Stumbling in Their Shoes

Abstract

Simulating other people’s difficulties often improves attitudes toward those people. In the case of physical disabilities, however, such experience simulations can backfire. By highlighting the initial challenges of becoming disabled, experience simulations decrease the perceived adaptability of being disabled and reduce the judged capabilities of disabled people. In two experiments, participants engaged in a challenging blindness simulation and afterward judged blind people as less capable of work and independent living than did participants after simulating a different impairment (Experiment 1), no impairment (Experiments 1 and 2), or after merely watching someone else simulate blindness (Experiment 2). Blindness simulators forecast that they would be less capable themselves if blind and that they would adapt to blindness more slowly (Experiment 2), highlighting the self-centered nature of judged capabilities of disabled people. The findings demonstrate that experience simulation can sometimes harm rather than help attitudes toward other people’s difficulties.

Keywords

perspective taking social judgment prejudice/stereotyping applied social psychology coping

A great truth in psychology is that simulating other people’s experience improves attitudes toward those people. Individuals who are temporarily hungry evaluate overeaters less harshly than do nonhungry people (Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007). People who are cold understand the need for warm clothing better than do people who are not cold (O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). And people who simulate paraplegia by navigating in a wheelchair express more sympathy toward physically disabled people compared with those who do not simulate paraplegia (Clore & Jeffery, 1972).

Of course, the opposite of a great psychological truth is also true (McGuire, 1973). This article is about the unintended negative consequences of experience sampling. Experience sampling can harm rather than help attitudes toward others.

We hypothesize that brief experience simulations of disabilities can decrease judgments of disabled people’s capability. Because experience simulations highlight the challenges and failures associated with being newly disabled, they may lead people to forecast that they themselves would be less capable if they were disabled. Because people judge others based on their personal experiences and forecasts of how they would respond to other people’s situation, people may judge disabled people as less capable after simulated experiences of challenge and failure.

To understand why experience simulations may backfire, it is important, first, to consider why experience simulations often work as intended. Experience simulations can give people more realistic expectations of what their personal reactions would be to another’s situation (Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002; Loewenstein, O’Donaghue, & Rabin, 2003). These personal experiences and expectations then serve as the basis for judging other people who are actually in those situations, which improves attitudes toward those people (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2005; Van Boven, Loewenstein, Dunning, & Norgren, 2013).

Experiences are sometimes misleading, however, and sampling misleading experiences is likely to backfire. In particular, experience simulations of disability can be misleading because they highlight the initial challenges and failure experiences of becoming disabled, rather than the competencies and adaptations of being disabled (French, 1992). Thus when people simulate disabilities, such as by wearing a blindfold to simulate blindness, they may underestimate how thoroughly and quickly people can adapt compared with people who do not simulate disabilities.

Although there is extensive evidence that people adapt to substantial changes in life circumstance, people tend to underestimate the rate and degree of adaptation (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Gilbert & Wilson, 2009; Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson, 2005). Healthy people underestimate what their health-related quality of life would be if they became disabled or chronically ill, compared with people who are actually disabled or chronically ill (Boyd, Sutherland, Heasman, Tritchler, & Cummings, 1990; Hurst et al., 1994; Riis et al., 2005; Sackett & Terranee, 1978). This pattern of adaptation neglect is reduced when people are encouraged to imagine how they would adapt to disability (e.g., what technologies they would use), suggesting that their judgment is based partly on forecasts of their own capability (Ubel et al., 2005). Disability simulations may have the opposite effect of imagining adaptation by providing people direct experience with the challenges and failures of being newly disabled (but not the successes of living as a disabled person).

These considerations led us to predict that embodied disability simulations cause people to judge disabled people as less capable. Specifically, we predicted that, after wearing a blindfold to simulate blindness, people would judge disabled people as less capable of working and living independently. We also reasoned that people would forecast that their own capabilities would be severely limited if they were disabled and that this perception would be associated with their negative attitudes toward the disabled (Van Boven et al., 2013).

Such results would indicate that disability simulations decrease perceived capability of the disabled even as simulations may increase sympathy toward the disabled (Clore & Jeffry, 1972; Wadlington, Elliot, & Kirylo, 2008). Warmth and competence are distinct dimensions of evaluation (Cuddy, Glick, & Fiske, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu, 2002), so disability simulations could have divergent effects on these two dimensions. If true, disability simulations could promote a patronizing pattern in which disabled people are seen as less capable but more likable (“Blind people can’t live on their own, but I really like them.”).

We tested these predictions in two experiments using blindness simulation. We focused on total blindness because it is widely regarded as a highly impactful condition (National Federation of the Blind, 2013), it is an increasingly common condition among an aging population, and is a commonly used disability simulation given its ease of operationalization (i.e., people simply wear blindfolds). In both experiements, some participants performed a series of tasks while blindfolded as an experiential simulation of blindness, whereas others performed the tasks in various control conditions. Participants then evaluated blind people’s abilities to live independently and to perform professional activities, such as being a schoolteacher.

In Experiment 1, participants performed tasks while blindfolded, while simulating an arm amputation, or with no impairment. We designed Experiment 2 to more precisely isolate the experiential nature of blindness simulation. Some participants simulated blindness; other participants watched videos of the blindness simulation or learned about the nature, but not the episodic details, of blindness simulation; and other participants were told nothing about the simulation. In both experiments, we predicted that blindness simulators would judge blind people as less capable than would participants in the other conditions.

In Experiment 2, we also tested whether blindness simulators would predict that they themselves would be less capable if they became blind. We expected that blindness simulators would forecast lower capability than participants in the other conditions. We also measured people’s predictions of adaptation to blindness over time. We expected blindness simulators to forecast slower and less complete adaptation compared with participants in the other conditions. Finally, participants in Experiment 2 reported their feelings of warmth toward blind people. We predicted that blindness simulators would feel greater warmth and sympathy toward blind people (Clore & Jeffry, 1972) even as simulators judged the blind as less competent.

Experiment 1: Blindness and Amputeeism

Experiment 1 provided an initial test of our hypothesis that simulating a physical impairment (blindness) would reduce capability judgments of people with that impairment (blind people). We predicted that blindness simulators would judge blind people as less capable than those who simulated an impairment unrelated to blindness (being an amputee) or no impairment at all. We included the amputee-simulation condition to disentangle the effects of simulating disability in general from the effects of simulating blindness specifically. We did not expect the amputee simulation to influence judgments of blind people, because the experience of being an amputee is different from the experience of being blind.

Method

Based on intuition and informal pilot testing, we estimated that the predicted difference would be a medium-sized effect. Given the time-intensive nature of running each participant, we aimed to recruit at least 30 participants per condition in each experiment, depending on the availability of research participants within the semester when the experiment was conducted.

One hundred and two university undergraduates (34 per condition) participated in Experiment 1 as part of a course requirement. We did not measure participant gender, as we had no hypotheses about how gender would interact with our manipulation. All participants were randomly assigned to condition and told that they would be completing a series of tasks either with or without impairment. Blindness simulators wore a blindfold during the tasks. Amputee simulators had their dominant arm tied behind their back in a sling. Nonsimulators completed the tasks unencumbered. Blindness and amputee simulators were asked to imagine the “experience and perspective” of a blind person (or amputee) while performing the tasks. Nonsimulators were asked to “perform these tasks as you normally would.”

There were four tasks. First, to simulate basic navigation, participants were instructed to walk twice around the lab room, once in a full circle around the perimeter of the room and then once from the far corner of the room to the door and back. Second, participants were directed to a table with a pitcher of water and asked to fill a glass with as much water as possible without spilling. The pitcher was always sealed initially, such that its pour lid needed to be turned 90° in either direction before the pitcher could pour any water, which participants had to figure out. Third, the experimenter scattered 5 nickels, 5 dimes, and 5 quarters on a table, and participants were tasked to gather the coins and sort them into piles according to their denomination. Finally, participants were instructed to write their identification number (a complex string of letters and numbers) and the date on the chalkboard.

After removing the blindfold or arm sling, participants answered eight questions about the capabilities of blind people.¹ Participants indicated “how well you think the average blind person could do this activity, compared with the average nondisabled person” (1 = a blind person could perform the activity much worse than a nondisabled person; 4 = a blind person could perform the activity as well as a nondisabled person; 7 = a blind person could perform the activity much better than a nondisabled person). The activities were living independently, walking around downtown, accountant, chef, construction worker, schoolteacher, small business owner, and tour guide. We averaged these 8 items into a judged capability index (α = .67).² We selected these activities based on anecdotal reports that blind people face especially strong discrimination in these fields (Omvig, 2002).

Results

We followed the new statistical reporting recommendations presented by Cumming (2014) in reporting all our results. Specifically, we test planned contrasts (based upon prior theory) rather than reporting omnibus analyses of variance, and we report effect sizes and confidence intervals for all estimates instead of reporting p values (Cumming, 2014). We excluded one blindness simulator who was more than 6.5 studentized residuals above the predicted mean in our key analyses.

As predicted, blindness simulators judged blind people as less capable (M = 2.26, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [2.04, 2.48]) than did amputee simulators (M = 2.61, 95% CI = [2.42, 2.80]) and nonsimulators (M = 2.54, 95% CI = [2.35, 2.74]). To estimate the size of this effect, we regressed capability judgments on two orthogonal contrasts (contrast weights in parentheses). The first estimated the difference between the blindness simulators (+1) and the other two conditions (amputee simulators = −1/2, nonsimulators = −1/2), which we hypothesized would be positive. The second contrast estimated the difference between the amputee simulators (+1) and the nonsimulators (−1), which we expected would be smaller and not different from 0. The first contrast supported our prediction that blindness simulators would rate blind people as less capable than the other two groups did, b = −.21, t(98) = −2.72, 95% CI = [−.06, −.36], d = .55. The second contrast implied little or no difference between amputee simulators and nonsimulators, b = .03, t(98) = .56, 95% CI = [−.23, .29], d = .11. Blindness simulation thus caused people to judge blind people as less capable of living and working independently.

Experiment 2: Blindness and Vicarious Blindness

We next sought to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 1 in four ways. First, to examine the effect of experiential blindness simulation more precisely, we compared the capability judgments of blindness simulators with those of vicarious simulators, with participants who had mere knowledge about the simulation, and with a no-information control group. The vicarious simulators watched films of blindness simulators, but they did not engage in simulation themselves. In the simulation-knowledge condition, participants learned about the blindness simulation, but they neither engaged in nor watched a simulation. Finally, in the no-information control condition, people did not receive any information about the blindness simulation. We predicted that blindness simulators would judge blind people as less capable than the three other groups, none of whom directly experienced the challenges and failures of blindness simulation. We did not expect that the vicarious simulators, simulation-knowledge participants, and control participants would differ in their judgments of blind people. Our theory suggests that direct experience with a condition can influence judgments of people with that condition but that observing or hearing about another person’s experience should not (Van Boven et al., 2013; see also Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998).

Second, we measured people’s forecasts of how capable they would be if they became blind, estimating whether blindness simulators forecasted less capability for themselves if they became blind. Third, we measured people’s forecasts of how much their lives would be impacted at increasing temporal distance from disability onset, estimating whether disability simulators predicted that they would adapt more slowly and less completely than nonsimulators. Finally, we examined whether disability simulators would feel more warmth and sympathy toward blind people than nonsimulators (Clore & Jeffery, 1972), even as simulators judged blind people as less capable.

Method

One hundred and fifty-three university undergraduates (37–39 per condition) participated as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were first randomly assigned to one of two pairs of conditions: the blindness-simulation pair or the nonsimulation pair. Within the blindness-simulation pair, participants were assigned to be either blindness simulators or vicarious simulators. Blindness simulators personally simulated blindness. Their simulation was videotaped and shown to the next scheduled participant, a vicarious simulator.

Blindness simulators completed the water pouring and coin sorting tasks from Experiment 1. To strengthen the manipulation, the room-navigation task was replaced with a more extensive walk, in which participants navigated the hall of the lab building using a white cane. Simulators were instructed to locate a stairwell in a neighboring hallway and then to find their way back to the lab room.

Each blindness simulator was filmed, and the film was shown to a vicarious simulator. Vicarious simulators were told they would be viewing a video of another participant who had been asked to imagine becoming completely blind and to perform tasks while blindfolded. Vicarious simulators thus witnessed a blindness simulation, affording detailed episodic knowledge about the simulation but without the personal experience of the blindness simulators.

Within the nonsimulation pair, participants were randomly assigned to the simulation-knowledge or no-information condition. In the simulation-knowledge condition, participants were told that they would not be asked to perform tasks with an impairment themselves, but that some other participants had been randomly assigned to pour water, sort coins, and walk down the hall while blindfolded. The experimenter showed the participant the blindfold, water pitcher, coins, and cane. These participants thus had knowledge of blindness simulation, but they had neither personal experience (in contrast with blindness simulators) nor detailed episodic knowledge (in contrast with vicarious simulators). No-information control condition participants were simply told that they would not be assigned to complete any tasks, and then they completed the dependent measures.

All participants completed the judgments of blind people’s capability using the same categories as in Experiment 1, using a 13-point scale (1 = a non-disabled person would do much better; 7 = non-disabled and blind people would do equally well; and 13 = a blind person would do much better, averaged into a single index, α = .79). In addition, we asked participants to forecast their own capability if they became blind. Participants were asked to consider the same activities and to estimate how well they would be able to perform each activity themselves if they became blind, compared with how well they perform the activity as a sighted person (1 = I would do much better while sighted; 7 = I would do equally well while blind and sighted; and 13 = I would do much better while blind; averaged into an index, α = .85).

To measure forecasted adaptation to blindness over time (Igou, 2004, 2008), participants were asked to consider how “the experience of being blind may or may not change over time” and to “imagine that you have become blind, and think about how much being blind would limit your everyday functioning at various time points since becoming blind. ‘Daily functioning’ means ability to take care of yourself, hold a job, and participate in leisure activities that you enjoy.” Participants were provided with a graph where the X-axis was time, ranging in 6-month intervals from 6 months following the onset of blindness to 36 months (3 years) after the onset of blindness. The Y-axis represented intensity of limitation (0 = not at all limited and 10 = extremely limited). Participants forecasted the intensity of their limitation at each of the 6 times.

To measure warmth and sympathy toward blind people, participants indicated how compassionate, empathetic, friendly, open, sympathetic, and warm they felt toward blind people (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely; averaged into a single index, α = .82).

Results

Preliminary Analyses

We analyzed blindness simulators and vicarious simulators as independent samples, because the intraclass correlation between the judged capability ratings was only .05 (Griffin & Gonzalez, 1995). We excluded one vicarious simulator and one simulation-knowledge participant from analyses of judged capability because they had studentized residuals greater than 4.5 from the predicted mean.

Our main prediction was that the blindness simulators (the only condition that included direct experience with blindness) would differ from the other three conditions on all the dependent measures. We did not expect the three nonsimulation conditions to differ from each other. To test these predictions, we regressed each dependent measure onto three orthogonal contrasts (weights in parentheses). Specifically, the first contrast examined the difference between blindness simulators (+3) and the other three conditions (−1 each). The second contrast examined the difference between the vicarious simulators (+2) and the two other control conditions (−1 each); the third contrast examined the difference between the simulation-knowledge (+1) and the no-information (−1) conditions.

As predicted, blindness simulators judged blind people as less capable (M = 3.61, 95% CI = [3.20, 4.02]) than did participants in the other three conditions (M = 4.13), b = −.12, t(147) = −2.33, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.24], d = .38 (see Figure 1). The vicarious simulators’ ratings (M = 4.11, 95% CI = [3.73, 4.49]) did not differ from those of the other two conditions, b = .01, t(147) = .13, 95% CI = [−.15, 0.16], d = .02. The simulation-knowledge (M = 4.28, 95% CI = [3.87, 4.69]) and no-information control conditions (M = 4.00, 95% CI = [3.62, 4.39]) did not differ, b = .14, t(147) = .99, 95% CI = [−.14, .42], d = .16. Direct personal experience with blindness simulation thus reduced judgments of how capable blind people are, compared with simply having knowledge of blindness simulation—even when that knowledge contained detailed, episodic, but third-person information about the simulation.

Figure 1.

Experiment 2: Effect of simulation condition on capability judgments of blind people and on capability forecasts of one’s own capability if blind. Error bars show 95% confidence interval (CI).

Capability Forecasts

Forecasts of one’s own capabilities if blind followed a similar pattern. We regressed the capability forecast index on the same three contrasts described earlier. Blindness simulators predicted that they would personally be less capable (M = 2.25, 95% CI = [1.87, 2.63]) than did participants in the other three conditions, M = 2.90, b = −.16, t(149) = −2.49, 95% CI = [.033, .292], d = .41 (see Figure 1). Vicarious-simulators’ capability forecasts (M = 2.91, 95% CI = [2.52, 3.30]) did not differ from those of the two other conditions, b = .004, t = .04, 95% CI = [−.180, .187], d = .01. There was no difference between the simulation-knowledge (M = 3.09, 95% CI = [2.45, 3.73]) and no-information control conditions (M = 2.70, 95% CI = [2.29, 3.11]), b = .20, t(149) = 1.20, 95% CI = [−.126, .517], d = .20. Simulating blindness thus caused people to expect that they would be less capable if blind.

Adaptation Forecasts

Blindness simulators forecasted that they would adapt more slowly and less completely to blindness over time. Using a hierarchical linear model, we computed the slope for each participant’s estimates of limitation intensity as a function of time. We then regressed these slopes on the three contrast codes described earlier. All participants estimated that blindness would become less limiting over time, b = −6.24, t(149) = −43.03, 95% CI = [−6.52, −5.95], see Figure 2). More important for our purposes, the downward slope was shallower in the simulation condition (M = −1.14, 95% CI = [−1.25, −1.03]) than in the other three conditions (Ms = −1.25, −1.33, and −1.28, 95% CIs = [−1.34, −1.16], [−1.47, −1.19], and [−1.40, −1.16] for the vicarious-simulation, simulation-knowledge, and control conditions, respectively), b = −.038, t(751) = −3.84, 95% CI = [−.057, −.018], d = .28. The three control groups were not different from each other (b = .02, 95% CI = [−.02, .06] for the difference between the vicarious-simulation conditions and the other two groups; b = .02, 95% CI = [−.06, .10] for the difference between the simulation-knowledge and control conditions).

Figure 2.

Experiment 2: Effect of simulation condition on capability forecasts over time.

As a result of estimating slower rates of adaptation, blindness simulators also estimated that their functionality would remain more limited 3 years after becoming blind (M = 3.69, 95% CI = [3.15, 4.23]) than did participants in the other conditions (Ms = 2.56, 2.78, and 2.76, 95% CIs = [2.06, 3.06], [2.16, 3.40], and [2.20, 3.32] for the vicarious-simulation, simulation-knowledge, and control conditions, respectively), b = .25, t(202) = 3.9, 95% CI = [.12, .38], d = .55. The three control groups did not differ on this measure, ts < 1. Personal experience with blindness simulation thus caused people to forecast slower and less complete adaptation, consistent with their capability forecasts.

Warmth and Sympathy Toward Blind People

To estimate the effect of blindness simulation on warmth toward blind people, we regressed participants’ index of warmth on the same contrasts described earlier. Blindness-simulators expressed more warmth toward blind people (M = 6.03, 95% CI = [5.77, 6.29]) than did participants in the other three conditions, b = .09, t(149) = 2.33, 95% CI = [.01, .17], d = .38. This conceptually replicates previous findings that disability simulation increases warmth toward disabled people (Clore & Jeffrey, 1972). Vicarious simulators were also less warm toward blind people (M = 5.37, 95% CI = [5.09, 5.65]) than were the simulation-knowledge and no-information control participants (Ms = 5.79 and 5.81, 95% CIs = [5.51, 6.07] and [5.54, 6.08]), b = −.14, t(149) = −6.51, 95% CI = [−.25, −.03], d = .41. The simulation-knowledge and control conditions did not differ, b = −.01, t(149) = −.11, 95% CI = [−.20, .08], d = .02. Experiential blindness simulation thus increased warmth toward blind people, even as it lowered judgments of blind people’s capability.³

Discussion

The results of two experiments indicate that experiential simulation of blindness causes people to judge blind people as less capable. People who simulated blindness evaluated blind people as less capable of work and life activities than did those who simulated no impairment (Experiments 1 and 2), a different impairment (Experiment 1), or who merely watched or learned about the simulation (Experiment 2). These negative effects of blindness simulation on judged capability occurred even as blindness simulation increased warmth toward blind people (Experiment 2).

These unintended negative consequences of disability simulation may occur because when people are confronted with challenges and failure experiences of becoming blind, this causes people to forecast that they would be less capable if they personally became blind. Like attitudes toward other people generally, attitudes toward the disabled are highly self-referencing, shaped by people’s imagined or simulated experience of being personally disabled (Van Boven et al., 2013). Such experiences help people form richer, deeper, and more vivid mental representations of evocative states (such as disabilities) through several mechanisms, including increased cognitive elaboration, emotional arousal, and imaginative ease (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996; Van Boven et al., 2013). These mechanisms combine to emphasize the negative aspects of initial disability. Future research could be useful in isolating the mechanisms through which personal experience with disability influences judgments of disabled people.

These results suggest that disability simulation may increase stigmatization of blind people. The combination of increased sympathy and reduced judgments of capability could motivate benevolent stigmatization (Fehr & Sassenberg, 2009), increasing discrimination against disabled job seekers (Smart, 2003) and parents (National Council on Disability, 2012), to name a few.

Future studies could also examine the accuracy of simulators’ judgments. Perhaps blindness simulators more accurately predict the time course of adaptation to blindness, whereas nonsimulators overpredict how quickly or completely they would adapt. However, even if simulators’ judgments are descriptively accurate (e.g., blind people do experience more difficulties working in some professions or living independently, on average, than nondisabled people), such difficulties are largely a product of social and environmental barriers rather than innate functional limitations (Omvig, 2002; Smart, 2003; Wright, 1978, 1983). For example, blind people may be less likely to live independently, not because they cannot physically care for themselves, but because socioeconomic disadvantage or paternalistic family relationships limit their options. Experiential simulations could cause people to perceive the limitations of disability as fixed personal deficits rather than as consequences of nonoptimal environments (French, 1992; Wright, 1975, 1978). Furthermore, disability simulations could make people more confident in their judgments, making them more reluctant to acknowledge individuals who deviate from the average (i.e., blind individuals with excellent abilities).

Because judgments of the disabled are self-referencing, disability simulations can be improved. Rather than simply confronting people with the challenges of becoming disabled, psychologically informed interventions might also provide people with successful adaptation experiences (e.g., Robinson & Rosher, 2001; see also Wright, 1978). Alternatively, simulation could be combined with contact between disabled and nondisabled people, or at least opportunities for participants to observe how disabled individuals perform tasks competently (e.g., having them watch a blind person effectively navigate a classroom). Disability simulation should have less harmful consequences if people are led to anticipate that being disabled is challenging, yet adaptable.

Notably, disability simulations are generally intended to increase empathy and helping toward disabled people (Clore & Jeffery, 1972; Flower, Burns, & Bottsford-Miller, 2007; Wilson et al., 2009) rather than to improve capability judgments. Our research suggests that disability simulations can increase sympathy and, in some situations, this could be advantageous. For example, having people simulate blindness could help them learn to guide a blind person more effectively (Wright, 1975). However, the unintended reduction in capability judgments could cause harm in other situations, such as if an educator develops lower expectations of disabled students, which leads to poorer performance (Rosenthal, 1994).

In conclusion, this research underscores the importance of theoretically grounded examination of psychological interventions. When underexamined, interventions such as disability simulations can present unexpected harms and even backfire (Yeager & Walton, 2011). Our findings indicate that disability simulations can have both intended beneficial and unintended detrimental consequences. Even when well intended and seemingly supported by previous research, interventions should be subjected to empirical scrutiny.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: NSF Grants 0552120 and 1049125 supported this research.

Notes

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