Comment: Status,Power,and Emotion

These articles present a cross-section of psychological theories of emotion. The theories are varied in their explanatory focus and in their assumptions. Though sociological theories of emotion are equally varied, they begin with the assumption that emotions develop in interactional systems shaped by culture and social structure (Stets & Turner, 2008). Many contemporary sociological theories of emotion place particular interest on social structure (see Clay-Warner & Robinson, 2008). Here, scholars focus on power (i.e., the ability to force compliance) and status (i.e., honor and deference) in emotion processes. This commentary will discuss ways in which the psychological theories presented attend to issues of power and status and also suggest ways in which greater attention to these components of social structure could lead to interdisciplinary theories of emotion.

Many aspects of Mesquita and Boiger’s (2014) sociodynamic model are consistent with sociological approaches to emotions. In particular, the model’s focus on the development of situated meaning through relationships and interaction is shared with many sociological theories. In sociology, however, a focus on relationship dynamics suggests attention to power and status processes, as power and status are considered to be key aspects of human relationships. Thus, though Mesquita and Boiger do not discsuss either power or status, their theory is well-suited to their inclusion. For example, they point out that responses to anger are different depending upon whether the target is one’s child or one’s boss—two relationships where power differences are clear. Status also likely plays a role, as anger felt toward an honored boss who holds little actual power would be experienced differently than would anger felt toward a boss who is quite powerful but not respected. Similarly, research finds that situational changes in relative power and status positions affect emotional response (Kemper, 1991). More explicitly incorporating power and status processes into the socio-dynamic model may increase the model’s predictive ability and also reveal mechanisms through which relationship dynamics affect emotions.

Like Mesquita and Boiger’s (2014) model, Barrett’s (2014) conceptual act theory views emotions as situated experiences. Barrett does not reference social structure, but the situated nature of emotions in her model suggests that status and power may be relevant contextual factors. Here, status and power could contribute to the conceptual knowledge that is used to interpret experiences and physical sensations. For example, it is often functional for those in low power positions to interpret physical arousal and situational cues in ways that allow them to avoid negative emotions, because expressions of negative emotion toward higher power others are often counterproductive. Also consistent with sociological theories, Barrett (2014) recognizes that emotions are part of larger situational dynamics by stating that emotions are not caused by culture but instead, “are performances of culture” (p. 294). I would argue that emotions are also performances of status and power in that feelings and expressions of emotion serve to reflect and reinforce existing hierarchies. These hierarchies then become part of the “conceptual act” that, according to Barrett (2014), “shape the trajectory of future experiences” (p. 293).

As Moors (2014) states, one of the goals of appraisal theories is to discover patterns in the association between situations and emotional episodes. One’s position in the social structure is known to affect both perceptions and appraisals. Thus, there would seem to be opportunities for inclusion of social structural factors in appraisal theories. Moors discounts the potential role of status in appraisal theories, however, stating that theorists would not incorporate status as a new appraisal factor until it was demonstrated that the effects of status were not simply mediated by other appraisal factors. This is a resonable position, as parsimony suggests a focus on proximal causes. If status and power influence multiple appraisal factors in consistent ways, however, then including them in the broader model would be warranted. This would also be the case if power and/or status moderate the effects of known appraisal factors alone or in combination. For example one’s status relative to an interaction partner likely shapes the effect of goal-relevant stimuli on emotional episodes, as individuals experience the goal-relevant act of a high-status other more intensely than they would the goal-relevant act of a low-status other.

Finally, evolutionary theories initally appear inconsistent with social structural approaches because they emphasize biological roots of emotion. Tracy (2014), however, notes the value of status signaling through displays of pride, which cue observers to engage in self-preserving acts of deference. Also, status moderates emotional responses to anger in the evolutionary model, as it does in Mesquita and Boiger’s (2014) approach. This nod to status structures should not be surprising, since status and dominance hierarchies are known to undergird primate behavior and emotion displays. Refocusing attention to status hierarchies could suggest new avenues for evolutionary theory.

I have described a few ways in which the focal theories could incorporate status and power without violating core assumptions. I invite the authors to comment on the extent to which a social structural approach is consistent with their theories, as well as what the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach might be.