The Baloch nationalism in Pakistan: Articulation of the ethnic separatism after the end of the Cold War

Introduction

This article intends to explain the process of changes that occurred in the characteristics, attitudes, and alliances of the nationalists in Balochistan in Pakistan, before the 1990s and after (during and post-Cold War). Whereas, it investigates the emergence and characteristics of the Baloch ethnic nationalism, it looks at the potential consequence of the current hostilities.

Since the article is a longitudinal-based comparative study, the events, to some extent have been presented in chronological order; and while evidence is provided to support the arguments, methodologically it does not pursue a positivistic approach and this belief that the facts speak for themselves. In this respect, interpretation is valued, and it is aware of the fact that in interpretation there is a degree of opinion by the agency. Now, we look at the area and some general characteristics of the Baloch nationalism to gain further insights about the context.

The area known as Balochistan (Baluchistan) is a vast territory, currently divided between Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. The largest section is in Pakistan which is the focal point of discussion in this article. The section in Pakistan constitutes about 43% of the country’s territory but less than 7% of the population of Pakistan. Balochistan Province is a highly multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-lingual area. It is home of the Baloch (Baluch), Pashtuns, Brahui, Jats and Lassis, Dehwaris, Hazaras as well as Punjabi, Sindi, and Sarikis (see BBC, 2013).

According to scholars in fields of history, politics, sociology, and international relations, nationalism is a modern phenomenon (see Anderson, 1983; Gelner, 1998; Hobsbawm, 1991, 2007; Hobsbawm & Roger, 1983; Smith, 1999). In this respect, nationalism in Balochistan is not an exception. Previously, the highly localized people in Balochistan hardly could imagine themselves as being part of a whole community, apart from a vague sense of religious belonging. The social and political context for the emergence of nationalist perceptions in Balochistan can be identified in the colonial British political exercises and modern conceptualizations produced in the relevant literature by the British. The British political agents, military officers, and travelers, provided an enormous body of literature and maps on the Balochistan issues, which to a certain extent, laid the political sense of the nationalist ideology(ies) in Balochistan.

The British exported and applied modern concepts to create a unified body of knowledge from what they observed, experienced, and heard about geographical conditions and historical stories, which previously existed in highly fragmented and mythical forms at that time. In this way, they started to codify Balochi language through writing dictionaries, syntax books, and publication and distribution of stories and epic poems, and maps. At the same time, at political and organizational levels, the indirect rule and highly complex, competing and multilayer forms of governance, introduced by the British, to discourage nationalism in Balochistan. It means that the emergence of nationalism in the area was not an inevitable product of the British literary stuff but, in that context, relatively widespread of the literature supported some of the local elites.

The Baloch nationalism started to emerge just a few decades before the formation of Pakistan in 1947. It was constructed in the process of rivalries and competitions among the sardars, in a broader context of conflict of interests and building alliances, among the foreign forces. First under the influence of anti-colonial struggles of Indian National movement against the British Empire (see Titus & Swindler, 2000). Second, after the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, in the context of the conflicts of this country with India and Afghanistan (Titus & Swindler, 2000).

The Baloch nationalism developed from inside tribal structures and represented by some elites as sardars and nawabs, many of whom had educated in the British institutions. The earlier nationalist leaders such as Yusuf Ali Khan Magsi, Abdul Aziz Kurd, Muhammad Sardar Khan Gishkauri, emerged from weaker factions of tribal divisions and argued for a more pluralistic form of nationalism with a quite strong religious approach (Kurd, 2018; Magasi, 1978; Titus, 2008, pp. 384–386). ¹ This sense of defining power exacerbated the rivalries among the established and powerful tribal leading elites, nawabs, and sardars, whose older generations were supported by the British political and military agents (see Noraiee, 2015). These elites were apprehensive about pervasive claims of newly emerged competing forces on the political scene, but could not break their strong tribal links to overcome the problem of fragmentation and rivalries.

Tribal rivalries and fragmentations reflected in both ideological approaches and cultural activities exercised since then. Nationalists, structurally and ideologically, are not necessarily a coherent force, but the Baloch-Brahui is an unusual case regarding much internal divisions, conflicts, and instability. Structurally, the nationalist movement in Balochistan has fragmented in line with tribal divisions evolved in a historical process in which indirect rule was enforced, first by the British and then in some forms by Pakistan. Through indirect rule, the tribal structure and values have undergone some changes but not in a direction to abolish the tribal relations. The state’s methods of control have been complex and hybrid, associated with manipulating the inter and intra-tribal rivalries, not just over economic resources, but also social resources and bureaucratic positions particularly over local, provincial and national posts and parliamentary seats which have channelized the resources (see Noraiee, 2015; Swindler, 1979, 1992). Tribal fragmentation led some researchers to consider the dominant nationalism in Balochistan as a traditional and tribal-feudal movement led by sardars, rather than being a modern nationalist movement initiated by the middle-class intellectuals (see Ahmad, 1973; Breseeg, 2002, and also with less clarity Harrison (1981).

In contrast, some others, similar to a dominant primordial approach of nationalists, have considered all forms of oppositions as Baluchi and Baluch Nationalism (e.g. Hosseinbor, 2000, mainly on Iran).

Through literary-poetic, and exploring the history, the nationalists, mainly the Baloch and Brahuis, searched for “Balochness” assumed to be a spirit hidden in the course of the history, and use it as a basis for constructing and supporting the Baloch nationalism. The Baloch historians, deeply influenced by primordial ideas, in many respects, reproduced the historical notes that the British had left but gave them a more heroic direction, and further combined them with myths existed, imagined, or newly invented. For a long time, the Baloch nationalist historian, similar to the western commentators, focused on the racial origin of the Baloch, as Aryan-Iranian or Samite-Arab, as was reflected, for example in Muhammad Sardar Khan, Mir Khodabakhsh Bijjarani, and Mir Gul Khan Nasser’s historical accounts (see Harrison, 1981). Being influenced by such arguments, most leading figures of the nationalist including Bizenjo proudly believed that the Baloch are Aryan.

Along with these developments, cultural and ideological products have been growing. Jan Mohammad Dashti (1982) and also Inayatullah Baloch (1987) further elaborated the cultural basis of the Baloch nationalism. However, Dashti in earlier stages in the 1980s, using the pseudonym of Shay Ragam, criticized the militant tribal nationalists in favor of Bizenjo’s constitutional approach. ² Sayed Zohurshah Hashemi had tried to produce a Balochi dictionary (now it is called Sayed Ganj), based on Makorani dialect, to support another aspect of the cultural-linguistic basis of parochial nationalism. Some monthly magazines in Balochi contributed to this process by promoting Balochi language. Among these publications, Ulus (People), Mahtak Balochi (monthly Balochi), Labzank Balochi (Balochi literature), as well as Quetta Balochi Academy played some tremendous roles in producing and spreading the image of nationalism and nationality among the Baloch.

From a tribal perspective, nationalism, in a cultural sense has been perceived as a tradition and customs (Rasm-o Rawaj), a matter of tribal honor for young or old males to be protected and celebrated. According to this tradition, men are obliged to retribution against the gangs who supposedly have strangled and raped the “Mother” land. A Balochi short story, by Mohammad Bakhsh Bizenjo (n.d.), called “washin wab salamatin jan” (The Sweet dream and the healthy body) is an excellent example of this analogy which emotionalizes the relation between land as the mother and the Baloch people (mainly men), as her sons.

In the Balochi nationalist literature, a typical nationalist is symbolically portrayed as a young male, with a long beard and thick curly mustache on his face and long hair covered with a turban and wearing loose Balochi garments, expressing his anger in a very aggressive way. This outraged man is carrying a gun on his shoulder while climbing a rocky hill or riding a camel in a desert away from his black tent or sometimes resting under the shade of date-palm trees, romantically painted as the Aden garden, in the burning temperature of wilderness. This is a portrait, which reflects the tribal and rural elements of the Balochi nationalism mixed with romantic values which nationalism usually appeals to.

In the changing circumstances, the sardars had to define, redefine, and modify their tribal sardari (related to tribal leaders) approach to absorb some elements of a middle-class perspective of nationalism. This has evolved through competition with other sardari factions, and growing internal divisions, on one hand, and in conflict with the central or provincial government on the other hand; to find new allies among the local middle-class.

Although, because of the influence of tribal-feudal values and structures, the political organizations of the nationalists are predominantly kin-based, strongly biased on women equal rights, and lack modern structures and constitutions. Moreover, if there is any, they are hardly more effective than some abstract ideas on papers. But the nationalists’ functions and alliances have varied along with essential changes in society and the ability of the central government and global shifts of hegemonies. This broader changes in Pakistan and also the collapse of the Soviet Union and even the communist government of Afghanistan have significantly changed the attitudes and functions of nationalism in Balochistan. The earliest, to some extent, flexible and semi “pluralistic,” approach, which was compatible with civic nationalism, after the 1990s gave its place to a harsher form of ethnic nationalism. Considering the characteristic of the state in Pakistan, now we turn to explain further the characters of nationalism in Balochistan during the Cold War.

Nationalism in Balochistan during the Cold War

As was mentioned earlier, initially, the nationalists in Balochistan, for example, Yusuf Ali Khan Magsi, were working together with Pashtun. In the 1930s, even they were talking about “oneness” of Baluchistan and referred to people as “Baluchistani” (see Noraiee, 2015; Balochistan and All India Baloch Conference, 1933). Later, the Pashtun nationalist party, the Pakhtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) led by Achagzai argued for the separation of Pashtun areas from Baluchistan and Joining the North West Frontier Province (NWFP; Titus & Swindler, 2000).

The earlier approach, to some extent, continued after incorporation of Balochistan into Pakistan, at least by most influential intellectuals in the area, who were presenting an anti-Sardar, cultural movement. For example, “Latt Khana,” in Quetta, was a good example of this cultural-political association (A. J. Jamaladini, 1985). Azat Jamaladini and Gul Khan Naseer could be seen as representatives of this movement. This movement was about freedom of ordinary people from the sardars considering them as “bloodsucker” and “oppressor,” rather than arguing for ethnic-based territorial independence of Balochistan (A. A. Jamaladini, 1985; Naseer, 2011). The intellectuals in Latt Khana, at that time, did not define their nationalism on the basis of language or even strong sense of ethnicity, as they were using Urdu as well as Balochi to express their ideas in their political poems. They wrote poems in Urdu and translated poems from Urdu to Balochi and were closely supported by famous Urdu poets and writers such as Faiz Ahmad Faiz (1911–1984).

During the Cold War, the superpowers’ global hegemonic roles strongly influenced the local and international conflicts, including the nationalist disputes, all over the world. The nationalists in Balochistan, in ideology and strategy (or just as a tactic), were mainly influenced by the ideological hegemony of the Soviet Union (USSR). Pro-Chinese and pro-American governments in Pakistan, was an important factor for the nationalists in Balochistan to find supporters from the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet Union pursued a strategy based on “non-capitalist path to development” in which priority was given to building their alliances, rather than genuinely considering the nature of alliances as feudal or tribal; and promoting social and political change.

The sardars and their proponents, who presented themselves as a powerful representative of nationalism and tribal relations in the area, ideologically relied on an amalgamation of tribalism, feudalism, capitalism, and also socialism (Socialism was part of the amalgamated ideas until 1990s), in a very an inexplicable way. Even if some intellectuals appeared as anti-sardars, they culturally moved in the same direction, and their criticisms of Sardari-tribal relations remained quite shallow, as poets like Gul Khan Naseer and Azat Jamaladini and some other did (see Haqqani, 1987; A. A. Jamaladini, 1985; A. J. Jamaladini, 1985; Naseer, 2011).

This hybrid product was consistent with the primordial assumptions and the methodologies that many Baloch nationalist scholars applied. In many ways, these assumptions were explained by borrowing Stalin’s objective criteria of defining a nation (see Stalin, 1913), but without Stalinist modernist elements to consider Nationalism as a modern phenomenon and to reject the “natural,” ahistorical factors in defining nation and nationalism. Probably one of the most attractive concepts for the nationalists, in the Russian literature, was the vaguely defined thesis of “the rights of nations for self-determination.”

However, the Soviet Union used the jargon of “the rights of self-determination of nations,” but it was rather a political tool to attract the nationalist movements, particularly in territories controlled by the western colonial powers and their allies, and put pressure on the United States and her allies whenever it was necessary. Otherwise, the Soviet Union, considering the risk of disintegration inside the country, hardly encouraged narrowly defined ethnic nationalism and their desires for separation and changing the boundaries already existed. To benefit from the Soviet Union support, the ethnic/cultural nationalists had reasonably adopted a soft approach in which the existing borders and the principle of the “peaceful coexistence” were not openly challenged. Thus, this approach had a less exclusionary impact on relationships with “others,” because it could damage the relationship with other pro-Soviet forces, particularly communist parties in the same country. The nationalists in Balochistan, in a broad sense, had accepted the hegemonic role of the Soviet Union in choosing their alliances and defining their strategy. However, the Soviet Union had not entirely abandoned the card of supporting separatism, as a tool, for the Baloch nationalist in Pakistan (Harrison, 1981, pp. 127–132).

Benefiting from the feudal-tribal relationships, the sardar nationalists in Balochistan considered themselves progressive and egalitarian, as it was a fashion among the nationalists at that time, when they ascended to power in 1972. But the Balochistan Government under the leadership of Bizenjo, Ataullah Mengal, and Khair Bakhsh Marri, did not hesitate to oppress their opponents for securing their feudal-tribal sardari interests. They would continue taxing their tribal members or farmers working on their lands, denigrating women and lower costs. A good example was the brutal suppression of the peasants’ resistance, under the leadership of Abdulkarim Bizenjo, a petty farmer, in Awaran and Jaljao in the early June 1972. This insurgency was against paying one-sixth of the products and saddlery taxes, to Sardars, in an area where sardars particularly Gous Bakhsh Bizenjo and Ataullah Mengal were the big landowners. It was reported that in this oppressive action, 400 peasants were arrested in Jaljao and thousands had to leave the area (Ahmad, 1973).

Despite the internal conflicts and tribal rivalries, the nationalists in Balochistan, during that time, were arguing in favor of a multi-ethnic unity in which ethnic division was less critical. Balochistan was considered as a historical entity which survived as a distinctive political unit over a “long period.” Since the emphasis was less on a narrow concept of “Balochness” in an ethnic and cultural sense (being Baloch and speaking Balochi), the secular tribal nationalism to some extent shared pluralist values and openly had no exclusionary elements in their approach. However, the women, both Baloch and non-Baloch were ignored entirely.

Relatively, a good level of consensus among some Sardar politician was developed, when they formed the first provincial government, lasted from 29 April 1972 to 15 February 1973, in Balochistan. Less emphasis on the ethnic nature of nationalism led to broader cooperation with the none Baloch and also adopting a more positive approach toward the Pakistani based political parties. This approach was continued, even after the dismissal of the Balochistan provincial Government. The following examples are used to support this suggestion further.

Affiliation to the National Awami Party (NAP) led by Wali Khan, a Pashtun politician, reflected the broader perspective of the Baloch nationalism at that time. Hardly any of the prominent Baloch-Barahui nationalists argued, at least in public, for ethnic cleansing, and killing Punjabis or other non-natives in territory of Balochistan. Being silent or rejecting separatism might have been a tactical position, but was successful in gaining the sympathy of the non-Baloch, particularly Punjabi, progressive activists during the guerrilla wars erupted after the dismissal of the government of the triangle leaders: Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Ataullah Mengal, and Khair Bakhsh Marri.

It was acceptable for NAP in Balochistan to send Zamrod Husain, a Punjabi intellectual politician as a senator to Islamabad. Or even more importantly some Punjabi intellectuals joined the guerrilla war in Balochistan. Initially, the Parari Baloch guerrilla Group was inspiring for some urban Punjabi intellectuals who were very much looking to Balochistan as a testing ground for the realization of Che Guevara’s and Regis Debray’s revolutionary ideas which were very dominant and inspiring at that juncture of history.

These Punjabi intellectuals, who were known as London group and many of them were from highly influential families, included people such as Mohammad Bhabha (Morad Khan); Asad Rahman (Chakar Khan) and Rashid, his brother, who were sons of Rahman, a well-known Chief Justice of Pakistan. They also included Najam Sethi (a well-known Pakistani journalist who became the interim chief minister of Punjab, and then the Acting Chairman of Pakistan Cricket Board). Another member was an internationally very well-known writer and Journalist Ahmed Rashid (Balach), writer of a best-seller book, “Taliban.” Furthermore, Dalip Dass, who was killed by Army at that time; and Mohammad Ali Talpur who is a Sindi Baloch was also a member of the group, who joined the Baloch nationalists (see Harrison, 1981; Khan, 2012).

In the context of the lethal conflicts erupted after the dismissal of the elected Balochistan Provincial government by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the gaps between the militant and moderate sardars started to be visible. Both Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri who had very tight links with their tribes undertook harder lines and took arms against the Pakistani government. But the tribal-nationalists insurgency was crushed by the Pakistani military supported by the Iranian Regime.

In spite of an optimistic view, that the nationalism in Balochistan would overcome the coalition of tribal-feudal division (Harrison, 1981, p. 41), the post-Cold War developments have become more divisive and fragmented. It may be argued that in the process of frequent conflicts with Pakistani governments, the nationalist awareness has broadened and deepened, but this hardly has put behind the tribal-feudal conflicts. Even, in a golden time when they captured the power, the nationalists were rarely united. Harrison by over-relying on the self-image of some powerful sardars had overestimated their power and influence, while underestimated the power of the opponent sardars such as Jams, Khan of Kalat, Akbar Khan Bugti and many others, who did not trust the triangle sardars alliance. Therefore, the level of fragmentations already existed and the weakness of nationalism in mobilizing forces has not been adequately covered.

During and after the dismissal of the provincial government, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti vigorously challenged his previous colleagues and cooperated with the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Federal Government against the triangle of the Baloch-Brahui political power. For that reason, he was rewarded by Bhutto, and was appointed as the provincial governor of Balochistan. The powerful Baloch-Brahui-Jam sardars and nawabs such as Khan Ahmad Yar Khan and Jam of Lasbila also ascended to power. Whereas, at that time, Akbar Khan Bugti (Governor of Balochistan in 1973–1974), like other nawabs and sardars, considered himself a nationalist, for Bizenjo, Mengal, and Marri’s followers he was seen as a hateful “traitor.”

After some negotiations, General Zia ul-Haq, as the military ruler of Pakistan from July 1977, released the imprisoned Baloch-Brahui sardars, but their political activities in Pakistan were banned. After that, the gap between Mengal, Marri, and Bizenjo was further widened. These sardars moved in different directions, which remarked the end of their alliance and the end of NAP in Balochistan as well. Bizenjo who was not entirely trusted by hardliners followed a more moderate policy and tended to pursue a constitutional approach through the foundation of Pakistan National Party (PNP) after he was released from prison. However, his party was banned, he continued to act in the same way until his death in 1989.

Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri went to London and then moved to Afghanistan, in the hope of gaining the support of Afghan and Soviet Union to restructure his power and mobilize the forces led by Mir Hazar Khan Ramkani and Sher Mohammad Marri in Afghanistan. Russia and its allied Government in Afghanistan, indeed, needed to strengthen their power through supporting and strengthening the nationalist movements, particularly the Baloch in Pakistan. Marris leaders, led by Khair Bakhash, Sher Mohammad, and Ramkani from Bijjarani branch, and also BSO (The Baloch Student Organisation) and BSO Awam, had succeeded to send over 100 of young male Baloch, including three sons of Khair Bakhsh and son of Ramkani, mainly from Pakistan but also some young male students from Iran to Russia. ³

It was not strange that these Baloch students from Pakistan and Iran hardly included any female student. The young Baloch were provided with Afghanis Passport, facilitated by the Tribal and Minority Ministry of Afghanistan. Broadcasting a Balochi program from Kabul and also the translation of a Russian magazine of “Problems of Peace and Socialism” into Balochi were part of a broader strategy the Russian pursued in the area.

Sardar Ataullah Mengal moved to London where he tried to establish a political alliance by Sindhi and Baloch nationalist dissidents in London; created an organization called “World Baloch Organisation.” However, none of these organizations succeeded. Only Bizenjo stayed in Pakistan and organized PNP. Under that condition, when Zia ul-Haq’s military rule, none of the triangle sardars had an effective organization.

What was important during the Cold War up to the late 1990s, the nationalist leaders were not talking in clear words that they would fight to establish an independent Balochistan. None of them were talking about separatism; however, the phrase of “self-determination of nations” was a familiar buzzword. During the 1990s when the cold war came to its end, many things globally and regionally started to change and affect the Baloch nationalist policies and alliances as well.

Post-Cold War and dilemma of the ethnic nationalism

The emergence of civilian rule after general Zia ul-Haq’s death (August 1988) in Pakistan, shortly followed by few historical events: the victory of Mujahideen and collapse of the pro-Russian government of Afghanistan, and much more critical event was the collapse of the Soviet Union and entire Eastern Bloc which brought the Cold War to its end.

The impacts of post-Cold War conditions entangled with the process of globalization (see Held, 2003; Hobsbawm, 2007; Scholte, 2005; Giddens, 1999). This condition also questioned the old and relatively stable identities in Pakistan. The process was associated with further instability of the present state which meant the weakness of the state in controlling of arms flow and protecting the borders, which had already been flattened by Mujahideen and then the Taliban. It also meant the failure of the state in maintaining the loyalty of the people particularly in areas such as Balochistan with a relatively more impoverished and marginalized population (see Ahmed & Baloch, 2017; and Grare, 2013). This situation became very visible both in Pakistan and Afghanistan and led to the collapse of these countries into zones of instability.

The conflicts developed in a way which reflected the interests of various forces, both from ethnic groups such as the Baloch, and some factions from inside government/military security forces (e.g., ISI in Pakistan). However, in Pakistan, the state had never reached a status to monopolize all coercive forces in its hand. Because of the existence of a level of indirect rule and fragmentation of power, many tribes had their own private/tribal armies, prisons, and rules and this was not very strange to find some tribes in Balochistan in such positions. Before the 1990s, in the context of more stability and a stronger state, the conflicts were generally more under control, and the tribal activities were relatively more regulated than the years after.

After the death of General Zia ul-Haq, a period of civilian rule started in Pakistan. For about a decade during the civilian rule of both prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, in spite of much disturbances in the country, politically situation in Balochistan was reasonably calm. However, as all other places in Pakistan, corruption, nepotism, injustice, and poverty, as a result of introducing neo-liberal policies by both governments, had further intensified and had alienated a large section of the population.

During the civilian rule, both Khair Bakhsh Marri and Ataullah Mengal, as the leaders of armed conflicts in 1973–1977, had returned to Pakistan and handed their tribal political legacies to their sons. The young nawabzadas (sons of nawabs) and sardarzadas (children or descendants of sardars) entered the parliamentary politics to increase their shares of power and resources through the patronage system in Pakistan. At that time, the senior sardars did not seem more than some defeated commanders who had accepted their destiny. However, many of them were still engaged in brutal inter and intra-tribal conflicts, as it was the case between Bijjarani and Gazzini factions among the Marris (see Noraiee, 2015).

Akhtar Mengal, son of Sardar Ataullah Mengal, and then the leader of the Balochistan National Party (BNP) became a provincial chief minister (February 1998–July 1999), and Hyrbyair Marri became a provincial minister. At that time, there was not any open talk about militancy against the Pakistani Government. Simply detribalization of society was not something that the sardars and nawabs wished to accept, but under civilian rule gaining share, the political corruption and tribal acts of revenge and murdering, were the issues of political deals and compromise. For example, the killing of Justice Muhammad Nawaz Marri, a prominent figure of the Bijjarani faction and a senior judge of the Balochistan High Court, in a rivalry between Bijjarani and Gazzini Marris, became a matter of compromise between the Government and Gazzini Marris.

Whether the continuation of civilian rule and the usual participation of the Sardars in the political process could prevent the new wave of militancy in Balochistan or not, is a hypothetical question, but it was a possibility which was ruined by General Musharraf (1999) military rule in Pakistan (see Grare, 2013). Even under such a hypothetical condition, it is doubtful that the tribal sardars had any capacity to tackle the problems of under-development, high rate of illiteracy and promote the democratization of society in Balochistan. General Musharraf’s ascendance to power, however, reflected the pressure of a high level of instability, fragmentation, and corruption in Pakistan, it triggered a new wave of nationalist militancy in Balochistan.

In the new conditions, old militants split. Whereas, some of them such as Ataullah and his son and also Bijjarani ex-militants refused to enter an armed struggle, Gazzini Marris led by Balach, Hyrbyair (and now also their younger brother Mehran) started an armed struggle. Then they found some new alliances such as Akbar Khan Bugti and his grandson Brahamdagh and some others. It happened in a context that the world political order significantly had changed and influenced the behavior of all political forces, both old and new.

Since a new wave of disturbances in Balochistan started with Musharraf’s military rule, we further explain the consequences of his rule.

General Musharraf, a migrant nationalist and an admirer of Ata Turk, intended to isolate the most traditional political forces led by powerful sardars in Balochistan. As a military ruler, Musharraf abolished the parliament and appointed some middle-class Baloch figures to some key posts and introduced some new elections at local areas to achieve his goal in Balochistan. ⁴ However, this policy created some tensions in the local forces against predominant sardars, as Musharraf wished, but where traditional social relations were strong and modern forces were very weak, it was not an effective and popular policy to bring positive changes through authoritarian rule.

Another critical issue which turned into disputes between the Federal Government of Musharraf and the discontent sardars and nationalists in Balochistan was a decision made by Musharraf to build the Gwadar deep-sea port in Makoran. Musharraf, saw the project of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as an opportunity to build a closer relationship with Chinese, and consider it as a massive development for modernization of Balochistan and undermining the power of influential tribal leaders. However, some Sardars and nationalists questioned the nature of the policy and regarded it as a “colonial” and a major conspiracy for total “occupation” of “homeland” and marginalization of the “native” population of Balochistan. Sardar Ataullah Mengal, who had adopted a more moderate approach than the 1970s, argued that it was a conspiracy for making the native people minority in their land (Axmann, 2008, p. 272, see also Wirsing, 2008). A nationalist wrote that the CPEC project is not for prosperity but for destruction, which is an element of a broader colonial plot for taking away the Baloch land as they do for destroying their language (Nagoman, 2006, 2007).

Others such as Jamil Bugti, son of Akbar Khan Bugti, rejected the “modern” nature of the project in Gwadar. Jamil Bugti, son of Akbarkhan Bugti, who supports militants in Balochistan, believes that being dependent on Pakistan means 60 years of slavery, barbarism, and torture. He had argued that they did not want to develop Gwadar or other ports—to have another Dubai in Balochistan, which means to develop another “whorehouse” or a “Hira Mandi,” the red-light district in Lahore (Lieven, 2011, p. 363). However, some moderate nationalists criticized the plan for lacking enough consultations with the provincial government and the political organizations and the local communities.

Opposing the projects in Balochistan by the Baloch and Brahui sardars is not new. Weaver (1990), during a visit of Balochistan, when Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was Chief Minister (1989–1990), reported that the project of building roads and bridges in Balochistan, supported by the United States, were under severe attacks by sardars and nationalists who considered the projects, at that time, as the US imperialistic plans. But as it is clear now, the same militants, with a strong separatist approach, are seeking to gain the US support, while targeting Chinese expatriates attached to the CPEC project in Pakistan. The separatist nationalists sometimes argue that being “slave of one power is better to be slave of a slave of a power.” Which means the Baloch are the slave (dependent/colony) of Pakistan and Pakistan is a slave (dependent/colony) of the United States or other Powers (see also Marri, 2009).

These oppositions reflected some concerns existed about the impacts of this project on the local communities and environment. But this deeply reflected the xenophobia the sardars had about the consequences that the process of modernization would have on social and economic conditions and the traditional power relations existed in the whole area. Despite all criticisms, sardars hardly have been keen on the necessity of modernization and improving education and the living conditions of the people; and dealing with widespread corruptions that people have been suffering from in Balochistan.

Even since the US-NATO, attacks on Afghanistan in 2001, the dimension of instability started to increase in Pakistan. In that context, the nationalists in Balochistan who had lost supports from Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, and initially lost the sense of direction, they started to take advantage of diverging aspects of the same phenomenon emerged in the forms of polarization and instability inside Pakistan. Under new conditions, notably since Musharraf rule, a large section of the Baloch nationalists, changed their strategies in terms of relationship with the central government in Pakistan, and their international alliances to gain new resources and support. Attacking Taliban in Afghanistan, in early years of the 21st century was seen as an opportunity for many middle-class nationalist Baloch to express their ideas more clearly and argue for gaining support from the United States to enhance the chance of independence or further freedom inside Pakistan. Many of the nationalists simply started to argue that as the Soviet Union and Balkan collapsed and new national states emerged, similar disintegration “inevitably” will happen in Pakistan as they considered as “superficial” state.

Conclusion

Nationalism in Balochistan, in Pakistan, has been and still is, fragmented in line with tribal sardars’ and landlords’ interests and their inter and intra-factional rivalries. However, at the same time, there are some obvious distinctions between previously more compliant nationalism of the Cold War era and narrowly defined puritan ethnic Balochi separatist nationalism developed after the end of the Cold War.

Spread of radical ethnic identity politics is comprehensible in the context of widespread corruption, injustice, and inequality in Pakistan. This situation, more than any time, has created a fertile ground for further instabilities in the society, and for security forces to intervene in the whole society. The intrusion of the security forces, more seen explicitly in Balochistan, where the security forces pursue brutal killing and dumping policies, to physically eradicate ethnic nationalists (particularly radical separatist functions), supposedly to protect integration of the country and also secure abundant energy and mineral resources.

At the same time, Balochistan has become a field of proxy wars by rival powers to inflame ethnic conflicts. The militant Baloch nationalists have also applied highly unethical methods of ethnic wars against non-“native” workers and teachers. Whereas, the sardar nationalists fairly criticize the corrupt political system in Pakistan, most of them have no clean record from the time they were in power, and hardly, have had any clear and well-defined policy concerning the improvement of education and miserable living and health conditions of the ordinary people.

Hardliner Baloch ethnic nationalists have disregarded the great features of the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-cultural society in Balochistan. Based on some ill-defined, objective-based meaning of nationhood, the ethnic nationalists with also irredentist approach, has already planted the seeds of internal ethnic conflicts in the society.

The current conflicts are ruining lives, hindering the development of education and prosperity and creating further hatred and hostilities which could enhance widespread ethnic cleansing in the area. Abandoning the killing and dumping policies by authorities could give the civilian governments some credits to persuade or put pressure on the ethnic militants to abandon their uncompromising, puritan, and rigid policies and enter negotiations to find some solutions beyond puritan ethnic-minded approaches.