Abstract
We address the differences between schadenfreude and happiness and those between gluckschmerz and anger. We argue that these emotions are largely elicited by distinct interactions of appraisals that trigger distinct emotional responses. Moreover, we discuss both schadenfreude and gluckschmerz in relation to the emotional lexicon of several languages and conclude that these emotions help us to better understand human behaviour.
More About When Bad News Arrives and Good News Strikes
Why Schadenfreude and Gluckschmerz Are Not Happiness or Anger
We use the emotion system model (Roseman, 2013) to pursue further the differences between schadenfreude and happiness (hereafter joy) and those between gluckschmerz and anger. In this model, emotions are conceptualized as a coherent, integrated system of coping strategies, guided by appraisal, for responding to situations of crisis and opportunity. Incorporating both appraisals and emotional responses in the emotion system model makes it a useful background for furthering our case, because we argue that schadenfreude and gluckschmerz differ from joy and anger on both these components.
Although schadenfreude, like joy, is preceded by an appraisal of motive-consistency, and gluckschmerz, like anger, is preceded by an appraisal of motive-inconsistency, the elicitation of schadenfreude or gluckschmerz, unlike that of joy or anger, needs an additional step in this appraisal process, that is, an appraisal of the social appraisal of the event as perceived by the person who experiences the (mis)fortune (Hess, 2018). Furthermore, whereas joy follows an appraisal of circumstance-agency and anger follows an appraisal of other-agency (Roseman, 2013), schadenfreude and gluckschmerz can follow both of these appraisals. That is, when the presumed (un)fortunate events are either appraised as circumstance-caused or as other-caused. In addition, situations eliciting schadenfreude or gluckschmerz are appraised as low in control potential. Unlike joy or anger, people experiencing schadenfreude or gluckschmerz appraise themselves as having little perceived control over the event (see also Fischer, 2014; Leach, Spears, & Manstead, 2014).
Research has yet not systematically examined the specific action tendencies or behavioural responses triggered by schadenfreude and gluckschmerz (van de Ven, 2018). Although we welcome van de Ven’s argument for the signal value of these emotions, note our use of “Yes!” (i.e., meaning this is good for me and mine) and “No!” (i.e., meaning this is bad for me and mine) as one way of capturing the experiences of schadenfreude and gluckschmerz, respectively (Smith & van Dijk, 2018), studies have shown schadenfreude does appear to elicit concrete behavioural responses or action tendencies. For example, research has shown that a product failure might evoke schadenfreude and prompt people to spread negative word-of-mouth about the failed product or brand (Ouwerkerk, van Dijk, Vonkeman, & Spears, 2018; Sundie, Ward, Beal, Chin, & Oneto, 2009), and that schadenfreude following a rival team’s misfortune is associated with increased (self-reported) likelihood of harming a rival fan (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011). Also, consistent with the emotion system model, specific interactions of appraisals in schadenfreude and gluckschmerz might evoke specific emotional responses for coping with the particular situation and which differ from those evoked in joy and anger. For example, gluckschmerz (motive-inconsistent and low control potential) might lead to an accommodating response (e.g., accept the situation), whereas anger (motive-inconsistent and high control potential) might lead to a contending response (e.g., attempt to change the situation). Moreover, the emotion system model distinguishes four emotion families, trying to place schadenfreude and gluckschmerz in these families reveals more differences between them and joy or anger. For example, joy fits within the family of contacting emotions—that increase contact and interaction in response to an appraisal of motive-consistency—whereas schadenfreude (although also motive-consistent) does not. Anger fits within the family of attack emotions—that move against stimuli, in response to appraisals of motive-inconsistency and high control potential—whereas gluckschmerz does not and would be better placed in the family of distancing emotions—that decrease contact and interaction with the stimuli, in response to appraisals of motive-inconsistency and low control potential.
Schadenfreude and gluckschmerz do have some overlap in appraisals and emotional responses with joy and anger, but they are also clearly different concerning these emotion components. That is why we think schadenfreude and gluckschmerz differ from joy and anger. Do these differences warrant considering schadenfreude and gluckschmerz as distinct emotions? This is, in our view, partly an empirical question and partly a judgment call. Until more systematic research is done on these emotions, the jury is still out.
What Is in a Name?
The common remark that a language does or doesn’t have a word for an emotion means little . . . Whether a language appears to have a word for an emotion depends on the skill of the translator and on quirks of the language’s grammar and history. A language accumulates a large vocabulary, including words for emotions, when it has had influential wordsmiths, contact with other languages, rules for forming new words out of old ones, and widespread literacy, which allows new coinages to become epidemic. (Pinker, 1997, pp. 366–367)
English, or any other language as far as we know, has no single word for the pain at another’s good fortune. There is, however, an informal Hebrew term, firgun, capturing this experience (Smith & van Dijk, 2018). The word schadenfreude has clearly more history (see also, van Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014). In 1895, the Oxford English Dictionary included it for the first time as an entry and loan word in the English language (hence our spelling without a capital starting letter). In an essay on the historical semantics of schadenfreude, Leo Spitzer (1942) dated the use of the word Schadenfreude in the German language back to as early as the 16th century and raised the possibility that it was calqued from the Greek word epichairekakia. Some Greek references to the pleasure at the misfortunes of others can be dated back to before the Common Era (see for example Aristotle 350 BCE, edited in McKeon, 1941). However, regardless of whether most languages have a separate emotion label for schadenfreude or gluckschmerz, we agree with Steven Pinker’s view that the emotional lexicon of a language might not be very informative about the prevalence of and capability of experiencing a specific emotion. People seem to be similar in their emotion potential and members of societies without a specific label for a particular emotion often readily understand the label, once its context is made clear (e.g., Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006; Mesquita, Frijda, & Scherer, 1997). Pinker used schadenfreude as a case in point: When English-speakers hear the word Schadenfreude for the first time, their reaction is not, “Let me see . . . Pleasure in another’s misfortunes . . . What could that possibly be? I cannot grasp the concept; my language and culture have not provided me with such a category.” Their reaction is, “You mean there’s a word for it? Cool!” (Pinker, 1997, p. 367)
We have found that English speakers have a similar reaction when we introduce the word gluckschmerz, and what is more, can appreciate a useful symmetry it creates when paired with schadenfreude. Actually, quite a few languages have a word for pleasure in another’s misfortune, mostly a compound of the words “harm” and “joy.” For example, Danish (skadefryd), Dutch (leedvermaak), Estonian (kahjurööm), Finnish (vahingonilo), Hebrew (simcha la-ed), Hungarian (káröröm), Mandarin Chinese (xing-xai-le-huo), Russian (zloradiye), and Slovenian (škodoželjnost). Likely, these emotion labels were calqued from the Greek word epichairekakia, the German word Schadenfreude, or the French word(s) joie maligne. Moreover, several languages lacking a specific emotion label for schadenfreude have sayings or adages that explicitly refer to it. For example, Spanish has “Gozarse en el mal ajeno, no es de hombre bueno” (“A man who rejoices in another’s misfortune, is not a good man”), whereas Japanese has “Hito-no-fukou-wa-mitsu no aji” (“The misfortunes of others taste like honey”). Illustrating the point that language is for communication and should adapt to the needs of its users (Hess, 2018), is the term Meshi-Uma used by Japanese youth in their Internet language to describe schadenfreude—a term that derives from “Tanin-no-fukou-de-meshi-ga-umai” (“Food tastes good when served with the misfortunes of others”).
Schadenfreude and gluckschmerz are intriguing and fascinating social emotions. Although they might not be part of the standard emotion lexicon of most languages, explicit references to schadenfreude at least have been widespread for a long time. When taken seriously, these emotions will further our understanding of emotions and their impact on people’s lives. They might not be the favourite cousins in emotion families, but they will teach us a few important lessons about our behaviour and our social relations.
