Varieties of international pluralism

Introduction

Political theorists have from time to time returned to the problematic tension between unity and difference. For example, this kind of tension is involved when dealing with the balancing of order and liberty, the collective and the individual or when combining international order and state autonomy. The solution to the problem seems to be to achieve some kind of unity and at the same time preserve a degree of autonomy and agency while avoiding fragmentation and disorder. Hence, the notion of international pluralism is central to most conceptions of international relations. However, international pluralism is challenging. It is a both a question of presenting an adequate description of the world as pluralistic rather than as anything else as well as conceiving of something like a pluralist ideal for international relations. This paper looks at how versions of international pluralism account for relations among states involving both contentions of social facts and normative accounts of pluralism and a pluralist ideal.

Two distinctions are central. First, the distinction between plurality as a condition and pluralism as a way to manage that condition. Plurality of states, argues Kooijmans (1964: 8) is the logical consequence of difference within any species, and states are different at least due to their spatial occupation. Empirically inclined scholars often take plurality of states to be a social fact (Mayall, 1990; Nye, 2005). However, social facts are typically contingent and perceived of differently. Especially realism conveys a pessimistic outlook on world politics (Lebow, 2003; Stevens and Michelsen, 2019). This also affects the attitude to international pluralism as less of a solution than a problematic condition likely to prevail despite attempts to reform. Second, the distinction between treating pluralism as a way to encounter the condition of plurality while promoting other values – hence treating pluralism as an instrumental value – or, alternatively, viewing pluralism as something worth defending and promoting for its own sake, hence treating pluralism as an intrinsic value. The latter points towards the notion of a pluralist ideal.

However conceived, pluralism requires some degree to toleration when building unity, within a state or among a group of states. Hence, pluralism addresses concepts such as inclusion, toleration and recognition. Responding to the variety of pluralist conceptions, Walzer (1997: xii) views versions of pluralism as ‘regimes of toleration’ recognising the complex relation between toleration and difference that is involved. He concludes: ‘Toleration makes difference possible; difference makes toleration necessary’. This begs the question to what extent different pluralist regimes of toleration reflect a pluralist political ideal or are merely regimes of necessity. Focussing on various accounts of international pluralism, this paper sets out to deal with the following questions:

The paper shows that while there seems to be more or less general acceptance for plurality as a condition of world politics, and often, at least a vague commitment to a pluralist ideal, the challenge remains to formulate a fruitful account of international pluralism. Initially, the paper reviews the two approaches to international pluralism characteristic of the English School, state pluralism and solidarism. The English School makes international pluralism a central concern and at the same time combines different versions of international pluralism reflecting what Wight (1991) labels the realist, rationalist and revolutionist traditions of international thought. Hence, the English School is a good starting point for dealing with international pluralism. In this paper, I claim that state pluralism and solidarism treat international pluralism largely as a by-product and as instrumental to other values, such as order, autonomy or justice. To that end, the theories conform the plurality there is in the world into a particular kind of international polity, and, when attempting to control differences, this constantly imposes new versions of difference. As an alternative, I suggest that the Roman concept of variety (varietas) enhances our understanding of plurality as a ‘splendid fact’ (Berlin, 1999: 66). This means that international pluralism is more than a way to manage or control difference. Embracing variety means to be able to enjoy, appreciate and utilise the good of plurality. The following section explores the deeper commitment to pluralism presented in the work of Hannah Arendt and Michael Oakeshott, two political theorists famous for their defence of pluralism, applying their thought to international relations. I claim that their thinking is an important contribution to understanding international plurality as variety. The final section of the paper focuses on the concept of variety involving a re-take on versions of international pluralism as well as a discussion of the viability of the pluralist ideal for international relations. I conclude that it is preferable to accept a variety of pluralist conceptions rather than go on searching for a theoretical conception that somehow stands above the controversy. Accepting pluralism in a sense involves rejecting just one version of pluralism.

State pluralism

In a seminal English School text, Vincent (1996: 123–124) cheerfully portrays international society as an egg-box. The idea is that international rules and institutions cushion the relations of states much like an egg-box cushions the eggs it contains. According to this description, the collective priority is to prevent international conflict and to preserve state autonomy; the result is state pluralism. This, of course, is primarily a pedagogical example of an account of international relations typical of the English School and according to which an international society is capable of conforming differences among states into a particular type of polity composed of shared values, interests, rules and institutions (Bull, 1977). This conception resonates on modern Western diplomatic tradition adding to it a degree of realism (Buzan and Little, 2000; Watson, 1992; Wight, 1977). Moreover, reviewing the history of modern international relations, the approach connects to cultural and religious conformity as the glue holding international society together (Watson, 1992: 216–217). Hence, in order to achieve recognition as states, each government has to live up to certain material as well as ideational standards (Osiander, 1994; Paul et al., 2014). Such ‘thick’ notions of international society has led to the construction of hierarchies among the members of international society as well as between members and non-members (Bull, 1977: 16; Simpson, 2003).

A central idea of state pluralism is the demarcation of political space into two separate spheres, that of the states-people within the bounded community and that of the state within international society (Jackson, 2000: 31). The distinction between the primary political association, the state and the secondary political association, the society of states, applies to a range of different state conceptions where state borders contain the realm of government proper in contrast with a more primitive account of international society. Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes among other early modern authors carved out this notion of international relations, securing both state autonomy and order among states in international society (Bull et al., 1990). The early modern version of this is neatly summarised by Tuck (1999: 13) in particular the critical balancing of autonomy and sovereignty against order and morality:

The sovereign state, on this account of international relations, is on the one hand an autonomous agent without any affective relationships: on the other hand, it is not entitled to treat other agents as moral nullities, but has to recognise some general principles governing its conduct towards them, albeit of a much thinner kind than would be the case in a developed civil society.

Hobbes presents a view, strange in his times, of the space in-between states as a devastating war, brutal and lawless (Brett, 2011; Hobbes, 1909). Rejecting the idea of a unity of states on a higher level by universal principles of a world society, Hobbes theorised that an order among sovereigns is possible. The covenants of sovereigns relies on the capacity to deter from aggression (Malcolm, 2002: 432–456). According to Hobbes (1991: 227), states provide ‘a retired life’ for the citizens within their boundaries while international society obtains at least some element of international order where there would otherwise rage a permanent war. By contrast, the Grotian conception of international relations places states in a system securing autonomy and international order. International society theorists often take as Grotian the view of international society as composed largely of positive norms and common institutions (Bull, 1966).

The nineteenth century version of state pluralism involves both the notion of a European state system founded on the balance of power, equality among the Great Powers, as well as the notion of a civilizational hierarchy and dominance (Keene, 2002; Simpson, 2003). To claim that affinities among nations have an impact on their relations is hardly controversial but awakens the distinction between recognition and toleration. Despite the formal term recognition among states the ‘thin’ notion of pluralism means substituting a regime of recognition for a regime of toleration. Accordingly, Walzer (1997: 19–22) pronounces international society a ‘weak regime’ but a practical one. Consequently, post-1945 accounts of international society emphasise a ‘thin’ version of state pluralism founded on the equal standing of sovereign states. However, modelled after strong states, this conception is not so much concerned with the problem quasi-states, weak states or alternatives to the state (Chowdhury, 2018; Jackson, 1990). Another recurring element of state pluralism is the popular analogy between the relations of states and relations among individual persons (Carr, 1995: 136–137; Skinner, 1999; Wendt, 2004). The parallel of states and individual persons attributes to states the capacity of agency as well as the idea that states just like persons are moral ends. Accordingly, Walzer (1980) and Nardin (2000) both claim that the treatment of the state as a moral end is necessary for a concept of international morality. Putting the state prior to international society can be defended on moral grounds not going that far, such as Hume (1952: 266) does when claiming that even if relations among states are ‘advantageous’ and ‘sometimes necessary’ these relations are nevertheless secondary to relations among individuals ‘without which it is utterly impossible for human nature ever to subsist’.

To conclude, state pluralism is not only a defence of state sovereignty and non-intervention, but also a positive account of international pluralism. In European history, state pluralism initially has been an attempt to resist hegemony, and later in global international society a means of defending the principles of sovereignty and self-determination worldwide. The challenge of plurality in the world has led on to the discrimination of particular kind of polity conforming international relations among key states to the inherited state pluralist model. The rest is difference.

Solidarism

In order to recognise a community as a member of equal standing in international society there has to be some common descriptive property, distinguishing members from non-members. For state pluralism, the common descriptive property is sovereignty, hence state pluralism. The separation of political space into the domestic and international society involves as a priority a shared commitment to defend sovereignty. However, there has always been other concerns involved, such as culture, status, religion or capability and there is therefore the question of what kind of differences among states that are tolerable to members of international society. Despite the fact that the plurality to encompass has become more diverse due to the global expansion of international society, the main challenges to state pluralism seem to have emerged in the West due to nationalism and the commitment to universal human rights. While nationalism like state pluralism opposes cosmopolitanism and empire, nationalism challenges state pluralism through secessionism and irredentism (Mayall, 1989; Miller, 2000: 176–177). The notion of individual human rights challenges the priority of the state and hence state pluralism. Accordingly, Vincent (1996: 93) shows why human rights and sovereignty clash and how the moral commitment to uphold human rights in world society, that is, beyond the territory of the sovereign state, is bound to be controversial. The inclusion of individual human rights into the international affairs of states has led to a value conflict between the rights of states and the rights of individual persons. The notion of two moral ends attributed with intrinsic value – individuals and states – make moral conflict inevitable once the spheres collide. Solidarism is a way to handle the dilemma.

Criticism against state pluralism centres on at least two important aspects thoroughly explored by Beitz (1999). First, the prima facie contention that all political relations, whether inside or outside of the bounded community, should be judged by the same principles of justice; hence there should be no double standards, and second, the rejection of the concept of states as moral ends, suggesting instead that only individual persons are moral ends (Beitz, 1999: 180). From this follows that states should be instrumental in providing the conditions for a decent human life and not ends in themselves leading on to the rejection of the fictional state-person as a moral person. Beitz (1999: 180) argues that the analogy between individual persons and states is flawed and that this is so because ‘[t]he appropriate analogue of individual autonomy in the international realm is not national autonomy but conformity of a society’s basic institutions with appropriate principles of justice’. While defending cosmopolitanism Beitz (1999: 215) admits that the ‘two level conception of international society’ is acceptable if and only if international society ‘serves to establish background conditions in which just domestic societies can develop and flourish’ and if all states are ‘committed to and capable of satisfying the human rights and basic needs of its own people’. The position presents a middle-way between state pluralism and cosmopolitanism. The question remains whether this notion is more or less inclusive than state pluralism.

First, the difficulty to combine the rights of states and individual human rights remains. One solution to this problem is to give general priority to one interest such as Beitz does when prioritising the rights of individuals. An alternative is to balance the different moral claims involved. Vincent applies this strategy to the problem of intervention claiming that the question of intervention is normative since the principles of intervention and non-invention are incommensurable (Vincent, 1974: 388–389). Accepting both intervention and non-intervention leads moral anarchy. Vincent’s solution to this problem in practice is to judge each cases separately balancing claims. Second, the conditioning of sovereignty involves a conflict between a universal account of justice and a particularistic concept of state autonomy. Affording general priority to state autonomy means differentiating ethical standards for other than the right reasons. If on the other hand justice is the priority, autonomy is lost. It is apparent that such a conclusion is impractical. There are a few alternatives left. One is to reject the binary account of state sovereignty, that is, the notion that states are either sovereign or not, but such an approach strains against basic conventions of diplomacy; relative sovereignty can be justified in theory but remains impractical. Looking back on the history of international society, inequalities among states have rarely been motivated on strict moral grounds but are implicated one way or another in the politics of power or on account of a perceived hierarchy of civilisations (Kingsbury, 1999; Simpson, 2003).

An alternative way to proceed is to accommodate several accounts of just government, hence widening the range of tolerable alternatives. This is the path chosen by Rawls’s (1999) version of an international social contract among theoretical constructs labelled ‘well-ordered peoples’ as opposed to three deviant forms (‘outlaw states’, ‘burdened societies’ and ‘benevolent absolutisms’). What Rawls labels the ‘society of peoples’ represents what would count as mutual recognition of tolerable differences among well-ordered peoples (Rawls, 1999: 59).This way Rawls offers reasons for limiting international pluralism, but the theory is not primarily a theory of pluralism in the sense that it takes pluralism to be the central idea: it is a theory of justice. Rawls is obviously concerned about the fact that cultural differences pose problems, but he accepts that toleration of cultural differences is nevertheless necessary. At least in theory he accommodates justice and cultural difference across borders. However, he sketches out a model form for a political society against which to judge the variety of forms. Rawls’s alternative therefore invites conflicts when challenging conditions for just exclusion. Moreover, he theorises a moral hierarchy of communities thereby inviting the kind of tensions and struggle for hegemony that state pluralism originally meant to resist making autonomy a central concern.

To conclude, solidarists defend the conditioning of state sovereignty when giving priority to human rights. Since state pluralism does not provide a solution to this moral and political dilemma, this has fuelled attempts to re-think and re-formulate state pluralism. However, solidarists are aware of and focus on the delicate balance of human rights and state sovereignty (Welsh, 2000; Wheeler, 2000). Solidarism to some degree can be labelled anti-pluralist or, perhaps, half-baked cosmopolitanism, at least by state-centrists, but is nevertheless an approach defending reasonable pluralism, that is, accounts of international pluralism that are justified from a moral point of view. Whatever the interpretation, international pluralism is not central to solidarism, human rights are or justice. Hence, international pluralism is instrumental to those values, and inasmuch as solidarism is a version of international pluralism, it adds these other aspects but remains faithful to the basic framework of state pluralism controlling differences.

The deeper commitment to pluralism

The versions of international pluralism dealt with so far share one significant characteristic viewing plurality as an encounter and pluralism as a by-product; hence, international pluralism is largely instrumental and a means for controlling difference. These versions of international pluralism make sense, but pluralism is not in the foreground and the question remains to what extent it is fruitful to conceive of a pluralist ideal for international political theory. To that end, this section of the paper elaborates on the work of two major political theorists known for their defence of pluralism in political life, Hannah Arendt and Michael Oakeshott. Despite their differences, Arendt and Oakeshott defend pluralism as a central political value and present a deeper commitment to pluralism. To them pluralism is essential to politics and a safeguard against the corruption of politics into tyranny, despotism or totalitarianism. Their main concern remains with the bounded community and not so much with international relations, yet their work inspire international political theory. This section deepens the concept international pluralism relations as informed by their work. This also invokes a different outlook viewing pluralism as more than instrumental conceiving of the good that plurality may bring. Such an outlook is a first step of embracing pluralism as a political ideal.

Arendt (1958: 8) famously claimed that the human condition is that of plurality, that ‘we are all the same, that is human, in a such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live’. It is central to Arendt (1986) that pluralism in politics is the way to counter antisemitism, imperialism and totalitarianism, the ultimate destructors of the human condition. Hence, plurality is not a problem to encounter but something that is valuable to protect and to preserve. Moreover, Arendt shows that the plurality is vulnerable. Accordingly, Hayden (2009: 18) points to Arendt’s concern for the vulnerability of the political and the avoidance of political perfectionism and grand schemes; this yields in domestic as well as international politics. Thus, the threat to politics, to the state, is not plurality, but conformity to one doctrine or one ideology.

Arendt is a political thinker in the sense that she theorises the polis – the bounded political community. She claims that ‘freedom was rooted in a place’ and that ‘the limits of freedom’s space were congruent with the walls of the city, of the polis or, more precisely, the agora contained within it’ (Arendt, 2005: 170). Outside this space, for example in international relations, she argues that the conditions for action ‘remains subject to the principle of coercion and the right that comes with might’ (Arendt, 2005: 171). One possible interpretation of this is that politics is only possible within the state and that international relations simply cannot emulate such ideas. This would make Arendt a realist as far as international relations is concerned. However, she does not stop at Wight’s (1966: 33) contention that political theory is a theory of the good life and that international theory is a theory of survival. Arendt (2005: 178) claims that relations of states following a peace treaty may lead on to the establishment of a new kind of international relations; one were the peoples of different nations share a common pluralist world:

In political terms, the peace treaty that binds two nations allows for a new world to rise up between them or, more precisely, guarantees the continuation of a new world that they share in common, which arose out of their meeting in battle, where deeds and suffering brought forth one and the same thing.(Arendt, 2005: 178)

These words display a philosophical-constructivist approach to international political theory similar to the works of Hobbes, Kant and Rawls. While Hobbes did not theorise a social contract among sovereigns he envisaged pre-contractual relations among nations analogous to relations within states. Kant (1992) and Rawls developed this idea as a social contract among peoples. Arendt does not use the term social contract but the image of a new world rising among peoples clearly resembles the vision. There is an obvious connection between the belligerent natural condition out of which the Leviathan emerges and the peace treaty making peoples and nations share a new and common world; and it is clear that in both cases the units sharing in the new world retain a substantial portion of their liberty. However, there is a distinctive difference between Arendt’s conception of politics understood as action and Hobbes’s priority for stability and order. The contract envisioned by Hobbes is a foundation for the ruling of a realm limiting the action and discourse of the pre-political condition. This is far from Arendt’s insistence on politics as action and as continuous discourse – not ruling but politics. Ruling entails the distinction between ruling and being ruled. Politics, in her view, is the domain of freedom founded on the belief in human ability to make judgements, keep promises and to act accordingly. Instead of viewing freedom a question for philosophical reflection, she turned freedom into something essentially political fulfilled only by a plurality of humans in continuous action. Recognising politics as freedom in this way, the notion of a contract as a foundation for ruling does more to limit than to stimulate politics (Arendt, 2005: 97, 108).

Yet, Arendt (2005: 181) claims that the law creates the space were politics takes place. The rationale behind this is the view that law is not to be confused with politics. Indeed, Arendt (2005: 179–181) claims that in ancient Greece laws and politics were separable, and that law shapes the political space. The walls of the city protecting the political life are not merely physical but legal. Consequently, it is possible to establish such space across borders. As for international relations, she argues that it was with the Romans that law ceased to be a matter only for the bounded community and instead became a tool for establishing relationships across borders. Hence, she contends that ‘the concept of foreign policy – of politics in foreign relations – and consequently of the idea of a political order beyond the borders of one’s own nation or city, is solely of Roman origin’. (Arendt, 2005: 189).

The question is to what extent it is reasonable from an Arendtian perspective to theorise not merely a legal but also a political conception across borders. The key to doing this is to acknowledge that boundedness, in Arendt’s view, does not necessarily lead on to a political condition even if boundedness in her view is conditional for politics. While defending the view of the bounded community as central to political relations, Arendt does not claim that all bounded communities possess the institutions that sustain political practices. Thus, there seem to be two requisites involved, boundedness and the character of the public space. Being true to Arendt, we cannot disregard the boundedness and her sharing the Hobbesian effort to put up a fence in the wilderness, but it is equally true that walls around bounded communities do not necessarily coincide with a particular type of polity inside. In other words, boundedness is at least not a sufficient condition for political relations. The question is whether it is a necessary condition.

Williams (2005) suggests that following Arendt, theories of international pluralism should focus not so much on states as on the space-in-between states, hence emphasising the character of the public space among states. This conception renders international pluralism less state-centric. The expression of a space-in-between is borrowed from Arendt and the idea that political relations emerges among persons acting in the space in-between, or in other words, emerges out of a relation; Arendt shared that vision with Hobbes. Among Arendt’s contributions to political theory is to identify the threat to the space-in-between in contemporary societies and to explore ways of approximating the ancient political ideal in modern times. The notion of a space in-between as the proper political room resonates on attempts to develop international society from the realm of interstate diplomacy to a sphere suitable for political deliberation and action while not fostering social norms, conformism or ideology. In this respect, Arendt’s work clearly is a source of inspiration for international theorists to elaborate an evolving concept of international or even global civil society as well as supporting efforts to protect diversity and the notion of individual persons as global actors (Williams, 2005: 209–215). Whether to adopt a concept of statehood open to the public space surrounding it or a version of a public space among nations possibly leading into some kind of cosmopolitanism is a choice for the Arendtian theorist to make. Cosmopolitan versions of Arendt’s work have focussed on the possibility of a global notion of political responsibility and human rights occasionally reading Arendt less as a political existentialist than as a modernist and essentialist (Benhabib, 1996, 2006). Being true to Arendt’s position, I sense that a cosmopolitan notion of Arendt’s politics necessitates legal cosmopolitanism, perhaps of the kind developed by Hans Kelsen, creating a global space for political action (Hjorth, 2022; von Bernsdorff, 2010).

Michael Oakeshott shared Arendt’s fear of totalitarianism and was committed to preserving politics within the civil condition. While Arendt makes clear that pluralism has to do with politics and not with ruling, Oakeshott makes ruling and the conditions for ruling a central concern. This is one reason to engage with both theorists. When read together they offer alternative but related paths to a deeper understanding of pluralism as a central political concept. At the heart of Oakeshott’s main work resides a particular concept of human association labelled civil association. According to Oakeshott, the modern European state as a political form combines two conflicting ‘modes of association’ (Oakeshott, 1975: 326). One is enterprise association working towards a common end and consisting of rules instrumental for that end. The other is civil association based on non-instrumental rules. Civil association, he argues, make of the modern European state a special form of human association accommodating a plurality of goals and opinions; by contrast, enterprise association subsumes everything under one goal and one will and is hence totalising. Defending pluralism therefore means defending civil association from political perfectionism, utopian temptations and the ‘politics of faith’ (Oakeshott, 1996). Pluralism resists what he labels rationalism in politics, that is, the totalising goal-oriented understanding of politics (Oakeshott, 1991). More importantly, the only way to manage pluralism, he argues, is by means of civil association since civil association enables a variety of points of view, interests and goals, yet demands subscription to a procedural form.

Oakeshott too was a political and not an international theorist. However, looking closely into his oeuvre there is an element of international theory as well (Orsi, 2016). One version of international theory inspired by his political philosophy is the work of Terry Nardin (1983) and Jackson (2000) portraying international society as a civil association. This makes sense since at least a pluralist international society cannot possibly be an enterprise association; if there were just one goal, there would not have to be an international society because there would be no plurality to preserve. Thus, the common notion of a purpose driven international society is difficult to maintain in theory if not so in practice. Oakeshott presents civil association as a mode of association and its representation in the world as contingent. This means that it is possible that civil association can exist in different realms, such as within the state, among states and across borders (Hjorth, 2018; Nardin, 2011).

For Oakeshott, pluralism, in theory, is a necessary condition for civil association whereas civil association, when practiced, is a necessary condition for political pluralism. As long as civil association remains exclusively within the walls of the city, international pluralism is a chimaera and international relations comply with the realist outlook. While theories of state pluralism, even those inspired by Oakshott’s work, are largely about stability and order and not about change and motion, Oakeshott’s categories invite a more dynamic perspective. When civil association gradually makes its way across borders international pluralism is possible. It may be a by-product to begin with, or just analogous to civil association within borders, but the more interconnectedness there is, the more of shared rules, institutions and practices there are, the more the world encompasses pluralism. In practice, however, the matter is more difficult. Civil association when understood as a mode of association is one form, but in practice, civil association is everywhere mixed with enterprise association. From this follows that civil association in practice may differ among nations, due to the constant tension in the relation to enterprise association. As for international relations, the acceptance of civil association across borders would then follow only when diminishing the spirit of enterprise association. Thus, pursuing international pluralism does not just involve the scaling-up of the formal element of the modern European state or of the practices of political deliberation occurring therein. It also involves the attempt to reducing the element of enterprise association, the view that politics is an instrument of ideology and the idea that political institutions are there primarily to satisfy policies.

Possibly, due to the influence of Martin Heidegger, Arendt and Oakeshott were inclined to a kind of archaic political thought when looking backwards to pre-modern conceptions of politics. Their reinvigoration of pluralism connects to such notions. This way they are able to criticise the view of the modern state as an instrument of ideology or policy rather than being a formal institution or a space for the actions of citizens free and equal. Moreover, both Arendt and Oakeshott reject the view that political relations essentially are social relations and that rules and institutions are social norms. For Arendt, political action is not behaviour or conforming to social norms; it is independent action among humans and a continuous engagement. For Oakeshott, the two modes of human association are trans-historic and at least during the modern period, they coexist in various contingent forms. While there are many similarities between Arendt and Oakeshott the differences are significant when considering the pluralist outlook they both share. An obvious difference is their view of politics. Oakeshott’s (1975: 164–165) concern with ruling and the notion of politics as ‘disciplined imagination’ when ‘thinking and speaking about a rule of civil intercourse. . .in terms of its desirability’ or when being ‘transformed into a rule by an authoritative act’ contrasts markedly with the importance Arendt places in politics understood as action and not concerned with rules and ruling. Consequently, with Oakeshott there is an emphasis on civil association among states and across borders focussing on the framework of rules and ruling while the Arendtian approach is more centred around the action and deliberation of individuals across borders.

Variety and the pluralist ideal

The choice here of the concept variety is not accidental. The point of referring to variety is not only its positive connotation it also belongs to another philosophical tradition, one of Roman origin. According to Fitzgerald (2016), the term variety was widely used in classical writings and frequently until the nineteenth Century in the fields of aesthetics, poetry, literature and in politics. Influential authors of the classical period such as Plotinus, Livy and Horace valued variety in all aspects of human life. Fitzgerald shows how the meaning and use of the Latin term varietas has changed over centuries but that there is in this literature and tradition of thought the positive affirmation of variety as valuable and beautiful, not as problematic and ugly. The concept variety contains two related notions of some importance here, variety of species and variety within species. Variety of species is the appreciation of the many splendored things there are to enjoy in the world; Epicurean variety is one example of this, that is, the notion that simply one desire in the end brings too little pleasure. Variety within one species portrays the attraction of, for example, variously coloured grapes or trees. Moreover, it is common to portray variety when using metaphors. Three such recurring metaphors are mosaic portraying the variety of the units composing a pattern of the whole; bee looking at a variety of elements coming together into something new inspired by how bees produce honey in the beehive; and finally, banquet where one can choose from a variety of dishes when composing a meal (Fitzgerald, 2016: 198–200).

These examples are not from the world of politics and do not involve the level of conflict typical for accounts of politics. However, at least Plotinus seems to have appreciated even conflict as a necessary element of variety (Fitzgerald, 2016: 2). Yet, to some degree, variety is present in the history of political thought. Since this is not the place to review the complexity of the matter, a few illustrations will suffice. During the mediaeval period, the work of Thomas Aquinas celebrated the richness and perfection of God’s creation arguing that ‘in order that things may reflect that goodness more perfectly, there had to be a variety in things’ (Aquinas, 1993: 271). This accounts for human society as well. The laws of different nations can exist within the unity of natural law; hence, the shaping of the good of community does not stand in opposition to variety (D’Entrèves, 1948: 129–131). Variety also had a place in the humanist thought of the Renaissance emphasising the appreciation of variety that can flourish due to political autonomy, letting each nation determine its own independent course within world society (Tuck, 1999: 34). Moreover, variety was central to the political thinkers of Romanticism stressing the organic character of separate communities. Accordingly, Berlin (1999: 66) writes on the topic of romantic thought that plurality expresses ‘the variety of the imagination of the creator and the splendour of human creative powers’ and under conditions where ‘the notion of a final answer to the question of how to live becomes absolutely meaningless’. To defend pluralism according to Berlin then means not only to tolerate difference but also to accept plurality as a ‘splendid fact’. In the context of Romantic political thought, the positive notion of variety was essential and involved an organic theory of nations. This, of course, supports the appreciation of plurality when conceiving of nations as different organic entities joined not primarily by formal compacts but by organic elements such as culture, customs and habits (Burke, 1967: 458). Embracing variety as a splendid fact implies that there is not the same ideals for all. Finally, it is interesting to note that the term variety despite its rare usage in contemporary political literature has in fact inspired the motto of the European Union – In varietate Concordia. To what extent the motto reflects EU practices is however not a question for this paper to examine.

There are of course enemies of variety. It is perhaps not surprising to find that Plato was a firm critic. He argued against variety (in Greek poikilia) and sought to reduce it in politics as well as in aesthetics (Fitzgerald, 2016: 38). In the Republic (Plato, 2000: 557b–557c), he refers somewhat ironically to democracy as the most beautiful system of government portraying the democratic man as unable to discipline himself in the manner Plato prescribed for building of a stable and just society. Cassirer (1946: 72) points to the problem Plato faced differentiating between the particular and universal when Plato consistently desired the universal. In the Statesman, he contends that even the best possible state involves the most appalling inequality when preserving the distinction between free men and slaves (Plato, 1995: 311b7–311c6). Here, Plato’s notion of perfection as a philosophical rather than a political matter describes politics as imperfect and that all states to some extent harbour injustices, inequality and violence. Accordingly, Rosen (2005: 308) claims that ‘the Socratic city does not resolve the problem of unity and difference; rather, it institutionalises that problem’. Against this background, Plotinus’ understanding of variety as necessarily involving conflict shows that the positive affirmation of variety in political life does not necessarily exclude elements of conflicts over power and values.

This exposé of variety in political thought bears striking resemblance with the discourses on pluralism in international theory but there is an emphasis on variety rather than on order and difference. The above review of English School accounts of international pluralism displays plurality as more of a problem than as a splendid fact and as something to be tolerated rather than appreciated. In that sense, state pluralism and solidarism do more to impose discipline and order than to care for variety. Yet, classical notions of variety are perhaps applicable to these conceptions. It is possible, for example, to picture the state system as a mosaic where the separate states form a whole. Hence, the mosaic is a way of ordering variety, but it is variety within a group of the same species in the sense that the modern European state system emphasised recognition as well as cultural and religious affinity. Similarly, solidarism seeks both to widen state pluralism when stressing universal human rights worldwide and, at the same time, deepen the conception of human rights. This perspective perhaps more resembles the bee metaphor of variety allowing the society of states to change when adapting to the norm of human rights.

The commitment to pluralism in the work Arendt and Oakeshott represents an alternative way to deal with pluralism, a way that better accommodates the notion of variety and that gives us an idea of a deeper pluralist thought. In fact, Arendt’s view clearly echoes the romantic notion of variety as a splendid fact. Accordingly, she claims that ‘the more peoples there are in the world who stand in some particular relationship with one another, the more world there is to form between them, and the larger and richer that world will be’. This, she continues, involves more open borders among nations because, ‘[t]he more standpoints there are within any given nation from which to view the same world that shelters and presents itself equally to all, the more significant and open to the world that nation will be’ (Arendt, 2005: 176). These sentences reflect both the appreciation of variety as richness and a defence of each society as a bounded polity. Thus, Arendt’s political outlook does not involve a choice between the bounded polity and openness towards the world surrounding it. To Arendt, there is no sovereign power to defend, only something much more valuable: a political space and the relations of free citizens themselves essentially plural. Only citizens of bounded polities are in possession of political agency and can choose freely from what the world offers while not risking their autonomy as citizens and as a polity. This is not the cosmopolitan vision of the bee metaphor and nor the constructivism of the mosaic metaphor putting together the pieces into something remarkable but rather an illustration of the banquet metaphor. In order to enjoy variety one has to be free to make choices. Reading Arendt it is not the whole of the state or the state system that is important, nor is it citizens merging in a new shape that matters. Citizens retain their individuality and act as individual persons forming their course and the plurality of the world increases their possibilities and range of alternatives.

Oakeshott approaches the matter in a slightly different way. To begin with, the separation of various modes of human understanding and of human conduct is always central to his work and dates back to his first major philosophical book (Oakeshott, 1933). The idea that human experience and conduct plays out in a number of separated spheres is as such an appreciation of variety. This means, for example, the separation of the aesthetic mode from the political mode, the historical from the scientific and so on. Hence, to humans the world is truly plural and the enjoyment of the world is due to its variety. To reduce variety means reducing what makes human life exciting, meaningful and joyful. Variety is there to be enjoyed and in that sense, Oakeshott’s work displays another example of the banquet metaphor and perhaps even of Epicurean variety. As for political life, Oakeshott insists that civil association is the mode of association that makes variety possible; it is the condition for the enjoyment of variety, to include many perspectives, desires and so on while not giving up on order. By contrast, enterprise association flows from a common goal or purpose. Enterprise association does not accept variety, only unity. This is the politics of faith – faith in one system, one ideology, one religion, one expression and one ideal form. While Oakeshott treats the modern state as a historically contingent arrangement and a mix of the two modes of association, its most valuable asset is the ability to preserve variety through civil association. As for international relations, the proper Oakeshottian approach should therefore be to defend the element of civil association wherever it is cultivated, within states, among states and across borders.

According to Oakeshott, pluralism is a defence against perfectionism in politics as well as when attempting to understanding something. When claiming that theorising is an ongoing adventure in search of understanding that is always conditional and contingent, he concludes by contrast, that the ‘notion of an unconditional or definitive understanding may hover in the background, but it has no part in the adventure’ (Oakeshott, 1975: 3). In politics, pluralism works against perfectionism and totalitarianism. Unless variety is appreciated, the pluralist ideal risks becoming another instance of perfectionism. In a similar vein, Berlin (1997: 9) defines pluralism as ‘the conception that there are many different ends that men may seek and still be fully rational, fully men, capable of understanding each other and sympathising and deriving light from each other’. This definition clearly involves an appreciation of variety. Certainly, such a conception of international pluralism does not eliminate conflicts but nor will a pluralist ideal conception.

The literature on variety is often concerned with the aesthetic domain where the appreciation of variety sometimes assumes the presence of an organiser putting the pieces together. One illustration of this is the notes made by the composer Gustav Mahler describing the variety of different sounds, of waves against the shore, of the wind in the trees, of birds singing and of human-made sounds. This, he sensed resembles a composition but that ‘[t]he only difference is that the artist orders and unites them all into one concordant and harmonious whole’ (Adorno, 1992: 112). Naturally, Mahler viewed himself as the orchestrator shaping something beautiful out of a variety voices and sounds. The picture resembles the mosaic metaphor creating a beautiful whole made up of disparate sounds, and perhaps even the bee metaphor when orchestrating the variety of voices tightly together in strict polyphony. By contrast, the pluralism of Arendt and Oakeshott is more oriented towards the action or shaping of something than with the output. An Oakshottian interpretation of Mahler’s note I sense would emphasise the rules of composing; rules that are open to all and that may lead on to a variety of music, and for Arendt the joy of playing or singing together. This attempt at ‘political musicology’ is perhaps far-fetched, but I think it conveys something about how Arendt and Oakeshott think of pluralism in political life and how this relates to variety. They emphasise the practices, the goings-on, the actions of humans, voluntary, intelligent and based on freedom and trust. They reject the master plans, the rational designs, social engineering, devoted to ends and not to action or conduct. This is why I sense that the banquet metaphor of variety best approximates that deeper sense of pluralism, not as an end state, but as never ending engagement. For the same reason, the notion of a pluralist ideal, only one, and definite is out of tune with that deeper commitment to pluralism.

In conclusion, approaching theories of international pluralism from the point of view of variety leads to a change of perspective. Instead of viewing plurality as problematic and pluralism as a way to encounter the problems of plurality, this perspective takes variety as a splendid fact and pluralism as a means to enjoy or utilise the good that comes from plurality. Instead of presenting a model state conception against which to measure the degree of difference, this perspective looks for ways to ensemble variety intending to preserve rather than to delimit. Finally, endorsing variety initially seems to be the closest approximation to something like a pluralist ideal. Unless admitting that variety is valuable, the problem of plurality and the constructions of pluralisms to counter it constantly imposes new versions of difference. However, contrasting variety with the pluralist ideal leads to the paradoxical contention that the only way to approach something like a pluralist ideal in international relations is to refrain from the temptation to define it or to pursue acts towards the realisation of such an ideal however conceived of.

Conclusions

Various accounts of international pluralism respond to tensions between unity and difference in international relations, focussing on the balancing of international order and the political autonomy of states. This paper concludes that it is better to accept the varieties of pluralist conceptions than to search for a theoretical conception above the controversy; to accept pluralism involves rejecting just one version of pluralism. The paper suggests that the Roman concept variety is fruitful for improving the understanding of both plurality as the human condition and of international pluralism. Variety portrays plurality as a splendid fact and pluralism as a way to preserve plurality while reacting against political perfectionism. Hence, the search for one pluralist ideal is in vain. However, the appreciation of variety does not overlook or diminish problems related to plurality such as conflicts over interests or resources. Conflicts of that kind play out in political life in much the same way as ideas or values sometimes clash.