Discrimination Across the Ideological Divide

Abstract

Despite ample research linking conservatism to discrimination and liberalism to tolerance, both groups may discriminate. In two studies, we investigated whether conservatives and liberals support discrimination against value violators, and whether liberals’ and conservatives’ values distinctly affect discrimination. Results demonstrated that liberals and conservatives supported discrimination against ideologically dissimilar groups, an effect mediated by perceptions of value violations. Liberals were more likely than conservatives to espouse egalitarianism and universalism, which attenuated their discrimination; whereas the conservatives’ value of traditionalism predicted more discrimination, and their value of self-reliance predicted less discrimination. This suggests liberals and conservatives are equally likely to discriminate against value violators, but liberal values may ameliorate discrimination more than conservative values.

Keywords

prejudice/stereotyping political psychology stereotypes discrimination quantitative models

Politics, as a practice, whatever its professions, has always been the systematic organization of hatreds.

- Henry Adams (1918, p. 7) Political discourse is rife with accusations of closed-mindedness, prejudice, and unfair treatment from both liberals and conservatives. However, social psychologists have repeatedly demonstrated that conservatives, compared to liberals, are more likely to discriminate against out-groups (e.g., Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006). As an explanation, social scientists point to differences in conservatives’ cognitive styles and worldviews that promote closed-mindedness and low-effort thinking (e.g., Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Jost et al., 2003), suggesting fundamental differences between liberals and conservatives in their propensity to discriminate. Although this proposition is provocative, it risks glossing over complexity of ideological thought on both the political left and right. Indeed, as Adams stated, politics on both sides of the ideological spectrum organize hatreds.

Political Conservatism and Discrimination Against Perceived Value Violators

There is a strong and consistent link between political conservatism and discrimination, including racism (Bobo, 1998; Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sears, 1988; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996), sexism (Silván-Ferrero & Del Prado, 2007), sexual prejudice (Haider-Markel, 2001; Herek, 1993), and support for torture (Crandall, Eidelman, Skitka, & Morgan, 2009). Conservatives generally oppose public aid for disadvantaged groups, including welfare (Henry, Reyna, & Weiner, 2004), affirmative action (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Reyna et al., 2006), public health care (Wetherell, Reyna, & Sadler, 2013), home mortgage relief (Brandt, in press), and natural disaster relief (Skitka, 1999). These consistent associations have led scholars to conclude that conservative ideology is based on ethnocentrism, intolerance, and opposition to equality (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Wilson, 1973).

The conservatism–discrimination association may be an oversimplification. Conservatives do not discriminate indiscriminately; rather, they more likely discriminate against groups who violate their values (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Reyna et al., 2006; Tetlock & Skitka, 1993; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991; Wetherell et al., 2013), even after controlling for prejudice (Henry et al., 2004; Reyna et al., 2006). For instance, since conservatives adhere strongly to traditional values, they oppose same-sex marriage because gays and lesbians are viewed as violating the value of traditionalism; that is, the desire to uphold social norms and traditional family structures (Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock, & Wright, 2008; Henry & Reyna, 2007). Similarly, conservatives oppose public health care because they perceive beneficiaries of these programs (i.e., the poor) as violating the values of hard work and self-reliance (Wetherell et al., 2013; see also Henry et al., 2004).

Political Liberalism and Discrimination Against Perceived Value Violators

Liberals are generally perceived as more tolerant than conservatives (Farwell & Weiner, 2000). However, theories on the role of values in ideological reasoning maintain that value violations result in prejudice and discrimination toward value violators, regardless of ideology. This perspective predicts that even liberals will sanction groups they perceive as violating their values. Decades of research on prejudice and discrimination supporting the stereotype of the tolerant liberal may simply reflect social scientists’ tendency to investigate groups and policies of liberal concern (Mullen, Bauman, & Skitka, 2003). Recent research demonstrates both liberals and conservatives make punitive attributions toward people who violate their values (Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010), supporting the prediction that, when values are at stake, prejudice knows no ideological bounds. Thus, similar to conservatives, we predict that liberals will support discrimination against groups that violate their values.

Ideology, Values, and Discrimination

We also predict that liberals and conservative values will differentially affect ideologically based support for discrimination. “Values” are abstract, overarching beliefs that drive goals and behaviors and guide evaluations of individuals or groups (Henry & Reyna, 2007). “Value violations” are a subject’s perception that his or her values, whether conservative or liberal, are devalued, demeaned, or disregarded by another person or group (Henry & Reyna, 2007; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Perceiving a violation of their respective values might evoke the ire of conservatives and liberals, but their abstract values might influence how they respond—by increasing or decreasing support for discrimination against the violators.

Conservatives endorse values that have been linked to discrimination, such as self-reliance (Henry & Reyna, 2007; Levy, West, Ramirez, & Karafantis, 2006) and traditionalism (Craig, Martinez, Kane, & Gainous, 2005; Kerlinger, 1984; Riley, 2002; Schwartz, 1996). Therefore, these values, together with conservatives’ perceptions of value violations should increase discrimination against violators of conservative values. Conversely, liberals espouse values running counter to discrimination, such as egalitarianism (the desire to promote the welfare of others, Schwartz, 1999) and universalism (the value of peace and tolerance, Schwartz, 1992). These will conflict with liberals’ desire to discriminate against value violations, with liberal values decreasing discrimination, and perceived value violations increasing discrimination against those who violate liberal values. Therefore, we predict that discrimination is informed by both values and perceived value violations.

The Current Research

This research tests three hypotheses: the ideological discrimination, value mediation, and abstract values hypotheses. The ideological discrimination hypothesis predicts that both liberals and conservatives will perceive ideologically dissimilar groups as violating their values and will support discrimination against these groups. The value mediation hypothesis predicts that perceptions of value violations mediate the association between political ideology and discrimination, so discrimination is less about political ideology than about protecting values. The abstract values hypothesis predicts that liberals endorse values that reduce discrimination, whereas conservatives endorse discrimination-enhancing values. These combined hypotheses suggest conservatism increases discrimination through perceptions of value violations and the values conservatives endorse. Liberalism, however, increases discrimination through perceptions of value violations, but decreases discrimination through abstract liberal values.

We test these hypotheses in student (Study 1) and community (Study 2) samples, by examining how liberals and conservatives perceive value violation and endorse discrimination against conservative or liberal groups. We also assess how egalitarianism and universalism on one hand, and traditionalism and self-reliance on the other, attenuate or exacerbate these effects. Participants completed an online survey gauging their beliefs that eight social/political groups violate their core values, and their willingness to discriminate against these groups. We chose groups we believed would violate either conservative (e.g., feminists) or liberal (e.g., Tea Party protestors) values.

Study 1

Method

Participants

Participants were students from a large Midwestern university (N = 210; 29% men, 71% women; M _age = 19.7, SD = 2.3) who received partial course credit for their participation in an online survey. The sample was primarily White (66%) and Latino/Latina (19%; 15% other ethnicities).

Measures

Abstract Values

All measures were adapted from previous research (Henry & Reyna, 2007; Katz & Hass, 1988; Schwartz, 1992). Three items were averaged together assessing each abstract value on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale: egalitarianism (e.g., “I believe that everyone should have an equal chance in life,” α = .86); universalism (e.g., “I think it is important to be tolerant of different ideas and beliefs,” α = .83); values of self-reliance (e.g., “I think it is important to put forth effort to get ahead,” α = .91); traditionalism (e.g., “The traditions of the past should be respected,” α = .85). A full list of items is included in the online supplement in Appendix S1 (see online supplemental material found at http://spps.sagepub.com/supplemental).

Perceptions of Value Violation

Half of the groups (liberal groups: feminists, atheists, leftist protestors, and prochoice people) were preselected because they are often portrayed as violating conservative values. The other half (conservative groups: supporters of the traditional family, religious fundamentalists, Tea Party protestors, and prolife people) were preselected because they are often portrayed as violating liberal values (Pew Research Center, 2011). The order of the eight target groups’ presentation was counterbalanced. Perceived value violations were measured for each group with the item: “[Target group] violate my core values and beliefs” assessed on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.

Support for Discrimination

Five items for each group measured support for discrimination on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Three items were from an existing “political intolerance” scale (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982), measuring willingness to deny basic rights to others (e.g., “[Target group] should not be allowed to make a speech in this city”). These items effectively measure discrimination against value violators because ideological differences often manifest in desires to restrict the social and political impact of violating groups (e.g., by censorship, or attempts to change voting laws and districts). We also created 2 items—“[Target group] deserve any harassment they receive,” and “I can see how defacing the property of [Target group] could be justified”—to measure nonpolitical discrimination. The target groups were counterbalanced to represent the within-subjects measure of group-based discrimination. The scale reliabilities across the eight groups ranged from .88 to .95 (M = .90).

Political Ideology

This was measured with 2 items on a 1 (strong liberal) to 7 (strong conservative) scale: “When it comes to economic policy, do you usually consider yourself a liberal, moderate, or conservative?” and “When it comes to social policy, do you usually consider yourself a liberal, moderate or conservative?” The items were highly correlated, so we averaged them together, forming a single measure of political ideology (r = .71).¹

Study 1

Results and Discussion

Preliminary Analyses

Principle axis factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation indicated a two-factor solution for the eight social/political groups on the value violation and discrimination measures (see Table S1 in the online supplement, accompanying this manuscript, found at http://spps.sagepub.com/supplemental). The conservative groups and the liberal groups loaded onto separate factors for both measures. Hence, we averaged the conservative and liberal group items into separate value violation and discrimination scales.

Examination of bivariate correlations demonstrated political ideology (high numbers indicate conservatism) was negatively related to egalitarianism, positively related to traditionalism but was unrelated to values of self-reliance and universalism (see Table S2 in the online supplement found at http://spps.sagepub.com/supplemental). This is not surprising, since college students generally value hard work, and these students attended a highly diverse college. Egalitarianism, universalism, and unexpectedly, self-reliance, related negatively to support for discrimination. Traditionalism showed no significant effects.

Different Groups Violate Liberal and Conservative Values

To see whether conservatives and liberals saw the eight target groups as violating or upholding their respective values (the first part of the ideological discrimination hypothesis), we ran a 2 (Political ideology: Liberal [N = 104] vs. Conservative [N = 29] participants) × 2 (Groups: Liberal vs. Conservative groups) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) predicting value violations (with the latter factor a within-subjects factor). We split the political orientation variable at its midpoint, omitting participants who scored a 4 (complete moderate) on the scale to test the differences between participants who identified as liberal or conservative² on perceptions of value violation. There were no main effects (all ps > .45) indicating no differences between liberals’ and conservatives’ perception of value violation. There was a significant interaction, F(1,131) = 48.81, p < .001, η _p ²= .27. Simple effects tests using a priori comparisons indicated liberals viewed conservative groups as more value-violating than liberal groups, and this effect reversed among conservatives (top panel, Figure 1). No differences emerged in perceptions of value violation between conservatives toward liberal groups and liberals toward conservative groups, or between conservatives’ perceptions of conservative groups and liberals’ perceptions of liberal groups. This indicates that people of both ideological stripes viewed value violators as equally violating, and value upholders as equally value-upholding.

Figure 1.

Perceptions of value violation and support for discrimination for Study 1. Note. *** p < .001. Error bars represent standard errors.

Conservatives and Liberals Discriminate Against Different Groups

We predicted both liberals and conservatives would support discrimination against ideologically dissimilar groups (the second part of the ideological discrimination hypothesis). As an initial test of this hypothesis, we used the same 2 (Political ideology: Liberal [N = 107] or conservative [N = 29] participants) × 2 (Groups: Liberal vs. conservative groups) mixed-measures ANOVA to predict support for discrimination. There were no main effects (all ps > .25), indicating no differences between liberals’ and conservatives’ support for discrimination. There was a significant interaction, F(1,134) = 27.90, p < .001, η _p ²= .17. Simple effects tests using a priori comparisons indicated liberals were more likely to endorse discrimination against conservative groups than liberal groups, and conservatives were more likely to endorse discrimination against liberal groups than conservative groups (bottom panel, Figure 1). Liberals were equally supportive of discrimination against conservative groups as were conservatives against liberal groups. Members of both ideologies equally opposed discrimination against their own ideological groups.

Path Models: Convergent and Divergent Paths to Discrimination

We predicted that perceptions of value violations would mediate the ideology–discrimination association (the value mediation hypothesis), and that conservatives’ values would promote discrimination, but liberal’s values would discourage it (the abstract values hypothesis). We used path analysis in MPlus Version 6.11 (Muthen & Muthen, 2010) and full information maximum likelihood estimation using all available data with 5,000 bootstrap samples to test these hypotheses (Peugh & Enders, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

We constructed two models, one predicting support for discrimination against liberal groups (Figure 2, left panel) and one predicting support for discrimination against conservative groups (Figure 2, right panel). See Table 1 for indirect effects. In both models, political ideology predicted abstract values, value violations, and support for discrimination. In each model, we tested mediation between political ideology and support for discrimination via perceptions of value violation and abstract values. Political ideology did not predict self-reliance and universalism, precluding their functioning as mediators, so we omitted them from the analyses. All models were saturated; so fit indices are not reported. We controlled for age, sex, ethnicity, and income in all path models reported in this article.

Figure 2.

Study 1: Liberal and conservative value violator models. Note. Solid paths indicate p < .05; Dashed paths indicate p < .10; Nonsignificant paths are in gray (p > .10). Coefficients are unstandardized slopes (SE).

Table 1.

Indirect Effects and Confidence Intervals.

	Study 1
	Liberal Groups		Conservative Groups
Values	Indirect Effect (SE)	CI	Indirect Effect (SE)	CI
Study 1
Egalitarianism	.03 (.02)	[.01, .07]	.04 (.02)	[.01, .08]
Traditionalism	.02 (.02)	[.02, .06]	.03 (.02)	[.01, .07]
Value violation	.16 (.04)	[.10, .24]	−.12 (.03)	[−.19, −.06]
Study 2
Egalitarianism	−.04 (.04)	[−.12, .02]	−.03 (.03)	[−.10, .03]
Universalism	.03 (.02)	[−.01, .09]	.06 (.03)	[.02, .14]
Traditionalism	.10 (.04)	[.04, .20]	.06 (.03)	[.02, .13]
Self-reliance	−.04 (.03)	[−.12, −.001]	−.03 (.02)	[−.08, −.01]
Value violation	.18 (.05)	[.09, .30]	−.10 (.05)	[−.26, −.07]

Note. Numbers in CI column represent 95% confidence intervals, unless italicized which represent 90% confidence intervals.

Discrimination against liberal groups

Consistent with the value mediation hypothesis, political ideology positively predicted perceptions that liberal groups violate values. Value violations, in turn positively predicted support for discrimination (Figure 2 , left panel). The indirect effect of political ideology on support for discrimination through perceptions of value violations was significant, indicating conservatism was related to support for discrimination against liberal groups through perceptions of value violation (see upper half of Table 1 for indirect effects).

Consistent with the abstract values hypothesis, political ideology positively predicted traditionalism and negatively predicted egalitarianism. Importantly, egalitarianism, a value more often supported by liberals, negatively predicted discrimination indicating this abstract value attenuates support for discrimination, as predicted. The indirect effect of political ideology on discrimination through egalitarianism was significant, indicating conservatism predicted support for discrimination against liberal groups via decreased egalitarianism. Traditionalism, a value more often endorsed by conservatives, positively predicted support for discrimination (marginally), and its corresponding indirect effect was marginally significant, indicating conservatism predicted support for discrimination against liberal groups through endorsement of traditionalism.

Discrimination against conservative groups

Consistent with the value mediation hypothesis, political ideology was negatively associated with perceptions that conservative groups violate values, which in turn predicted support for discrimination against these groups (Figure 2 , right panel). This indicates that liberalism predicted perceptions that conservative groups violate values. The indirect effect of political ideology on support for discrimination through value violations was significant, indicating that liberalism positively predicted discrimination against conservative groups through the perception they violate values.

Consistent with the abstract values hypothesis, egalitarianism negatively predicted support for discrimination. The indirect effect of political ideology on support for discrimination through egalitarianism was significant, indicating support for discrimination against conservative groups was attenuated by liberals’ endorsement of egalitarianism. As with the liberal groups, the indirect effect of political orientation on support for discrimination via traditionalism was marginally significant, indicating that support for discrimination against conservative groups was attenuated by liberals’ rejection of traditionalism.

Study 1

Discussion

The results of Study 1 supported our three hypotheses. Consistent with the ideological discrimination hypothesis, both liberals and conservatives perceived ideologically dissimilar groups as violating their values, and both were equally supportive of discrimination against these groups. Consistent with the value mediation hypothesis, the perception that these groups violate values significantly accounted for the relationship between ideology and discrimination against dissimilar groups. Finally, consistent with the abstract values hypothesis, the endorsement of abstract values can either attenuate or exacerbate support for discrimination. Specifically, traditionalism (a value associated with conservative ideology) exacerbated support for discrimination, but egalitarianism (a value associated with liberal ideology) decreased support for discrimination. This pattern supports our hypothesis that the abstract values associated with ideology motivate support for discrimination against ideologically incompatible groups. Interestingly, universalism and values of self-reliance were not related to political orientation, possibly because of the characteristics of the sample. The values of college students tend to be more tolerant than the community at large (Henry, 2008; Sears, 1986). Hence, in Study 2, we replicate our findings using a community sample of adults, wherein conservative ideology might be more strongly associated with the values of self-reliance and traditionalism, and liberal ideology with universalism and egalitarianism.

Study 2

Method

Study 2 participants were drawn from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (N = 126; 46% men, 54% women; M _age = 33.9, SD = 11.8). The sample was primarily White (81%) and Asian American (10%; 9% other ethnicities). We used the same survey as used in Study 1 (egalitarianism α = .77, universalism α = .75, self-reliance α = .79, traditionalism α = .92, support for discrimination αs range from .85 to .94 [M = .92], political ideology r = .72).

Study 2

Results and Discussion

Preliminary Analyses

We used the same analytic strategy as Study 1. Factor analysis demonstrated the liberal groups and conservative groups loaded onto two separate factors for the value violation and discrimination measures (see Table S1 in the online supplement found at http://spps.sagepub.com/supplemental). Bivariate correlations showed the same general patterns as in Study 1, but political ideology significantly related to all abstract values (see Table S2 in the online supplement found at http://spps.sagepub.com/supplemental).

Different Groups’ Violate Liberal and Conservative Values

To see whether conservatives and liberals saw the target groups as violating or upholding their respective values (the first part of the ideological discrimination hypothesis), we used a 2 (Political ideology: Liberal [N = 51] vs. Conservative [N = 27] participants) × 2 (Groups: Liberal vs. Conservative groups) mixed-measures ANOVA predicting value violations. There was no main effect for groups, F(1,76) = .66, p = .42, η _p ²= .01; however, a main effect of political ideology emerged, F(1,76) = 3.93, p = .05, η _p ²= .05, suggesting conservatives perceived slightly greater value violation than liberals. A significant interaction qualified these patterns, F(1,76) = 32.74, p < .001, η _p ²= .30. Simple effects tests using a priori comparisons indicated liberals viewed conservative groups as more value-violating than liberal groups, and conservatives viewed liberal groups as more value-violating than conservative groups (top panel, Figure 3). There were no differences in perceptions of value violation between conservatives toward liberal groups, and liberals toward conservative groups. Interestingly, liberals perceived liberal groups as upholding their values (marginally) more than conservatives perceived conservative groups, explaining the main effect of ideology.

Figure 3.

Perceptions of value violation and support for discrimination for Study 1. Note. ***p < .001. *p < .05 +p < .10. Error bars represent standard errors.

Conservatives’ and Liberals’ Discriminate Against Different Groups

As predicted in the second part of the ideology discrimination hypothesis (and consistent with Study 1), the mixed-measures ANOVA revealed no main effect of groups or political ideology (both ps > .40), but did reveal the Predicted Groups × Ideology interaction, F(1,70) = 17.27, p < .001, η _p ² = .20 (bottom panel, Figure 3). A priori simple effects tests demonstrated that liberals (N = 48) were more supportive of discrimination against conservative than against liberal groups, and conservatives (N = 24) were more supportive of discrimination against liberal than against conservative groups. Thus, liberals and conservatives were equally likely to support discrimination against each other, and equally unlikely to support discrimination against their own groups, which is consistent with the findings from Study1.

Path Models: Convergent and Divergent Paths to Discrimination

Discrimination against liberal groups

Consistent with the value mediation hypothesis, political ideology positively predicted conservatives’ perceptions that liberal groups violate values, and value violations positively predicted support for discrimination (see left side of Figure 4). The indirect effect was significant, indicating that conservatism positively predicted support for discrimination against liberal groups through beliefs they violate their values (see lower half of Table 1 for indirect effects).

Figure 4.

Study 2: Liberal and conservative value violator models. Note. Solid paths indicate p < .05; Dashed paths indicate p < .10; Nonsignificant paths are in gray (p > .10). Coefficients are unstandardized slopes (SE).

The abstract values hypothesis was also supported, with an indirect effect of political ideology on discrimination via traditionalism, suggesting the relationship between conservatism and discrimination against liberal groups occurred, in part, through traditionalism. Also, political ideology positively predicted self-reliance, which negatively predicted support for discrimination, suggesting that self-reliance decreases conservatives’ support for discrimination against liberal groups (see lower half of Table 1). Egalitarianism and universalism had no effect on discrimination.

Discrimination Against Conservative Groups

Consistent with the value mediation hypothesis, political ideology negatively predicted perceptions that conservative groups violate values, leading to discrimination against these groups (see Figure 2). The indirect effect via value violation was significant, indicating that liberalism was related to support for discrimination against conservative groups through beliefs that these groups violate their values (see lower half of Table 1).

The abstract values hypothesis received qualified support. Political ideology negatively predicted universalism and egalitarianism, but only universalism was related to decreased support for discrimination. The indirect effect of political ideology on support for discrimination through universalism was significant, but the indirect effect through egalitarianism was nonsignificant (see lower half of Table 1), suggesting that discrimination against conservative groups was attenuated by liberals’ espousal of universalism, but not egalitarianism.

Political ideology positively predicted values of self-reliance and traditionalism. Traditionalism was associated with support for discrimination, but self-reliance marginally predicted decreased support. The indirect effect of political ideology on support for discrimination via traditionalism was significant, and was marginally significant via self-reliance, suggesting that the relationship between ideology and discrimination against conservative groups occurred through traditionalism (positively) and self-reliance (negatively).

General Discussion

Research on political ideology and discrimination in the United States consistently finds that conservatism is associated with prejudice and discrimination, while liberalism is associated with tolerance. Our two studies, using two distinct samples show that these conclusions may be oversimplified. Across both studies, liberals and conservatives supported discrimination against groups who violated their values. Discrimination by liberals has received scant attention in the literature, despite this being a prevalent concern in conservative rhetoric. By only examining conservative biases, social scientists fail to fully explore political intolerance in America. This research helps fill that gap.

Both liberals and conservatives support discrimination against one another because of their mutual beliefs that ideologically divergent groups violate their core values. Previous research suggests that people feel that discrimination is more justified when important values are threatened (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003), and perceptions of value violations are a dominant predictor of discrimination (e.g., Henry & Reyna, 2007; Reyna et al., 2006, 2009; Wetherell et al., 2013). The present work underscores the power of perceived value violations to evoke ire regardless of political ideology.

Although liberals and conservatives both discriminate against value violating out-groups, this is only part of the picture. Both are also influenced by respective abstract values that guide whether they discriminate or not. Regarding liberals, their guiding values in this research were egalitarianism (Study 1) and universalism (Study 2). Both these values are antithetical to discrimination, since it undermines equality and tolerance toward differences. Therefore, we expected (and found) that these values attenuated discrimination. Conservatives’ abstract values—traditionalism and self-reliance—had different effects on their support for discrimination. Traditionalism (marginal effects in Study 1, significant in Study 2) positively predicted discrimination, since protecting traditions is an important part of what it means to conserve them. Discrimination may be seen as justifiable when traditions are under assault (see e.g., Duckitt, 2006).

Results were different for the value of self-reliance (in the Study 1 correlations, and Study 2 path models), which was associated with decreased support for discrimination. This finding is not that surprising, given the nature of this and previous research. Most research associating beliefs in self-reliance and increased discrimination (e.g., Federico & Sidanius, 2002) has focused on groups depicted, either directly in research measures or in popular discourse, as violating values of self-reliance (e.g., African Americans, the poor). The groups used here, however, do not represent groups that violate self-reliance, and, in fact, tend to be proactive about their respective causes. More theoretically, self-reliance, as an abstract value, is associated with self-determination and freedom of choice, both of which would be rendered moot in the face of discrimination, with discriminatory barriers to success negating an individual’s hard work. Consistent with this idea, discrimination violates the worldview of people who value meritocracy (e.g., Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy, 2007). Also, Protestant work ethic (a measure of self-reliance) is positively related to egalitarianism when presented in abstract or definitional forms, but related to intolerance and discrimination when presented as justifications (Levy et al., 2006). Through all these lenses, it makes sense that the value of self-reliance presented in the abstract decreased support for discrimination. Further research should explore the role of abstract expressions of self-reliance on discrimination, controlling for perceptions that groups are violating values of self-reliance.

Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions

By studying discrimination toward a variety of groups, we extend the literature on political ideology and discrimination and demonstrate the existence of liberal support for discrimination. Understanding when and how liberals support discrimination adds important nuance to the literature on ideologies and prejudice. So why has this issue received such little attention? We suspect that this is because researchers predominantly focus on issues central to liberals’ value systems (e.g., poverty, minority rights). This focus creates a theoretical blind spot toward issues that are important to conservatives, and obscures our ability to detect and understand discrimination by those who profess liberal ideologies (cf. Inbar & Lammers, 2012). We also demonstrated that the abstract values held by liberals and conservatives can ameliorate (egalitarianism, universalism, self-reliance) or exacerbate (traditionalism) discrimination. These studies represent a more complete picture of the power of values in predicting discrimination across the ideological divide.

Despite these strengths, there were some limitations. First, the results for the abstract values were not entirely consistent across studies. This could result from the different samples involved, or because abstract values are weaker than value violations when predicting prejudice and discrimination (see Henry & Reyna, 2007). It seems unlikely that demographic factors (i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, income) contributed to these differences, because these variables were added as covariates in the path models. Future research should explore when and how abstract values influence willingness to discriminate.

Second, we do not test, nor mean to imply, causality with our path models, but merely wish to demonstrate that perceived value violations and abstract values account for the variance that ideology explains in discrimination.

Third, although our results indicate that liberals and conservatives are equally likely to discriminate against value violators, we do not conclude that both ideological groups discriminate equally across the range of potential groups. There are reasons to believe that conservatives have a broader array of issues reflecting their values (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) and thus may be more likely to perceive more instances of value discrepant beliefs and behaviors (resulting in more frequent discrimination). Future studies can explore this possibility by randomly sampling participants as well as target groups being studied. This type of study would require new predictions regarding the propensity for conservatives versus liberals to perceive value violations in general. We are pursuing different goals. We suggest that both liberals and conservatives can be influenced by the same psychological force (perceptions that a group violates important values) to predict discrimination but make no claims regarding the overall prevalence of discrimination between these groups.

Conclusions

Political discourse is rife with accusations of partisan bias and prejudice; however, little research has been conducted to fully explore how both sides of the political divide are guilty of discrimination and the role their values play in shaping whether and how discrimination is expressed. The present research explores how values may both promote and dissuade discrimination against ideological out-groups. Although both liberals and conservatives are willing to support discrimination against ideologically divergent groups, the values that the former prioritize may play very different roles in legitimizing that discrimination. Conservative values of traditionalism may augment motives to discriminate, while liberal values of equality and tolerance and the conservative value of hard work may attenuate discrimination.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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