Abstract
In this edifying and accessible book, Timothy Pickavance seeks to clarify the role of knowledge in the Christian life. He begins with a question with which he once struggled: granted that knowledge might be important to bring one into the faith, why is it important after conversion? To be sure, one might need to think about knowledge, culturally dominant beliefs, and apologetic arguments before one decides to become a Christian. But why should knowledge matter after that? Why shouldn’t knowledge of a few essential gospel truths be all the Christian needs for life and godliness? Why seek more knowledge instead of simply adding to our faith the virtues of self-control, perseverance, godliness, mutual affection, and love (cf. 2 Pet. 1:3-9)? The short answer to these questions, Pickavance argues, is that faulty views about knowledge are a hindrance to discipleship — “your heart needs your mind.” Genuine faith requires more than knowledge, but not less.
Early in the book, Pickavance identifies his audience: younger Christians struggling in the same way his past-self struggled, and anyone else who seeks a clearer understanding of the relationship between faith and knowledge. The book is not a general defense of Christian truth claims. Rather, it is an attempt to clear away obstacles to flourishing faith that stem from damaging assumptions about faith, reason, knowledge, and evidence, including the following: • Faith and religion are simply excuses to stop thinking; • There is no objective truth that is independent of what humans think and how they feel; • Belief in God cannot be reasonable; • Having faith is opposed to having knowledge and evidence.
Perhaps surprisingly, Pickavance observes, such assumptions may be found in both the writings of New Atheists like Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett and in Christian communities that seek insulation from intellectual critique. Though it does address concerns from both camps, the book is not merely a set of replies to atheists or anti-intellectual Christians. Instead, Pickavance sets out a positive vision for a Christian life of the mind—an answer to questions like, What should a Christian think about why knowledge is important? And, What is knowledge, anyway?
His answer begins with the claim that knowledge matters to God. It matters because God wants us to know God in personal relationship. This is knowledge by acquaintance. On Pickavance’s view, such knowledge itself requires propositional knowledge of God—knowledge that certain claims are true about God. (Think here of the claims that God exists, that Jesus died for our sins, and that Jesus rose from the dead.) Throughout the Old and New Testaments, Pickavance argues, personal relationships with God flourish or fail in ways that show that propositional knowledge of God is important. Indeed, the story of Israel is largely the story of a nation flourishing when it remembers what it knows about God, and floundering when it forgets. In the New Testament, Jesus regularly takes himself to convey knowledge about what God and his Kingdom are like. Similarly, Paul urges readers to add knowledge to their faith. As Pickavance puts it, “The short story about why knowledge matters is that knowledge prompts and supports worship and grounds our formation into Christ followers. The flip side of this is that sacrificing and suppressing knowledge, ignoring the life of the mind, leads us to idolatry and character deformation” (27).
This picture of the importance of propositional knowledge presupposes a view about what propositional knowledge is. Here Pickavance follows a prominent philosophical tradition in thinking of knowledge as (at least roughly) reasonable true belief. On this account, for someone to know a claim, three conditions must be satisfied. First, she must believe the claim—she must be confident that it is true. Second, the claim must be true—its description of reality must be accurate. (Pickavance argues that truth is largely objective: it is independent of human beliefs and desires, because reality is largely mind-independent in this way.) Third, her belief must be reasonable—roughly, held on the basis of good reasons or evidence.
Given this view of what knowledge is, how should the Christian think about it? First, Pickavance argues, the Christian cannot waver on the truth part of the idea that Christian doctrines can be known. The claim that Christianity is true does not mean that Christian claims are useful. Rather, it means among other things that certain historical events concerning Jesus really happened. If these events (e.g., Jesus’ crucifixion and resurrection) did not occur, then Christianity is simply false.
Second, the belief that certain Christian claims are true can itself be reasonable, and thus satisfy the reasonability requirement on knowledge. Here Pickavance identifies two varieties of evidence on the basis of which faith can be made reasonable: general revelation and special revelation. The former includes those truths about God (e.g., God’s existence) that can be gleaned from observation and reasoning about the natural world. The latter includes, chiefly, Christ himself, but also the truths God has revealed in Scripture. On Pickavance’s view, both sorts of revelation are important: “We should be open to communication from God wherever and however he chooses to communicate. And he quite clearly has chosen to communicate about some subjects in multiple ways. All the better for us: more of God’s voice to hear!” (54).
Pickavance develops an account of faith according to which faith is belief that certain things are true about God plus trust in the person of God (69). If we put this account together with the view that belief in Christian doctrine can be reasonable, we get the conclusion that faith can be reasonable. If this is right, then contra Harris, Dennett, and certain Christian anti-intellectuals, faith can be reasonable.
With his positive vision of faith, reason, and knowledge in place, Pickavance goes on to discuss three “complications” one might take to threaten the vision, namely these objections: • Science is the only genuine source of knowledge; • One cannot know a claim is true just because the Bible says it is true; • One cannot sensibly maintain Christian belief once one is aware of religious disagreement and diversity.
I cannot do justice to his replies here. But Pickavance’s treatment of these topics is clear, and frequently original. He puts considerable pressure on scientism, disagreement-based skepticism, and the view that knowledge on the basis of the Bible is unavailable. Such views are often self-defeating, or appeal to intellectual standards that are rarely applied outside discussions of religion. Perhaps not all readers will be convinced. But no one who has read Pickavance’s book will be able to embrace such views without pause.
I close with one point by way of critical interaction. I wonder if Pickavance’s model of faith implies that Christians who suffer from severe doubts about the truth of Christianity thereby fail to have faith. Recall that on Pickavance’s view of faith, faith in God requires certain beliefs about God, coupled with trust in God. To his credit, Pickavance rejects the view that belief requires high confidence. One need not be certain that Christianity is true in order to count as believing this claim, and so as having faith. Faith is compatible with doubt because, to a significant extent, belief is compatible with doubt. On this point we agree, and all should applaud Pickavance’s kindness toward doubters. But might it be possible to go even further? Perhaps, in cases of severe religious doubt, one who no longer believes Christian doctrines to be true can still have genuine faith, even if her faith would flourish more fully under a condition of high confidence (other things equal). Perhaps hope, acceptance, or other states can “stand-in” for belief, thereby allowing the Christian to persist in faith despite doubt that draws her confidence below the threshold required for belief. Some Christian philosophers (e.g., Daniel McKaughan and Daniel Howard-Snyder) have recently argued for such a view. If it is correct, then Pickavance’s requirement for faith may be too stringent. This is not the place to decide for or against such a view, but I submit that it is worth taking seriously.
Despite this concern, Pickavance’s book is eminently worthy of careful study. It addresses topics that should be of vital concern within Christian circles. It combines depth and rigor with accessibility. It is chock-full of interesting arguments, and filled with helpful illustrations from sources ranging from NBA basketball, to Harry Potter, to reflections on the author’s own experiences. The book is ideal for use in upper high school and college classes in philosophy and theology, and would be an excellent choice for small group discussion and Sunday School curricula. Those who study the book carefully are sure to become more thoughtful and, I join the author in hoping, better placed to use their knowledge for the love of God.