Abstract
Culture is a prominent theme in U.S. military doctrine, and the Department of Defense has invested much effort in improving the cultural competency of military professionals. This article utilizes first-person reflections of the author, a political scientist who worked in an advisory capacity for the Army in Afghanistan in 2012, to support arguments for applying the social sciences as a way to address the need for improved cultural competency training provided to military personnel. Observations are described, followed by brief analyses of how knowledge of social science concepts, methods, and theories proved to be an instrumental means through which the author’s missions were understood at the time and ultimately conducted in a manner that improved the chances of success. This article therefore provides a unique perspective on the value of social science education, specifically political science, to obtain cultural competency among military personnel engaged in modern combat operations.
Introduction
Recent counterinsurgency missions in Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly shown that aspects of culture are capable of compounding already complex battle situations. This point is acknowledged across a range of doctrinal publications that guide U.S. military actions. The original Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, recognized the U.S. Army’s need to become better equipped to deal with all things related to the intersection of culture and modern national defense efforts (U.S. Department of the Army 2006). The most recent version of Field Manual 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, devotes a chapter to “Culture” and a separate section on how to understand it (U.S. Department of the Army 2014). Culture is also prominently featured in Field Manual 3-22, Army Support to Security Operations, and rightly so, given that U.S. military personnel are increasingly engaged in a wide range of missions that involve not only defeating enemy soldiers but also providing various forms of non-lethal security assistance to allies (U.S. Department of the Army 2013).
The Department of Defense (DoD) has added cultural components to aspects of individual and unit training cycles and continues to develop culture-specific guidance across a range of military publications. These doctrinal-level discussions of culture are necessary and useful, but they only provide surface level understanding. There are resources that can provide more in-depth knowledge that are at the DoD’s disposal that have yet to be fully utilized in a mission specific way that enables military forces to fulfill national security objectives, according to the principles dictating military operations currently. Training alone is not enough for military personnel, who are engaged in stability operations, security assistance missions, or other forms of peace-keeping activities that occur in poorly governed or ungoverned areas. Education is a vital component. More specifically, an education directed at teaching military personnel how to think about culture enables them to better assess the cultural environment. This type of education is achieved through a systematic process of instruction in the humanities, primarily the disciplines comprising the social sciences. Social scientists study various aspects of society, including power dynamics and dimensions of the relationship between individuals and groups within societies. They also understand how to apply appropriate research methodologies to different tasks.
Viewed through this lens, it makes sense that an understanding of the meticulous approaches used by scholars to gain the knowledge generated by those social science disciplines would be useful across a range of military occupations. One example covered by doctrine are military advisors, who serve as a “go-between” the U.S. military and their counterparts. As stated in Field Manual 3-22 (U.S. Department of the Army 2013), . . . advisors are interpreters and communicators between US superiors and foreign counterparts. Advisors must introduce and explain one to the other; they must help resolve myriad problems, misunderstandings, and suspicions that arise in any human organization, particularly when people of very different cultures approach difficult tasks together. (pp. 6-8)
Communication is never simple when those attempting to communicate are from disparate cultural backgrounds. The stakes are obviously high in a combat zone or any other area of instability, and not just for personnel formally assigned as military advisors. All military personnel equipped with a culture-specific education are in the best possible situation to achieve mission success, especially when success depends on communication with counterparts from disparate cultural backgrounds.
The fields in the social sciences are all applicable on the modern battlefield. However, military personnel need not obtain a PhD in any particular discipline to see an improvement in job performance. DoD can develop a curriculum-based approach, preferably with the help of other soldier-scholars, who themselves can educate military personnel on the most useful, streamlined, and methodical approaches to acquiring the knowledge to do their jobs properly. This perspective on modern warfare, as practiced at the tactical rather than at the operational or strategic level, is based on the observations of the author, who is a former Infantryman, a PhD in Political Science, and served as a field social scientist and cultural advisor on a Human Terrain Team in Afghanistan.
Like other social scientists, political scientists pay close attention to research methodology. These scholars know how to make observations of human activity and interactions, treat those observations as data, and conduct analyses of data in a way that leads to a better understanding of any given situation. They also know which type of research approaches is best suited for different tasks. This foundation of academic knowledge greatly assisted the author, whose directive was to advise and assist Brigade Combat Team staff in planning and implementing long-term development projects that supported the array of broader security and stability-related objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom. This type of education was most useful for thinking through and completing a multitude of tasks associated with that directive, to include frequent interpersonal interaction with government officials, key religious and tribal leaders, and members of the local population in Southern Afghanistan.
Although the examples presented below are specific to political science and new to the body of literature devoted to examining the current and potential uses of social science in modern combat, the general argument has been made before. Campbell (2007) describes a rather successful history of “irregular” or unconventional warfare that tended to dominate U.S. Army tradition from colonial times until 1941. This is a type of warfare that involves “. . . advising, liaison, training, leading, and operating closely with local tribal levies, militias, and other nonstate forces” (p. 3), but fell out of fashion after World War II (WWII) at least for the wider Army. Relegated since then largely to elements of Special Forces Command, Campbell points to the clear fact that the nature of national security needs in the post–Cold War era involves missions that place most military personnel in a variety of political environments. For Campbell, what he refers to as a “culture of irregular warfare” can in part be restored with education, for the ranks of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers focused on . . . the nature of nonstate armed groups, the social and cultural structures of local tribes, the realities of conflict in failed states or ungoverned space, methods of integrating local forces into military and civil affairs operations, symmetric warfare, the list goes on. (p. 21)
Perez (2012) advances this argument further, recognizing political science as the appropriate choice to improve the performance of personnel engaged in irregular warfare. In his view, it is necessary for both policy makers and military strategists to take a more critical look at the concepts of nation- and state-building, key areas of inquiry in comparative political science and international relations, as they plan and implement military interventions around the globe. One explanation for his perspective is his experience, which compels him to emphasize the role of individual soldiers as political actors, and not just lethal warriors. In essence, he argues for military personnel to be provided with education in political foundations to improve their chances of successfully assisting in nation- and state-building efforts. Pointing to “ethical and political obligations that the American trooper has toward the indigenous other,” this type of education can improve relations between soldiers and civilians, leading to less volatile outcomes in future campaigns (p. 179). While Perez argues for a general empirical foundation in political science for U.S. military personnel that can be implemented in “fits and starts” in places where these campaigns are taking place, a more strategically effective approach would be to develop additional in-depth education opportunities in political science for military personnel.
To be sure, the DoD has addressed the issue to some extent by adding information on aspects of culture to individual and unit training cycles, and continued the development of culture-specific guidance in doctrine. 1 Digging a bit deeper into the current U.S. military doctrine addressing culture and cultural competency, consider the first chapter in Field Manual 3-22 (U.S. Department of the Army 2013) mentioned above, which deals with the “Strategic Context,” and the section on “Internal Defense and Development” that explicitly directs efforts toward “building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society” (pp. 1–51). Consider also the “Decisive Action Tasks” listed in Chapter 5: Considerations for Brigade Operations, in which “Stability” pertains to “civil security, civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development” (pp. 5–7). However, completing these tasks in a manner that promotes the outcomes desired by DoD requires a more sophisticated understanding of how culture is intertwined into the very processes by which these activities must occur. 2
The Current State of Cultural Competency within the U.S. Military
Given the ostensible doctrinal acknowledgment of culture as a key component of the operating environment, DoD efforts on developing culture training must focus on helping personnel partner with military, political, and civilian leadership in other countries. Planning for some missions may require the acquisition of more nuanced information about culture than others, and the same can be said for some occupational specialties that require higher levels of cultural competency than others. In response to this complexity, the Defense Language National Security and Education Office created the Adaptive Readiness for Cultural Competence model, hereafter referred to as “Adaptive Readiness,” to evaluate levels of cultural proficiency. It was developed through a field study of cultural competencies utilized by more than 200 culturally experienced personnel from every branch of service and is intended to help guide the development of training that promotes a general level of cultural awareness (Rasmussen, Sieck, and Duran 2016).
The Adaptive Readiness model seems to be the recommended model for use across the DoD. Recently, Rasmussen (2020) provides an assessment of the extent to which the guidance set in the Adaptive Readiness model matches the cultural training needs of courses required for personnel who work in “Civil Affairs” roles and members of the Army special operations forces branches. The Adaptive Readiness model identifies core cultural competencies deemed necessary for operational effectiveness by special forces and other personnel whose jobs require interpersonal interactions in a cross-cultural context. However, identifying competencies is only a start, and the Adaptive Readiness template may be less useful in the field by soldiers whose jobs require a more sophisticated understanding of how cultural factors influence the mission. It is not a roadmap on how to get to the desired end-state, as “. . . the model captures specific training needs for the most part but requires customization for best alignment with specific learner groups” (p. 109).
Academic curriculum that delivers a culture-specific education grounded in the social sciences provides the customization Rasmussen suggests for civil affairs. There are many others across DoD who must demonstrate a high level of cultural acumen while performing security cooperation missions, and they can also benefit from completing social science coursework tailored to helping them better understand their missions. Drawing from disciplines across the social sciences, focused curriculum can be implemented into training cycles. Such measures would help personnel achieve a heightened sense of situational awareness because it would put them in a better position to identify cultural elements and themes occurring in the operating environment that stand to either contribute to or detract from completing the mission.
Education and training
The Army makes a clear distinction between education and training, as outlined by the Army’s Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force (2015) in a White Paper, “Cross-cultural Competence: Overview of Cross-cultural Training Theory and Practice for the Army.” Separating training and education into independent, albeit comparable concepts, the authors review literature on culture training to begin developing “a common language and understanding of the key concepts and initiatives that have already been developed in the field” (p. 1). As explained in this White Paper, training is “. . . typically intended for short-term and immediate goals,” whereas education is more general, “. . . directed at improving an individual’s overall competence” and designed to be applied long-term (p. 6). Put another way, a soldier can be trained to use any specific weapon system, but they must be educated to understand why a weapon system is being used in any given context.
Currently, training, in a general sense, is the only recommended approach to achieving the competencies desired by the Adaptive Readiness approach, which is problematic in part because many of the personnel who receive training lack a foundational education in culture. Intentionally or not, the Adaptive Readiness model identifies student learning outcomes associated with each of its domains, which include recommended behavioral strategies, knowledge, and skills expected for specific competencies. However, without a clear path to achieving these goals, there remains a gap between training and the outcomes expected of the Adaptive Readiness model. Formal academic training is a necessary first step in cultivating the ability to self-direct toward cultural learning in the field and applying it in day-to-day planning and operations. A higher level of intercultural awareness for military personnel can be achieved through formal academic training, as it increases an individual’s ability to know both how culture affects individual relationships and how culture interacts with other important aspects of development projects and stabilization efforts. Any training that builds on this approach to learning about the operational environment serves to reduce or even eliminate knowledge gaps about cultures other than one’s own and better informs decision-making processes. Arguably, what military personnel need for enhanced cultural competency is to receive an education before they begin training, or at least be placed in situations where the two are occurring simultaneously under the guidance of subject matter experts.
Subject matter experts understand their subjects, but they also know how knowledge is generated in their respective academic discipline, as a high level of rigor is associated with learning about a subject established by and according to learning outcomes set by experts. Given the DoD’s resources, curriculum can be developed by subject matter experts in ways that engage personnel in both the process of dissemination of cultural knowledge as well as generating knowledge. Possessing the ability to comprehend how knowledge is created essentially means that one has learned how to learn. This approach is in accordance with Rasmussen’s (2020) idea that “a mindset of self-directed cultural learning will enable students to seek out learning opportunities on their own and not rely on formal training exclusively” (p. 111).
Interdisciplinary by nature, political science is an excellent choice of study for educating military personnel. Political science draws from disciplines such as anthropology, economics, history, psychology, and sociology, yet it is distinguished by a concentration on studying power, identifying sources of power, and understanding how it is wielded in and across societies. In addition to concentrating on democracy, elections, ideology, partisanship, and representation, for example, advanced undergraduate and graduate-level coursework emphasizes the scientific method and research methodology. This means that the political science student learns how to use methods of research as well as which method is better suited to the task at hand. When practicing their craft, political scientists know the capabilities of specific research approaches and their limits. This understanding of research methodology permits a more systematic assessment of the operational environment, thus leading to better decision-making.
In the next section, the discussion of how political science education can contribute to modern security assistance operations is deepened through the firsthand reflections of the author. More so than traditional intelligence analyses, the author’s contributions were made possible through completion of PhD coursework in political science, a discipline in which these types of operations can be discussed in relation to literature on state-building. 3
Using Political Science in Irregular Warfare
Awareness of Methodology
Observation #1
Data purportedly collected from residents living in an extremely remote district in which the Human Terrain Team worked in Afghanistan were submitted from a contractor to the author’s team for analysis. The author’s team had been involved in a partnership with the District Governor for more than six months. Often, for weeks at a time, team members lived at the small combat outpost adjacent to the District Center. This proximity helped the team understand the demographic makeup of the region. It was suspicious that the District Governor and other key contacts and leaders had no knowledge of survey researchers collecting data in their district. However, other aspects of the data were more alarming. The contractor stressed the dataset was useful because it contained approximately the same number of females and males. This was simply not feasible in this extremely conservative district where rigid traditional customary gender roles were adhered to, and “outsiders” are treated with suspicion, to say the least. Understanding regional women’s perceptions about a range of issues would have been valuable, especially when implementing development initiatives designed to improve their living conditions. However, the author’s knowledge of survey research methodology, combined with knowing the demographics of the area, sent up red flags about the way the data were reported to have been collected. Given the description of how households were selected for interviewing, which was confined to a limited geographic area around the small combat outpost, the author was suspicious of the data. The contractor’s sample size was much larger than the number of individuals actually residing in the area.
Analysis
Advisors need to understand how culture affects operations and how to properly conduct research. It was coincidental that members of the Human Terrain Team lived at the outpost, participating in numerous foot patrols throughout the district, but the author’s knowledge of gender relations in this situation provided one clue needed to suspect that the data were falsified. Knowing how to appropriately design a survey instrument and collect data from a representative sample of a population gave the author the capacity to evaluate the data’s applicability, reliability, and validity. The author’s background in survey research methodology is what ultimately led to the data being discarded and not used to inform any recommendations made by the team. Data are frequently obtained through survey research conducted to help the DoD in attempts to learn about the perspectives of host-country residents. It was intended to be part of decision-making processes in both the recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. An advisor with knowledge of research methodology is quite useful under the circumstances.
During day-to-day operations, the author utilized a variety of social science research tools to observe the operating environment and structure analyses of data created from observations. Although the statements above may suggest to some that there is not much worth to survey research on the modern battlefield, if done correctly it can be very useful; for example, in helping the advisor understand key demographic information about the context in which the work on the ground is occurring. Interpersonal interviews were the most frequently used collection methodology—used on a near-daily basis to obtain information from local Afghans and key leaders. Focus groups of locals and leaders allowed the author to be a part of open discussion on a variety of topics and gauge participants’ reactions not only to the topic of discussion but also to one another. Textual analysis allows a researcher to analyze spoken and written information for the purposes of understanding people’s experiences, from their own communications. Social network analysis permits the investigator to understand social structures and examine connections between individuals and groups. Finally, an underused methodology known as Action Research is helpful when some type of transformative change is the intended outcome of the research. Although not typically a tool used by political scientists, this approach provided structure to the implementation of development and partnering initiatives with local leaders, proving particularly useful in testing assumptions that went into original planning procedures (Hardy and Rodman 2016; Ledet and Turner 2021).
Understanding Sources of Stability (and Instability)
Observation #2
Like other faith traditions, Islam is a complex belief system woven into the very fabric of a believers’ identity. In many areas where DoD personnel have recently been engaged in irregular warfare it is helpful to recognize religion as a main source of political legitimacy (Ledet, Emeigh, and Turner 2021). In these areas, religious leaders achieve their legitimacy largely by addressing the spiritual needs of the community, although the local religious leader’s importance in community decision-making varies. In rural Afghanistan, for example, the mullah’s role in day-to-day life is no less important in modern times than it was during the Soviet occupation. “Mullah” is generally the title earned by a respected religious elder and community leader whose input in stability and support operations is often necessary for successful implementation of development initiatives. In addition to learning this information through academic coursework, this is a feature of Afghan local culture the author observed firsthand while helping plan security assistance and other development-related operations (Ledet and Turner 2021).
One District Governor the author became acquainted with was originally thought by many DoD elements to be ineffectual. However, during discussions with numerous formal and informal leaders, and many other Afghans across the province, a theme emerged when the District Governor’s name was mentioned—he was thought of as one of the most respected religious leaders in the area. Therefore, his actions were more likely to be viewed as legitimate by locals. His work was not obvious to the DoD, but it made sense to the people he was governing, which was far more important and valuable. In fact, his ability to understand the religious element often required in the Afghan “decision-making-process” was instrumental in helping bring stability to the region. 4
Analysis
In terms of day-to-day operations and long-term mission planning, knowledge about the role of religion and the way in which a particular local mullah’s advice is perceived by the local community helped the author understand how religion and religious actors serve as sources of stability. Religion is a powerful force, shaping human thought and behaviors in complex ways, for both the religious person and the advisor operating in an environment where religion is strictly adhered to. The author’s academic training emphasized how religion interacts with a range of political, social, and economic aspects of society because it carries a great deal of political legitimacy and can be a source of stability. Political power can be formal or informal, but stability can come when political power is wielded by political agents perceived as legitimate by the local population. While the formal variant is something one possesses because of winning an election or appointment into a formal governmental position, informal power is something where legitimacy is dependent on local custom and culture (Murtazashvili 2016).
Recognizing the power of local custom and culture matters. The ability to recognize informal versus formal sources of authority is invaluable in part because in some instances formal political titles are not necessarily considered a legitimate source of authority. Many informal leaders are tribal and family leaders, who are not formal political titles, although they have earned or inherited a degree of prominence in the management of community affairs. For example, holding the title of mullah, or even hajji, can be more respected in the community than that of District Governor. Individuals who have fulfilled this religious duty have attained a certain amount of social status. Furthermore, holding titles simultaneously may mean that a local leader’s decisions are more respected by members of the community than another leader without such accolades.
Facilitating the Implementation of Development Initiatives
Observation #3
Many missions in Afghanistan were conducted in support of development initiatives intended to help promote security and stability. The author assisted with implementing the Radio Literacy Program, which involved planning the distribution of materials, such as radios, textbooks, and workbooks, to the community. 5 Doing this project properly could help educate people and give local government a chance to show that it can effectively deliver services to the population. This is one of numerous state-building efforts for which missions were designed to support, and in this setting it means that fragile governments must collect as many “wins” as possible—large or small, because such productivity improves the perceptions of the government’s legitimacy among members of the local population.
The Author’s team understood that before the project could begin in the most appropriate manner, DoD needed buy-in and approval of local religious leadership. After numerous meetings with several District Governors, members of the elected provincial council, other appointed and elected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan officials, as well as numerous family and tribal leaders, it was clear the Radio Literacy Program was not only necessary, but also desired. Another reoccurring discussion point in those meetings was that the best way to proceed was with the approval of religious elders. They also shared a concern that many of the most prominent among them had yet to be consulted on the issue.
For successful implementation of the Radio Literacy Program, DoD had to take the following things into consideration: security, avoiding the appearance of a DoD-led initiative, and letting the “Afghans take the lead.” A distribution point and transportation of the materials from a DoD installation to that point was needed. The province’s Ministry of Education office seemed like a logical choice for a distribution point, but that could be a dangerous choice. In terms of security, DoD elements cannot be seen delivering books to the Ministry of Education’s office, as this would place the Minister himself in a precarious security position, given the heavy Taliban presence in the area. Taking this into consideration, a plan began to form. At later stages of planning, the Minister invited three well-respected mullahs and an additional powerful local leader from a prominent family to sit in on the meetings. After careful inspection of the Radio Literacy Program materials by these informal political leaders, the plan received the “seal of approval.” The Minister then agreed to accept the materials and arrange for an acceptable means by which to physically transfer the educational materials to the Ministry of Education office.
Analysis
Field Manual 3-22 (U.S. Department of the Army 2013) makes clear that supporting the development of viable institutions in a host country is part of security assistance. 6 Stability in state-building can be enhanced through development projects that improve the human condition. That is why military personnel find themselves engaged in a variety of initiatives designed to improve human welfare. However, without a keen awareness for how aspects of culture interact with different facets of an initiative, the outcomes can range from disappointing to deadly. On one hand, the Radio Literacy Program could support the rebuilding process and stability in the area if implemented correctly. On the other hand, if these types of initiatives are not implemented in a culturally appropriate manner, the likely outcome is just the opposite, and could result in the loss of life. 7
Conclusion
The DoD is well-suited to performing lethal tasks, but many military personnel are required to perform non-lethal activities and promote diplomacy. Many military personnel in the modern era need “soft skills,” which refers to certain sociocultural skills that individuals learn throughout the course of their lives; social skills, influence, negotiation, interpreter use, cultural awareness, and language ability are just a few of the requirements (U.S. Department of the Army 2013:6-3). Some of these skills are innate to some individuals currently serving in the U.S. military, but these skills can also be taught and honed through education in social sciences.
In addition to identifying specific methodologies that can help U.S. military professional achieve a greater awareness of culture and help them learn about culture during the course of military operations, this article discussed domains of military activity where political science education gives individuals an advantage. Essentially, cultural knowledge is accentuated with a keen sense of awareness of methodology, which helps military personnel identify sources of stability and instability, something that serves to facilitate the implementation of development initiatives. Being able to think like a political scientist put the author in a better position to achieve mission success while involved in irregular warfare. U.S. military personnel who are educated and trained in the same manner will also be better prepared for similar ends.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Sharon Emeigh for providing much needed editorial assistance during the preparation of this manuscript, as well as anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Applied Social Science for their critiques and useful recommendations.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
