Using Bandura's Self-Efficacy Theory to Explain Individual Differences in the Appraisal of Problem-Focused Coping Potential

Abstract

Appraisal theory assumes that the individual variability of emotional reactions to the same situation is due to individual differences in appraisal. However, the question of how interindividual differences in appraisal come about has been rarely formally addressed. We focus on one of the central dimensions of appraisal—problem-focused coping potential—and attempt to explain individual differences in appraisals along this dimension using self-efficacy theory. We integrate outcome expectancies, self-efficacy expectations, and problem-focused coping potential into a single framework and outline their personality antecedents. Using generalized self-efficacy beliefs as an example, we then discuss the mechanisms underlying the effects of personality dispositions on appraisal and the conditions that moderate their influence. We conclude with the implications for theory, research, and practice.

Keywords

appraisal theory problem-focused coping potential self-efficacy

There is considerable variation in people's emotional reactions to the same events. While some are extremely anxious giving a public speech, others feel excited about it. Similarly, while some feel helpless facing a life-threatening disease, others are optimistic that they can fight it. Explaining such individual differences in emotional reactions to the same situation is one of the major tasks of emotion theory (e.g., Roseman & Smith, 2001).

Appraisal theory (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 2009; Scherer & Moors, 2019; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) proposes to explain the interindividual variability in emotional reactions by means of the concept of appraisal—the evaluation of the eliciting event in relation to personal wellbeing. The core assumption of appraisal theory is that a person's emotional reaction to an event depends on her appraisal of the event on a set of appraisal dimensions such as motivational relevance, goal conduciveness, accountability, coping potential, and compatibility with internal standards. Based on this assumption, individual differences in emotional reactions to the same event can be explained by attributing them to corresponding individual differences in the appraisal of the event on one or more appraisal dimensions. These individual differences in appraisal, in turn, are assumed to be due, at least in important part, to personality dispositions such as stable beliefs and values (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2021).

However, our understanding of the processes underlying the effects of personality dispositions on appraisal and emotion is still limited. That is, most of the relevant research has focused on demonstrating that appraisal-related personality dispositions influence how individuals react emotionally to events (see Reisenzein et al., 2020). For example, there is evidence that stable pre-existing irrational beliefs are partly responsible for emotional disorders (Ellis, 1995); that stable pre-existing control beliefs are important personality determinants of achievement emotions (Pekrun, 1992, 2006); and that stable appraisal biases partly explain interindividual differences in the likelihood of experiencing different emotions (Scherer, 2021). However, attempts to delineate the processes underlying the effects of these and other personality antecedents on appraisal and emotions are still scarce.

In response to this knowledge gap, the current paper provides an analysis of the possible mechanisms underlying individual differences in appraisal and emotion. Because it is impossible for a single article to comprehensively discuss this question for each proposed dimension of appraisal, we focus on just one appraisal dimension, problem-focused coping potential. This appraisal refers to the person's assessment of her ability to make or keep a situation congruent with her goals (Smith & Kirby, 2009a). To explain how individual differences in the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential emerge, we integrate Bandura's (1977) theory of self-efficacy into appraisal theory, based on the assumption that self-efficacy plays a central role in the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential.

The remainder of this article comprises two main parts: (1) a brief overview of the central assumptions of appraisal theory and self-efficacy theory; (2) a model that describes the role of generalized self-efficacy beliefs in the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential, as well as the mechanisms that underlie their effect. In the first part, we document that while self-efficacy was originally conceptualized by Bandura (1977) as a highly specific judgment, the concept was subsequently extended to (also) denote more general and stable personal beliefs. We then compare the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential, self-efficacy as a judgment (the original view of self-efficacy) and self-efficacy as a stable and generalized belief (the more recent view) with regard to their content, scope, and function.

In the second part, we combine the two central components of self-efficacy judgments— outcome expectancies and self-efficacy expectations (Bandura, 1977)—and the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential into a single model and propose that stable self-efficacy beliefs are the main personality antecedent of the appraisal of coping potential. Using the example of self-efficacy beliefs, we then discuss possible mechanisms that underlie the effects of personality dispositions on the appraisal process and that can explain interindividual variability in appraisal. We conclude with the implications of our proposal for theory and research.

Self-Efficacy and Appraisal of Coping Potential: Review and Comparison of the Two Concepts

Key Assumptions of Appraisal Theory

The term “appraisal” was coined by Arnold (1960) in reference to the cognitive processes preceding emotional experiences, and was made “scientifically respectable” (Reisenzein, 2006) through empirical work of Richard Lazarus (e.g., Lazarus, 1964; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964). In the following decades, appraisal theory became a dominant approach of psychological emotion research (Frijda, 1986, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 2009; Scherer & Moors, 2019; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

The key theoretical assumptions of modern appraisal theory have been summarized by Moors et al. (2013). Three central assumptions are: (1) appraisal is the key determinant and differentiator of various emotional states; (2) individual difference variables play a significant role in appraisal; and (3) the process of appraisal can occur in two different forms: deliberate or rule-guided, consisting of the online computation of appraisal values; and automatic, consisting of the activation of learned associations between representations of stimuli and stored appraisal values. The last two assumptions are of central importance to the main theme of our paper.

The second assumption underscores the significance of pre-existing interindividual difference variables for the appraisal of concrete events. In fact, a central reason for postulating an intervening appraisal process has been to explain the variability in emotional reactions to the same situation among different people (Roseman & Smith, 2001). As Lazarus (1991) and Smith and Lazarus (1993) have emphasized, appraisal is a relational process in the sense that perceived events are related to the person's goals and pre-existing beliefs. Accordingly, both dispositional and situational factors participate in the appraisal process (Kappas, 2001; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Smith & Kirby, 2009a, 2009b). This assumption is empirically supported by several lines of research. For example, Smith and Kirby (2009b) found that appraisals of problem-focused coping potential about solving a math task with different levels of difficulty are influenced both by ability beliefs (a stable dispositional factor) and by the perceived difficulty of the task (a situational parameter). Similarly, work on the emotions evoked by achievement activities and their success and failure outcomes support the importance of both situational factors (e.g., task difficulty) and personal factors (e.g., the self-concept of ability) for these emotions (Pekrun, 2006). Analogously, Griner and Smith (2000) found that individuals’ affiliative orientation predicts appraisals of motivational relevance if the situation is interpersonally challenging.

The third key assumption of appraisal theory mentioned above is that appraisal can occur either in a conscious, effortful or an unconscious, automatic manner. This dual-process assumption, which is shared by most appraisal theorists (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Kappas, 2001, 2006; Lazarus, 1991; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Moors, 2010; Smith & Kirby, 2000), is similar to parallel distinctions made in dual-process theories of decision making (Kahneman, 2011), impression formation (Brewer, 1988) and persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Deliberate appraisal is based on conscious, explicit, and controlled reasoning, whereas automatic (or associative) appraisal is based on unconscious implicit and automatic information processing. In addition to empirical support for this distinction (see Moors & De Houwer, 2001, 2005; Moors et al., 2004), it should be noted that it is also well-motivated theoretically. In particular, the assumption that appraisal processes are frequently automatized can explain why emotions often follow eliciting stimuli very rapidly. It also allows to answer the objection that appraisal processes are too cognitively taxing for individuals to be made every time a particular emotion-evoking event is encountered (Kappas, 2006). Finally, one of the key adaptational functions of emotions is widely assumed to consist in directing attention toward relevant events so one can respond to them appropriately. However, as pointed out by Smith and Kirby (2000), emotions could hardly achieve this function if the mechanism underlying emotion elicitation were itself highly dependent on attention, as is the case for deliberate appraisal processes.

As detailed later, the assumption that appraisal processes can occur in a deliberate or automatic manner is in our view particularly helpful for explaining how interindividual differences in appraisal come about. To anticipate, we assume that automatic appraisal processes are particularly strongly influenced by individual predispositions such as generalized beliefs (Kappas, 2001; Smith & Kirby, 2000).

Self-Efficacy Theory

Self-efficacy—a personal judgment of one's ability to execute a course of action required to attain a desired outcome (Bandura, 1977; see below for an elaboration)—is a central concept of Bandura's Social Cognitive Theory¹ (Bandura, 1989, 2001). According to Bandura, judgments of self-efficacy determine whether individuals will engage in coping behavior and how long they will persist in the face of setbacks. Specifically, it is assumed that individuals with high self-efficacy are motivated to exert sufficient effort to reach desired goals, which will often lead to success, whereas those with low self-efficacy are more likely to give up early and fail. Self-efficacy has been linked to numerous psychological and behavioral outcomes, ranging from academic success (e.g., Komarraju & Nadler, 2013), to creativity (Haase et al., 2018) and self-management of chronic disease (e.g., Farrell et al., 2004).

Importantly, self-efficacy was initially conceptualized by Bandura (1977) as a highly specific and contextualized judgment, that is, as the judgment of one's perceived ability to enact a specific behavior in a specific situation. Bandura proposed that these self-efficacy judgments result from the integration of four sources of information: enactive mastery experiences (How well did I do at similar tasks in the past?), vicarious experiences (How well are others doing at the task?), persuasive messages (What do others say about my ability and performance at the task?), and momentary bodily or mental states that may influence performance (e.g., Am I tired/depressed?). Of these, personal mastery experiences were assumed to be the most important for self-efficacy judgments (Bandura, 1977). Gist and Mitchell (1992) subsequently refined this proposal by arguing that the effect of personal experiences on self-efficacy is moderated by the interpretation of the causes of previous performance (see Weiner, 1986).

Importantly, Bandura differentiated between efficacy expectations and outcome expectancies (Bandura, 1977). Outcome expectancies refer to one's estimate that a given behavior will lead to a desired outcome. In contrast, self-efficacy expectations refer to the judgment that one can successfully execute the behavior needed to produce this outcome. Together, outcome expectancies and efficacy expectations produce an overall expectancy of success that determines behavior as well as emotional experiences (Bandura, 1977).

As already pointed out by Lazarus and Folkman (1984), the initial definition of self-efficacy as a highly situation-specific judgment (Bandura, 1977) is close to the concept of secondary appraisal proposed by Lazarus (e.g., 1966). Commenting on Bandura's concept of self-efficacy, Lazarus and Folkman (1984) wrote: “To couch Bandura's ideas in our frame of reference, we would say that efficacy expectancies are part of secondary appraisal, which also includes an evaluation of alternative coping strategies” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 70). Hence, the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential—the perceived ability to improve their unfavorable circumstances—is a central component of secondary appraisal (see also, Smith & Kirby, 2009a).

Although Bandura (1977) thus originally defined self-efficacy as a highly situation-specific judgment, many subsequent authors have used the concept of self-efficacy to refer to corresponding, relatively stable, and global beliefs (Chen et al., 2001; Jerusalem & Schwarzer, 1992; Luszczynska et al., 2005; Sherer et al., 1982). Indeed, even Bandura (1977) himself seems to have later used “self-efficacy” in this way when he wrote:
The weight people give to new experiences and how they reconstruct them in memory also depends, in part, on the nature and strength of self-efficacy beliefs into which those experiences must be integrated. … After a strong sense of efficacy is developed through repeated successes, occasional failures or setbacks are unlikely to undermine belief in one's capabilities. (Bandura, 1997, p. 82)

To mark this distinction, we will speak of self-efficacy judgments versus self-efficacy beliefs. Although related (see below), self-efficacy judgments and self-efficacy beliefs are distinct types of psychological phenomena. The judgment of self-efficacy, as conceptualized by Bandura (1977), is the outcome of a judgment process that is contextualized and specific to the “here and now.” In contrast, self-efficacy beliefs are more stable and often also general (e.g., refer to a broader domain of functioning). Such beliefs are often regarded as components of cognitive schemata—mental structures that organize knowledge and guide cognitive processes and behavior (Bartlett, 1932).²

The distinction between self-efficacy judgments and self-efficacy beliefs is crucial to the current discussion of the relation between self-efficacy and the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential. The similarities and difference between the three concepts are summarized in Table 1. As shown, we propose that the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential and self-efficacy judgments are quite similar, with one notable difference: Whereas self-efficacy judgments are defined by Bandura (1977) as very narrow in scope and as highly specific, referring to a single behavior, appraisals of problem-focused coping potential are broader in scope and may refer to many behaviors. Thus, the appraisal of coping potential could be said to combine many parallel judgments of the ability to exert specific coping behaviors (i.e., many self-efficacy judgments). Self-efficacy judgments can therefore be regarded as being a part of the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential. Furthermore, we propose that appraisals of problem-focused coping potential are similar in meaning and function to the expectancies of success that, according to Bandura (1977), are determined by the combination of outcome expectancies and efficacy expectations. Finally, regarding self-efficacy beliefs, that is, more stable and global cognitions about one's ability to cope, we propose that they are the major dispositional antecedents of appraisals of problem-focused coping potential.

Table 1.
A comparison of the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential with self-efficacy judgments and self-efficacy beliefs.

Appraisals of problem-focused coping potential Self-efficacy judgments Self-efficacy beliefs

Stability May show some stability over time in the same situation; however, because these judgments are influenced by the specific constellation of situational demands, they vary from situation to situation Stable, resistant to change

Generality Specific to the task and situation at hand. Self-efficacy judgments are more situation-specific than appraisals of problem-focused coping potential: self-efficacy judgments refer to a single behavior, while appraisals of coping potential may include the perceived ability to execute a range of behaviors suited to change an unwanted situation for the better. Appraisals of coping potential are similar to Bandura's overall success expectancy (Bandura, 1977) Can vary in generality from task-specific to general self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., beliefs that one is able to perform successfully across a wide range of tasks and domains of activity)

Main function Influences emotion as well as motivation and action Guide the cognitive processes underlying emotion, motivation, and behavior

Level of processing Bandura does not make an explicit distinction between different levels of processing; however, he does assume that once one has formed a schema of one's ability, the initially deliberate judgment process becomes less deliberate. Appraisal theories explicitly assume that the process of appraisal can be both deliberative and automatic/associative Are formed over time mainly as the result of repeated mastery (success or failure) experiences. Although these experiences may be processed consciously, self-efficacy beliefs can also be shaped by the automatic processing of success and failure

How Self-Efficacy Theory Enhances the Understanding of the Process of Appraising Problem-Focused Coping Potential

Building on the comparison of self-efficacy judgments, self-efficacy beliefs, and appraisals of problem-focused coping potential, we propose a model that integrates them as elements of a single process (Figure 1). The basic assumption of this model is that the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential relies on, and combines, outcome expectancy and self-efficacy judgments. To motivate this proposal, consider that to judge one's potential to cope with a challenging event or situation relevant to one's wellbeing, one needs to become clear about two things: One must determine what needs to be done in order to make a desired outcome happen (outcome expectancy), and one must determine whether they can execute the behavior or behaviors necessary to produce the desired outcome (self-efficacy judgment).³

Figure 1.
The process of appraisal of problem-focused coping potential.

Outcome expectancies are an important component of the appraisal of coping potential because the information they convey—about whether there are actions that are in principle suited to attain the desired outcome, and if yes which actions these are—obviously affect the person's motivation to act. Outcome expectancy judgments can be influenced by general and stable control beliefs (e.g., Rotter, 1966) as well as by specific information about how the desired outcome can be achieved. Because these dispositional beliefs can differ in different people, they are one source of variation of outcome expectancy judgments and hence, of the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential. To illustrate, whereas some people regard finding a job as primarily a question of luck (external locus of control), others regard it as mainly dependent on effort and persistence (internal locus of control). Furthermore, among the latter, different individuals can have different beliefs about what specifically needs to be done to find a job. Some may believe that the best strategy is to send out as many unspecific job applications as possible, whereas others may believe that it is best to focus on only a few jobs and to tailor their application materials to each of these jobs.

Self-efficacy expectations—assessments of whether one can or cannot do what is needed to achieve a desired outcome—are likewise influenced by situational and personality factors. Among the latter, the most important are stable beliefs about one's perceived ability to execute a given behavior, that is, what we refer to as self-efficacy beliefs. Other personality constructs conceptually similar to self-efficacy beliefs, such as personal mastery beliefs (e.g., Pearlin & Schooler, 1978), likely act in the same direction as self-efficacy beliefs. However, inasmuch as these constructs are more general than self-efficacy beliefs, they are probably particularly important in situations in which one needs to engage in a novel activity and therefore cannot rely on pre-existing stable self-efficacy beliefs specific to this activity.

We propose that self-efficacy beliefs function as a filter that guides the way the parameters of a specific situation are integrated into the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential. As documented in the literature on confirmation bias (e.g., Nickerson, 1998), people tend to interpret information in ways that confirm their pre-existing beliefs. The reason for this is presumably that the pre-existing beliefs guide the way people attend to, recall and interpret information about a specific situation. In this way, pre-existing self-efficacy beliefs can account, in part, for interindividual variability in the appraisal of coping potential.

In the following section, we elaborate these assumptions by considering in more detail several selection mechanisms in the appraisal process that may be influenced by pre-existing beliefs, using self-efficacy beliefs as the example to illustrate these mechanisms. However, although we focus on self-efficacy, we believe that the proposals described below are largely universal and can therefore be applied, in a parallel fashion, to the analysis of other individual predispositions and other appraisal dimensions.

Self-Efficacy Beliefs and Information Processing: Attention, Memory, and Attribution

Attentional bias

Research has consistently confirmed that attention can be systematically biased by a variety of personality characteristics, such as attachment style (Rowe & Carnelley, 2003), dispositional optimism (Segerstrom, 2001), the presence of an emotional disorder (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Epp et al., 2012; Greenberg et al., 1992; MacLeod et al., 1986), and level of self-esteem (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004; Li et al., 2012). The general finding of these studies is that a given personality attribute (e.g., low self-esteem) makes congruent stimuli (e.g., negative information about oneself) more salient. A similar attentional bias has also been found for generalized self-efficacy beliefs: individuals with lower self-efficacy beliefs exhibit a greater bias toward threat-related stimuli (Karademas et al., 2007).

This attentional bias is directly relevant to the process of appraisal. In most situations, numerous pieces of information potentially relevant for the appraisal of a specific event are available. However, given that the appraisal process is often automatic and takes very little time, it is unlikely that all of the appraisal-relevant information is considered. Rather, some of the available information is likely left out and therefore does not contribute to the appraisal.

We propose that, by influencing attention, self-efficacy beliefs play the role of an attentional filter that determines, in part, which information does and does not enter the appraisal process. This will lead to biases in the appraisal process whenever the available appraisal-relevant information is ambiguous, which is typically the case in real-life situations. That is, typically the situation contains both positive stimuli (e.g., cues for success) and negative stimuli (e.g., cues for failure) that can potentially inform appraisals, and in this way can influence subsequent emotions and actions. We assume that in these cases, pre-existing self-efficacy beliefs act in the same manner as other relatively stable individual differences (such as dispositional anxiety and depression, self-esteem, or attachment style): They bias attention toward stimuli that are congruent with the self-efficacy beliefs. Thus, particularly in ambiguous situations, individuals with low self-efficacy beliefs will be more likely to direct their attention toward cues indicating potential failure, whereas individuals with high self-efficacy beliefs will be more likely to orient toward cues indicating the possibility for success.

Memory bias

Memory activation is the central component of associative processing that has been proposed to underly automatic appraisals (e.g., Scherer, 2001; Smith & Kirby, 2000). According to Smith and Kirby's (2000) process model of appraisal, once information relevant to an appraisal has been identified in the environment, it triggers the activation of memories storing relevant information about one's past experiences and similar events or situations. Because self-efficacy beliefs represent consolidated past experiences, it is likely that these beliefs, too, are activated in the process of appraisal in an automatic and effortless way. Once activated, they can then bias the retrieval of other information relevant to the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential.

As in the case of attentional biases, personality dispositions can influence memory processes too. For instance, high levels of social (Morgan, 2010; Moscovitch et al., 2018) and generalized (Burke & Mathews, 1992) anxiety can bias autobiographical memory retrieval toward more threatening stimuli. Similarly, depressive disorder has been linked with a negative memory bias that favors the theme of sadness (see Gotlib & Joormann, 2010, for a review). Furthermore, studies on the role of the self in memory found that autobiographical memory retrieval is influenced by the person's global self-esteem (Christensen et al., 2003; Sedikides & Spencer, 2016), with higher global self-esteem leading to positive shifts in memory, and lower global self-esteem to negative shifts. Similarly, research on the role of the self-enhancement motive in memory has shown that people with higher self-esteem are more susceptible to a positivity bias, that is, they remember positive events in greater detail than negative events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008) and report higher levels of psychological closeness with positive memories (Demiray & Janssen, 2015).

Based on these findings, we propose that self-efficacy beliefs bias memory in the same way as other individual differences. That is, low self-efficacy beliefs make individuals more likely to spontaneously recall situations in which they failed, whereas high self-efficacy beliefs make the recall of situations in which they succeeded more probable. This effect has direct implications for the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential: individuals with low self-efficacy beliefs should appraise their coping potential in a specific situation as lower than individuals with high self-efficacy beliefs.

Self-efficacy judgments and causal attribution

Once a coping action has been performed, the outcome of the action (e.g., success or failure at a specific task) provides individuals with the opportunity to revise, or reappraise, their appraisals of coping potential. As mentioned, according to Bandura (1977) such enactive mastery experiences (How well did I do at similar tasks in the past?) are the most important source of self-efficacy information. To predict if and how people revise their appraisals (or not), it is crucially important to know how they explain the outcome (see Weiner, 1986; Gist & Mitchell, 1992). Specifically, the kind of explanation or causal attribution found is a key factor that accounts for the stability in the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential over time (Weiner, 1986).

As already hinted, the outcomes of coping actions can be broadly classified into the categories of success and failure. Success comprises positive situations that remain the same and negative situations that change for the better, while failure comprises negative situations that remain the same or even change for the worse. The task of the individual is to understand why these changes (or the lack thereof) occurred, including who or what was responsible for the success or failure. We propose that individuals with high self-efficacy beliefs tend to attribute success to internal and stable factors (e.g., their ability) and failure to either internal unstable (e.g., tiredness) or external (e.g., lack of time) factors. In contrast, people with low self-efficacy beliefs are more likely to attribute their success to internal unstable or to external factors, and their failure to internal and stable factors (e.g., low ability). This pattern of attribution reinforces the pre-existing self-efficacy beliefs and thus further contributes to their stability.

Existing research provides support for these assumptions. For example, Au (2015) found a significant effect of generalized self-efficacy beliefs on course-level outcome control judgments (the extent to which students believed their outcome depended on their effort). Additionally, Alden (1986) found that people made internal attributions if they received feedback congruent with their self-efficacy beliefs, but external attributions if they received incongruent feedback. Finally, Stajkovic and Sommer (2000) provided support for the existence of both direct and reciprocal links between self-efficacy beliefs and causal attributions.

Conditions That Moderate the Relationship Between Self-Efficacy Beliefs and the Appraisal of Problem-Focused Coping Potential

Because appraisals are bound to specific situations and different situations present the appraiser with different combinations of information about situational and task parameters, we propose that the influence of self-efficacy beliefs on the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential is not uniform but differs across different situations. We propose that at least three factors moderate the influence of self-efficacy beliefs on the appraisal of coping potential: the degree of ambiguity of the situation or task, the difficulty of the task, and the mode of information processing.

Ambiguity of the situation

The information about an appraised situation or task is rarely complete and unambiguous. More often, individuals operate in situations of uncertainty, in which it is difficult to make an accurate prediction of their objective chances of success or failure. We propose that self-efficacy beliefs play a greater role in the appraisal of coping potential whenever other appraisal-relevant information is either absent (or not easily identifiable) or ambiguous. In the former case (the absence of information), self-efficacy beliefs are the only source of information available for the appraisal of coping potential; therefore, its effect on the appraisal should be strong. In the latter case (ambiguity), the processes discussed above—selective attention and memory—come into play. That is, in this case the pre-existing self-efficacy beliefs filter the situational information in a way that confirms these beliefs. In contrast, if the situational information is unambiguous (which, as said, is however rarely the case in real-life situations), self-efficacy beliefs have less weight in the appraisal of coping potential.

Similar proposals on the influence of pre-existing beliefs on the judgments made in concrete situations have been made before. For example, regarding locus of control, Rotter (1966) emphasized that “the more clearly and uniformly a situation is labeled as skill or luck determined, in a given culture, the lesser the role such a generalized expectancy would play in determining individual differences in behavior” (Rotter, 1966, p. 2). Similarly, Pekrun (1992) proposed that generalized expectancies are more influential in ambiguous situations or when situational information is scarce.

Task difficulty

Some of the literature on appraisal suggests that the difficulty of the task is another factor that moderates the influence of pre-existing self-efficacy beliefs on the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential. For instance, Kappas (2001) proposed that there should be little variance between individuals in appraised coping potential if the task is either very easy (in this case, coping potential should be judged as uniformly high) or very difficult (in this case, coping potential should be judged as uniformly low).

Empirical evidence for the moderating role of task difficulty on the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential was obtained by Smith and Kirby (2009b). Similar to Kappas (2001), the authors hypothesized that when faced with a very easy problem, all participants would judge that their abilities exceed the task demands and therefore report high levels of problem-focused coping potential; whereas when faced with a difficult problem, the participants’ judgments of coping potential would be determined by their perceived ability level and would accordingly increase with higher perceived ability. The findings of Smith and Kirby (2009a, 2009b) largely confirmed these predictions: There was little variation in the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential when the task was very easy; however, when the task was difficult, the judged coping potential increased with perceived ability.

Generalizing from these theoretical proposals and empirical findings, we propose (a) if the task is perceived as either very easy or as extremely difficult, self-efficacy beliefs have little effect on appraisals of problem-focused coping potential: virtually everyone will see the task as within their abilities when it is easy, and beyond them when it is extremely difficult; (b) if the perceived task difficulty is between these two extremes, individuals with higher self-efficacy beliefs appraise their problem-focused coping potential as higher than those with lower self-efficacy beliefs.

Mode of information processing

As discussed previously, the process of appraisal can be either deliberate or automatic (associative). Associative appraisal is based on the activation of relevant information from memory, including pre-existing stable and generalized beliefs. That is, in associative appraisal, self-efficacy beliefs are activated from memory and then influence the formation of self-efficacy judgments, either by being used as one source of information for these judgments or by influencing the processing of other appraisal-relevant information in a selective manner, as proposed above.

In deliberate appraisal, individuals rely on systematic reasoning, which is generally assumed to leave less room for pre-existing beliefs (e.g., Evans, 2008). However, there is evidence (concerning, for instance, the influence of depression on explicit memory) which suggest that pre-existing beliefs can influence the judgment of problem-focused coping potential even if it is formed in a conscious, deliberate manner (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). We therefore propose that the impact of self-efficacy beliefs is greater in the associative mode of processing than in the deliberate mode. Furthermore, because the deliberate mode of appraisal requires attentional resources, we predict that factors that reduce cognitive capacity, such as tiredness, high levels of stress, or alcohol intoxication (e.g., Casbon et al., 2003) encourage the reliance on associative appraisal processing.

Note that according to several appraisal theorists (e.g. Scherer, 2001; Smith & Kirby, 2001), deliberate and automatic appraisal processes can occur in parallel in the same situation. In these cases, if the outcomes of the two processes agree, they may reinforce each other, leading to higher confidence in the appraisal. If the outcomes conflict, one might become dominant and the other discarded, or both might be integrated into an intermediate judgment. Understanding the interaction between automatic and deliberate appraisal processes is one of the great current challenges for appraisal theory.

Implications for Future Research

Although appraisal theorists agree that pre-existing individual differences in beliefs, values, and other stable personality characteristics influence appraisal (Reisenzein et al., 2020; Scherer & Moors, 2019), knowledge about precisely which personality characteristics are important for different appraisals and how they exert their effects is still limited. In this article, we tried to fill this knowledge gap for the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential. To achieve this goal, we first integrated Bandura's (1977) theory of self-efficacy into appraisal theory by combining the two central kinds of expectancies featured in self-efficacy theory—outcome expectancies and self-efficacy expectations—and the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential into a single model. We then proposed that stable self-efficacy beliefs are the major antecedent of the appraisal of coping potential and discussed possible mechanisms (attentional, memory, and interpretational/attributional processes) underlying the actualization of self-efficacy beliefs in appraisal. In addition, we outlined conditions that moderate the impact of self-efficacy beliefs on the appraisal of coping potential.

We believe that the proposed model has three main benefits. First, it provides a more detailed explanation than has been available before of the interindividual differences in appraisals of the same event.⁴

Second, the proposed model partly explains how early-life experiences and socialization processes influence appraisals of coping potential and associated emotional experiences and behaviors. Mastery experiences, the primary and most important source of self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1977), depend in significant degree on the physical and social environment in which individuals grow up. For example, individuals raised in environments that support mastery experiences (e.g., those born into a high-status family) will more likely develop high self-efficacy beliefs, whereas those who grow up in less lucky circumstances will less likely acquire high self-efficacy beliefs. In addition, personal features that cannot easily be changed, such as sex, skin color, or disability, can have strong effects on the mastery experiences of individuals in societies in which these attributes are associated with lesser or higher competence. Furthermore, growing up in a particular environment and/or belonging to a particular social group can also influence the way individuals interpret their mastery or failure experiences (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). Parents, siblings, friends, and teachers may encourage or discourage us to engage in particular kinds of activities and may teach us how to explain our success and failure at these activities—which, as mentioned, is another key factor in the development of generalized self-efficacy beliefs. For instance, in some non-Western cultures it is normative to attribute success to external factors (e.g., good luck) and failure to internal factors (e.g., Al-Zahrani & Kaplowitz, 1993). Individuals socialized in such cultures are predicted to systematically differ in their self-efficacy beliefs and accordingly, their appraisals of problem-focused coping potential.

Third, the proposed model can be of use for evaluating programs aimed at influencing self-efficacy beliefs and related cognitions (see for instance, Unrau et al., 2018, for a meta-analysis of interventions targeting reading self-efficacy), and to further fine-tune these programs. Having a more in-depth understanding of the processes underlying appraisal formation and of the boundary conditions of the influence of self-efficacy beliefs, it is easier to understand why interventions aiming to improve educational outcomes by strengthening self-efficacy beliefs are often not as effective as hoped.

In conclusion, in this article we attempted to clarify how personality factors such as stable beliefs and values influence appraisal and thereby explain, at least in part, the interindividual variability of emotional reactions to the same event. Although our analysis was restricted to the appraisal of problem-focused coping potential, we believe that appraisals on other dimensions are influenced by stable personality dispositions analogously to how the appraisal of coping potential is influenced by self-efficacy beliefs. This means in particular that the mechanisms that underlie the effect of personality on appraisal (attentional biases, memory biases, and interpretational/attributional biases) are likely the same. Promising candidates of personality characteristics amenable to a parallel analysis are self-esteem and sensitivity to unfairness, which have been found to be associated with individuals’ readiness to experience anger (Kuppens et al. 2007a) as well as with interpersonal orientation (De Hooge, 2016), emotional intelligence (Mikolajczak et al., 2007), and agreeableness and neuroticism (Kuppens et al., 2007b).

We believe that a systematic analysis of the relations between individual predispositions associated with different emotions and the appraisals that underlie these emotions could go a long way toward explaining individual differences in emotional reactions. An improved understanding of these individual differences is key for improving interventions targeting maladaptive emotional reactions and thus, of improving individuals’ wellbeing.

	Appraisals of problem-focused coping potential	Self-efficacy judgments	Self-efficacy beliefs
Stability	May show some stability over time in the same situation; however, because these judgments are influenced by the specific constellation of situational demands, they vary from situation to situation	Stable, resistant to change
Generality	Specific to the task and situation at hand. Self-efficacy judgments are more situation-specific than appraisals of problem-focused coping potential: self-efficacy judgments refer to a single behavior, while appraisals of coping potential may include the perceived ability to execute a range of behaviors suited to change an unwanted situation for the better. Appraisals of coping potential are similar to Bandura's overall success expectancy (Bandura, 1977)	Can vary in generality from task-specific to general self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., beliefs that one is able to perform successfully across a wide range of tasks and domains of activity)
Main function	Influences emotion as well as motivation and action	Guide the cognitive processes underlying emotion, motivation, and behavior
Level of processing	Bandura does not make an explicit distinction between different levels of processing; however, he does assume that once one has formed a schema of one's ability, the initially deliberate judgment process becomes less deliberate. Appraisal theories explicitly assume that the process of appraisal can be both deliberative and automatic/associative	Are formed over time mainly as the result of repeated mastery (success or failure) experiences. Although these experiences may be processed consciously, self-efficacy beliefs can also be shaped by the automatic processing of success and failure

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback and Rainer Reisenzein who acted as an editor on this manuscript for his advice and help. We sincerely appreciate all the valuable comments and suggestions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the H2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions under grant agreement No [713639]; the first author was funded through the BIGSSS-departs PhD stipend.

ORCID iD

Olga Poluektova

Notes

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