Japan’s Normative Power in Central Asia: Norms,Development Cooperation,and the Long-lasting Partnership

Introduction

It has become a truism that today’s “liberal international order” (LIO) faces an ideological challenge in the rise of non-Western great powers (Gat, 2007; Jasques, 2009). The durability of autocratic regimes in different parts of the world and the “third wave of autocratization” (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019) have made it clear that the optimism over the “triumph of liberal democracy” declared after the end of the Cold War was somewhat premature. In fact, evidence is now mounting that rather than heading towards “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989), the world is actually at the cusp of a global turn (Kupchan, 2012).

Actors that undermine the LIO have grown in strength and confidence to the point that they are not only resisting the spread of democracy, which is of paramount importance for building and sustaining the liberal order (Mearsheimer, 2019) but also becoming more assertive in promoting their own normative preferences and casting themselves as alternative political role models for others (Kneuer & Demmelhuber, 2015).

In this context, recent studies have increasingly focused on Sino-Russian efforts to craft their own “packages of ordering ideas and norms” (Kupchan, 2014) to be propagated predominantly in their immediate neighborhood, such as Central Asia (Sharshenova & Crawford, 2017).

Numerous scholarly contributions have emphasized that effective socialization, emulation, learning processes, and policy transfers depend on the geopolitical proximity of target countries and protagonists. The basic law of geography (Tobler, 1970) postulates that states tend to interact more with countries that are geographically closer. As such, it has been suggested that regional organizations allow “critical states” (Ambrosio, 2008) to disseminate norms, ideas, and practices more effectively (Kneuer et al., 2018). According to this argument, the fact that Central Asia is sandwiched between China and Russia, reduces the prospects of socializing Central Asian countries into Western-dominated international society (Warkotsch, 2008) and increases their chances of being gradually “Shanghaied” (Kavalski, 2010).

While the salience of the rise of normative powers in Central Asia continues to attract increasing attention, the focus has tended to be on familiar great and rising powers, such as the United States (US), China, Russia, the European Union (EU), and India. The presumption is that apart from these actors, “no one else seems intent on influencing conceptualization of the ‘normal’” in Central Asia (Kavalski, 2012).

Widespread acceptance of this narrative has resulted in strikingly far less attention being given to an important stalwart supporter of the rule-based international order—Japan. The traditional exclusion of Japan from discussions of “the rise of normative powers in Central Asia” and “soft power[s] in Central Asia” (Nourzhanov & Peyrouse, 2021) often appears to be related to the belief that Japan plays second (if not third) fiddle at best and has limited power to influence developments in the region.

While this thinking for the most part continues to organize much that is written about Japan–Central Asia relations, this article suggests otherwise. I assert that Japanese normative power should be taken more seriously, as Japan plays a more important role in Central Asia than many studies understand.

First, while today’s world is “headed toward a global dissensus” (Kupchan, 2012), rising powers will continue to advance norms that further their normative preferences and material interests. Although a rising power can act alone, whether it will succeed or not will eventually depend on the help from others.

The reason is that new ideas grow to fully fledged norms only when they are embraced by other actors. As such, on the road to constructing what may be called “parallel order[s]” (Stuenkel, 2016), the support and normative preferences of middle powers are of paramount importance (Aydin, 2021). Among those whose support is critical is Japan.

Second, an actor’s normative power agency, conceptualized as “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” (Manner, 2002), is contingent on the reaction of states over whom the power is being applied. The ability to exercise normative power is not inherent. No matter how hard an actor has striven to present itself as a “normative power,” it cannot be one unless it is viewed as such by others. Therefore, “normative power emerges as a power in context,” as it “depends on the kind of relations the actor has in specific settings” (Kavalski, 2013). Central Asia provides a particularly interesting context in this regard, as it has traditionally been “a natural experiment for observing the dynamics of a multipolar world” (Cooley, 2012).

Third, currently, neither China nor Russia constitutes a force of attraction for Central Asian countries (Chen & Jiménez-Tovar, 2017). Norms promoted by the US and EU are not eagerly welcomed either, not only because those in power are not very interested in building congruence between Western ideas and norms and local beliefs and practices (Acharya, 2004) but also, to a certain extent, due to contestation of strategic norms (Isaacs, 2017).

Consider Kazakhstan, where anti-Western, anti-Chinese, and anti-Russian sentiments have recently been evolving (Schatz, 2021). While Kazakh elites try to keep up with the famous “foreign policy of multivector diplomacy” (Vanderhill et al., 2020), it has become more difficult to find a balance among the so-called great game powers. For instance, although those in power are largely holdovers from the Soviet administration, Kazakhstan is being pushed “from below” to exit from the Russian sphere of influence. This trend is evident in the revision of historical narratives and attitudes of the general population (Toiken, 2022).

For China, it is also true that not everything goes smoothly. While China makes deeper inroads in the region (Von Soest, 2015), its activities, nevertheless, provoke strong public backlash. In September 2019, a series of anti-Chinese protests erupted in several large cities across Kazakhstan, including Astana and Almaty, with demonstrators carrying banners declaring “No to the expansion of China.” Despite its soft power efforts, locals continue to see China as a dragon that lies in wait rather than a friendly panda.

Japan, on the other hand, has no “negative” baggage in its relations with Kazakhstan and has been widely praised and accepted by the local population and elites (MOFA, 2016). Therefore, the potential for Japan to exert a “normative” influence totally disproportionate to its size or standing in the world community appears high. After all, normative power is “neither military, not purely economic, but one that works through ideas and opinions” (Diez, 2005).

That said, it should be noted that this research aims to add not only to the literature on Japan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Central Asia but also contribute to the wider scholarship on Japan’s normative power.

The reason is the widespread acceptance of Japan as a global “trouble-shooter” (Heng, 2014), that has been relatively inactive in exerting its normative power and instead generates attraction by promoting “already-accepted global norms rather than promoting a particular vision of world order that would significantly challenge any established outlook or practice” (Kavalski, 2014). This research presents a critique of the above thinking.

In this article, I revisit the “normative powers” debate on the basis of a new set of empirical materials that allows me to unpack the normative aspect of Japanese foreign policy vis-à-vis Central Asia (in this case Kazakhstan). The theoretical framework this article relies on draws on insights from normative power, norm diffusion, socialization, and learning literature. A normative power refers to “a foreign policy actor intent on shaping, instilling, diffusing—and thus ‘normalizing’—rules and values in international affairs through non-coercive means” (Tocci, 2008). In general, it means that a normative power actor would have a “normative core,” which is comprised of norms to which it adheres to and it is expected that the rest would follow the suit.

Norm diffusion literature examines how norms, ideas, policies, and knowledge spread from one place to another. Scholars distinguish between coercion, competition, learning, and emulation as the main diffusion mechanisms (Blatter et al., 2021). This article is particularly concerned with the latter two. ¹ Learning implies that those in power assess the possible costs of the policy change by analyzing the experience of other states (Gilardi, 2012). Emulation is less concerned with rational reasons and focuses mostly on symbolic and normative factors that led to the adoption of foreign policies and practices (Marsh & Sharman, 2009).

Using a combination of document analysis (in Japanese, Kazakh, Russian and English) and key stakeholder interviews, the analysis presented here addresses one of the existing gaps in the current research on Japan–Central Asian relations. I examine how Japan socializes its Central Asian partner, Kazakhstan, into a set of norms of appropriate behavior in the field of foreign aid.

The research relies upon primary data that I collected during my fieldwork in 2014–2020. The fieldwork covered four locations in Kazakhstan (Almaty and Astana), Japan (Tokyo), and the USA (Washington, DC). Field trips consisted of visiting archives, libraries and relevant organizations, and interviews with a) Kazakh high-ranking governmental officials who were responsible for drafting and enacting Kazakh ODA policy (in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Official Development Assistance Administration), the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Japan, b) the Japan International Cooperation Agency, with representatives of the headquarters office in Tokyo and the office in Kazakhstan as well as c) the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) staff members.

The remainder of this introduction proceeds in three parts. The next section discusses why Japan’s “exceptional”/“abnormal” identity matters and what it means for Japan’s foreign aid policy.

The following sections examine Japan’s normative power through the analysis of its efforts to exert normative influence, focusing not on the capability of Japan to perform as a normative power but on the process of norm diffusion. The discussion also offers the analysis of outcomes to confirm the effectiveness of these diffusion efforts. Finally, I note how Japan diffuses its norms, values, and rules in Central Asia by engaging the target states (Kazakhstan) in shared practices through joint official development assistance (ODA) programs.

Foreign aid and normative power in Japan

In the post-war period, Japan was considered ‘the “abnormal” state par excellence’ (Hagström, 2015). This was true not only in foreign and security policy but also in the realm of foreign aid. (Insebayeva, forthcoming).

Japan has an outstanding history as an international aid provider. It became a founding member of the DAC (formerly known as the Development Assistance Group) in 1960, and 4 years later, it joined the DAC’s parent organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964, as the first non-Western member. Since then, Japan has been grouped with other DAC members in what is widely recognized as “the club” of donors.

Nonetheless, Japan’s relationship with the DAC has always been complicated. The primary reason is that while Japan’s aid resembles “Western aid,” it nevertheless has been quite distinct (Sato, 2013). As such, many aspects of Japan's foreign aid policy, such as its overemphasis on infrastructure projects, its “overly commercial aid programme”, and its overconcentraion on Asia, have often been bashed (Pharr, 1994).

Japan has consistently tried to address the criticisms raised by the DAC community (e.g., on considering debt sustainability and delegating more responsibility to its implementation agency) (OECD, 2010). However, these efforts were seen as insufficient to meet the DAC “gold” standard.

Social identity theory suggests that states are always anxious about their social position vis-à-vis others and seek to secure a positive distinctive identity (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). Therefore, an actor, which is concerned about its relative status, may either try to fit in with the group by emulating established norms, values, and standards of behavior (social mobility) or attempt to alter the existing status hierarchy (social competition). If, however, an actor perceives the status hierarchy to be legitimate and stable, it may practice social creativity, which entails attaining higher status through disseminating “new norms or a development model” and emphasizing “the state’s uniqueness and differences from the dominant powers” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010).

This reading allows us to put forward an argument: within the foreign aid discourse, to present a distinguished positive international identity, Japan must exercise normative power. Let us unpack the situation a little further.

Japan’s ODA model has been widely discussed elsewhere, so I only summarize its key principles here. First, Japan’s foreign aid policy espouses “self-help” (jijyo doryoku) and “aid on request” (yosei shugi) as fundamental principles. “Self-help” denotes principally that recipient governments are expected to improve their development by their own efforts, whereas aid only supports these efforts. Making such efforts is considered to be a prerequisite for developing countries to have a sense of ownership. Thus, Japan helps only those states that are inclined to help themselves. In addition, Japan’s aid involves a high proportion of technical cooperation, a focus on infrastructure development and the nexus of trade, aid, and direct investment. Japan’s ODA model is different from those of other Western states.

Thus, the norms and policies that Japan pursues in its foreign aid that differ from the DAC’s are in fact part of reconceptualizing what can be considered “normal” in world politics (Manners & Whitman, 2003).

The conventional understanding reflected in DAC reports suggests that Japan’s aid philosophy is based largely upon its own experience in development after the Meiji Restoration and particularly after WWII.

The “request first principle” indicates that the recipient country must take initiative and approach Japan first, asking for assistance after it has identified the country’s needs and decided on the development path. The idea is that Japan will not infringe on the sovereignty of recipient countries by deciding what projects should be financed. Committing to the principle of “noninterference” in other countries’ domestic affairs, Japan also endeavors to provide aid without political strings. The values of equality, mutual respect, and reciprocity (gokei-kankei) are also emphasized. Many contend that memories of imperialism and defeat have prevented Japan from speaking out on key international issues and forced it to adopt a cautious stance towards interfering in the internal affairs of another state. While this might be true, it should be noted that at the time when memories of the Nazi era were still fresh, the two German states (Federal Republic (FRG) and Democratic Republic (GDR)) were not timid about linking development assistance with particular political objectives (Howell, 1994).

As such, this kind of explanation has been used to normalize Japan’s “abnormal” behavior as a foreign aid donor. I do not suggest that we should dismiss the importance of international conditions and domestic constraints. The point is to illustrate how Japan has defined “what passes for ‘normal’” (Manners, 2002) in foreign aid debates but has not challenged the Western-engineered aid architecture.

It should be noted that this discussion is not about Japan being “legitimately exceptional” or “unique”—that is, governed by different norms, not conforming to DAC rules and therefore differing from the aid model of the DAC—but rather about Japan offering an alternative model of foreign aid by emphasizing special circumstances under which the DAC norms and rules might not apply. These circumstances are the experience of being an aid recipient. In other words, Japan’s case as an “exceptional” yet “legitimate” donor has called into question taken-for-granted DAC rules and expectations.

Actors that exert normative power “set out to alter the prevalent normative order according to certain ideas or norms that they deem more suitable as compared to the existing ones” (Wunderlich, 2013).

However, unlike other types of power, normative power seeks to diffuse its core ideas, normative standards, and practices internationally (Börzel & Risse, 2012) and needs to be recognized and perceived as legitimate by target countries in order to do so. As Ringmar (2012) put it, “their reaction is far more important than the action itself and their reaction is what the exercise of power ultimately seeks to influence.” For this reason, normative powers intentionally aim to create learning situations so that they could socialize target countries (Kavalski, 2013). It needs to be stressed that Japan does not aim to challenge or replace the DAC model, but rather offers an alternative for Asian donors in terms of aid-giving.

If we accept that the normative power of Japan is conceptualized as a practice by which Japan aims to disseminate its foreign aid norms and practices internationally, it is important to scrutinize its normative power through the study of its efforts to exert power and to evaluate the outcomes of these efforts (Hart, 1976).

Neither/nor: Kazakhstan’s subtle third way

This section focuses on Japan–Kazakh bilateral relations in order to reveal a more profound presence of Japan than the preceding observations may have suggested. I dwell on the Kazakh case not because it is unique but precisely because it is rather representative of Japan’s foreign aid policy vis-à-vis the “Asian” other.

Kazakhstan declared independence on December 16, 1991. A few years later, the Kazakh government started the preparation process for relocating the capital from the south (Almaty) close to the center of Kazakhstan (Astana) (Dzhaksybekov, 2008). The reason, as many observers agree, was not so much concern about separatism in the Northern Kazakhstan and nationalistic motives (Anacker, 2004) as an attempt for Kazakhstan to distance itself from its Soviet past and build a newly independent and unified country. The construction of a new capital has been the central element of “the elite nation-building project […], in which Kazakhstani is defined as forward-looking and ‘modern’” (Koch, 2010).

Astana, as Kazakhstan’s new symbol of statehood, was envisioned as a trademark of Kazakh conceptions of “modernity.” Koch (2010) argued that this vision of modernity “must be understood as inherently political.” If so, then the important question is who decides what is considered to be modern and what is not.

The new capital, as a site of Kazakh “modernity,” was planned almost from scratch according to a master design developed by the Japanese architect Kisho Kurokawa. As Kurokawa was “not Russian, post-Soviet or a Westerner,” he was the perfect choice for Kazakhstan (Shelekpayev, 2020). Kazakhstan’s state planners likely preferred to avoid calling upon Russia or Western countries, many of which continued to perceive the country as a “great game” pawn.

Preceding studies pointed out that choosing a Japanese architect helped to evoke “‘the Asianness’ of Kazakhstan while drawing on the public’s positive perception of Japan’s high-tech and cultured civilization” (Shelekpayev, 2020).

I argue, however, that the choice was guided partly by the vision of becoming “a bridge between East and West” in Eurasia. Japan, whose national identity is defined by its “in-betweenness” between the West and Asia, serves as a perfect role model in this sense (Insebayeva, 2019).

It should be noted that Japan not only symbolically extended a helping hand at the origins of the formation of a new state in “Asia” but also covered all costs associated with the development master plan.

Kurokawa was not only a renowned Japanese architect, but more importantly he belonged to the powerful group Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference). According to their official webpage, Nippon Kaigi is a non-governmental organization (minkandantai) whose aim is to restore a beautiful Japan (utsukushii Nippon) and to build a proud nation (hokori aru kuni zukuri) through presenting relevant policy proposals and promoting a national movement in Japan (Nippon Kaigi, 2021). The slogan of this largest conservative organization is “Building a nation with a pride” (Nippon Kaigi, 2021).

It should be noted that in 2006, Shinzo Abe laid out a vision of making Japan a “Beautiful Country” in his first speech as the 90^th Prime Minister of Japan (2006–2007) (Abe, 2006a). The goal was to make sure that Japan would become a country that “can preserve its culture and traditions,” “is respected and admired by the world,” and a country that “future generations could be confident in and proud of” (Abe, 2006a). In a book, titled “Toward a Beautiful Country” (Utsukushii kuni e), he presented a specific vision of Japanese nationalism, which is deeply rooted in Japanese culture and values (Abe, 2006b). And Nippon Kaigi is known for throwing their support behind Shinzo Abe’s vision.

Kurokawa, whose works are seen all over the world (e.g., the Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB), the Chinese Japanese Youth Center in China), significantly contributed to the enhanced visibility and dissemination of Japanese values abroad.

In the Astana's case, Kurokawa’s application was backed by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (the governmental body that coordinates Japanese development aid to developing countries) and the Japanese Development Institute. This fact was another decisive factor in Kurokawa’s eventual victory in the design competition (Shelekpayev, 2020).

Another example of Japan’s diplomacy in Kazakhstan is “the Japanese garden of stones” at the Cultural Center of Nazarbayev University (NU), the master plan for which was also drafted by Kurokawa.

According to the official discourse, the “NU garden” is an exact replica of a Japanese garden in Kyoto (formal capital city of Japan), which symbolizes the eagerness to learn, self-knowledge, and philosophical worldview. While there exist many different types of Japanese gardens (e.g., karesansui (the dry landscape garden), tsukiyama (hill garden), chaniwa (tea garden), kaiyushiki-teien (stroll garden), etc.), it is the karesansui type of garden or “the dry landscape garden” that was built in the Nazarbayev University. In this minimalist landscaping style, rocks of varying shapes and sizes are carefully arranged and surrounded by sand. The dry landscape gardens are designed to provide an ideal space for meditation and as Ono & Mizuno (2004) put it “are meant to be viewed from a sitting position inside a nearby building.”

While gardens are commonly perceived as peaceful, apolitical spaces for relaxation, they are in fact also “unexpected places” for global politics and diplomacy (Callahan, 2017). Japanese have traditionally been using garden building as one of the instruments of its public diplomacy abroad, with the earliest one being built as early as 1893.

Within the Kazakhstani setting, the Cultural Center at NU is a popular location for diplomatic, cultural, and educational activities organized both by the university itself and occasionally by the Embassy of Japan. As such, the garden employs “seemingly apolitical activities for very political aims” (Callahan, 2017).

In 2018, two Japanese landscape architects (Namura Yoshikazu and Namura Kazunori) from Kashihara City, Nara Prefecture (Japan) were dispatched to the Cultural Center at the Nazarbayev University to assist with the completion of the Japanese dry landscape garden and provide guidance on its maintenance. In addition, Mr Namura Kazunori, a native of Kashihara city, delivered a lecture on “The History of Japanese Garden: about idea, technique and Wabi-sabi of a gardener” and most importantly introduced the city of Kashihara to the Kazakhstani audience within the framework of the “Host Town Initiative.” The Host Town Initiative is a project implemented by the Government of Japan which aimed to promote social, economic, and cultural exchanges between Japanese local towns and target countries/regions that were supposed to participate in the Tokyo 2020 Olympic/Paralympic Games.

In 2017, Kashihara (Nara Prefecture) was officially registered as a host city for the Kazakhstan’s team during the Tokyo Games (“Registered Host Towns,” 2019). Here it should be noted that in Asia, Nara (the ancient capital of Japan) competes with Xian (Chang’an) for the status of the eastern end of the Silk Road (Winter, 2020). As Nakano (2022) argues “the absence of Nara on the Silk Roads” can have dire consequences, as it might mean that “memory infrastructures could be created without Japan.” Thus, the emphasis on the historical ties between Kashihara (Nara Prefecture) and Kazakhstan that go back to the history of the Silk Road, align well with Japanese interests (“Nara Prefecture”, 2018).

In addition to that, the Japanese-style garden at the NU is open to the public, and beyond its simple exotic attraction, it works to familiarize Kazakhs with what an Asian garden should look like, inspiring a fascination with Japanese culture and representing “peaceful” and “friendly” Japan.

The Japanese-style garden is absolutely a success of Japan’s public diplomacy in Kazakhstan. The facts speak for themselves. First, this is the only “foreign” garden in the University. Secondly, NU was established in 2010 and considered to be one of the most important symbols of Kazakhstan’s post-independence achievements and an object of national pride. The University is generously funded by the Kazakh government and is presumably educating the next generation of Kazakh leaders.

Considering that NU is a dearly cherished project of the first president of Kazakhstan, who ruled the country for almost 30 years, certainly the initiation, funding, and construction process of the garden depended on close cooperation and collaboration between the two states at the highest political level.

The importance of the university for Kazakhstan, not only for internal politics but also for foreign affairs, is presumably very well understood at the international level. To emphasize its importance and symbolic value, it should be noted that the NU campus is the place where in September 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping first announced an umbrella brand for the most impressive project of the 21^st century: “One Belt One Road,” now renamed the “Belt and Road Initiative.” Additionally, it is the same place where just 2 years later, in 2015, Shinzo Abe gave a historical speech to Central Asian countries.

The above observations provide some important clues about the relational aspect of norm diffusion—the interplay between Japan and Kazakhstan. Kazakh elite’s predisposition for socialization and learning, national interdependence and linkages, and cultural affinity are particularly important for facilitating diffusion as the local context conditions the outcomes of Japanese normative power (Bjorkdahl et al., 2015).

The next section goes one step further in analyzing how Japan exerts normative power by examining the case of Japan–Kazakhstan cooperation in the field of development assistance to Afghanistan. The significance of this cooperation stems from the fact that Kazakhstan is expected to become an increasingly important actor as a development aid provider in South–South cooperation in the years to come. By facilitating Kazakhstan’s understanding of foreign aid practices and promoting the Japanese ODA model discussed in the previous section, Japan obtains recognition from its Asian “peer” and confirms its “unique” identity as a “legitimate” donor.

Tracking where the “package of ideas and norms” comes from

The Kazakh Official Development Assistance (ODA) concept was officially presented in 2013. The Kazakh Agency for International Development (in Kazakh: Qazaqstandyq halykaralyq damu agenttigi) (KazAID) was established in 2020 under the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOJ RK, 2020). The main purpose of KazAID is to provide development assistance to partner countries.

In 2014, Kazakhstan adopted the Law on Official Development Assistance (in Kazakh: damuǧa resmi kömek), which marked the official transition of Kazakhstan from recipient to aid provider (MOJ RK, 2014).

While Kazakhs experts thoroughly studies different ODA models (USAID, GIZ, SIDA, JICA, KOICA, and SlovakAid), eventually it was decided that Kazakhstan would draw on the expertise of Japan’s JICA (Interview (1) 2017).

Japan guided Kazakhstan forward through a “learning by doing” approach, which traditionally guides Japan’s technical transfer activities. As Insebayeva (2020) explains the development and implementation of pilot projects became a key part of the establishment of Kazakhstan's ODA system. The “Assistance to Kazakhstan in cooperation with Afghanistan in the field of official development assistance” (2017–2018) project was developed with the help of the UNDP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Interview (2) 2017; Interview (2) 2019).

According to the official discourse, the project is based on the visit of then-Prime Minister Abe to Kazakhstan in 2015, when the Joint Communiqué between Japan and Kazakhstan was signed. The document sets out that Japan embraces Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish the Kazakh ODA system and is willing to work with Central Asian countries and Afghanistan towards achieving sustainable development goals. The Communiqué also stipulates that Japan will establish a tripartite partnership with the United Nations Development Programme and Kazakhstan to promote the economic empowerment of women of Afghanistan.

In supporting the project titled “Promoting Kazakhstan’s ODA Cooperation with Afghanistan,” Japan International Cooperation Agency advised on how to manage and implement projects and trainings, as well as shared their observations and insights about foreign aid. Japanese side also assisted the Kazakh government in the establishment of the national ODA system by building the Kazakh personnel’s capacity to ensure the sound project management practices and sustainability of Kazakh projects in the future. (Interview (3) 2019).

Interestingly, the whole project is financed by the Japan–UNDP Partnership Fund (pātonāshippu kikin), which is funded by the government of Japan (UNDP n.d.). The partnership fund was established in 2003 and aims to support projects that ensure sufficient visibility of Japan’s aid.

As a JICA representative explained in an interview, JICA expected that Kazakhstan would obtain the essential knowledge and skills to implement development assistance projects successfully through “the Afghanistan project” and anticipated that Kazakhstan would develop into one of the major foreign aid providers in Afghanistan in the years to come (Interview (5) 2020).

Contrary to the official story, the preparation for this project started long before, as discussions of Kazakhstan’s plans to establish its own aid agency began many years ago. More specifically, the MFA of Kazakhstan has been working with the UNDP since 2010 (Interview (2) 2019). According to Stephen Tull, a former UN resident coordinator and UNDP resident representative in Kazakhstan (Dec. 2010–Oct. 2015), he had been working specifically on KazAID since 2011, together with the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. On April 9, 2013, the concept in the sphere of ODA was approved, and the Law on ODA was adopted in December 2014.

In the same month, seven Kazakh governmental officials that were responsible for the Kazakh ODA project (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance) were invited to attend the workshop organized by JICA (Interview (3) 2019). It should be noted that the Japanese way of conducting business traditionally involves long and laborious preparation on the part of the partners. The fact that JICA conducted the seminar almost immediately after Kazakhstan announced its official transition from recipient to donor implies that Japanese officials had given this issue a significant amount of attention. The presentations in the 2-week seminar were devoted specifically to Japan’s ODA model and contained information about Japan’s foreign aid, a brief history of the establishment of Japan International Cooperation Agency, its organizational structure, and its schemes (Interview (4) 2019).

In May 2015, during a conference dedicated to the ODA system in Kazakhstan held within the framework of the Astana Economic Forum, the UNDP and JICA along with the MFA of Kazakhstan established a common understanding and intention to collaborate in this important area of development not only for Kazakhstan but also for the whole Central Asian region and Afghanistan. The minister of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan, Mr Erlan Idrissov; the administrator of the UNDP, Ms Helen Clark; and the vice president of JICA, Ms Kae Yanagisawa shared their ideas regarding how Kazakhstan would successfully promote its best practices and act as a model of development in the region and how the country could promote its ODA system by learning best practices from other players in the same arena.

Here, it should be noted that Ms Clark of the UNDP has a long-standing partnership with JICA. The collaboration between the UNDP and JICA has continued in various ways since the late 1980s but reached a significant new level in November 2009, when the then-president of JICA, Sadako Ogata, and Clark of the UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen collaboration between the two institutions. Priority areas for cooperation included Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), capacity development and, most important for this analysis, South–South cooperation. Since the signing of this memorandum, regular discussions have been held every year to strengthen cooperation, and information sharing in each region/sector as well as confirmation of the results of cooperation and discussions on cooperation activities are undertaken. In each country, there is close communication between the UNDP and JICA field offices, especially in the above areas. In addition, regular interviews are held to take advantage of opportunities for the UNDP president to visit Japan and the JICA president to participate in the UN General Assembly.

Another interesting point is that while the author interviewed people from both JICA and KazAID, when asked who had initiated the cooperation, the respondents gave contradictory replies. While those on the Japanese side replied that there had been a request from the Kazakh side, in line with Japan’s request-based aid approach, those on the Kazakh side believed that the Japanese side had come up with the proposition.

However, what is most important here is that Japan assisted in Kazakhstan’s process of learning about foreign aid, and JICA’s aid system has eventually become a benchmark for the Kazakh aid. Consider the main underlying principles that Kazakhstan has embraced as a donor: 1) The horizontal model of cooperation, which is built upon shared solidarity and equality between partners (in Kazakh: ärıptes el); 2) the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of partner countries; 3) the principle of no political conditionality; 4) emphasis on technical cooperation for capacity-building by transferring technology, skills, and knowledge in the areas in which Kazakhstan has achieved significant progress (in Kazakh: tehnikalyq kömek); 5) focused assistance (MOJ RK, 2014).

Contributions to the rather sparse literature on Kazakhstan’s ODA conclude that Kazakhstan has a hybrid identity as a donor, adopting the “relevant discourse of mutual respect and non-interference” on the one hand, and “selectively compl[ying] with policies and practices of the OECD-DAC camp” (Insebayeva, 2020). In other words, Kazakhstan shares key features with Japan in its approach to aid-giving.

For Japan, the realization of “the empowerment of Afghan women” project with Kazakhstan in 2016–2018 was perfect timing. In July 2011, Hillary Clinton, the U. S. Secretary of State at that time, advocated for strengthening economic partnerships between Central Asia, South Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: “A stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan in the heart of a stable, secure and prosperous region” (LeVine, 2011). In September 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals were adopted and included a special focus on gender equality, health, and eliminating hunger. In addition, Kazakhstan officially expressed its interest to serve as a nonpermanent member at the UNSC for 2017–2018 in September 2013. As a “regional leader” and “a global partner and a valuable contributor to international peace,” Kazakhstan based its bid on four central pillars: food security, water security, energy security, and nuclear security (Nurbekov, 2015). In June 2016, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian country that managed to secure a seat at the Security Council table. At the vote, which took place at the UNGA in New York, Kazakhstan received 138 votes out of 193, squeezing out contender Thailand. Before that, Kazakhstan celebrated its diplomatic triumph back in 2010, when it chaired the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In June 2010, Kazakhstan proclaimed its candidacy for a Security Council nonpermanent seat. The following year, Kazakhstan became the first country from the Central Asian region to chair the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

On November 7, 2016, during the Japan–Kazakhstan summit meeting, Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida expressed the desire to collaborate even more closely with Kazakhstan, which would join the UN Security Council as a nonpermanent member from Asia. This was followed by the signing of the “Joint Statement between Japan and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Expanded Strategic Partnership in the Asian Century of Prosperity” by then-Prime Minister Abe and then-President Nazarbayev. During that meeting, the Japanese leader emphasized the significance of UN Security Council’s reorganization and expressed his appreciation for Kazakhstan’s continued support in this matter. Japan, like several other countries (Brazil, Germany, and India), has aspired to join the UNSC as a permanent member for many years.

Conclusion

When discussing Japan’s normative power, many scholars have argued that it is reluctant to exert its normative power and instead generates attraction by the diffusion of already fully fledged norms rather than advancing norms that might challenge any established outlook or practice. As a result, while the salience of the rise of normative powers in Central Asia continues to attract increasing attention, the focus has tended to be on familiar great and rising powers, while Japan remains in shadow.

In contrast to this thinking, the evidence presented here suggests that Japan’s normative power should be taken more seriously, as it plays a more important role in Central Asia than many studies understand. The omission of this fact from the analysis of normative powers’ presence in Central Asia is problematic because it distorts the true “normative” dynamic ongoing in the region.

The analysis of Japan’s relations with Kazakhstan presented here examined the process of norm diffusion and confirmed the effectiveness of Japan’s diffusion efforts. This study demonstrates that Japan has diffused its core ideas and normative standards by constructing learning situations—the Afghan project—through which it could socialize Kazakhstan into a set of norms of appropriate behavior in the field of foreign aid. The case of Japan–Kazakh relations is particularly illustrative as it allows for examination of the process of norm diffusion from the outset as Kazakhstan has evolved from the recipient country of foreign aid to the leading Central Asian donor. The fact that Kazakhstan adopts a hybrid identity as an official development provider confirms the effectiveness of Japan’s diffusion efforts.