A Devil On Each Shoulder

Abstract

This article examines how cognitive capacity influences self-control. Two studies demonstrated a cognitive capacity by visceral state interaction. Study 1 found that cognitive load impaired self-control for satiated smokers but increased self-control for craved smokers. Study 2 replicated this effect in the context of dieting. Hungry dieters who were given the opportunity to deliberate selected more unhealthy snacks compared to hungry dieters who were forced to make an immediate choice. Study 2 also demonstrated the process driving this effect. The authors found that visceral states bias information processing in ways that promote impulsive behavior, thereby turning cognition into a vehicle for impulsive action.

Keywords

self-control visceral drives deliberation

Self-control dilemmas are often depicted as having a devil on one shoulder and an angel on the other. The devil is impulsive and seeks immediate gratification. The angel is rational and advocates for the delayed benefits of future goals. Each side seeks supremacy through different means. The angel works through reason, thoughtfully considering the benefits of long-term planning, whereas the devil inflames the passions that promote impulsive action.

This lay image of the self-control process is not too different from prevailing scientific understanding. Most theories depict self-control dilemmas as a struggle between an impulsive and a deliberative system (Fujita, 2011; Hoffmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Loewenstein, 1996; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The impulsive system consists of affect-laden, automatic responses that promote short-term gratification. The deliberative system pursues long-term interests through effortful, information processing that serves to monitor behavior, apply rules and standards to situations, and weigh the consequences of actions.

According to most models, whether self-control dilemmas end in indulgence or restraint hinges on the momentary balance of power between the two systems. Consequently, situations that constrain the capacity of the deliberative system, such as cognitive load manipulations (Friese, Hofmann, & Wanke, 2008; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999), time pressure (Friese, Wanke, & Plessner, 2006), and alcohol consumption (Steele & Josephs, 1990) tend to impair self-control.

Although cognitive capacity is generally considered an essential requirement for self-control, recent theorizing and evidence has called this simple association into question (Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005; Strack & Deutch, 2004; Mann & Ward, 2007). In the present article, we argue that whether cognitive capacity helps or hinders self-control depends on the visceral state of the individual. Specifically, we predict that when people are gripped by visceral states such as hunger, sexual arousal, and cigarette craving, greater cognitive capacity will impair self-control. This prediction is based on recent evidence demonstrating that visceral states can transform information processing in ways that promote impulsive behavior (e.g., Nordgren & Chou, 2011).

The term visceral drives refers to a class of highly adaptive physiological states, such as hunger, fatigue, and thirst that provide information about the state of the body and motivate behavior toward satisfying essential physical needs (Gilovich & Griffin, 2010; Loewenstein, 1996; Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007).¹ For example, people experience hunger when they require nourishment, fatigue when sleep deprived, and thirst when dehydrated. Unfortunately, visceral drives often encourage behavior that directly undermines long-term goals and thus represent one of the principle obstacles for self-control (Loewenstein, 1996). Not surprisingly, most self-control problems, such as obesity, drug addiction, and sexual transmitted disease, are integrally connected to a corresponding visceral drive (hunger, drug craving, and sexual arousal).

In addition to its direct motivational consequences, visceral drives bias information processing in ways that support impulsive behavior. In the context of smoking, for example, nicotine craving shifts attention toward cigarette cues (Field & Cox, 2008), creates more positive implicit associations with cigarettes (Payne, McClernon, & Dobbins, 2007), and motivates reasoning to reduce the perceived health risk of smoking (Sayette, Martin, Wertz, Shiffman, & Perrott, 2001). Parallel effects have been found for alcohol craving (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005), hunger (Papies, Stroebe, & Aarts, 2007), sexual arousal (Blanton & Gerrard, 1997), and thirst (Aarts, Dijksterhause, & De Vries, 2001). These findings suggest that when people are in a visceral state, cognition generally acts as a vehicle for impulsive behavior.

In support of this view, we recently examined how people respond to the emergence of temptation in their environment (Nordgren & Chou, 2011). In particular, we were interested in how temptation cues influence key cognitive processes related to self-control, such as attention and motivated reasoning. Self-control dilemmas represent a conflict between short- and long-term goals. Taking a “thinking is for doing” perspective (Fiske, 1992; James, 1890/1983), we reasoned that the cognitive mechanisms associated with self-control (e.g., attention and motivated reasoning) would generally serve the interests of the dominant goal in this conflict. In line with this reasoning, we found that when participants were in a “hot” visceral state, the presence of temptation directed cognition toward impulsive action. However, when people were in a “cold,” nonvisceral state (when long-term interests are dominant) we found that these cognitive processes generally supported self-control.

Based on these findings, we reasoned that if cognition promotes impulsive behavior when people are in a visceral state, greater cognitive capacity should undermine self-control. This prediction is consistent with several models of self-control. For example, the elaborated intrusion theory of desire (Kavanagh et al., 2005) argues that visceral desire triggers intrusive thoughts and imagery about satisfying that desire. These viscerally laden ruminations are a threat to self-control and blocking these ruminations (e.g., by having participants imagine something else) can relieve desire and improve self-control outcomes (May, Andrade, Panabokke, & Kavanagh, 2010). In a similar vein, Strack and Deutch’s (2004) dual system model of behavior argues that deprivation can activate knowledge structures associated with gratification of the deprivation, leading to biased information processing.

The Present Studies

In two studies we examined how cognitive capacity influences self-control. In Study 1, we manipulated cigarette craving in a sample of smokers (craving vs. satiated), and then had them perform a delay of gratification exercise under high or low cognitive load. In Study 2, we asked dieters (hungry vs. satiated) to select among a range of healthy and unhealthy snacks. We manipulated cognitive capacity by varying the amount of time dieters had to make their selections (immediate vs. extended choice). In both the studies, we predicted that great information processing would bolster self-control for satiated participants but would impair self-control for participants actively experiencing a visceral state. This prediction is based on prior evidence that visceral drives bias information processing in ways that support impulsive action. Study 2 directly assessed this process account.

Study 1

Study 1 tested the prediction that greater cognitive capacity would undermine self-control for participants in a visceral state. To do this, we had a sample of smokers participate in a delay of gratification exercise after manipulating their current level of cigarette craving (satiated vs. craved) and cognitive capacity (high vs. low cognitive load). In the delay-of-gratification exercise, smokers could receive additional money if they delayed smoking during the experiment. We predicted that, for satiated smokers, low cognitive load (i.e., ample cognitive capacity) would benefit self-control compared to satiated smokers under high cognitive load. For craved smokers, however, we predicted that low cognitive load would impair self-control compared to craved smokers under high cognitive load.

Method

Ninety-three smokers (61 women and 32 men) participated for money. To be eligible, participants had to report regularly smoking at least ten cigarettes a day. All participants were instructed to bring a cigarette to the lab. Participants in the craved condition were instructed to abstain from smoking for 3 hr before the study, whereas satiated smokers were instructed to smoke immediately before the experiment began.

Participants were informed that they would participate in an hour-long word categorization task. Participants were next told that, although they were allowed to smoke their cigarette during the experiment, they could earn bonus money if they agreed to delay smoking. Specifically, participants would earn $3.00 for abstaining for 60 min, $2.50 for 50 min, $2.00 for 40 min, $1.50 for 30 min, $1.00 for 20 min, $0.50 for 10 min, and they earned no money if they chose to smoke immediately. Participants were then given 3 min to make their decision. During this decision period, participants were also asked to memorize a number string. Participants in the low cognitive load condition received a three-digit number string. Participants in the high load condition were asked to memorize an eight-digit number string. Participants then chose one of the seven delay-of-gratification options, which concluded the experiment.

Results

Results confirm our expected visceral state by cognitive capacity interaction, F(3, 89) = 8.14, p = .005, η² = .08. Although not statistically significant, greater cognitive resources (i.e., low cognitive load) led satiated smokers to engage in marginally greater delay of gratification (M = 47.50 min, SD = 13.90) compared to satiated smokers with constrained processing resources (M = 38.63 min, SD = 18.59), t(44) = 1.84, p = .07. This finding replicates prior evidence that the capacity to engage in effortful, systematic information processing benefits self-control. For craved smokers, however, greater cognitive capacity led to less delay of gratification (M = 16.66 min, SD =19.03) compared to craved smokers with constrained cognitive capacity (M = 27.82 min, SD = 15.66), t(45) = −2.19, p = .03. That is, greater cognitive capacity hindered self-control for craved smokers.

Study 2

Study 2 sought to replicate the findings from Study 1 in a different self-control domain (dieting) using a different manipulation of cognitive capacity (decision time). We asked a sample of hungry and satiated dieters to select from a range of healthy and unhealthy snacks. We then varied the amount of time participants had to process the decision (Moore, Hausknecht, & Thamodaran, 1986; Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991). For satiated dieters, we predicted that more decision time would lead to more self-control (i.e., more healthy snack selection) compared to dieters who made immediate decisions. For hungry dieters, however, we predicted that more decision time would hinder self-control compared to hungry dieters who made immediate decisions.

Our prediction is based on prior evidence that visceral drives bias information processing in ways that support impulsive action. To test this claim, we asked participants to assess the importance of dieting before they made their snack selection. This question was designed to allow dieters in the extended choice condition the opportunity to engage in motivated valuation (Kunda, 1990). Previous research has shown that people will strategically heighten the value of self-control goals in order to buffer themselves from temptation (Trope & Fishbach, 2000). We predicted that satiated dieters in the extended choice condition would heighten the importance of dieting in order to encourage healthy snack selection, whereas we expected that hungry dieters in the extended choice condition would lower the importance of dieting in order to encourage unhealthy snack selection.

Method

Ninety-five students (72 women and 23 men) from a Dutch university participated for course credit. To be eligible for participation, students had to indicate “yes” to the following three questions: “Are you actively dieting?” “Are you actively trying to lose weight?” “Are you actively trying to avoid high-caloric food?”

Prior to arriving at the experimental session, participants were assigned to the hungry or satiated conditions. Following a previously used hunger induction procedure (Nordgren et al., 2007), participants in the hungry condition were instructed not to eat for at least 4 hr prior to participation in the study. Participants in the satiated condition were instructed to eat a full meal within an hour of participation.

After completing an unrelated study, participants were presented with a platter of snacks. The platter contained 12 snacks. Six of the snacks were rated in a pretest to be healthy (three were mildly healthy and three were moderately healthy) and the remaining six snacks were pretested to be unhealthy (three were mildly unhealthy and three were moderately unhealthy). Participants were then given the following instructions: “We are almost at the end of today’s experiment. But first I’d like you to reflect on how important dieting is to you. Afterwards, please select three snacks as an additional bonus for participation.” Participants in the immediate choice condition were given 30 s to select their three snacks. Participants in the deliberation condition were given 3 min to select their snacks.

Before selecting their snacks, participants answered the question, “How important is dieting to you?” on a scale from 0 (not at all important) to 50 (extremely important). Snack selection was scored as follows: moderately unhealthy (−2), mildly unhealthy (−1), mildly healthy (1), and moderately healthy (2). Thus, participants’ scores could range from −6 (selecting all three moderately unhealthy options) to 6 (selecting all three moderately healthy options).

Results

Snack Selection

As predicted, we found a hunger state by decision time interaction, F(3, 92) = 9.79, p = .002, η² = .09. For satiated participants, dieters who were given greater decision time selected more healthy snacks (M = 3.25, SD = 2.09) compared to dieters who decided immediately (M = 2.00, SD = 1.88), t(46) = −2.17, p = .04. However, hungry dieters who were given greater deliberation time selected less healthy snacks (M = −.52, SD = 2.17) compared to dieters who decided immediately (M = .92, SD = 2.25), t(46) = 2.25, p = .03.

Motivated Valuation

We next examined whether these observed differences were driven by motivated valuation. We found a hunger state by decision time interaction, F(3,92) = 10.46, p = .002, η² = .10. Satiated dieters in the extended deliberation time condition heightened the importance of dieting (M = 37.83, SD = 5.50) compared to satiated dieters who chose immediately (M = 34.29, SD = 5.86), t(46) = −2.15, p = .04. However, hungry dieters in the extended deliberation time condition lessened the importance of dieting (M = 30.65, SD = 6.45) compared to dieters who chose immediately (M = 35.08, SD = 6.26), t(46) = 2.41, p = .02. As expected, importance ratings significantly predicted snack selection. Participants who gave greater importance to dieting selected more healthy snacks (β = .08, SE = .04), t(90) = 2.06, p = .04.

Discussion

Although cognitive capacity has long been considered as an essential requirement for self-control, recent theorizing and evidence has called this simple association into question (Kavanagh et al., 2005; Mann & Ward, 2007; Strack & Deutch, 2004). This article identifies a key factor that influences whether cognitive capacity helps or hinders self-control: the visceral state of the individual. In two studies, we found that when people were in a “cold,” nonvisceral state greater cognitive capacity tended to improve self-control outcomes. However, when people were in a “hot,” visceral state, increased processing capacity hindered self-control. Specifically, Study 1 found that cognitive load hindered self-control for satiated smokers but improved self-control for craved smokers. Study 2 replicated this effect in the context of dieting. Hungry dieters who were given the opportunity to deliberate selected more unhealthy snacks compared to hungry dieters who were forced to make an immediate choice.

Our findings are consistent with several models of self-control. For example, the elaborated intrusion theory of desire (Kavanagh et al., 2005) argues that visceral desire triggers intrusive thoughts and imagery about satisfying that desire. These viscerally laden ruminations are a threat to self-control and blocking these ruminations (e.g., by having participants imagine something else) can relieve desire and improve self-control outcomes (May et al., 2010). In a similar vein, the reflective-impulsive model of self-control (Strack & Deutch, 2004) posits that deprivation can activate knowledge structures associated with gratification of the deprivation, leading to biased information processing.

Our findings are also consistent with attentional models of self-control. For instance, in Mischel’s seminal research on delay of gratification, distraction (i.e., pulling one’s attention always from the tempting stimuli) significantly increased self-control (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Other research has found that distraction improves pain tolerance, which can be considered a form of self-control (e.g., Farthing, Venturino, & Brown, 1984; Grimm & Kanfer, 1976; Johnson & Petrie, 1997; McCaul & Haugtvedt, 1982; Petrovic, Petersson, Ghatan, Stone-Elander, & Ingvar, 2000). Our findings suggest that distraction (or other forms of cognitive impairment) will support self-control when the overarching motivational goal (in our studies triggered by a visceral state), is oriented toward impulsive behavior. However, when an individual holds goals associated with long-term behavior, distraction should impair self-control. This view supports Mann and Ward’s (2007) attentional myopia model of behavioral control. According to the model, when an individual’s attentional capacity is limited, behavior will be disproportionately influenced by the most salient cues in the immediate environment.

Our findings suggest that people are most vulnerable to self-control failure when they are in a visceral state and must actively decide on a course of action. For instance, the hungry grocery shopper who has an established shopping routine is more likely to make healthy choices than a hungry shopper who does not have a routine, and must contemplate the groceries he or she would like to purchase. This insight highlights the importance of “mindless self-control,” or habits, planning, and implementation intentions that obviates the need for active decision making (Gollwitzer, 1999).

Finally, these findings broaden our understanding of how the impulsive system impacts self-control outcomes. Most theories and research on self-control have heavily emphasized the role of the deliberative system, and much less attention has been given to how the impulsive system works to corrupt self-control (Fujita, 2011; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). Our findings suggest that visceral drives impact behavior through two routes: a direct motivational route carried out through the impulsive system and an indirect route that transforms the information processing resources of the deliberative system into vehicles for impulsive action. In such instances, great cognitive capacity is like having a devil on each shoulder.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Note

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