Jurors’ Emotions and Judgments of Legal Responsibility and Blame: What Does the Experimental Research Tell Us?

Abstract

Jurors’ emotions, both integral and incidental, can affect their attributions of legal responsibility and blame in several, sometimes complexly interrelated ways. The article reviews the experimental research, outlining the multiple paths of emotional influence, and explains why identifying them is worthwhile. It then discusses why the modest to moderate effect sizes found in the research may understate emotions’ actual influence in some cases yet overstate it in others, and discounts moral intuitionism as a reason for believing that emotional influences in real cases are stronger than the experimental data indicates. The article concludes with recommendations for further research.

Keywords

decision making emotion judgment jurors responsibility

Everyday experience and common sense tell us that our moods and emotions can affect how we attribute responsibility and blame for bad outcomes. We’d expect that something similar would be true of jurors’ judgments of liability and damages in civil cases, and guilt and punishment in criminal cases. Despite the law’s official discouragement of emotional decision making, neither judges nor jurors can hold their everyday habits of thinking and feeling entirely in check.

But how important are emotional influences? Controlled experiments provide some answers. Jurors’ emotions, both integral (i.e., prompted by features of the case being decided) and incidental (i.e., prompted by sources extrinsic to the judgment task), can affect attributions of responsibility and consequent punishment or damages in several, sometimes complexly interrelated ways. I outline these multiple paths of emotional influence and explain why identifying them is worthwhile.¹ I then explain why the modest to moderately sized effects found to date may understate the actual role of emotions in some cases yet overstate it in others. I also argue that moral intuitionism does not offer convincing reasons to believe that emotional influences on actual legal judgments are stronger than the experimental research indicates.²

Effects on Information Processing

Several studies have shown that different incidental emotions have different effects on depth of information processing, as indicated by a greater reliance on judgmental cues or a reduced ability to differentiate stronger from weaker arguments. This is due to what has been labeled the appraisal tendencies of the respective emotions (e.g., Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).³ Specifically, some emotions (e.g., anger) are typically associated with a greater sense of certainty; others (e.g., anxiety) are typically associated with uncertainty (cf. Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). The more certain people feel, the less inclined they are to process information systematically, because they are more confident that they already know what they need to know to address the task at hand.

Thus, Tiedens and Linton (2001, Experiment 2) found that the higher degree of certainty associated with anger, as opposed to sadness or fear, leads to greater susceptibility to heuristic cues. Other studies have similarly found that anger leads people to consider fewer factors when making judgments (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; but cf. Moons & Mackie, 2007).

Studies of legal decision making have generally confirmed these findings. For instance, mock jurors in a criminal reckless driving case who were saddened by emotional testimony more accurately identified inconsistencies in the testimony than neutral participants did, indicative of more systematic information processing (Semmler & Brewer, 2002).

Directional Processing

Specific emotions can incline people to interpret information in a direction consistent with the cognitive structure of the emotion, an emotion-congruency effect. For instance, the cognitive structure of anger—“disapproving of someone else’s blameworthy action and being displeased about the related event” (Ortony et al., 1988, p. 148)—makes more salient those aspects of the scenario that can plausibly be construed as due to the target person’s culpable behavior,⁴ which in turn makes people more likely to assign responsibility or blame to the target (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993) and to punish him more severely.

Thus, a consistent finding is that people who are angry due to incidental emotion sources tend to blame more (for a review, see Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). For instance, Lerner et al. (1998) found that participants who viewed an anger-provoking video clip and then read several vignettes of accident cases blamed the defendants who caused the injuries more than did participants who had watched an emotion-neutral video (see also Ask & Pina, 2011). One interesting aspect of these studies is that even where people are aware that the incidental source of their emotional state has nothing to do with the judgment target, the emotion continues to affect their judgments (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003).

More recent research has shown that this directional effect extends to integral emotion as well. Georges, Wiener, and Keller (2013) found that participants’ increased anger after learning the facts of an attempted rape and first-degree murder case caused them later, during sentencing, to evaluate mitigation evidence as less strong, which in turn made them likelier to vote for a death sentence.⁵

Informational Effects

People may also take their emotional state as directly informative about the target of their judgment. This path is described in the literature as the affect-as-information model (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). The emotional state sends the person a signal (Damasio, 1994), which the person takes as an informational cue to judgment.

Incidental emotions can influence ultimate judgments directly when people misattribute their emotions to the target instead of its true source. In a classic study (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), people who were asked on rainy days to gauge their satisfaction with their lives gave more negative responses than did people who were asked on sunny days. Respondents apparently used their weather-induced moods as informative of the judgments they were asked to make, when in fact those moods were irrelevant to the judgment task. When people’s attention was called to the local weather, however, the difference disappeared.

Although no one has yet tested the affect-as-information process using incidental emotion as an independent variable and judgments of legal blame as the dependent variable,⁶ several studies have examined the informational effects of integral emotion sources on judgments of responsibility and blame. Here emotion functions as a mediator (Baron & Kenny, 1986) of the effect of case features, such as the severity of an accident or a party’s blameworthiness, on responsibility judgments, rather than as an independent variable. For instance, Bornstein (1998, Study 1) found that sympathy mediated the effect of outcome severity on mock jurors’ responsibility judgments in a civil case: Participants were more likely to blame the defendant for harming the plaintiff when the plaintiff was more seriously injured because, in that situation, they felt more sympathy for the plaintiff and less for the defendant.

In the context of criminal offenses, Laurent and colleagues (Laurent, Clark, Walker, & Wiseman, 2014, Studies 2 and 3) found that participants reacted to hypocritical offenders (e.g., a woman arrested for driving under the influence despite being president of the local chapter of Mothers Against Drunk Driving) with greater anger, and this anger mediated the effect of perceived hypocrisy on both ratings of guilt and the assigned punishment. In addition, mock jurors exposed to victim impact statements feel more sympathy for crime victims and more anger toward perpetrators (Paternoster & Deise, 2011), or feel more upset and nervous (Wevodau, Cramer, Kehn, & Clark, 2014), and these emotions cause them to be more punitive (but cf. Myers, Lynn, & Arbuthnot, 2002).

Studies of visual evidence also show direct informational effects from integral emotion sources. For instance, Bright and Goodman-Delahunty (2006) found that showing mock jurors gruesome crime scene photographs made them angrier at the defendant, which in turn made them likelier to convict.

Anticipated Emotions

Judgments of responsibility and blame may be affected not only by currently experienced emotions but also by anticipated or expected emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Indeed, Wiener, Georges, and Cangas (2013) have recently found that the less intense the positive emotions participants in a simulated capital case expected to feel after assigning a death sentence, the more likely they were to vote for life.

Complicating the Picture

Reciprocal Relationships

The paths of affective influence on attributions of responsibility or blame may well be recursive rather than linear. Decision makers may respond emotionally to the facts of the case or to their own attributions of responsibility, and these emotions may in turn influence their further thinking about the facts or the attributions. For instance, an observer who perceives the target person as the cause of harm may be inclined not only to blame the target but to feel anger toward him, and that anger may then make the target person even more salient as the cause of the harm, engendering stronger blame (Keltner et al., 1993). Thus, anger and attributions of blame comprise a reciprocal relationship in which each can increase the other (Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996).

Emotional Responses to Attributions of Responsibility

In civil cases, jurors who attribute enough responsibility to the defendant must then proceed to assess damages. In capital and some other criminal cases, jurors must follow a guilty verdict by deciding on a punishment. The attribution of responsibility or blame can itself prompt emotional responses, which then influence the extent of any punishment (Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997). Thus, Palazzolo and Roberto (2011) found that participants exposed to facts indicating greater responsibility on the part of the perpetrator of domestic violence reacted with more anger and less sympathy toward the perpetrator, and these emotions made them more likely to sentence the offender to jail.⁷

Simultaneous Emotion Effects of Different Types

The different ways in which affect can influence legal judgment may operate simultaneously. For instance, the angered decision maker should be primed to construe target information in the direction of greater blame. At the same time, anger may reduce depth of processing, leading to greater reliance on stereotypes, which may amplify blame if the target conduct is stereotype-consistent (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994).

Multiple Emotions

In a comparative negligence case, jurors may feel sympathy for an accident victim, which inclines them to hold the defendant more responsible; yet they may also feel anger toward that same victim, which would incline them to hold the victim more responsible and the defendant less (Feigenson, Park, & Salovey, 1997). Multiple congruent emotions (e.g., anger and disgust) may have interactive effects on judgments (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013), or the experience of one emotion (anger) may blunt the impact of a succeeding one (sadness; Winterich, Han, & Lerner, 2010). The fact that legal cases present multiple judgment targets creates further complex relations among jurors’ emotional reactions and between those reactions and their ultimate decisions.

Why It’s Worth Identifying Paths of Emotional Influences

Given the tangled interrelationships among the different kinds of emotional effects on judgments of responsibility and blame likely to be found in actual cases, why bother trying to identify discrete causal paths? Some of the research is ambiguous as to whether emotions are exercising influence due to directional bias pursuant to appraisal tendency or informational effects, while other findings are hard to explain in terms of either approach (e.g., Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999). One leading psychologist has gone so far as to assert “the futility of teasing apart statistically the causal priority of cognitive appraisals versus emotions in the mediational sequence” (Tetlock et al., 2007, p. 201).

There are several reasons to persevere. First, illuminating the relationships among emotion, cognition, and judgment is a subject of ongoing psychological interest, recently enhanced by neuroscientific investigation (e.g., Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Identifying distinct paths of emotional influence would contribute to this project. Second, whether emotions affect judgments indirectly, through construals of case features, or directly, as informational cues, would be expected to lead to different outcomes in some cases (Feigenson & Park, 2006). Third, some effects (such as reduced depth of information processing) are normatively less desirable than others, so it is important to distinguish those effects from arguably more defensible ones. Fourth, to the extent that emotional influences are unwanted, they may be differently amenable to correction or debiasing.

How Large Are Emotional Effects on Judgment?

Analyzing the paths of emotional influences on judgments of responsibility and blame doesn’t tell us much about how important those influences are. Do jurors’ emotional reactions to cases drive their judgments of responsibility and blame, or do emotions merely tip the balance when the evidence is close (e.g., Kalven & Zeisel, 1966)? Are emotional effects routinely overcome by other considerations?

A preliminary meta-analysis (Park & Feigenson, 2015) suggests that the average size of emotion effects on judgments of legal responsibility is in the modest to moderate range; most studies indicate an r between .2 and .3. This is roughly consistent with the effect sizes found for emotions in judgment and decision making generally (Angie, Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011). It indicates that while participants’ emotions matter, factors other than the measured emotional responses play a substantial role, and in the aggregate a more important one, in explaining participants’ ultimate judgments.

Experimental findings, of course, might understate the strength of emotional influences on legal judgments. There is an enormous difference between the strength of the emotions prompted by laboratory manipulations and those aroused in some actual trials (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2007), especially criminal cases involving monstrous crimes (e.g., Bandes, 2007) or capital cases (Bandes & Salerno, 2014). People who serve as jurors in cases that are traumatic due to the nature of the case (e.g., murder) and/or the evidence (e.g., gruesome photos) may experience such strong negative emotions that they suffer afterwards from PTSD(Shuman et al., 1994). In addition, typical undergraduates responding to hypothetical cases for course credit are unlikely to experience the level of personal involvement and concern that tends to accompany decision making about real people’s fates, heightening emotional intensity and hence possibly the impact of those emotions on judgment (for a review, see Wiener, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2011).

On the other hand, experimental research might well overstate the effects of actual jurors’ emotions on their judgments in many cases (cf. e.g., Salerno & Bottoms, 2009). Real jurors tend to be mindful of their obligation to consider the evidence carefully (Hans & Vidmar, 1986), which would temper their emotions’ capacity to reduce the depth of information processing. In real cases, the impact of emotional evidence is often blunted by the much larger amount of relatively boring testimony that precedes and follows it, and decision making typically follows the emotion-provoking evidence by days or weeks, not minutes or hours as in the psychology lab, attenuating the effect of the prompted emotions on judgment.⁸ Judges also instruct jurors not to be swayed by their emotions, and while this sort of instruction may not be fully effective or may even backfire (Edwards & Bryan, 1997), many of the studies reviewed in the previous lines do not include it. In addition, unlike most mock jurors, real jurors deliberate, which would be expected to dampen the effects of their emotions (but cf. Bandes & Blumenthal, 2012), and real jurors know that they will be at least somewhat accountable to one another during deliberations for the reasons behind their decisions (Salerno & Bottoms, 2009), which should further attenuate the impact of their emotions on those decisions (Lerner et al., 1998).

Moral Intuitionism Reconsidered

One argument for the primacy of emotional influence needs to be addressed. Moral intuitionism, a model of social judgment that has been much discussed and debated in recent years (e.g., Haidt, 2007), claims that people’s immediate, intuitive reactions to situations with moral dimensions play a very important, if not dispositive, role in their judgments about those situations. Their subsequent thoughts or feelings serve largely to underscore the evaluations they’ve already reached; what seems to be moral reasoning is mostly rationalization. These intuitive responses, moreover, are fundamentally emotional (Haidt, 2007). A considerable amount of research supports this affective primacy model of moral intuitions (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010), although others have challenged or qualified the model (e.g., Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, 2015).⁹

Moral intuitionism indicates that jurors’ initial, integral emotional responses to the facts of any case with moral dimensions—almost every tort or criminal case, as well as many others—would tend to drive their ultimate judgments of responsibility and blame. But is that really so? In fact, moral intuitionism leaves considerable room for both reasons and emotions subsequent to the initial response to matter. Haidt himself has identified

[A]t least three ways we can override our immediate intuitive responses. We can use conscious verbal reasoning . . . We can reframe a situation, thereby triggering a second flash of intuition that may compete with the first. And we can talk with people who raise new arguments, which then trigger in us new flashes of intuition. (Haidt, 2007, p. 999)

However infrequent (according to Haidt) these behaviors may be in everyday life, all three occur all the time in legal decision making. Jurors are encouraged throughout the trial to think carefully about the case before them: to listen, to ponder, to suspend judgment. The adversarial structure of the trial ensures that jurors will be exposed to competing ways of framing the situation. And of course deliberations provide the opportunity to talk with others who will raise new arguments. Thus, legal decision making in actual trials, more so than in most of the experiments discussed here, seems especially amenable to the influence of reasons as well as intuitions, emotional and otherwise.

Indeed, the hold of moral intuitionism on real legal judgments is probably even more attenuated than this. Some cases may not prompt very strong moral-emotional intuitions. Or jurors may have conflicting moral-emotional reactions to their first encounter with the facts of the case—perhaps because the defendant has presented a plausible justification or excuse for his behavior—turning a quick moral reaction into a more troubling moral dilemma (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007) and baffling any clear intuition about who is in the right. In either situation, jurors’ conscious minds are not relegated to generating arguments for the side that has already been intuitively chosen. In sum, moral intuitionism does not offer a compelling reason to believe that jurors’ emotions, at least the integral ones they experience at the outset of the case, influence their judgments of responsibility and blame more than the experimental research to date shows.

Further Research

Many questions remain unanswered. Here are a few examples of studies that would help to address them. First, experiments manipulating independent variables to permit clearer tests between directional and informational paths of emotional influence, as opposed to differentiating between paths solely via statistical analysis, would be helpful (see Feigenson & Park, 2006). Second, the domain specificity hypothesis of moral judgment (e.g., Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011) posits that only anger, and possibly sympathy, should affect moral-legal judgments of responsibility and blame; further research examining the effects of other emotions, such as fear, would test this theory (cf. Cameron et al., 2015). Third, more studies measuring emotional responses at different stages of the trial and decision-making process (see Georges et al., 2013) could advance discussion about the relevance of moral intuitionism to legal judgment. Fourth, and in conjunction with the preceding recommendation, studies of emotional responses and effects both pre- and postdeliberation (see Bandes & Blumenthal, 2012) would be especially worthwhile.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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