the Sunni and Shia sects posed medium level threats to national security. They feared Pakistan could lapse into a situation like that in the Middle East if substantive efforts were not taken to check this burgeoning problem and expressed confidence in the state institutions’ ability to preserve normalcy. This assessment, however, goes against the findings of other researchers who found that journalists in Pakistan considered sectarianism to be a low-level conflict (Ahmer, 2009; Hussain and Lynch, 2016; Shah, 2015; Sheikh, 2014).
‘Sectarianism is a curse and we need to remain vigilant about it. Media irresponsibility can wreak havoc with religious harmony in the country’, warned Mohammad Amin from an Urdu daily. Zahoor Khan from the daily Express concurred that the media in Pakistan and especially the electronic media ‘must show responsibility in reporting on this conflict’. He feared a single image can create a law and order situation in the country. Other journalists narrated incidents of the rising sectarian wave in Pakistan and were unanimous in their views that sectarian organizations were expecting the media to create propaganda against other groups. This, they maintained, made it incumbent upon journalists to remain vigilant and critically aware about the intentions of vested interests. During sectarian violence in Gilgit in September 2014, Geo TV – like other media outlets – specifically focused on the international conspiracies to create religious tension in Pakistan. The TV channel reported: Many innocent lives have been lost. The common people are suffering. The only beneficiaries of such a situation are our enemies who are conspiring against us. If we remain united, we will win, otherwise our enemy will prevail. We all have to play our role and show responsibility towards our society and statehood.
Elite flak (flak from government)
The strong anti-sectarian media policy of government which is duly supported by public opinion acts as a stringent flak on the media. The government, through its monitoring bodies, is keeping a vigilant eye on the media companies and has issued clear instructions to discourage sectarian propaganda and incitement. ‘Thankfully, the media have responded positively and the situation in Pakistan is under control’, said Arif Noor from the daily Dawn. Researchers have found that the Pakistani media have successfully countered sectarian propaganda and remained socially responsible and professional (Shah, 2015). A reporter for an English daily said, ‘even if sometimes we make an error by highlighting events which may escalate tension, the editorial staff will cover it.’
Public sensitivity also serves as a check on the media. Most media outlets usually do not reveal the sects of people involved in a conflict. When asked about this phenomenon, the editors said that, even though people would ultimately come to know about the actual events, they delay some information in order to avoid emotional outpourings and backlashes. The Pakistan media humanize this conflict and focus on the issues and problems of common people (Hussain et al., 2016). For example, consider the following story on sectarian conflict in an English daily.
Unfortunately, the situation in Quetta has not improved so far. A curfew has been imposed in the area while police and military are patrolling on the deserted roads of the city. The food and water supplies have been suspended in the city for the last four days while a shortage of food items has been reported in different areas of the city. The government should expedite the steps towards normalcy so that the problems of people can be addressed soon.
5. Political conflict on the National Reconciliation Ordinance
All the 10 reporters and 10 editors interviewed for this study were unanimous that the conflict between the government and the higher judiciary on the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) did not pose any threat to national security. Other researchers have also found that Pakistani journalists treated the political conflict as a non-security conflict (Fatima, 2015; Hussain, 2015a; Hussain et al., 2016), although the journalists were free from the bogey of securitization that made them an easy prey of commercialism (Hussain and Lynch, 2016). As documented by Hussain (2015a), the journalists considered it the most important conflict between the top institutions of the country where missing a single event was not an option: The journalists were under constant pressure to come up with new information, new angles and more interesting news which necessitated drama and sensationalism. The judge’s remarks during proceedings were reported like a final judgment, creating unrest and tension in the country.
This approach is in line with findings that when threats to national security are minimal or non-existent, journalists dramatize events for audience maximization (Allen and Seaton, 1999).
Commercial flak
All the journalists agreed that the strong commercial flak put them under tremendous pressure to sensationalize this conflict to attract larger audiences. The editors expressed the view that the Pakistan news media were caught in a ratings business that sought to outdo their competitors. Asim Nawaz of the daily Jang said: The annual advertisement budget in Pakistan is about ten million dollars and it is insufficient to sustain 100 plus TV channels, hundreds of newspapers and magazines. So, to survive economically, the only way out is to maximize audiences by catering to the lowest common denominator. And this was actually done in Pakistan during this saga.
Others agreed that the commercial flak was so dominant and obsessive that it determined each and every aspect of reporting. ‘There was a strong impression among the journalists that the whole nation was obsessed with the happenings in the court. So, the media tried to exploit this national obsession and reported it as a tug of war between two clowns’, said senior reporter Youaf Khan.
When the editors were asked about the enormity and strength of this commercial flak, they said it was more stringent than pressure from the military, separatist, Taliban and other extremist groups. A senior employee of a TV channel said: ‘We can stand against the Taliban or the other groups but we cannot argue with our owners who are always interested in making more profits.’ This conforms to the available scholarship that the preponderance of commercial flak influences media reportage to a greater degree than any other factor (Herman and Chomsky, 2010; Schudson, 1995).
Conclusion
This study offered an analysis of the applicability of an original contextual field–flak interaction model while investigating five different conflicts of varying intensities. The need for this context-specific model was felt because the universal models developed in the Westernized settings could not explain the typical socio-political and security environment of Pakistan. While complementing the existing literature, the model discussed here identified two key factors that influence conflict reporting in the violence-prone semi-democratic milieu of Pakistan. These two factors include journalistic assumption of threats to national security and the resultant flaks embedded in different specific scenarios.
The model was tested in a qualitative analysis by interviewing 60 reporters and editors. The researcher found broad support for the key assumptions that conflict journalism is determined by the assumed seriousness of threats to national security and the pressures from relevant quarters. As shown in Table 2, the Taliban conflict is perceived to have serious repercussions for national security due to the high casualty rate and ideological differences with the Taliban. Such an assumption leads to strong institutional flak emanating from the journalistic profession itself that forces journalists to adopt a more adversarial attitude toward the Taliban.
Similarly, in the contexts of the Balochistan conflict, ethno-political conflict in Karachi and sectarian conflicts, journalists considered these conflicts posed mid-level security threats to the country. They are regarded as easily solvable politically. The journalists eschew the institutional responsibility to remain vigilant and rely on political systems for information, which makes them prone to elite propaganda in these conflicts.
Finally, in the context of non-violent political conflict where no national security concerns are involved, the media became an easy prey to commercial interests. The journalists were under tremendous pressure to sensationalize and dramatize this conflict to attract larger audiences. The editors in this study reported that commercial flak at times appeared to be more stringent than institutional and elitist flaks.
It can be concluded that, although journalists are always interested in the objective reporting of events (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005), in the conflict-infested milieu of Pakistan, however, it remains undesirable (in the case of the Taliban conflict), challenging (in the case of the Balochistan, Karachi and sectarian conflicts) and professionally impossible (in the case of political conflict) for them.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.