The role of the media in violent conflicts in the digital age: Israeli and Palestinian leaders’ perceptions

Scientific review of the literature

A basic, theoretical assumption in the literature is that the politically powerful have much better access than the less powerful to the news media (Bennett, 1990; Bennett et al., 2008; Entman, 2004, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997, 2004). When it comes to internal conflicts, the advantages the powerful enjoy are particularly obvious. The authorities have regular, almost automatic access to the news media as legitimate sources, while weaker antagonists must prove their newsworthiness, often through acts of disorder. Wolfsfeld (1997, 2015) referred to this imbalance as the difference between gaining media access through the front door, while the rear door is intended for deviants who provide sufficient drama to be admitted. Consequently, more powerful actors are more likely to be covered as legitimate, while their challengers are more likely to be portrayed as deviants.

This principle can also apply internationally. One of the most obvious indicators concerns how journalists are assigned to cover international affairs. It is not surprising that the United States is the most covered country (Wu, 2000), or that the major European countries host the greatest number of foreign reporters (European Federation of Journalists, 2015). The richer and more powerful the country, the more likely it is that reporters from other countries are permanently assigned there. This leads to an ongoing, routine flow of stories from those countries that include both orderly news (such as elections and decisions about policy) and disorderly news (such as violence and natural disasters). The mainstream media in Western countries usually only covers the poorer parts of the world if something terrible happens. Even then, a terrorist attack in Paris, Brussels, or the United States will receive far more international coverage than one that happens in Beirut or Tunisia. ³ However, the relative wealth of a country is not the only reason for such editorial decisions about attention. Other factors can include a country’s strategic interests, amount of perceived threat, and the cultural proximity between the countries (Hawkins, 2011).

Some people believe that things have changed in the digital era. For example, pundits point to the power of social media in the 2010 Arab Spring. The conventional wisdom was that the emergence of social media provided protesters with the necessary tools to bring down Egypt’s long-ruling Mubarak government. However, Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer’s (2013) study of 20 Arab countries and the Palestinian authority provided convincing evidence of a negative correlation between the amount of social media penetration and the outbreak of violence. The primary reason for this is that the wealthier Arab countries had no shortage of internet and social media access, but very little political discontent. In addition, the data showed that people joining social media were much more likely to follow the outbreak of political unrest than to precede it. In short, the political situation provided a far better explanation for the outbreak of violence than the advent of the digital age. ⁴

Nevertheless, it has become clear in recent years that those in power are finding it increasingly difficult to control the flow of information. The development of the internet meant that the entire world now has access to information and images that would not have seen the light of day in the past. Mobile phones play a similar function in poorer countries (Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013). A major reason for this is the massive proliferation of smartphones, allowing users to record events as they happen and immediately upload the images to YouTube and similar platforms (Allan, 2013; Andén-Papadopoulos, 2013; Gregory, 2015). In keeping with Chadwick’s (2013) thesis, it is critical to emphasize that we are not referring just to information that flows through newer media. Such events receive their greatest amplification when they are picked up and publicized by more traditional media.

Although there have been many examples of this phenomenon in recent years, perhaps the best known is the massive increase in videos of police brutality in the United States, which has led to major public debate about the issue (Antony and Thomas, 2010; Goldsmith, 2010; Gregory, 2015; Robinson, 2011; Wilson and Serisier, 2010). In the field of political communication, this change is sometimes referred to as the transition from ‘institutionally driven’ to ‘event-driven’ news (Lawrence, 2000; Livingston and Bennett, 2003).

The difficulties that modern authorities face in the digital age are not limited to the proliferation of cameras. The fact that activists can now break into the most secure databases and spread their information worldwide has made it much more difficult for authorities to keep secrets. The best-known examples of this include Wikileaks (Chadwick, 2013; Sifry, 2011), the Snowden affair (Gurnow, 2014) and the Panama Papers. ⁵ This suggests that weaker antagonists now have tools enabling them to compete with their more powerful adversaries, especially when these stories are picked up by the mainstream media. Nevertheless, gaining public attention is quite different from bringing about significant policy or regime changes.

Methods

This research was conducted as part of INFOCORE, an international collaborative research project funded under the 7th European Framework Program of the European Commission. ⁷ The data here is based on one specific interest of a larger research project focused on the ongoing interactions between political leaders and the media. Fifteen interviews were conducted with Israeli leaders and another 15 with Palestinian leaders. Not all interviewees were elected officials. Some were officials involved in diplomacy, while others were leaders of political organizations. The major criteria for selection were that interviewees must be somehow involved in promoting a particular political agenda and had ongoing contact with the media concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. All interviewees were promised anonymity, so only a general description of their role and status is noted when they are quoted.

The Palestinian–Israeli case is an excellent place to start when asking these research questions. It is clearly an asymmetrical conflict that often involves violence and has generated an enormous amount of international political and media attention. In addition, given that there has been an extensive amount of scholarly work on the role of traditional media in this conflict, it provides a useful place to see what has changed. ⁸

The interviews were all semi-structured and focused on a core set of questions. However, the interviews were allowed to go in interesting directions that emerged in the course of the interview. In this analysis, we specifically focused on four core questions related to the two research concerns discussed above:

The one-hour interviews were all conducted in person in 2015, in either Hebrew or Arabic. They were recorded, transcribed, and then translated into English

Findings

The discussion begins by considering the first research question: Has the advent of the digital age had any impact on how political leaders view the ability of weaker antagonists to compete politically with the more powerful side in asymmetrical conflicts? In general, the political leaders who were interviewed believed that things had changed and that the new media environment was more advantageous for weaker antagonists. Although the technological changes have not eliminated the advantages that the political powerful enjoy, the new media environment has improved the ability of weaker challengers to compete with their more powerful adversaries.

One of the most important indicators of an antagonist’s ability to manage the political environment surrounding any conflict is the extent to which they can control the flow of information and images. In asymmetrical conflicts, a loss of control by the more powerful antagonist can provide opportunities for the weaker side to bring third parties into the conflict as allies and reduce disparity (Wolfsfeld, 1997).

It was apparent from talking to Israeli and Palestinian leaders that the former group saw recent technological changes as a threat, while the latter saw these changes as an opportunity. The most obvious, powerful change in this area has been the revolutionary rise in the number of ordinary Palestinians and human-rights groups using camera phones to record and upload abuses by Israeli security forces. The Israelis also have their own cameras, which sometimes worked to their advantage, especially when capturing Palestinian attacks on Israeli citizens. Nevertheless, the interviews made it abundantly clear that the Palestinian leaders are far more enthusiastic about these changes than are their Israeli counterparts.

A perfect example of this phenomenon occurred in March 2016, when an Israeli soldier shot and killed a Palestinian attacker who was lying, wounded, on the ground. ⁹ Someone connected to the B’Tselem human-rights organization videotaped the incident and uploaded it to the web. The film led to a major public debate, both inside and outside Israel, about whether or not the shooting was justified. The solider was arrested and charged with manslaughter. ¹⁰

Of course, there are similar examples of powerful videos that embarrassed authorities long before the digital age. The powerful scenes of the Selma, Alabama, police beating black protesters during the American civil rights movement (Lee, 2002; Roberts and Klibanoff, 2008) is one of the best-known examples. The fact that these occurred during the early days of television may have significantly increased the impact that those horrible images had on the American public and political leaders. There have also been similar examples in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Perhaps the best-known of these took place in September 2000, when a petrified 12-year-old, Mohammad Al-Durrah, was filmed hiding behind his father during a gun battle between Palestinians and Israelis. The prevailing assumption was that the boy was killed by Israelis soldiers.

Nevertheless, the dramatic changes that have occurred in recent years cannot be ignored. In the first intifada (Palestinian uprising), which broke out in late 1987 and killed hundreds of people, not one incident was captured on film and shown in the news (Alimi, 2007; Cohen and Wolfsfeld, 1994; Wolfsfeld, 1997). ¹¹ In addition, the al-Durrah incident took place during the first days of the second intifada. Despite hundreds of Israelis and Palestinians being killed, it would be difficult to find a similar episode recorded on film. ¹²

However, almost everyone today has a camera and can instantly upload their videos to the internet. Such videos also originate in thousands of public surveillance cameras. Almost all Palestinian and Israeli leaders who were interviewed noted this change. Most Palestinians saw this as a tool for revealing Israel abuses. The remarks of a Palestinian leader, who also served in a senior position at a Palestinian university, were typical. When asked about whether the proliferation of cameras affected the conflict, he responded:

Yes, it has a big influence. The public has started to practise media-related activities. They monitor events and capture them with their smartphones. This explains why the Israeli army assaults Palestinian civilians carrying their cameras more than Palestinian journalists. Media of the public, so to speak, has a positive impact on spreading the Palestinian cause. But for the Israelis, of course, it plays a negative role. (Pal 005, 1 December 2015)

A Palestinian director for a major political organization responded in a similar, if somewhat exaggerated, manner:

Yes, it changed and left an influence. Instead of traditional media outlets becoming the source of the news, social networks have become the main source of news. Sometimes they even become more reliable sources when an event is immediately captured on camera and instantly published on various social network sites. Therefore, social networks have superseded traditional media outlets in becoming the source of news. (Pal 004, 27 November 2015)

None of these political leaders suggested that the flow of information exclusively runs through social networks, but rather that newer media becomes an important new source for all forms of media. A number of the Palestinian interviewees specifically focused on the power of YouTube to make their case to the world. A head of a major Palestinian organization said:

YouTube has helped a lot in disseminating news worldwide. It is the most influential and the easiest method. For instance, some four months ago, Israeli soldiers attacked a young Palestinian boy, 12-year-old Mohammad Tamimi from the village of Nebi Saleh, north of Ramallah. The assault was captured on video cameras and immediately posted on YouTube. It reached all corners of the universe and revealed the volume of Israeli violence in assaulting a little kid. It also showed how the family tried to protect their kid during the attack. Moreover, Facebook has a significant effect on disseminating news as information passes through in no time and with minimal effort. (Pal 009, 28 December 2015)

One Palestinian interviewee, in charge of public relations for one of the ministries, had a different view, talking about the more negative aspects of the spread of cameras:

Well, sometimes it is useful and has a positive impact on news-gathering as well as on the conflict itself. But, on the other hand, almost 99 percent of images captured are taken in a wrong way, leaving a negative impact that helps the Israelis more than the Palestinians. This is the most serious element in dealing with social networks. Shots and videos should be captured properly in a way that helps and serves the Palestinian cause and refutes the Israeli version of the event. (Pal 007, 10 December 2015)

This quote reminds us that the ubiquity of cameras can also work to the disadvantage of the Palestinian cause. The Israeli police and army employ trained photographers who accompany many units. They sometimes release these videos to reinforce official claims about Palestinian terrorism. During the 2015–2016 wave of violence, videos of knife-wielding Palestinians attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians, before being shot, were far more common than more controversial videos, such as those discussed previously.

The question remains as to why the proliferation of cameras is more of a problem for the Israelis than the Palestinians. The answer brings us back to the international political environment that opposes the Israeli occupation. The problem for Israeli political leaders is that, from a strategic perspective, no news is good news. The Israeli government would prefer that the conflict remain as far under the international radar as possible. Also, while images of Palestinians attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians work to the government’s advantage internally, many international audiences may consider such attacks understandable or even justified.

The advent of the digital age has led to some changes regarding Israeli behaviour on the ground, especially when war broke out. Again, the presence of cameras recording the deaths of Palestinian civilians is nothing new. Indeed, an attempt to gauge the impact of such images on international opinion and policy would more likely point to two historical events: the 1982 Lebanese war and the first intifada that erupted in December 1987 (Wolfsfeld, 1997).

Nevertheless, concerns about the increasing presence of cameras on the battlefield and the inability to control the flow of information have a significant impact on how the Israeli military and political leadership think about military operations. Many Israeli leaders talked about the bitter lessons they learned about this problem during the second Lebanese war in 2006. The conventional wisdom was that one reason why the war against the Hezbollah went so poorly was the continual flow of bad news coming from the battlefield, especially from soldiers using their cellphones during the fighting.

Rapaport (2010: 52–53) convincingly wrote about the changes the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) made when they again went to war in Gaza in a conflict called Operation Cast Lead:

Regarding operational discipline, a great improvement has occurred since the 2006 war. A number of examples illustrate this: (1) The use of cellular phones during operational missions has been forbidden completely, and this is enforced. (2) Leaks to the media have been reduced significantly. Checks of telephone conversation emissions that were conducted after the second Lebanon war revealed that dozens of senior officers had been in contact with journalists. The scope of this phenomenon began to decline the moment Ashkenazi [the Chief of Staff] decided to instate heavy penalties for media leaks. It appears that the Chief of Staff’s threats, along with other factors, have been effective, as a check that was conducted of 550 officers during Cast Lead found that none of them leaked information or conversed with journalists without the mediation of the IDF spokesperson.

This conclusion did not mean that the Israelis felt in complete control of the flow of information during the Gaza War. Many difficult images of the destruction were easily uploaded to YouTube. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had people working full time to respond to those images, particularly those it believed were staged or faked. The new technology also made it easier for journalists and government officials to verify user-generated content.

The lack of Israeli control over the flow of information is not limited to the proliferation of cameras. It can also be attributed to the massive number of communication channels that now enable the general public and leaders around the world to share information and opinions about the conflict. Here too, it is important to emphasize that the ongoing interdependence between older and newer media is one of the reasons the changes seem to have had such an effect on general perceptions of the conflict. While this development has provided Israel’s defenders with some helpful tools, most Israeli leaders view these developments more as threats than opportunities. A leading official from the Israeli Foreign Ministry talked about the difficulties Israel faced in the new media environment:

Our main problem is facing your opponent, which is much more than the Palestinians, but all those organizations that are on social networks. There is significance to mathematics. In traditional media, let’s say, in front of the Washington Post, you and your opponent are going with the story of the newspaper, and the situation is that either I managed to get the story or not. In social media, the story is how many people you succeeded to reach and will pass on your story. For example, in Europe, in France, there are between 500,000 and 600,000 Jews, and at least 10 times more Muslims. Not all Muslims are automatically active in this anti-Israeli activity. So, for example, in the Netherlands, Britain and other countries, demographics play a role. The point is that, within the French-speaking space, there is a large majority of people whose natural environment is against you. Therefore, this new media presents us with the challenge of their control in numbers. (IS009, 16 August 2015)

It can be argued that the Israeli interviewees often found themselves constantly involved in damage control. A useful metaphor would be a ship in which the sailors are constantly attempting to plug leaks as the water keeps rushing in. The problem facing the Israelis and other powerful antagonists is that the number of leaks has grown exponentially. New leaks seem to emerge every day, and plugging them all becomes almost impossible. The Foreign Ministry professional’s description provides an excellent example of what happens as political leaders move from the news cycle to the much less institutional, but more dynamic and fragmented political information cycle (Chadwick, 2013).

The question remains as to if any of this has any significant long-term effect on the conflict itself. It is helpful to consider two types of possible effects on the level of restraint the Israeli military exhibits and the extent to which the international community makes significant attempts to resolve the conflict.

First, the interviews with Israeli leaders suggest that they are more reluctant to engage in military operations that involve massive civilian casualties. Some readers may be skeptical of this conclusion, given the high number of Palestinian civilians killed in the 2014 Israeli–Gaza conflict, which suggests that the Israeli military is willing to pay the price of international condemnation if it believes the alternatives on the ground are worse. It is also likely that there are other factors at work, such as changing international norms about civilian casualties. However, there is little doubt that all Israeli leaders take the new media environment into account when planning such operations. At the very least, they agree that the current political and media environments have increasingly shortened the amount of time they have to carry out such operations.

Turning to the second indicator, there is little evidence of significant changes in the international community’s willingness to intervene in the conflict. While there have been repeated international condemnations of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and a growing hostility towards the Jewish state, it would seem that a good deal of the world has reached the conclusion that this is an intractable conflict. It is also worth noting that many other recent international conflicts have been far bloodier than the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Given the constant flow of horror emanating from places such as Syria and Southern Sudan, the videos from Israel and Palestine pale in comparison.

This suggests that, although the advent of the digital age has enabled the Palestinians to compete on a more equal basis with Israel on the international stage, there is scant evidence that this has led to any significant changes in the nature of the conflict or the chances of any resolution. This pessimistic conclusion receives further support as the discussion turns to the second research question.

Peace and hatred in the digital age

The second research question asks: To what extent do political leaders involved in violent conflicts think that the changes associated with the digital age have led to the media playing a more positive or negative role in attempts at peace and reconciliation? In exploring this question, we found significant agreement among Israeli and Palestinian interviewees. Interviewees perceive that the internet, like traditional media, is far better at spreading hate and extremism than promoting peace and reconciliation. If accurate, there is good reason to believe that the internet has made things worse. There are certainly significant differences in the way Israeli and Palestinian leaders relate to this issue, but they seem to agree that the internet in general, and social media in particular, have made the chance for peace even less likely.

The discussion begins by considering the views of Israeli political leaders. One point that frequently arose in the interviews was the conventional wisdom in Israel that a major cause for the 2015–2016 wave of Palestinian violence was the incitement that spread through the social media. This idea resonated within the Israeli populace, particularly given the extremely young age of many of the perpetrators. The general consensus surrounding this issue can be demonstrated by the fact that the speaker of the Knesset talked about it during his annual Independence Day speech in May 2016:

Israel’s enemies incited against us without stop and sowed the seeds of hate and death. Social media played a major role in spreading the wild incitement against us. It’s ironic that it [social media], which is meant to join together, to bring countries and people together, has served those who want to do us evil, to divide, distance, and break [us] up. ¹³

Study of public discourse on this issue in Israel also revealed that claims about incitement were not only adopted by the right-wing parties in power, but also the parties from the centre, and even some who would normally be considered part of the peace camp. One interesting comment on the issue of incitement came from a Knesset member of the opposition, who surprised us by comparing what was going on among the Palestinians to some of what he learned in school about the more extremist Jewish movements who fought against the British occupation of Palestine. He started by supporting the government position on this issue:

It’s true … When you see an ISIS ‘snuff’ film, and they took your parents away and the like, and it may not be nice to say, but it reminds me of the books I’d read as a child about Etzel and Lechi, which would fill me with pride. Everyone always says that when God forbids someone to commit suicide, you shouldn’t publicize it because it could lead to a chain reaction. Here, the chain reaction works through the internet. On the internet, you learn everything: How to hate, how to use weapons, everything.

Interviewer: So you think that has an influence on extremist groups?

Absolutely. Those forces become more powerful because to hate is easy, and to love is difficult. (IS014, 25 November 2015)

A Knesset member who had extensive experience in both the military and Israel’s attempts at public diplomacy expressed a more nuanced view of this issue. When asked if he accepted the claim that incitement was a key factor in the recent wave of attacks, he replied:

I can’t tell exactly which factor has more weight. Obviously, incitement is one factor in encouraging violence, but it is not the only cause of violence. It encourages violence, but if there was no infrastructure or political situation that has an effect on people, then incitement wouldn’t do that. Propaganda can influence only when people have already mentally prepared to take these actions. That’s how I see it. From all sources of incitement, what I think is most effective in the Arab society is still television. It is true that this thesis about social media exists, but in the Arab society it is still the television. I am talking about domestic and international media, like Al-Jazeera. In the local media, there is an impact of the Palestinian Authority and we can also influence them, so they are more cautious. But when it comes from Al-Jazeera and many other similar TV channels and from others that dominate our sky, it does all the work. (IS012, 1 November 2015)

This particular reply is particularly insightful with regard to two issues. The first is that those who make claims about Palestinian incitement while ignoring the political situation are deluding themselves. The idea that politics comes first was the central argument in the article about the role of social media in the Arab Spring (Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer, 2013). The second insight is a further reminder to pundits and researchers who hope to understand the role of the media in conflicts to never ignore the power of television. This is probably especially true when it comes to the power of Al-Jazeera and other Arab satellite news stations within Palestinian society (Lynch, 2006; Samuel-Azran, 2013).

Another Israeli Knesset member was interviewed because of his high level of knowledge and experience in diplomacy and dealing with the international media. He talked about the ways in which the internet was also a boon for extremist groups among Israelis and Palestinians. He specifically mentioned the Israeli right-wing group Lahava. News reports suggested that this Jewish anti-assimilation group was on the verge of being declared a terrorist organization by the defence minister. ¹⁴ The Knesset member was asked about the major changes that had taken place since the dawn of the digital age, and responded:

It changed in two major ways. The first way is that digitalization has increased the power of Lahava groups to recruit and to indoctrinate, and to even instruct militarily building bombs. And rather than advancing the cause of peace, almost invariably, the internet serves as a tool of excitability and building bombs. It hasn’t brought understanding because usually people tend to look at sites that confirm their ideas. They’re not looking to challenge their ideas on the internet, and they get indoctrinated and instructed. We know that lone-wolf terrorists are people that have been indoctrinated and instructed via the internet. I often say that the ones who benefit the most from the internet are the people who are opposed to peace, not the ones who are in favor. Because their message is easy to carry, and they were isolated, and now they’re not isolated. I think they are much more likely to help hate groups, and terrorist groups, and Nazis, and Islamic fundamentals. I think they have gotten the most out of the media revolution. And it’s sad, but I really think that’s the case. (IS010, 20 August 2015)

There is one more Israeli viewpoint on this issue that is worth noting. One of the Knesset members quoted earlier was a close associate of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin when he was involved in the Oslo peace process. The Knesset member’s thoughts about what had changed since then are significant:

I’m not sure today that Rabin would have gone for Oslo. I mean he would have been bombarded with millions of emails and the like, and that is a big deal. (IS014, 25 November 2015)

Assuming there is some truth to this point, it suggests that the digital age may create similar problems for leaders who hope to either initiate peace negotiations or go to war. The inability to control the flow of information from either negotiations or the battlefield represents a serious obstacle to success. Add to that the increasing ability of protest movements to quickly and massively mobilize against the government, and one begins to appreciate the difficulties modern governments face in waging either war or peace.

It was not surprising that the Palestinian leaders we interviewed were less likely to see a problematic link between social media and the 2015–2016 wave of violence. When they did talk about the violence, they either said it was invented by the Israelis as an excuse for killing Palestinians or that it was a justified form of resistance to the Israeli occupation. However, many interviewees did talk about the ability of more radical groups to exploit the internet to achieve their goals. Consider the following comments from a major figure in the Palestinian academic world:

The internet has contributed to spreading chaos, wars, and hatred much more than it has helped in the educational or cultural spheres. At least this is how I see its influence in the Arab world. I see no positive developments that serve the Palestinian cause. I read or watch real news in traditional media outlets. As for social media, I see it as a tool for misleading people, confusing their beliefs, and spreading lies in all directions. (Pal005, 1 December 2015)

A similar sentiment was expressed by another Palestinian leader, a director of a semi-government organization that deals with the conflict:

The dissemination of frightening images of murder and killings have contributed a lot to increasing hatred, while digital media should have been used and guided towards ending wars and not increasing them. The digital age has allowed the spreading of news on destruction. It gave all parties the chance to blame each other. It allowed a fast means of action and reaction, blame and counter-blame. (Pal 004, 27 November 2015)

Some Palestinian interviewees also talked about how the internet had been a boon for their enemies. Interestingly, Israel was not the only enemy that exploited digital tools against the Palestinians. A political leader who was also involved in conflict-related issues referred to both Hamas and Israel:

Unfortunately, the internet has played a major role for the bad more than for the good. Based on the experience in Gaza, it served as a tool to threaten civilians and suppress their aspirations. Yet, it all depends on the user. Hamas, for example, thought it could control the public through social media or digital media, as it allowed it for some and prohibited it for others. At the same time, the Israeli army used the internet and social media to recruit informers, and to frighten and intimidate the civilian population. (Pal003, 17 November 2015)

Only one of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders disagreed with this pessimistic view of the digital age. This exception concerned the attempts of the Israel Foreign Ministry to reach citizens living in the Arab world. Their not-so-hidden agenda was to promote Israel’s viewpoints in the Arab world. Many would argue that these attempts had nothing to do with peace, but should really be seen more as a form of propaganda. They are certainly seen by the Israeli government as a type of public diplomacy.

Nevertheless, one can also not ignore the number of Arab citizens around the world who positively responded to these efforts. One official who was heavily involved in these digital efforts noted:

As soon as we talk about digital media, you have more tools to measure, and have more ability to keep track of things with hashtags, some kind of search or another. What we see at the micro-level is that we reach people. We see who is following us because these studies have showed that we are doing is not bad. It’s not just Israelis, and it is not only non-Israelis. We can see and identify information that goes away and really comes to other media outlets. Important examples come from those who are not considered pro-Israel. We have from the Arabic page that, in terms of ‘likes,’ is our most popular, with 320,000 likes.

Interviewer: How can there be so many Arabs in this group?

Because it is working correctly. When we started, it was around 70,000.

Interviewer: Which Arabs are they?

Very diffuse. A lot from Egypt, Iraq and so on. They are involved and responsive, which is important to us. The guys who work in Arabic, the message trickled down to them, and they invest a lot of time in answering, do not leave the page without commenting, stimulate dialogue, and a lot of interesting things come out. It changes the situation very much compared to traditional media. You have a real dialogue with the Arab population, which is amazing. (IS001, 1 February 2015)

It is noteworthy that this was the only positive comment we heard in all the interviews we conducted. While there may be more exceptions, whereby some movements working for peace are able to exploit the new technology for good, the overall impression suggests that new media has made a bad situation even worse. If the leaders are to be believed, both newer and older media appear to be far better at spreading hate and violence than any voices for reconciliation.

Conclusion

The initial evidence presented in this article points to some interesting conclusions about how the role of the media may have changed since the dawn of the digital age. The increasing difficulties that powerful antagonists have in maintaining control over the flow of information works to the advantage of the weaker side. The proliferation of people with cameras seems particularly significant in this regard.

However, this does not mean that these changes have a significant impact on conflict outcomes. There was some evidence that Israeli leaders had become increasingly concerned about how more aggressive military actions would be covered in the news. Nevertheless, the massive number of civilian casualties being caught on film from conflicts around the world suggests that many have come to the conclusion that military benefits of such actions outweigh any short-term costs to their image. We should be careful about generalizing from this case because the Israeli–Palestinian conflict receives an unusual amount of international attention. In addition, we need to bear in mind that the findings in this study reflect leaders’ perceptions. Further analysis is required before drawing any firm conclusions about the actual role of the media. In any case, any other effects on asymmetrical conflicts will be gradual and long-term. It will be up to historians to assess the overall impact that the internet has on violent conflicts.

With regard to the second research question, results are extremely pessimistic. There was nearly total agreement among the interviewees that social media is much more likely to spread violence and hate than aid in any attempts at conflict resolution. It would be important to look further into this issue using content analysis and the impact of this traffic on various public groups. As with traditional media, we may find some exceptions to this general rule, but there is no current good news on that front.

The research path forward is clear. First, we want to look at other violent conflicts and see if these conclusions also help explain the role of the new media in other contexts. Second, there is a need to look beyond leaders’ perceptions and attempt to use additional methodologies to better understand the changing role of different types of media. Finally, the two research questions asked here have barely scratched the surface in terms of the issues that need to be addressed. The effects of technological changes will be minimal in some areas and are likely to be more significant in others. The goal of research in this area is to learn much more about such differences.