Abstract
Jamieson, Hangen, Lee, and Yaeager (2018) present their empirical findings as evidence for the effects of reappraising arousal on affective responses. This comment highlights the important contribution of the research by Jamieson and colleagues, but offers alternative ways of conceptualizing it.
Jamieson et al. (2018) present a fascinating program of research. They show that leading people to think about the physiological symptoms of stress as beneficial attenuates the harmful consequences of stress and improves performance. They review a series of elegant studies, demonstrating the adaptive implications of their manipulations in various stressful contexts. They describe their effects as the result of regulating affective responses to stress, which they refer to as “arousal reappraisal.” At least two conclusions can be drawn from the article. First, how we think about our phenomenology carries important implications for adaptive functioning. Second, there is still much to learn about the regulation of phenomenological states. In this comment, I discuss some questions that arise from the article by Jamieson and colleagues and why such questions are important to consider.
What Is the Target of Regulation?
Does the manipulation developed by Jamieson and colleagues (Jamieson, Mendes, Blackstock, & Schmader, 2010; Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2012; Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2013) target affective experiences? The manipulation involves modifying expectancies, which are beliefs about future events (Roese & Sherman, 2007). Specifically, it changes expectancies about the effects of stress on performance. What is the goal of modifying these expectancies? The authors argue that their manipulation regulates affective responses and negative affect. Yet, they also claim that their manipulation is not aimed at eliminating or dampening (i.e., regulating) experienced arousal or stress (i.e., affective responses). Indeed, they assessed and demonstrated the effects of their manipulation on performance and sympathetic reactivity. However, they typically did not assess effects on negative or positive affect or on subjective stress (e.g., Jamieson et al., 2010; Jamieson et al., 2013). When they assessed such effects, they failed to find any (Jamieson et al., 2012). It appears, therefore, that Jamieson et al.’s manipulation may not target affect, nor necessarily influence it.
Does the manipulation involve cognitive reappraisal? According to Gross (2015, p. 9), cognitive change involves “modifying one’s appraisal of a situation in order to alter its emotional impact.” As one form of cognitive change, cognitive reappraisal targets “either the meaning of a potentially emotion-eliciting situation . . . or the self-relevance of a potentially emotion-eliciting situation” (Gross, 2015, p. 9). Jamieson et al.’s manipulation does not conform to this definition as it does not target the emotion-eliciting situation (e.g., an upcoming test), nor is it designed to change its emotional impact.
Is the manipulation a form of emotion (or affect) regulation? According to Gross, Sheppes, and Urry (2011), emotion regulation is defined by the activation of a goal to modify the emotion-generative process, in an attempt to influence emotion generation. Affect regulation could be similarly defined as the activation of a goal to modify affect generation. The goal of Jamieson and colleagues’ (Jamieson et al., 2010; Jamieson et al., 2012; Jamieson et al., 2013) manipulation is not to change the subjective experience of stress (which it does not), but rather to change how well people behave under stress. Their manipulation, therefore, does not conform to the definition of emotion (or affect) regulation.
How Is the Target Regulated?
If Jamieson and colleagues’ (Jamieson et al., 2010; Jamieson et al., 2012; Jamieson et al., 2013) manipulation does not target affective states, does not influence affective states, and potentially does not involve affect regulation, what does it involve? I offer two possible accounts. One possibility is that modifying beliefs about the benefits of stress changes the motivation to regulate it. When people expect stress to be useful, they become less likely to try to avoid it and more likely to accept it, leading them to divert their attention to other matters. This account is consistent with research on experiential avoidance and acceptance (e.g., Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Such research shows that when emotional distress is inevitable, accepting it without judgement could promote well-being.
Another possibility is that expectancies can be self-fulfilling (Roese & Sherman, 2007). Like other types of placebo effects, if people expect stress to improve their test scores, stress may indeed improve their test scores. Such effects of expectancies may be mediated by changes in motivation (e.g., Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979). When people expect an outcome, they feel more confident and persist longer to achieve that outcome. Consistent with this possibility, when people expected stress to be beneficial for test performance they felt more confident about doing well in the test (e.g., Jamieson et al., 2010). Expecting stress to improve performance, therefore, might increase self-efficacy, promote goal persistence, and subsequently improve performance. Both this account and the previous one suggest that the effects of Jamieson and colleagues’ (Jamieson et al., 2010; Jamieson et al., 2012; Jamieson et al., 2013) manipulation on physiology and behavior were perhaps not mediated by changes in affect, but instead were mediated by changes in motivation.
Why Are These Questions Important?
The phenomenon captured by Jamieson and colleagues may be unique to stress and its particular physiological and behavioral implications. It is also possible, however, that this phenomenon is but one striking example of how changing expectancies regarding our phenomenological states can alter the consequences of these states. If so, the mechanism underlying the findings of Jamieson and colleagues should not be unique to stress. Indeed, it should be applicable to any affective state.
Supporting this latter possibility, there is evidence that changing expectancies about the effects of negative emotions changes the motivation to experience these emotions (see Tamir, 2016). For instance, changing expectancies about the potential benefits of anxiety or anger decreases the motivation to avoid anxiety or anger, respectively (Tamir, Bigman, Rhodes, Salerno, & Schreier, 2015). The motivation to experience negative emotions when they are expected to be beneficial, in turn, is associated with greater well-being (e.g., Kim, Ford, Mauss, & Tamir, 2015; Tamir & Ford, 2012). Similarly, at least some evidence is consistent with the idea that changing expectancies about the effects of emotions on behavior might change the actual effects of emotions on behavior (Tamir & Bigman, in press).
The research by Jamieson and colleagues is important, as it demonstrates the powerful and far-reaching effects of beliefs about phenomenological states. It is, however, open to different interpretations. Identifying the mechanisms that underlie this and other forms of regulation is necessary for understanding how regulation occurs, what factors are likely to influence it, and in what ways it is most likely to impact health, well-being, and behavior.