Approach and Avoidance as Organizing Structures for Motivated Distance Perception

Abstract

Emerging demonstrations of the malleability of distance perception in affective situations require an organizing structure. These effects can be predicted by approach and avoidance orientation. Approach reduces perceptions of distance; avoidance exaggerates perceptions of distance. Moreover, hedonic valence, motivational intensity, and perceiver arousal cannot alone serve as organizing principles. Organizing the literature based on approach and avoidance can reconcile seeming inconsistent effects in the literature, and offers these motives as psychological mechanisms by which affective situations predict perceptions of distance. Moreover, this perspective complements functional models of perception claiming perceptions of distance serve adaptive responding, and in so doing suggests why perceptions of distance respond to affective situations. This review contributes to the building of a broader theory of motivated distance perception.

Keywords

approach arousal avoidance distance perception motivation valence

Evidence across social psychology, vision science, health science, judgment and decision-making, and affective neuroscience suggests that distance perception is inherently tied to social experiences that evoke strong emotions and motivations. For example, perception and management of distance are required for successful navigation of interpersonal space and satisfaction of individual attachment concerns (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Dewitte & De Houwer, 2008; Hall, 1968). Representations of distance affect the quality of financial decisions (Maglio, Trope, & Liberman, 2013). Distance perception affects trust and collaboration during negotiations (Henderson & Lount, 2011). It predicts efforts to protect oneself from harm in dangerous contexts, to manage fitness goals, and to restore feelings of social connection (Adolph, Berger, & Leo, 2011; Cole, Balcetis, & Zhang, 2013; Gibson & Walk, 1960; Pitts, Wilson, & Hugenberg, 2014).

While distance perception is inherently tied to a multitude of social situations, the psychological mechanisms that give rise to changes in perceptual experience have not been fully articulated. Although researchers propose that emotional and affective states of perceivers affect perceptual experience, a growing literature presents seemingly inconsistent effects of what might seem similar affective experiences on perceptions of distance. I suggest organizing the literature and directing future research according to a novel taxonomic structure. I propose that features of eliciting situations shift perceivers’ motivational direction, which predicts changes in perceptions of distance (see Figure 1). Situations can induce both emotions and motivational states, but motivations best predict perceptions of distance. Motivational direction, defined as approach and avoidance orientations, best synthesizes existing research on distance perception, reconciles inconsistencies, suggests psychological mechanisms, and contributes to the building of a broader theory of motivated distance perception.

Figure 1.

Conceptual model of motivated distance perception.

Affective Experiences and Perceptions of Distance

In the growing body of work relevant to motivated distance perception, researchers generally expose participants to affective situations, measure or manipulate emotional states of the perceiver or properties of affective objects, and test effects on distance perception (e.g., Cole, Balcetis, & Dunning, 2013; Stefanucci, Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008). For instance, travelers who reported being happier about where they were going than where they started overestimated how far they had already traveled (Alter & Balcetis, 2011, Study 1). People with a phobia surrounding snakes judged the slithery creatures as nearer to them than did control patients (Teghtsoonian & Frost, 1982). These and other studies document whether emotional states of the perceiver or affective properties of objects contract, expand, or leave untouched perceptions of distance.

However, an attempt at summarizing this literature by rendering a profile of unique effects of emotions or affective objects on specific changes in distance perception will prove dissatisfying. Complications arise because specific emotions and affective objects do not exert the same or consistent effects on distance perception. For instance, disgusting objects appear farther away in some instances (Cole et al., 2013, Study 1; Siegel, Walker, & Stefanucci, 2009), but equidistant to neutral objects in other instances (Cole et al., 2013, Study 2). Likewise, at times threatening targets seem proximal and other times distal. For instance, people judged the length of a journey through a dangerous Philadelphia neighborhood as greater the more they felt fear (Mattson & Rengert, 1995). However, baseball fans reported that another team’s field felt closer to them the more they considered that team to be a threatening rival (Xiao & van Bavel, 2012). Inconsistencies like these demonstrate the problems that arise if attempting to map specific emotional states to specific perceptual biases in a one-to-one manner.

Inconsistent effects within this literature can be reconciled if researchers adopt a taxonomic structure based on component dimensions of affective responding (e.g., Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000; Carver, 2006; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, 2013; Lindquist, 2013; Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Russell, 2003). Three dimensions are relevant. First, people can vary in the hedonic valence of their experience, or the degree to which they feel pleasure or displeasure (Russell, 2009). Second, people can experience variation in the intensity of their motivational response, level of activation, energy, or urge to act (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Russell, 2009). Third, people can experience variation in motivational direction, or the degree to which situations engage an impulse to approach or avoid (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Davidson, 1995; Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2008; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999).¹

Among these factors, motivational direction best organizes the literature on motivated distance perception. Structuring this literature through the lens of motivational direction offers testable claims regarding mechanisms responsible for perceptions of distance, specifying how perceptions of distance change. Moreover, this account offers theoretical speculation on why perceptions of distance change. Consistent with other functional accounts of perception (e.g., Proffitt, 2006), motivated distance perception may assist in adaptive navigation of the environment. I speculate that perceiving objects as closer than others (perceived proximity) could encourage action, while perceiving objects as farther than others (perceived extremity) could inhibit action or promote reevaluation. While perceptions of distance themselves do not directly satisfy an active motive, motivated distance perception might serve as one catalyst for actions that contribute to the satisfaction of motives in some situations. This review proposes that approach and avoidance orientations exert independent effects on distance perception. It encourages researchers to consider not only the affective properties of objects and emotional reactions of perceivers, but perhaps even more critically the motivational states of perceivers when investigating perceptions of distance. In so doing it offers a testable, mechanistic model for and suggests regulatory functions served by motivated perceptions of distance.

Motivational Direction as a Unique Dimension

Motivational direction is the drive or impulse to approach or avoid. These motives can arise as people encounter objects under variable circumstances, and manifest as inclinations to engage with or disengage from the target. Approach and avoidance orientations may arise despite people’s preferences. For instance, a person may prefer to avoid contamination, but may still be motivated to approach dog feces in order to clean up the backyard. An employee may prefer to steer clear of an irate and hostile boss, but may still be motivated to approach in order to explain his or her side of the story. Approach and avoidance motivations can also arise independent of physical movements a person is currently making. For instance, a person may experience both an approach motivation in response to and a preference for a fresh donut rather than a gelatinous organic veggie smoothie even at the moment that he or she is walking up to the salad counter and away from the bakery. Approach and avoidance motivations can engage despite people’s preferred responses, and may arise without forewarning and despite intuitions about how people might respond when only considering what their reactions might be. And approach and avoidance motives can arise irrespective of physical motion.

To predict when and to what degree approach and avoidance engage, it is necessary to consider not only the contents of the environment and to what objects people are exposed, but additional features of the situations themselves. Approach and avoidance motives can arise in counterintuitive situations when certain conditions discussed in more detail in what follows are met. While it is not the aim of this review to articulate a complete model of object properties, situational affordances, and individual differences that give rise to approach and avoidance motives, this review draws from well-established research to forward the testable proposition that perceptual biases in distance research can be organized by motivational direction.

Different Than Valence

Approach and avoidance orientations can each arise in conjunction with eliciting experiences that are appraised as positive or negative in valence, supporting the claim that motivational direction is independent of valence (Carver, 2004; Harmon-Jones et al., 2013). Approach can activate in the presence of both positive and negative objects; avoidance can also activate in the presence of both positive and negative objects. For instance, as intuition suggests, people experience an approach motivation when exposed to some positively valenced objects, including pleasant words and positive faces (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). Also intuitively, people experience an avoidance motivation in response to some negatively valenced objects. When moving a lever to categorize photographs, faces depicting anger yielded faster pushing rather than pulling movements, which is a marker of avoidance motives (Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005).

However, counter to intuition, approach motivations engage in some negative experiences. For instance, individuals addicted to binge eating and gambling experience approach motives in response to stimuli from which they no longer derive pleasure (Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009). Infants experience approach motives in response to frustration, as measured by arm pulling (Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1990). Adults, too, experience stronger approach motives in response to some negative experiences, like those that evoke anger (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones et al., 2013). Specifically, people experienced stronger approach motives after being insulted rather than treated neutrally, as indicated by EEG measures of greater left frontal cortical activity (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001). Finally, people actually engaged in approach behaviors, suggesting activation of approach motives, as feelings of anger intensified; in a simulator, people drove faster to tailgate offending cars when angry (Roidl, Siebert, Oehl, & Höger, 2013).

Counterintuitively, avoidance motives can arise in response to positively appraised objects. Although socially anxious people evaluated smiling faces as positive, they reacted to them with stronger avoidant behaviors than approach behaviors (Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007). Similarly, people evaluated high-fat foods (e.g., chocolate) positively, but avoided attending to pictures of them compared to neutral pictures (Veenstra, De Jong, Koster, & Roefs, 2010).

To demonstrate their independence, researchers measured patterns of brain activity after manipulating motivational direction orthogonal of object valence (Berkman & Lieberman, 2010). Participants learned to associate certain foods they personally considered positive and negative with approach and avoidance orientations. Researchers measured hemispheric differences in patterns of brain activation when participants indicated whether to “eat” or “not eat” these foods. Activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex increased during approach, when participants indicated these were foods to eat. Moreover, activation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex increased during avoidance, when participants indicated these were foods not to eat. However, no such hemispheric effect emerged as a function of valence. Moreover, individual differences in approach/avoidance motivation moderated the effect, such that increased trait approach motivation was associated with greater left-sided asymmetry during approach actions regardless of the stimulus valence (see also Spielberg, Heller, & Miller, 2013, for a hierarchical model of cortical asymmetry differences across time). Approach and avoidance motives can exert consequential effects in a manner independent of the valence of a target.

Different Than Emotion

Approach and avoidance orientations do not correspond to any one particular emotion exclusively. For instance, some situations can elicit both disgust and avoidance, as people prepare to protect against disease (Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004; Curtis & Biran, 2001; Fessler, Eng, & Navarrete, 2005). Other situations can elicit both disgust and approach motives, as people gather more information to determine the best way to respond to disgust elicitors. Indeed, when participants were tasked with identifying targets hidden in pictures they knew portrayed disgusting images, participants elected to view the most disgusting aspects of pictures first rather than the least disgusting aspects, even when offered the opportunity to simply avoid viewing the pictures altogether (Eng, 2008).

Likewise, some situations can elicit feelings of threat and avoidance motives, while other situations can elicit feelings of threat and approach motives. For instance, situations that present the opportunity and ability to escape elicit feelings of threat and avoidance motives. Indeed, rats attempt to flee from a predator cat, but only if the opportunity to escape seems possible (R. J. Blanchard, Fukunaga, & Blanchard, 1976).

However, situations that present an imminent threat while limiting the opportunity for escape elicit feelings of threat and approach motives; importantly though, these approach motives manifest as attack behavior meant to defend oneself against immediate danger (D. C. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984; R. J. Blanchard, Flannelly, & Blanchard, 1986; Carver, 2004; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). When resident mice, for instance, find their home cage invaded by a rogue mouse, residents will approach, crossing a pain-inducing electrified grid, to attack the rogue character (Lagerspetz, 1969). Among humans, limiting the possibility for flight or escape leads people to activate approach motives (Cesario, Plaks, Hagiwara, Navarrete, & Higgins, 2010). Indeed, when people considered how they would react in dangerous situations, the inescapability of a threat predicted approach-related defensive attack, reduced freezing, and was uncorrelated with avoidant running away (D. C. Blanchard, Hynd, Minke, Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001). Similarly, when participants encountered a social threat—in this case, photographs of African American men—while sitting in a small booth, participants showed greater accessibility of approach-related words (e.g., fight) compared to avoidance-related words (e.g., flight) and responded with greater aggressiveness, a behavioral marker of approach, when an experimenter made a mistake (Cesario et al., 2010). Emotional experiences cannot—nor can specific affective objects—be mapped in a one-to-one manner on to specific motivational directions. The situational circumstances under which affective objects are experienced can shift the appraisal of the target, emotional reaction, and most centrally for this argument the specific motivation that is activated.

Motivational Direction and Distance Perception

Motivational direction serves as an organizing structure for research documenting effects of motivated distance perception. Objects and situations that elicit approach and avoidance orientations each produce unique effects on distance perception. Approach motives lead people to perceive objects as close, relative to avoidance motives, which lead people to perceive objects as farther away. By considering the motivational state that arises in response to the eliciting object under specific situational circumstances, researchers can a priori predict whether perceptions of distance contract or expand.

Approach Orientations and Perceived Proximity

Approach orientations lead to perceptions of proximity. People perceive objects that evoke approach orientations as closer than objects that do not evoke approach (see Figure 1). Because approach motives can arise in the presence of both positive and negative objects, the sections that follow are organized by valence.

Approach and positive objects

Approach orientations reflect strong inclinations to acquire desirable goods (e.g., Elliot, 2006), and desired objects appear closer than undesired objects. For example, people more frequently judged that desirable objects like chocolates or diamonds appeared within arms’ reach compared to negative or neutral objects like cigarette butts or paperclips (Valdés-Conroy, Román, Hinojosa, & Shorkey, 2012). Likewise, people estimated that a diagnostic survey on which researchers provided flattering feedback appeared 16% closer than one offering critical feedback (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010).

Approach orientations also activate in the presence of money (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008), and money appears closer than a financially valueless object (Cole & Balcetis, 2013). Participants tossed a beanbag with the intention of hitting a $100.00 bill or an equivalently sized, valueless object (see Figure 2a). Tosses that landed closer to the participant suggested that distances appeared smaller, while those that landed farther away suggested that distances appeared greater. Participants undertossed the beanbag by 8% when the target was the desired $100.00 bill relative to when it was valueless.

Figure 2.

Depiction of performance-based (Panel A) and visual matching measures (Panels B, C, D) assessing perceptions of distance. Dotted lines indicate movement vector. Labels indicate whether positioning closer or further indicates perceived extremity or proximity (Panels A, B). Positioning experimenter (Panel C) or markers (Panel D) closer indicates perceived proximity.

Approach orientations also arise in response to visceral states including the motivation to satisfy hunger and thirst (Loewenstein, 1996). While these states are experienced as aversive, the goods that can alleviate them are appraised as desirable, and elicit strong inclinations to acquire them (Ortony & Turner, 1990). Such viscerally induced approach orientations lead people to perceive these desired goods as closer. For instance, thirsty participants estimated that a bottle of water was 10% closer than did quenched participants (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010).

Approach orientations arise after being socially rejected, and appear in the form of drives to affiliate with others (Elliot, Gable, & Mapes, 2006). Such motives impact perceptions of physical distance. In one study, participants recalled a time they were rejected or recalled their morning activities (Pitts et al., 2014). They tossed a beanbag with the goal to land it next to a new interaction partner (see Figure 2a). Based on where the bag landed, researchers inferred that participants motivated to affiliate perceived a new partner as over 7% closer than did control participants.

Approach orientations activate both as a result of changes in perceivers’ states as well as of the nature of the objects in the environment. People experience the strongest approach orientations when both a motive arises and an object that can satisfy that motive is present (Loewenstein, 1996). Motivated distance perception reflects this form of specificity. Hungry restaurant diners perceived pizza as 23% closer than did sated patrons; but estimates of distance to empty, plastic cups did not vary between hungry and sated diners (Balcetis, 2006). Similarly, rejected participants perceived distances to a target as shorter than did control participants, but only when the target was a real person (Pitts et al., 2014). Estimates of distance to a life-sized cardboard depiction of a person did not vary between rejected and control participants. These studies suggest that psychological and physiological states of the perceiver may give rise to approach orientations when situational constraints offer an opportunity to satisfy the motive (see Figure 1). Moreover, people perceive distances as shortest when they experience an approach motivation and see an object can satisfy that motive.

Approach and negative objects

The wealth of research in this category exposes participants to threats. When people encounter an imminent threat and situational constraints preclude escape, approach orientations can activate as people prepare to defend against the threat (see Figure 1; D. C. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984; R. J. Blanchard et al., 1986). In such cases, threatening objects appear physically close. When securely seated in a small, dark room, a tarantula appeared closer when people lacked resources to respond to the threat compared to when people had resources to respond to the threat (Harber, Yeung, & Iacovelli, 2011).² Likewise, the more threatened people felt (controlling for other negative feelings), the closer they estimated a spider was to them (Cole et al., 2013). Similarly, threatening interaction partners appeared closer than nonthreatening ones (Cole et al., 2013). Some women learned of a man’s pent up aggression, while other women learned of his class schedule. Then, participants moved in to a small office and closed the door to spend 20 minutes with him alone, conditions known to activate approach behaviors as people prepare to defend against possible harm (Cesario et al., 2010). Women estimated that the threatening man describing his explosive temperament appeared 26% closer than the calm, mundane man. Situations that elicit approach motives lead to perceptions of proximity.

Avoidance Orientations and Perceived Extremity

Perceptions of distance are also responsive to avoidance orientations. However, avoidance affects perceptions of distance differently than does approach. While approach reduces perceptions of distance, avoidance orientations exaggerate them. Because avoidance orientations can arise in response to both negative and positive objects, the sections next are organized by valence.

Avoidance and negative objects

Motives to maintain interpersonal space can engage social avoidance orientations (e.g., S. L. Gable, 2006), and these social experiences affect perceptions of distance. For instance, using both numeric reports and a visual matching measure (see Figure 2b), researchers found that social avoidance predicts perceptions of distance to objects serving as symbolic markers of interpersonal closeness (Fay & Maner, 2012). People with chronic tendencies to avoid others perceived a hot cup of coffee (a symbol of warmth and social inclusion) as farther away than did people with chronic approach tendencies. Likewise, women experiencing attachment anxiety who just imagined saying goodbye to their partner at the airport as he boarded his flight to start a job in another country estimated that their partner was standing farther away if they experienced strong rather than weak levels of chronic attachment avoidance motivations (Refling, 2014).

Objects that evoke disgust also may evoke avoidance orientations (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & David, 2008), and shift perceptions of distance. For instance, participants perceived objects covered in a disgusting substance as farther away than clean objects, and this difference was exaggerated when the objects actually were located nearby (Siegel et al., 2009). When statistically isolating feelings of disgust from threat, the more revolting a tarantula seemed, the farther away it appeared (Cole et al., 2013). Likewise, disgusting dog feces appeared farther away than desirable chocolates (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010). Specifically, when attempting to match the distance between the self and the object to the distance between two referent lines (see Figure 2b), participants positioned themselves about 88 in. away from the feces and 101 in. away from the chocolates. Positioning themselves closer to the feces when trying to match the referent distance indicated the feces actually appeared further away.

Avoidance and desired objects

Although this line of work is still in its infancy, convergent evidence suggests that avoidance orientations sometimes arise in the presence of positive objects. Avoidance orientations can engage when in the presence of hedonically pleasant and seemingly positive objects that conflict with central goals (i.e., temptations). People construe some temptations as positive in the here and now, yet demonstrate behavioral avoidance of them. Indeed, people were faster to respond to temptation-related words than goal-related or neutral words by making a pushing motion indicative of the activation of avoidance (Fishbach & Shah, 2006). In particular, dieters evaluated food words like chocolate, cake, and butter as equally positive as fitness words like slim, gym, and muscles. However, dieters pushed away food words significantly faster than fitness words. Important to note, in these situations avoidance of delicious but fattening foods may arise as a by-product of a strong orientation to approach a fitness goal.

If avoidance orientations lead to perceived extremity, it is reasonable to hypothesize that temptations that activate avoidance orientations might be perceived as further away. Indeed, the researchers discuss implications of their work suggesting that “people secure attainment of goals by keeping a distance from tempting objects” (Fishbach & Shah, 2006, p. 821). Just as goal pursuit can be facilitated by increased distance, so too might goal pursuit be facilitated by the mere perception of exaggerated distance. Future research on the effects of avoidance orientation in the presence of positively evaluated objects on perceptions of distance is needed. Nonetheless, data thus far suggest that situations that elicit avoidance orientations lead to perceptions of extremity.

Motivational Direction Reconciles Inconsistencies

Attempts to synthesize the literature linking affective experience to distance perception produce some perplexing inconsistencies. A particular emotional experience or affective response to an object may lead to contracted perceptions of distance in some instances, but expanded perceptions of distance in others. How can this be? The apparent inconsistencies can be resolved by considering the underlying motivational direction.

Reconciling Inconsistencies Regarding Threat

Motivational direction as an organizing principle reconciles an inconsistency within studies on threat and distance perception. In some threatening situations, people perceive distances as shorter. Objects that can cause harm and that people do not believe they have the personal resources to combat appear closer than affectively neutral objects (Cole et al., 2013; Harber et al., 2011). For instance, White females who considered Black males more threatening judged a nearby urban city known for its large minority population as closer when the White females made the judgment alone than when they made the judgment in the presence of other females (Cesario & Navarrete, 2014). However, in other threatening situations, people perceive distances as greater. People with a strong fear of heights or those who imagined falling saw the distance to the ground off a balcony as greater than those with less fear or those who did not envision falling (Clerkin, Cody, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Teachman, 2009; Jackson, 2009; Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, & Proffitt, 2008). Likewise, people estimated the distance to the ground was greater when their hands were secured behind their backs than when firmly holding on to a handrail (Harber et al., 2011).

Although intuition suggests people’s emotional experiences across these situations might be similar—people likely feel scared—these situations might evoke different motivational orientations. Exposure to dangerous threats might evoke approach motives when situations prohibit escape and resources to combat the threat are ample (see Figure 1; Cesario & Navarrete, 2014). However, when perceiving the extent of a possible fall, different motives may arise. Indeed, heights can produce avoidance orientations. People with higher self-reported acrophobia indicated responding to height-related situations with more avoidance behaviors (Cohen, 1997). While people might anticipate and report similar feelings, like fear, the motivational orientations that arise may differ. The eliciting situation and resources available could activate approach or avoidance motives even if people report or anticipate having similar emotional responses. To best predict perceptions of distance, it may be necessary to specifically measure the activation of underlying approach or avoidance motives.

Reconciling Inconsistencies Regarding Disgust

The literature documenting perceptions of distance to disgusting objects can also appear inconsistent. In some work, disgusting objects appear farther away than neutral objects. Objects covered in slimy substances appeared farther away than clean objects (Siegel et al., 2009). Likewise, as feelings of disgust intensified, people’s estimates of the distance to a tarantula also increased when statistically adjusting for feelings of threat (Cole et al., 2013). In such cases, underlying motives to avoid touching gooey substances or creepy spiders may have led to exaggerated perceptions of distance.

In contrast, other evidence suggests disgusting objects are perceived as equally distant as neutral objects. Specifically, a disgusting man who revealed he had urinated into customers’ beverages while working at a fast food restaurant appeared equally as far from participants as did a mundane man who described his class schedule (Cole et al., 2013). Why in this case did disgusting objects seem just as far as mundane ones? One possibility is that the motivational orientations that arose in that situation were multiple. The specific situational context may have activated both approach and avoidance orientations. Although participants reported feeling disgusted by the urinating man (which may have elicited avoidance), they were taking part in a study on social interactions where they believed their ability to converse with him for quite some time was being tested (which may have elicited approach). Indeed, social interactions can simultaneously activate both approach and avoidance tendencies (e.g., S. L. Gable, 2006). The concurrent activation of both orientations may have counteracted any effect on distance perception. In different situational contexts, multiple motives may be activated and it may be necessary to measure the relative activation of both approach and avoidance to predict perceptions of distance.

It is also possible that the concurrent activation of both approach and avoidance orientations engaged the behavioral inhibition system (BIS)—another motivational system relevant to guiding action-based responses in aversive situations. Inhibition arises when drives to both approach and avoid are active and the situation requires behavioral reassessment (McNaughton & Gray, 2000; Wacker, Chavanon, Leue, & Stemmler, 2008). As a result of BIS activity and behavioral uncertainty, perceptions of distance may remain unaffected. Inconsistencies can be resolved by considering underlying motivational orientations that arise as a function of different social and situational contexts.

Valence, Motivational Intensity, and Arousal Are Inadequate Organizing Principles

Valence

Valence does not serve as an apt organizing principle for motivated distance perception. Valence as an independent construct cannot consistently predict whether affective objects will appear closer or farther. To predict the direction of perceptual bias, it is necessary to know more than only the valence of the target. Objects with a positive affective valence (e.g., €50.00 note) were more likely to be judged as within a reachable distance at locations at which neutral objects (e.g., white box) were judged as nonreachable (Valdés-Conroy et al., 2012). Likewise, positive objects including water, money, gift cards, and positive feedback appeared closer than neutral, control objects (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010). However, so too did a scary man (Cole et al., 2013). Moreover, not all negative objects appear closer. A threatening tarantula appeared closer than a disgusting one even though both evoked intense negative feelings (Cole et al., 2013). Valence does not alone predict the direction of perceptual change.

Motivational Intensity

An organism can approach or avoid a cue with varying degrees of motivational intensity, urgency, and engagement (e.g., Atkinson, 1957; Elliot, 2006; Hull, 1943; McClelland, 1985). However, it is not the intensity of the experienced motivation that predicts perceived proximity or extremity. The manner in which motivational intensity affects perceptions of distance is inconsistent. For instance, when estimating the number of inches to a bill, people judged a $100.00 they could win—an object that likely elicits high intensity—as 14% closer than a $100.00 they could never take home with them (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010). However, greater intensity does not always predict increased perceptions of proximity. Although disgusting objects evoke more intense motivations than neutral objects (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a), disgusting objects do not appear closer than neutral objects (Cole et al., 2013, Study 2; Siegel et al., 2009). Reciprocally, perceptions of proximity do not require differences in motivational intensity; the strength of the feelings of threat experienced by women meeting a dangerous man did not differ from the strength of the disgust experienced by women meeting a foul man, yet the dangerous man appeared closer than the foul one (Cole et al., 2013, Study 2). Motivational intensity does not consistently predict the direction of perceptual shifts, nor are differences in intensity necessary for changes in perceptions of distance to occur.

Additional Consideration: Addressing Arousal

Motivated distance perception is sensitive to arousal that people experience, but arousal alone cannot consistently predict perceptual experiences. Important to note, while arousal is considered similar to motivational intensity within some perspectives (Bradley & Lang, 2007), arousal has been separated from motivational intensity in other perspectives (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010b). Arousal can predict perceived proximity; participants who saw a $100.00 bill they could win reported feeling more energized and worked up than participants who saw an empty picture, and participants saw the $100.00 as closer than the frame. They underthrew a beanbag by 2 in. when intending to hit the $100.00, but overthrew by 11 in. when intending to hit the frame (Figure 2a). These data suggest participants who felt greater arousal also perceived the target eliciting that arousal as closer than the other target (Cole & Balcetis, 2013). However, arousal can also predict perceived extremity; anxious golfers perceived the hole as farther away, when assessed using a visual matching measure (Figure 2c), compared to golfers trained to down-regulate arousal (Stern, Cole, Gollwitzer, Oettingen, & Balcetis, 2013).

Moreover, the effect of arousal on distance perception seems to require that the arousal experienced be relevant to the perceptual task. For example, participants experiencing arousal after viewing evocative photographs perceived the distance to the ground from the balcony ledge as greater than people who viewed less arousing photographs, but arousal did not impact perceptions of the distance across a flat hallway or when viewing the height of the balcony from below (Stefanucci & Storbeck, 2009; Storbeck & Stefanucci, 2014).

Arousal is not sufficient to change distance perception. In one study, situational contexts led some police officers to experience increased heart rate during a simulated altercation, while others’ heart rates remained relatively low. Even though arousal varied, perceptions of distance to the suspect did not differ between the groups of officers (Nieuwenhuys, Cañal-Bruland, & Oudejans, 2012).

Arousal is not necessary to change distance perception. Although people perceived chocolates as closer to themselves than dog feces, self-reported levels of arousal did not differ between participants presented with either the chocolates or feces, and estimates of distance did not correlate with self-reported arousal (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010, Study 3b). Likewise, perceptions of distance to a target remained the same even after statistically adjusting for arousal measured by heart rate (Cole et al., 2013, Study 2). Arousal exerts inconsistent directional shifts on perceptions of distance, does not always lead to, and is not necessary for predicting perceptual change.

Building a Theory of Motivated Distance Perception

Synthesis With Function-Based Models

A model of motivated distance perception based on approach and avoidance orientation is a model rooted in function. This model of motivated distance perception implies that perceptual changes occur in order to promote adaptive responding. Direct evidence tying perceptions of distance to consequential and adaptive actions is still forthcoming, however researchers offer speculations. If distance perception assists in functional responding, distance perception should prompt action when action is needed, as is the case when a desired good can be acquired or a dangerous threat requires self-defense (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010; Cole et al., 2013). People’s bodies prepare to act when in the presence of a desired good or dangerous threat, and preparations intensify as rewards and threats appear to come closer (Pichon, de Gelder, & Grezes, 2012). If readiness to engage in action increases as the proximity of a reward or threat increases, misperceiving rewarding or threatening targets as proximal may facilitate the regulation of action. Some research suggests this is the case. Interventions designed to create the experience of perceived proximity (e.g., narrowed attention), facilitate faster goal-relevant responding (Cole, Riccio, & Balcetis, 2014). This suggests that motivated perception may assist in prompting adaptive action.

This causal account could be tested by experimentally manipulating perceptions of distance and testing behavioral consequences. For instance, researchers could place perceivers in situations known to enhance or attenuate approach orientations (e.g., a small room, with a bottle of water when thirsty that they could eventually drink or when they could not). Researchers could manipulate whether the object appears closer or farther by inducing different styles of attention; narrowed focus of attention produces perceptions of proximity relative to relatively more expansive focus of attention (Cole et al., 2014). Then researchers could measure the action-related responses. If perceptions of distance assist in the regulation of action, then when approach motives are active and the object appears close (e.g., when the bottle can be acquired and it appears close) readiness, inclinations, and attempts to acquire the object should be greatest.

If distance perception assists in functional responding, distance perception should also serve as a system of forewarning. Some researchers argue that distances appear greater during circumstances of danger in order to intensify the feeling of potential harm. For instance, the distance to the ground from a balcony ledge appears greater among people who are scared. Researchers propose that this perceptual experience occurs in order to emphasize the costs of potentially falling and to guide action planning in response to this hazard (Teachman et al., 2008).

Although existing functional accounts generate predictions about when and why people might perceive distances as smaller or larger, they leave unspecified the psychological mechanisms by which perceptual shifts occur. The psychological mechanisms by which desired and dangerous items appear closer or disgusting ones appear farther are not articulated yet in functional accounts. Approach and avoidance orientations may serve as one mechanism by which affective situations affect perceptions of distance in order to guide the regulation of adaptive behaviors (see Figure 2). This model of motivated distance perception suggests how perception changes and complements existing functional theories that articulate why such perceptual experiences occur.

Reciprocity in Motivated Distance Perception

Distance perception may be the consequence of motivational direction, but also might reciprocally change the strength of approach and avoidance orientations (see Figure 1). For instance, threats can engage or inhibit motivated responses depending on the distance to the perceiver (Low, Lang, Smith, & Bradley, 2008; Mühlberger, Neumann, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008). Close threats mobilize bodies for action by increasing blood flow to gross muscles and accelerating cardiac activity when defensive self-protection is deemed necessary and effective (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Fanselow, 1994; Masterson & Crawford, 1982; Wilkowski & Meier, 2010). However, far away threats induce freezing, inhibition of motor movement, and decreased heart rate (Campbell, Wood, & McBride, 1997). Likewise, rats approached food pellets with greater intensity when they were nearby (Dollard & Miller, 1950). Just as the actual distance to a threat or a reward can shift the strength of the motivated response, so too might the mere perception of a dangerous threat or appetitive reward. Indeed, people trying to exercise who saw the rewarding finish line as closer rather than farther away were also the people who walked faster and experienced the physical exertion as easier (Cole et al., 2014). The relationships among actual distance, perceptions of distance, and motivational direction may prove interrelated and reciprocal as perceptual experiences functionally guide behavioral responses.

Methodological Considerations

Perceptual Bias Versus Accuracy

I argue that motivated distance perception may assist in functional navigation of the environment. A critic might retort and argue that accurate assessments of spatial layouts should promote more adaptive responses rather than biased perceptions. Accurate perceptions might better assist in acquiring desired goods, defending against a menace, and avoiding contamination. This intuition leads to the prediction that strong approach and avoidance orientations should reduce perceptual bias rather than create it—a prediction that stands in contradiction to the general premise of this review.

To reconcile this paradox, it is necessary to consider the specific stage of action during which perception is measured, including planning action and engaging in action. Separate systems handle processing during planning and engagement (e.g., Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Glover, 2004; Goodale & Milner, 1992; Jeannerod, 1997). Prior to action, people must first design a plan (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). The perceptual system assists in action planning by surveying what the environment affords in light of the perceivers’ ability to act (Proffitt, 2006). During planning, perceptual experiences that exaggerate the nature of the threat or the immediacy of the reward could expedite decision-making. For example, when planning how to respond to a threat, misperceptions of proximity may facilitate decisions regarding whether and how to defend the self. Likewise, when planning how to acquire a desired item, misperceptions of proximity might expedite the behaviors that assist in attainment. To test whether perceptions of proximity promote action planning, researchers might, for instance, examine whether people who perceive significant rewards as closer than trivial rewards are also those who more quickly decide whether and how to proceed to acquire the desired good.

In contrast, during action engagement, the visuomotor system guides motor movements, helping calibrate muscular responses to the actual topography of the environment (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995; Witt, 2011). During action engagement, accurate perceptual experiences may better assist successful navigation. To test whether accurate perceptions assist in calibrating motor movements to engage in action, researchers might compare participants’ estimates of distance to the objective, actual distance. Minimal discrepancy between estimates and actual distance may predict muscular coordination and successful navigation.

Studies within the motivated distance perception literature generally assess perceptual experiences at the action planning and deliberation stages, before people react to or move within the environment. As researchers test perceptual experiences during implementation and stages of action, and delineate precisely when implementation and action stages occur, they might make predictions regarding the accuracy of perceptual experience and compare estimates with an objective standard. Biased and accurate perceptual experiences might differentially serve action planning and engagement through separate visual systems (see Witt, 2011).

Measurement Error

The utility of perceptual bias and perceptual accuracy remains an open question. Currently, researchers are limited in their ability to draw strong conclusions about what factors reduce or increase perceptual accuracy. Any technique used to measure perceptual experiences assumes unique error, and this methodology-based error offers little value to the psychological questions posed by the study of motivated distance perception. For example, when people offer numeric judgments, they tend to underestimate distances relative to the actual distance (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004). Beanbags can only be tossed so far, so their ability to accurately track changes in perceptual experience is limited to a specific range of actual distances. When manipulating the distance between two referents until the distance between them appears equal to the distance to the target (Figure 2d), the starting location of referents shifts the degree to which perceptual experiences reflect overestimations (Witt et al., 2004). Any error associated with the manner in which researchers capture perceptions of distance will be distributed equally, making measurement error only problematic for theories that require estimates be compared against objective standards. Systematic differences in measurement error that shift the range of possible responses leave any claim regarding the relationship between a single estimate and the objective standard of accuracy a dubious one to interpret at present.

Response Bias and Measurement Issues

Early theories regarding the effects of perceivers’ internal states on perception suffered from shortcomings that confounded perception with cognitive judgment, response biases, and experimenter demand (see critiques by Erdelyi, 1974; Howes & Solomon, 1950). This concern prevails today. Some measures of distance perception are thought to reflect cognitive judgments (Durgin et al., 2009; Firestone & Scholl, 2014). Conscious steps and cognitive calculations may be needed to convert perceptions of distance into a written numeric estimate. Instructions can shift the degree to which perceivers incorporate features of the environment, subjective experiences, and internal states when constructing a numeric estimate of distance perception (Woods, Philbeck, & Danoff, 2009). Instructions to hit or get as close to the target when tossing a beanbag can shift the distribution of landing spots across participants, suggesting that instructions exerted an effect on the manner in which participants approached the task (Durgin, DeWald, Lechich, Li, & Ontiveros, 2011).³

Concerns regarding the effects of response bias have historically plagued this area of research. Contemporary research relies on multiple strategies for circumventing response bias (see Witt, 2011, for a review). First, researchers conceptually replicate effects across dependent measures (Loomis & Philbeck, 2008). Physical and psychological factors affect perceptual experiences in the same manner and in the same proportion whether distance perception is measured through numeric reports, performance-based, or visual matching measures (see Witt et al., 2004).

Second, researchers collect opaque measures of perception that require participants behave in counterintuitive ways. For instance, researchers can infer that participants experienced an object as closer if participants positioned themselves farther away from the target when trying to match a set referent distance (Figure 2b).

A third strategy used to reduce the likelihood of response bias is to offer financial rewards for responding as accurately as possible. For instance, participants in one study knew they would receive the object—in this case a $25.00 gift card—if they hit it with a beanbag (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010, Study 3a). Despite this incentive, beanbags landed on average 9 in. shy of a $25.00 gift card but 1 in. beyond the gift card when it had a $0.00 balance. If participants chose to alter how they responded, they should have (and could have) hit the object with the beanbag to earn an extra $25.00.

Despite researchers’ concentrated efforts to reduce response bias, demand effects, and other forms of calculated responding, a discussion regarding the degree to which perceivers’ internal states truly affect perceptions of distance continue (Firestone, 2013; Pylyshyn, 1999). While response bias and experimenter demand effects can influence measurement (e.g., Durgin et al., 2009; Firestone & Scholl, 2014), whether they are solely responsible for the effects that emerge has not been adequately supported. At present, the debate regarding the degree to which certain paradigms and measures assess true shifts in perceptual experiences, rather than reflect response bias or calculated cognitive judgments, is not yet settled.

A Call for Future Research

Moving forward, researchers should directly test this model of motivated distance perception. If, as I propose, approach and avoidance motives mediate the relationship between exposure to an affective object and the specific direction of perceptual shifts, specific hypotheses should be confirmed. Next I articulate ways in which researchers can explicitly test whether motivational direction serves as a useful framework for synthesizing this literature.

Moving forward, research can measure the strength of individuals’ approach and avoidance motives to provide direct evidence for the effect of motivational states on distance perception. While some individuals might respond to a situation in different ways (e.g., experiencing avoidance motives when the majority response is to approach), the predictions remain the same regarding the effect of the active motive on perceptions of distance. Researchers can measure anterior cortical lateralization to provide direct evidence for the activation of approach or avoidance motivational states (see Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009, for a review). Greater left anterior cortical activation marks approach. Greater right anterior cortical activation marks avoidance. These cortical differences have been validated with self-reports. For instance, greater left-sided frontal cortical asymmetry is associated with higher behavioral activation systems (BAS) scores (Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008). Left-sided asymmetry predicts response latency-based measures of promotion orientation, and right-sided asymmetry predicts response latency-based measures of prevention orientation (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, & Harmon-Jones, 2004). If approach and avoidance motives underlie specific directional shifts in perceptual experiences, researchers may find distance perception predicted by cortical lateralization.

Researchers could also manipulate conditions known to exaggerate or attenuate the strength of activated motives, and these situations should predict divergent effects on distance perception. For instance, researchers can manipulate whether the situation allows one to escape from threat. Approach should activate if a threat is inescapable and imminent; however, avoidance should activate if escape is possible (R. J. Blanchard et al., 1986; Cesario et al., 2010; Stankowich & Blumstein, 2005; Ydenberg & Dill, 1986). Manipulating situational conditions such as these should change the motive activated and hence the direction of perceptual change.

Moreover, researchers could measure or manipulate the degree to which people believe they have the resources to counteract a threat, a variable referred to as resource-holding potential (Parker, 1974), which should affect the activation of approach or avoidance. When options for escape were possible, people responded to threats with approach when they considered their resources sufficient to combat the threat and responded with avoidance when they considered their resources insufficient (Cesario et al., 2010). Situational contexts and personal resources to respond to threats can interact to determine the degree to which approach or avoidance emerges, which should moderate effects on motivated distance perception.

Researchers could also experimentally manipulate the actual distance to target objects to test the effects of distance perception on motivational drives. Indeed, the distance to a target can shift the strength and direction of the motivation the target elicits (Low et al., 2008). Threats that are actually close engage approach motivations because in these instances forms of behavioral responding are more limited (R. J. Blanchard et al., 1986; Cesario et al., 2010). However, threats that are actually far can engage avoidance motivations as these situations may allow for escape before confrontation with a threat occurs. Researchers must consider and can experimentally manipulate the properties of the object, distance to the object, and situational affordances to predict the type of motivation the perceiver will experience, be it approach or avoidance.

Finally, researchers could manipulate the degree to which the situation allows for the satisfaction of the motive. Motivations that seem impossible to satisfy attenuate in strength for most people (Brehm & Self, 1989)—a decline which can be measured by patterns of cortical activation (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003). In order to a priori predict when situations will elicit approach or avoidance, researchers must vary the affective properties of the object, consider the distance to the affective object (Low et al., 2008), and take into account situational affordances (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984; Cesario et al., 2010).

Conclusion

Motivational direction, independent of hedonic valence and motivational intensity, serves as an organizing principle of motivated distance perception. Motivational direction can account for the direction in which perceptions of distance shift and can serve as a psychological mechanism that predicts when distances appear smaller or greater. From motivational direction, a taxonomy emerges: approach leads to perceptions of proximity and avoidance leads to perceptions of extremity. As evidence that finds emotional experiences relate to perceptions of distance accumulates, and the field of motivated distance perception grows as a result, additional first-generation questions will be posed that test the ability of motivational direction to predict perceptions of distance. Moving forward, next-generation questions will expand the field of inquiry, offering insight into the mechanisms underlying and functions served by motivated distance perception. In addition to considering the affective properties of objects and reported emotional experiences, measurement and manipulation of motivational states of perceivers may serve to predict perceptions of distance. Distance is tied to fundamental social experiences, which are defined in part by the affective, emotional, and motivational states they elicit. Understanding the factors that give rise to differences in the ways which people perceive, manipulate, and represent distances might help explain successes and failures at adaptive responding in rich social contexts.

Footnotes

Author note:

Much appreciation to Shana Cole, David Dunning, and Yael Granot for collaborations on these topics and assistance with this manuscript. Three anonymous reviewers substantially guided the development of this article. A grant awarded to Balcetis from National Science Foundation BCS 1147550 partially funded this research and preparation of this manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

None declared.

Notes

References

Adolph

K. E.

Berger

S. E.

Leo

A. J.

(2011). Developmental continuity? Crawling, cruising, and walking. Developmental Science, 14(2), 306–318.

Aglioti

DeSouza

J. F.

Goodale

M. A.

(1995). Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand. Current Biology, 5, 679–685.

Alter

A. L.

Balcetis

(2011). Fondness makes the distance grow shorter: Desired locations seem closer because they seem more vivid. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(1), 16–21.

Amodio

D. M.

Master

S. L.

Yee

C. M.

Taylor

S. E.

(2008). Neurocognitive components of the behavioral inhibition and activation systems: Implications for theories of self-regulation. Psychophysiology, 45(1), 11–19.

Amodio

D. M.

Shah

J. Y.

Sigelman

Brazy

P. C.

Harmon-Jones

(2004). Implicit regulatory focus associated with asymmetrical frontal cortical activity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(2), 225–232.

Argyle

Dean

(1965). Eye-contact, distance and affiliation. Sociometry, 28, 289–304.

Atkinson

J. W.

(1957). Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior. Psychological Review, 64, 359–372.

Balcetis

(2006). Motivated visual perception: How I see what I want to see. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, 67(7-B), 4153.

Balcetis

Dunning

(2010). Wishful seeing: More desired objects are seen as closer. Psychological Science, 21, 147–152.

10.

Barrett

L. F.

(2006). Are emotions natural kinds? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1, 28–58.

11.

Berkman

E. T.

Lieberman

M. D.

(2010). Approaching the bad and avoiding the good: Lateral prefrontal cortical asymmetry distinguishes between action and valence. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22, 1970–1979.

12.

Berridge

K. C.

Robinson

T. E.

Aldridge

J. W.

(2009). Dissecting components of reward: “Liking,” “wanting,” and learning. Current Opinion in Pharmacology, 9, 65–73.

13.

Bhalla

Proffitt

D. R.

(1999). Visual–motor recalibration in geographical slant perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 25, 1076–1096.

14.

Biederman

(1987). Recognition-by-components: A theory of human image understanding. Psychological Review, 94, 115–147.

15.

Blanchard

D. C.

Blanchard

R. J.

(1984). Affect and aggression: An animal model applied to human behavior. In Blanchard

R. J.

Blanchard

D. C.

(Eds.), Advances in the study of aggression (Vol. 1, pp. 1–62). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

16.

Blanchard

D. C.

Hynd

A. L.

Minke

K. A.

Minemoto

Blanchard

R. J.

(2001). Human defensive behaviors to threat scenarios show parallels to fear- and anxiety-related defense patterns of non-human mammals. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 25, 761–770.

17.

Blanchard

R. J.

Flannelly

K. J.

Blanchard

D. C.

(1986). Defensive behaviors of laboratory and wild Rattus norvegicus. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 100, 101–107.

18.

Blanchard

R. J.

Fukunaga

K. K.

Blanchard

D. C.

(1976). Environmental control of defensive reactions to a cat. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 8, 179–181.

19.

Bradley

M. M.

Lang

P. J.

(2007). Emotion and motivation. In Cacioppo

J. T.

Tassinary

L. G.

Berntson

(Eds.), Handbook of psychophysiology (3rd ed., pp. 581–607). (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

20.

Brehm

J. W.

Self

E. A.

(1989). The intensity of motivation. Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 109–131.

21.

Cacioppo

J. T.

Berntson

G. G.

Larsen

J. T.

Poehlmann

K. M.

Ito

T. A.

(2000). The psychophysiology of emotion. In Lewis

Haviland-Jones

J. M.

(Eds.), The handbook of emotion (2nd ed., pp. 173–191). New York, NY: Guilford Press

22.

Campbell

B. A.

Wood

McBride

(1997). Origins of orienting and defensive responses: An evolutionary perspective. In Lang

P. L.

Simons

R. F.

Balaban

(Eds.), Attention and orienting: Sensory and motivational processes (pp. 41–67). New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group.

23.

Carver

C. S.

(2004). Negative affects deriving from the behavioral approach system. Emotion, 4, 3–22.

24.

Carver

C. S.

(2006). Approach, avoidance, and the self-regulation of affect and action. Motivation and Emotion, 30(2), 105–110.

25.

Carver

C. S.

Harmon-Jones

(2009). Anger is an approach-related affect: Evidence and implications. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 183–204.

26.

Carver

C. S.

Scheier

M. F.

(1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

27.

Cesario

Navarrete

C. D.

(2014). Perceptual bias in threat distance: The critical roles of ingroup support and target evaluations in defensive threat regulation. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5, 12–17.

28.

Cesario

Plaks

J. E.

Hagiwara

Navarrete

C. D.

Higgins

E. T.

(2010). The ecology of automaticity: How situational contingencies shape action semantics and social behavior. Psychological Science, 21(9), 1311–1317.

29.

Chen

Bargh

J. A.

(1999). Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 215–224.

30.

Clerkin

E. M.

Cody

M. W.

Stefanucci

J. K.

Proffitt

D. R.

Teachman

B. A.

(2009). Imagery and fear influence height perception. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 381–386.

31.

Cohen

D. C.

(1997). Comparison of self-report and behavioral procedures for assessing acrophobia. Behavior Therapy, 8, 17–23.

32.

Cole

Balcetis

(2013). Sources of resources: Bioenergetic and psychoenergetic resources influence distance perception. Social Cognition, 31(6), 721–732.

33.

Cole

Balcetis

Dunning

(2013). Affective signals of threat produce perceived proximity. Psychological Science, 24, 34–40.

34.

Cole

Balcetis

Zhang

(2013). Visual perception and regulatory conflict: Motivation and physiology influence distance perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 18–22.

35.

Cole

Riccio

Balcetis

(2014). Focused and fired up: Narrowed attention produces perceived proximity and increases goal-relevant action. Motivation & Emotion, 38(6), 815–822.

36.

Creem

S. H.

Proffitt

D. R.

(2001). Defining the cortical visual systems: “What,” “where,” and “how.” Acta Psychologica, 107(1), 43–68.

37.

Curtis

Aunger

Rabie

(2004). Evidence that disgust evolved to protect from risk of disease. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 271(Suppl. 4), S131–S133.

38.

Curtis

Biran

(2001). Dirt, disgust, and disease: Is hygiene in our genes? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 44, 17–31.

39.

Davidson

R. J.

(1995). Cerebral asymmetry, emotion, and affective style. In Davidson

R. J.

Hugdahl

(Eds.), Brain asymmetry (pp. 361–387). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

40.

Dewitte

De Houwer

(2008). Proximity and distance goals in adult attachment. European Journal of Personality, 22(8), 675–694.

41.

Dollard

Miller

N. E.

(1950). Personality and psychotherapy. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

42.

Durgin

F. H.

Baird

J. A.

Greenburg

Russell

Shaughnessy

Waymouth

(2009). Who is being deceived? The experimental demands of wearing a backpack. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(5), 964–969.

43.

Durgin

F., H.

DeWald

Lechich

Ontiveros

(2011). Action and motivation: Measuring perception or strategies. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 1077–1082.

44.

Dyde

R. T.

Milner

A. D.

(2002). Two illusions of perceived orientation: one fools all of the people some of the time; the other fools all of the people all of the time. Experimental Brain Research, 144(4), 518–527.

45.

Ekman

(1992). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 6, 169–200.

46.

Elliot

A. J.

(2006). The hierarchical model of approach–avoidance motivation. Motivation and Emotion, 30(2), 111–116.

47.

Elliot

A. J.

Gable

S. L.

Mapes

R. R.

(2006). Approach and avoidance motivation in the social domain. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(3), 378–391.

48.

Eng

(2008). Experimental exposure-willingness (EEW): Testing a behavioral measure of attraction vs. aversion to disgust stimuli (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of California, Los Angeles.

49.

Erdelyi

M. H.

(1974). A new look at the new look: Perceptual defense and vigilance. Psychological Review, 81, 1–25.

50.

Fanselow

M. S.

(1994). Neural organization of the defensive behavior system responsible for fear. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1, 429–438.

51.

Fay

A. J.

Maner

J. K.

(2012). Warmth, spatial proximity, and social attachment: The embodied perception of a social metaphor. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(6), 1369–1372.

52.

Fessler

D. M.

Eng

S. J.

Navarrete

C. D.

(2005). Elevated disgust sensitivity in the first trimester of pregnancy: Evidence supporting the compensatory prophylaxis hypothesis. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26(4), 344–351.

53.

Firestone

(2013). How “paternalist” is special perception? Why wearing a heavy backpack doesn’t—and couldn’t—make hills look steeper. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 455–473.

54.

Firestone

Scholl

B. J.

(2014). “Top-down” effects where none should be found the El Greco fallacy in perception research. Psychological Science, 25(1), 38–46.

55.

Fishbach

Shah

J. Y.

(2006). Self-control in action: Implicit dispositions toward goals and away from temptations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 820–832.

56.

Gable

P. A.

Harmon-Jones

(2010a). The motivational dimensional model of affect: Implications for breadth of attention, memory, and cognitive categorisation. Cognition and Emotion, 24(2), 322–337.

57.

Gable

P. A.

Harmon-Jones

(2010b). The blues broaden, but the nasty narrows: Attentional consequences of negative affects low and high in motivational intensity. Psychological Science, 21, 211–215.

58.

Gable

S. L.

(2006). Approach and avoidance social motives and goals. Journal of Personality, 74(1), 175–222.

59.

Gibson

E. J.

Walk

R. D.

(1960). The “visual cliff.” Scientific American, 202, 67–71.

60.

Glover

(2004). Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action. Behavioral Brain Sciences, 27, 3–24.

61.

Goodale

M. A.

Milner

A. D.

(1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and action. Trends in Neurosciences, 15, 20–25.

62.

Goodale

M. A.

Pelisson

Prablanc

(1986). Large adjustments in visually guided reaching do not depend on vision of the hand or perception of target displacement. Nature, 320, 748–750.

63.

Hall

E. T.

(1968). Proxemics. Current Anthropology, 9(2), 83–95.

64.

Harber

K. D.

Yeung

Iacovelli

(2011). Psychosocial resources, threat, and the perception of distance and height: Support for the resources and perception model. Emotion, 11(5), 1080–1090.

65.

Harmon-Jones

Allen

J. J. B.

(1998). Anger and frontal brain activity: EEG asymmetry consistent with approach motivation despite negative affective valence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1310–1316.

66.

Harmon-Jones

Gable

P. A.

(2008). Incorporating motivational intensity and direction into the study of emotions: Implications for brain mechanisms of emotion and cognition–emotion interactions. Netherlands Journal of Psychology, 64, 132–142.

67.

Harmon-Jones

Price

T. F.

(2013). What is approach motivation? Emotion Review, 5, 291–295.

68.

Harmon-Jones

Sigelman

J. D.

(2001). State anger and prefrontal brain activity: Evidence that insult-related relative left-prefrontal activation is associated with experienced anger and aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 797–803.

69.

Harmon-Jones

Sigelman

J. D.

Bohlig

Harmon-Jones

(2003). Anger, coping, and frontal cortical activity: The effect of coping potential on anger-induced left frontal activity. Cognition and Emotion, 17, 1–24.

70.

Heckhausen

Gollwitzer

P. M.

(1987). Thought contents and cognitive functioning in motivational versus volitional states of mind. Motivation and Emotion, 11, 101–120.

71.

Henderson

M. D.

Lount

R. B.

(2011). Physical distance in intragroup and intergroup negotiations: Implications for negotiator judgment and behavior. Research on Managing Groups and Teams, 14, 35–56.

72.

Heuer

Rinck

Becker

E. S.

(2007). Avoidance of emotional facial expressions in social anxiety: The approach–avoidance task. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 2990–3001.

73.

Howes

D. H.

Solomon

R. L.

(1950). A note on McGinnies’ “Emotionality and Perceptual Defense.” Psychological Review, 57(4), 229–234.

74.

Hull

C. L.

(1943). Principles of behavior: An introduction to behavior theory. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

75.

Izard

C. E.

(2007). Basic emotions, natural kinds, emotion schemas, and a new paradigm. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(3), 260–280.

76.

Jackson

R. E.

(2009). Individual differences in distance perception. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 276(1662), 1665–1669.

77.

Jeannerod

(1997). The cognitive neuroscience of action. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

78.

Lagerspetz

K. M. J.

(1969). Aggression and aggressiveness in laboratory mice. In: Garattini

Sigg

E. B. S.

(Eds.), Aggressive Behavior (pp. 77–85). New York: Wiley.

79.

Lewis

Alessandri

S. M.

Sullivan

M. W.

(1990). Violation of expectancy, loss of control, and anger expressions in young infants. Developmental Psychology, 26, 745–751.

80.

Lindquist

K. A.

(2013). Emotions emerge from more basic psychological ingredients: A modern psychological constructionist model. Emotion Review, 5, 356–368.

81.

Loewenstein

(1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65, 272–292.

82.

Loomis

J. M.

Philbeck

J. W.

(2008). Measuring perception with spatial updating and action. In Klatzky

R. L.

Behrmann

MacWhinney

(Eds.), Embodiment, ego-space, and action (pp. 1–43). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

83.

Low

Lang

P. J.

Smith

J. C.

Bradley

M. M.

(2008). Both predator and prey: Emotional arousal in threat and reward. Psychological Science, 19, 865–873.

84.

Maglio

S. J.

Trope

Liberman

(2013). Distance from a distance: Psychological distance reduces sensitivity to any further psychological distance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 644–657.

85.

Marsh

A. A.

Ambady

Kleck

R. E.

(2005). The effects of fear and anger facial expressions on approach- and avoidance-related behaviors. Emotion, 5, 119–124.

86.

Masterson

F. A.

Crawford

(1982). The defensive motivation system: A theory of avoidance behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 661–675.

87.

Mattson

Rengert

(1995). Danger, distance, and desirability. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 3(3), 70–78.

88.

Mauss

I. B.

Robinson

M. D.

(2009). Measures of emotion: A review. Cognition and Emotion, 23(2), 209–237.

89.

McClelland

D. C.

(1985). How motives, skills, and values determine what people do. American Psychologist, 40, 812–825.

90.

McNaughton

Gray

J. A.

(2000). Anxiolytic action on the behavioural inhibition system implies multiple types of arousal contribute to anxiety. Journal of Affective Disorders, 61(3), 161–176.

91.

Mühlberger

Neumann

Wieser

M. J.

Pauli

(2008). The impact of changes in spatial distance on emotional responses. Emotion, 8(2), 192–198.

92.

Nieuwenhuys

Cañal-Bruland

Oudejans

R. R.

(2012). Effects of threat on police officers’ shooting behavior: Anxiety, action specificity, and affective influences on perception. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 26(4), 608–615.

93.

Oaten

Stevenson

R. J.

Case

T. I.

(2009). Disgust as a disease-avoidance mechanism. Psychological Bulletin, 135(2), 303–321.

94.

Olatunji

B. O.

Haidt

McKay

David

(2008). Core, animal reminder, and contamination disgust: Three kinds of disgust with distinct personality, behavioral, physiological, and clinical correlates. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(5), 1243–1259.

95.

Ortony

Turner

T. J.

(1990). What’s basic about basic emotions? Psychological Review, 97(3), 315–331.

96.

Parker

G. A.

(1974). Assessment strategy and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47, 223–243.

97.

Pichon

de Gelder

Grezes

(2012). Threat prompts defensive brain responses independently of attentional control. Cerebral Cortex, 22, 274–285.

98.

Pitts

Wilson

J. P.

Hugenberg

(2014). When one is ostracized, others loom: Social rejection makes other people appear closer. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5, 550–557.

99.

Proffitt

D. R.

(2006). Embodied perception and the economy of action. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1, 110–122.

100.

Proffitt

D. R.

Bhalla

Gossweiler

Midgett

(1995). Perceiving geographical slant. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2(4), 409–428.

101.

Pylyshyn

(1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 341–365.

102.

Refling

(2014). Adult attachment orientation and physical distance: Do threat primes alter perceptions of interpersonal proximity? (Doctoral dissertation). Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

103.

Roidl

Siebert

F. W.

Oehl

Höger

(2013). Introducing a multivariate model for predicting driving performance: The role of driving anger and personal characteristics. Journal of Safety Research, 47, 47–56.

104.

Rotteveel

Phaf

H. R.

(2004). Automatic affective evaluation does not automatically predispose for arm flexion and extension. Emotion, 4, 156–172.

105.

Russell

J. A.

(2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological Review, 110, 145–172.

106.

Russell

J. A.

(2009). Emotion, core affect, and psychological construction. Cognition & Emotion, 23, 1259–1283.

107.

Shields

M. R.

Larson

C. L.

Swartz

A. M.

Smith

J. C.

(2011). Visual threat detection during moderate- and high-intensity exercise. Emotion, 11, 572–581.

108.

Siegel

Walker

Stefanucci

(2009). So close and yet so far away: An effect of disgust on distance perception and graspability. Journal of Vision, 9(8), 1096. doi:10.1167/9.8.1096

109.

Spielberg

J. M.

Heller

Miller

G. A.

(2013). Hierarchical brain networks active in approach and avoidance goal pursuit. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 284. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00284

110.

Stankowich

Blumstein

D. T.

(2005). Fear in animals: A meta-analysis and review of risk assessment. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 272(1581), 2627–2634.

111.

Stefanucci

J. K.

Proffitt

D. R.

Clore

G. L.

Parekh

(2008). Skating down a steeper slope: Fear influences the perception of geographical slant. Perception, 37(2), 321–323.

112.

Stefanucci

J. K.

Storbeck

(2009). Don’t look down: Emotional arousal elevates height perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138, 131–145.

113.

Stern

Cole

Gollwitzer

P. M.

Oettingen

Balcetis

(2013). Effects of implementation intentions on anxiety, perceived proximity, and motor performance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(5), 623–635.

114.

Storbeck

Stefanucci

J. K.

(2014). Conditions under which arousal does and does not elevate height estimates. PloS One, 9, e92024.

115.

Teachman

B. A.

Stefanucci

J. K.

Clerkin

E. M.

Cody

M. W.

Proffitt

D. R.

(2008). A new mode of fear expression: Perceptual bias in height fear. Emotion, 8, 296–301.

116.

Teghtsoonian

Frost

R. O.

(1982). The effects of viewing distance on fear of snakes. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 13(3), 181–190.

117.

Valdés-Conroy

Román

F. J.

Hinojosa

J. A.

Shorkey

S. P.

(2012). So far so good: Emotion in the peripersonal/extrapersonal space. PloS One, 7(11), e49162.

118.

Veenstra

E. M.

De Jong

P. J.

Koster

E. H. W.

Roefs

(2010). Attentional avoidance of high-fat food in disinhibited eaters. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 41, 282–288.

119.

Vohs

K. D.

Mead

N. L.

Goode

M. R.

(2008). Merely activating the concept of money changes personal and interpersonal behavior. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(3), 208–212.

120.

Wacker

Chavanon

M. L.

Leue

Stemmler

(2008). Is running away right? The behavioral activation-behavioral inhibition model of anterior asymmetry. Emotion, 8(2), 232–249.

121.

Watson

Wiese

Vaidya

Tellegen

(1999). The two general activation systems of affect: Structural findings, evolutionary considerations, and psychobiological evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(5), 820–838.

122.

Wilkowski

B. M.

Meier

B. P.

(2010). Bring it on: Angry facial expressions potentiate approach-motivated motor behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(2), 201–210.

123.

Witt

J. K.

(2011). Action’s effect on perception. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 201–206.

124.

Witt

J. K.

Proffitt

D. R.

Epstein

(2004). Perceiving distance: A role of effort and intent. Perception, 33, 570–590.

125.

Woods

A. J.

Philbeck

J. W.

Danoff

J. V.

(2009). The various perceptions of distance: An alternative view of how effort affects distance judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 35, 1104–1117.

126.

Xiao

Y. J.

van Bavel

J. J.

(2012). See your friends close and your enemies closer: Social identity and identity threat shape the representation of physical distance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(7), 959–972.

127.

Ydenberg

R. C.

Dill

L. M.

(1986). The economics of fleeing from predators. Advances in the Study of Behavior, 16, 229–249.