Maximizers,Satisficers,and Their Satisfaction With and Preferences for Reversible Versus Irreversible Decisions

Abstract

Previous research on decision reversibility has found that, although people believe they prefer reversible decisions, irreversible decisions yield the most satisfaction. Two studies investigated whether these findings are moderated by individuals’ tendencies toward maximizing (decision making via extensive search for the best option) versus satisficing (decision making via less exhaustive search and less optimizing). Study 1 found that satisficers were more satisfied following an irreversible decision about a poster choice, whereas maximizers were more satisfied following a reversible decision. When a different group of participants in Study 2 were asked whether they would prefer the reversible or irreversible versions of Study 1, satisficers disproportionately chose the irreversible version, and maximizers disproportionately chose the reversible version; however, some extreme maximizers preferred the irreversible version as a means of preventing needless worry or second guessing. The results demonstrate that individual differences are likely to moderate even robust patterns of decision making and affective forecasting.

Keywords

maximizing affective forecasting decision making decision reversibility regret

The decisions that people make everyday vary in their reversibility. When people make choices about jobs and new romantic partners, they may still change their minds later and select a different option, whereas other decisions are irreversible. The small literature on decision reversibility suggests that, although people may prefer reversible decisions in the abstract, they are most satisfied with their selections when those decisions are irreversible (Bullens, Forster, van Harreveld, & Liberman, 2012; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). The present studies addressed whether this same pattern applies to people with a maximizing decision-making style (Schwartz et al., 2002); maximizing involves decision making via extensive search for the best possible option. Given the nature of maximizers’ decision-making strategies, maximizers may not only prefer reversible decisions but also experience greater satisfaction with their choices after making such decisions.

The Effects of Decision Reversibility

In an influential set of studies, Gilbert and Ebert (2002) examined whether people are more satisfied with their choices following reversible or irreversible decisions. In one study, participants ranked a set of posters in order of preference and then were asked to choose between their third- and fourth-ranked posters to take home; participants were told the choice was either reversible or irreversible. After a brief delay, participants re-ranked the posters. Participants who believed they could later exchange their poster choice were less satisfied with their selection than participants who believed their choice was final. Yet, when a different set of participants was asked whether they would prefer to be in the reversible or irreversible versions of the study, two thirds selected the ultimately less satisfying reversible version. These findings led to the provocative conclusion that, although people may prefer reversible decisions, they achieve greater satisfaction when their selections are permanent. This pattern has been found in some (Bullens et al., 2012; Frey, Kumpf, Irle, & Gniech, 1984), but not all other studies (Lowe & Steiner, 1968).

Why do people underestimate their satisfaction with irreversible decisions? Gilbert and Ebert (2002) theorized that individuals fail to recognize that, when people know that a choice is final, they put aside their reservations about their chosen option as they begin to psychologically optimize their permanent selection. People who have made reversible decisions continue to engage in counterfactual thinking; they consider how they might feel if they had chosen differently. The findings in Gilbert and Ebert (2002) are consistent with other evidence that people are not very good at affective forecasting (Bullens et al., 2012; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Kushlev & Dunn, 2012; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), meaning they mis-predict their emotional responses to future experiences.

More recent studies have elaborated on Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) claims about why decision reversibility affects satisfaction. Reversible decisions lead people to focus on the less satisfying aspects of their choices, whereas irreversible decisions lead people to focus on the more satisfying aspects of their choices (Bullens, Harreveld, Forster, & van der Pligt, 2013). Reversible decisions lead people to engage in more counterfactual thinking under low cognitive load (Hafner, White, & Handley, 2012), which may yield lower satisfaction. Further, reversible decisions engender a prevention focus—concern with “security, responsibility, and the presence or absence of negative outcomes” (Bullens, van Harreveld, Forster, & Higgins, 2014, p. 836), whereas irreversible decisions engender a promotion focus—concern with “growth, accomplishment, and the presence or absence of positive outcomes” (Bullens et al., 2014, p. 836). Reversible decisions may promote counterfactual thinking and thinking about negative aspects of choices because these styles of thinking reflect a focus on preventing potential negative outcomes.

Maximizers’ Approaches to Decision Making

The present studies investigated the hypothesis that maximizers may exhibit a different pattern of responses to reversible versus irreversible decisions. People vary in the extent to which they seek to optimize their outcomes when making a decision (Schwartz et al., 2002). At the one extreme, maximizers try to identify and select the best possible option across many different decision-making contexts, while at the other extreme, satisficers conduct a less exhaustive search and make choices without striving to pick the best option.

Several correlates of maximizing are relevant for understanding its likely impact on responses to decision reversibility. First, maximizing is associated with a tendency to experience regret about decisions (Parker, de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2007; Purvis, Howell, & Iyer, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2002; Spunt, Rassin, & Epstein, 2009). Second, maximizing predicts a propensity to generate counterfactuals about choices (Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006), particularly counterfactuals involving upward comparisons (Leach & Patall, 2013). Third, maximizing correlates with markers of negative affect, including depression and anxiety, neuroticism, and threat sensitivity (Iyengar et al., 2006; Purvis et al., 2011; Spunt et al., 2009). A broader literature suggests that these three tendencies—propensities toward regret, counterfactuals, and negative affect—often co-occur (Epstude & Roese, 2008).

Maximizers’ tendencies toward regret, counterfactuals, and negative affect may lead them to value reversible decisions. An influential theory of regret regulation (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006) suggests that people are motivated to regulate regret that they anticipate may result from future decisions. According to this model, people try to prevent anticipated regret by improving the quality of their decisions and by ensuring that they can alter decisions later. Thus, relative to satisficers, maximizers seem likely to favor reversible decisions, in order to manage their higher levels of anticipated regret. Gilbert and colleagues wrote this about the role of anticipated regret in decision making: “…people are less susceptible to regret than they imagine, and…decision makers who pay to avoid future regrets may be buying emotional insurance that they do not need” (Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004, p. 346). Maximizers, however, may be accurate in their expectations of future regret, and they may particularly prefer reversible decisions as a result.

Maximizers likewise may be more satisfied with their choices following reversible decisions than irreversible decisions. People are often motivated to experience emotional and cognitive states that are congruent with their own proclivities and goals (Ford & Tamir, 2014; Tamir, 2009). Maximizers may be motivated to experience counterfactual thinking and a focus on the negative during and after decision making to avoid failure and optimize outcomes. The states engendered by reversible decisions—including counterfactual thinking and a focus on the potential negative aspects of decisions—are congruent with maximizers’ typical experiences and likely support maximizers’ decision-making goals. Further, maximizers scrutinize their options to avoid negative outcomes, a decision-making style associated with a prevention focus (Molden, Lee, & Higgins, 2008); maximizers may thus feel comfortable with the prevention focus fostered by reversible decisions. In contrast, satisficers likely show the more typical pattern of greater satisfaction following irreversible decisions.

Sparks, Ehrlinger, and Eibach (2012) recently examined some of these hypotheses. In one study, participants experienced a lab situation similar to the irreversible condition in Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) poster study. Maximizers were less satisfied than satisficers with their poster choice because they failed to spread out their rankings of the chosen poster versus the alternatives in the manner that satisficers did. A second questionnaire study established that maximizing is associated with preferences for keeping options open and avoiding commitment and that maximizing is associated with preferences for the reversible version of the poster study. These studies provided initial support for the claim that maximizers respond differently to decision reversibility than do satisficers.

The Present Studies

In the two present studies, I further investigated the differences in maximizers’ and satisficers’ responses to decision reversibility. Study 1 presented maximizers and satisficers with a modified version of Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) poster study, with half the participants making a reversible decision and half making an irreversible decision. This study included an irreversible condition similar to Sparks and colleagues’ (2012) study, but added a reversible condition. Study 2 asked a different set of participants to indicate and explain their rationales for their preferences for the reversible versus irreversible versions of Study 1. I expected that maximizers would be more satisfied with and prefer reversible decisions over irreversible decisions, in contrast to satisficers, who would be more satisfied with and prefer irreversible decisions.

Study 1: Maximizers’ and Satisficers’ Satisfaction With a Reversible Versus Irreversible Decision

Study 1 was modeled closely on Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) poster study and investigated whether maximizers and satisficers differ in their levels of satisfaction and regret following either a reversible or an irreversible decision about a poster to take home. I predicted that satisficers would be more satisfied and less regretful about their decision in the irreversible versus the reversible condition, consistent with Gilbert and Ebert’s findings. However, I predicted that maximizers would be more satisfied and less regretful in the reversible condition than in the irreversible condition.

Study 1: Method

Participants

Sixty undergraduate students (68% female; 80.0% White, 1.7% Black, 3.3% Asian, 5.0% Hispanic or Latino/Latina, 10.0% multiracial; ages 18–21) participated in this study in exchange for course credit in an introductory psychology course. During a pretesting session, participants completed the Maximization Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002), a 13-item questionnaire assessing tendencies toward maximizing versus satisficing on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). Items assess desires to make optimal choices in a variety of situations (α = .83, e.g., “When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning through the available options even while attempting to watch one program,” “I never settle for second best”). A maximizer group (top 32% of scores, 4.62–6.46, N = 30) and a satisficer group (bottom 35% of scores, 1.92–3.92, N = 30) were recruited.

Materials and Procedure

The procedure was based closely on Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) Study 2a “Experiencer” condition script. An experimenter brought each participant individually to a large testing room and explained that the study focused on art appreciation in daily life. The experimenter then placed nine posters affixed to foam boards against a wall of the testing room; the posters were of paintings by well-known artists (e.g., Monet, Dali). The experimenter gave the participant numbered index cards corresponding to each poster and asked the participant to rank his or her preferences for the posters by stacking the index cards in order of how much the participant liked each poster. After this ranking task, the experimenter explained that there were extra copies of the third- and fourth-ranked posters (without referring to these posters as the ones ranked third and fourth) and asked the participant to select which one he or she would like to take home.

The experimenter next randomly assigned the participant to the reversible condition (N = 15 maximizers and N = 15 satisficers) or the irreversible condition (N = 15 maximizers and N = 15 satisficers). The experimenter told participants in the reversible condition that they could change their minds about the poster then or any time in the next month and could call the experimenter to switch to the other poster. The experimenter told participants in the irreversible condition that their choice of poster was final and that they would not be able to exchange it later. The experimenter placed the third- and fourth-ranked posters in a visible spot on the wall, put the other posters away, and asked the participant to spend 15 min writing about his or her perceptions of any of the posters. After 15 min, the experimenter gave the participant the stack of index cards in its original order and asked the participant to re-rank the posters in order of preference. This yielded a measure of change in ranking from the original ranking to the ranking following the writing task (higher scores indicate increases in liking). The participant completed a Satisfaction With Decisions Scale, a 7-item questionnaire created for this study to assess participant satisfaction versus regret with the previous selection of the third or fourth ranked poster to take home (α = .83; 7-point scale from completely disagree to completely agree; e.g., “I am satisfied with my poster,” “If I could, I would definitely go back and change my decision”-reversed). This new questionnaire was included to obtain a second measure of participants’ satisfaction with their decisions. Finally, the participant was debriefed and told that the truth that there were not extra posters to take home.

Study 1: Results and Discussion

The two indicators of decision satisfaction—changes in the ranking of the selected poster and the Satisfaction with Selection Scale—were only modestly correlated, r = .27, p = .04, so they were examined separately. To examine the effects of decision reversibility and maximizing tendencies on decision satisfaction, I conducted two hierarchical linear regressions predicting the two poster decision satisfaction measures, following the recommendations of Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, and Nicewander (2005) for extreme group analyses. I first entered the main effects of condition and the continuous Maximization scores and then entered the interaction of the two in a second step.

Changes in ranking were not predicted by condition or Maximization scores in Step 1, R ² change = .03, F(2, 57) = .73, p = .49 (condition: β = .04, SE = .33, p = .77; Maximization: β = .16, SE = .15, p = .24), nor by the interaction of the two in Step 2, R ² change = .01, F(1, 56) = .46, p = .50 (β = −.36, SE = .31, p = .50). Participants changed their rankings very little overall (M = .10, SD = 1.28), suggesting that this may not be a sensitive measure of participants’ choice satisfaction.

Satisfaction with Selection scores likewise were not predicted by condition or Maximization scores in Step 1, R ² change = .01, F(2, 57) = .40, p = .69 (condition: β = .00, SE = .00, p = .98; Maximization: β = 0.12, SE = .14, p = .38). However, the interaction of condition and Maximization scores added significantly to the prediction of Satisfaction with Selection scores in Step 2, R ² change =. 17, F(1, 56) = 11.54, p = .001 (β = −1.67, SE = .26, p = .001). I probed this interaction effect by comparing the satisfaction scores of the maximizer and satisficer extreme groups across conditions using t-tests. As shown in Figure 1, as predicted, maximizers in the reversible condition reported greater satisfaction (M = 5.32, SD = .98) than maximizers in the irreversible condition (M = 4.43, SD = 1.08), t(29) = 2.38, p = .03. In contrast, satisficers in the irreversible condition reported greater satisfaction (M = 5.58, SD = .96) than satisficers in the reversible condition (M = 4.63, SD = 1.26), t(29) = 2.33, p = .03. However, maximizers in the reversible condition did not differ in satisfaction from satisficers in the irreversible condition, t(28) = 0.73, p = .47, nor did satisficers in the reversible condition differ from maximizers in the irreversible condition, t(28) = 0.47, p = .64. These results are consistent with predictions: Satisficers were more satisfied when their decision was final rather than reversible, whereas maximizers were more satisfied when their decision was reversible rather than final.

Figure 1.
Study 1: Mean satisfaction with previous poster selection (standard errors as whiskers) as a function of maximizing group (satisficers vs. maximizers) and changeability of poster choice (reversible vs. irreversible decision).

Study 2: The Relationship Between Maximizing Tendencies and Preferences for Reversible Versus Irreversible Decisions

Study 1 demonstrated that maximizers and satisficers differ in their satisfaction with previously made reversible or irreversible decisions. In Study 2, new participants were asked whether they would prefer to experience the reversible or the irreversible version of the study and to explain their reason for that preference. The procedure for Study 2 replicated Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) Study 2b; in this earlier study, 66.3% of the participants preferred the reversible version of the study. I expected that maximizing would be associated with greater preferences for the reversible version of the study, as Sparks and colleagues (2012) found. I also examined whether participants’ maximizing tendencies predicted their rationales for their preferences. These analyses were exploratory; however, based on the literature on maximizing and satisficing, I expected that greater maximizing would predict preferences for the reversible condition with the rationale of reducing regret and distress, and greater satisficing would predict preferences for the irreversible condition based on the rationale that participants were comfortable with decision making.

Study 2: Method

Participants

One hundred ninety-eight undergraduate students (53% female; 71.2% White, 4.5% Black, 8.1% Asian, 5.6% Hispanic or Latino/Latina, 7.1% multiracial, 3.5% other; ages 17–23) participated in a pretesting session in which they completed a packet of questionnaires in exchange for course credit in an introductory psychology course.

Materials and Procedure

During pretesting, participants completed the Maximization Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002; α = .73) and the “Art Study” questionnaire used in Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) study 2b. The Art Study questionnaire explains that psychologists often test pilot versions of potential studies before running large-scale studies and asks participants to imagine they would be participating in the study described next and to predict their preferences for alternate versions of the study. The questionnaire describes the procedures used in the present Study 1, that is, that participants in the study are shown art posters by famous artists, rank those posters, and are given a choice of the third or fourth ranked poster to take home. Next, the two alternate versions of the study are presented: irreversible (the poster choice is final) and reversible (the poster may be exchanged in the next month). The questionnaire asks participants to indicate which version of the study they prefer and then asks participants to offer a narrative answer for why they prefer that version.

Study 2: Results and Discussion

A majority of participants preferred the reversible version of the study (57.6%) over the irreversible version (42.4%). A logistic regression revealed that higher scores on the Maximization Scale predicted preferences for the reversible version, χ²(1) = 4.73, p = .03. The odds of choosing the reversible version were 1.67 times higher for each one-unit increase on the Maximization Scale. To address whether maximizers and satisficers were accurate in predicting whether they would be most satisfied in the reversible or irreversible versions (according to the results of Study 1), groups of maximizers (top 30.8%, scores = 4.85–6.69, N = 61) and satisficers (bottom 29.8%, scores = 1.69–4.08, N = 59) were created from roughly the top and bottom thirds of scores on the Maximization Scale. A χ² test revealed that maximizers were more likely to pick the reversible version (62.3% vs. 37.7%), and satisficers were more likely to pick the irreversible version (55.9% vs. 44.1%; χ²(1) = 4.00, p = .05, Figure 2).

Figure 2.
Study 2: Percentage of participants in each maximizing group (satisficers vs. maximizers) indicating a preference for reversible versus irreversible poster decisions.

Based on a pilot administration of the measure to 113 participants, a coding scheme was developed in a “bottom up” fashion for the participants’ narrative responses to the question about why they picked the reversible or irreversible condition. In this pilot administration, participants selecting the reversible condition nearly always cited the desirability of options and choices; contrary to expectations, participants almost never mentioned that such decisions would help minimize regret or distress about the finality of the decision. Participants selecting the irreversible condition offered several different explanations. Seven coding categories were created based on the rationales offered: (1) reversible—The participant expressed a desire for choice or options or for the ability to change his or her mind (e.g., “Even if you don’t exchange it, it’s good to know you have a choice”), (2) reversible—any other rationale, (3) irreversible—The participant noted insecurity, worrying, or difficulty with making decisions and indicated that a final decision is better for him or her (e.g., “I tend to worry about decisions so closure is good for me”), (4) irreversible—The participant did not indicate worrying or difficulty with making decisions but still expressed a preference for the irreversible option (e.g., “I like making final decisions, once you choose you learn to be satisfied with what you chose”), (5) irreversible—The participant expressed a sense of being good at making decisions or being unlikely to change his or her mind (e.g., “Because I am usually confident in my initial decision”), (6) irreversible—The participant considered this a trivial choice and not worth the hassle of exchange (e.g., “I wouldn’t care that much and wouldn’t want to deal with exchanging it”), and (7) irreversible—any other rationale. Three research assistants coded the rationales; the average Cohen’s κ coefficient between the three possible pairs of codings was .87, indicating excellent interrater reliability. For discrepant codings, the ones chosen by two of the three coders were used. Options 2 (3.5%) and 7 (4.1%) were excluded from further analyses. The percentages of participants offering all the other rationales are presented in Table 1.

Table 1.
Study 2: Mean Maximizing Scores for Participants Offering Different Rationales for Preferring the Reversible Versus Irreversible Study Version.

Rationale for Preferring Reversible Versus Irreversible Study Version % Total Sample M Maximizing Score/Percentile

Prefer reversible

A reversible decision offers options or the opportunity to change one’s mind 54.0% 4.51^a (.72) 53rd percentile

Prefer irreversible

Final decisions help the participant minimize worry or prevent second-guessing 9.6% 4.87^b (.94) 74th percentile

Final decisions are preferable 8.1% 4.31^ac (.67) 46th percentile

The participant would not want to reverse such a trivial decision 12.6% 4.12^cd (.87) 33rd percentile

The participant is good at making decisions 8.1% 3.75^d (1.03) 20th percentile

Note. Percentages do not sum to 100% because some rationales were excluded from these analyses. When maximizing scores significantly predicted the likelihood of picking one of a pair of rationales over the other at p < .05, the rationales have different superscripts. Percentiles are within the total sample.

I examined whether participants’ maximizing tendencies predicted their rationales, using a multinomial logistic regression. This type of regression is used when the dependent measure being predicted is nominal and includes more than two categories (in this case, the five rationales for picking the reversible vs. irreversible study option). The multinomial logistic regression revealed that Maximization scores predicted participants’ rationales for their choices, χ²(3) = 18.18, p < .001. For each possible pairs of rationales, logistic regression determined whether maximizing predicted the likelihood of offering one rationale versus the other (see Table 1 for results). Among participants selecting the irreversible version, the participants scoring the highest on maximizing were those who picked that option to minimize anxiety, whereas the lowest scoring participants were those who saw themselves as good at decision making or who didn’t think the choice was significant enough to be worth reversing. In the middle of maximizing scores were those who selected the irreversible version because they prefer final decisions but not in order to minimize anxiety. Thus, participants selecting the irreversible version included a group with high maximizing scores (who selected that option to minimize worry and insecurity) and groups with low maximizing scores (who selected the irreversible version because they find it easy to make decisions or not worth the effort to change their minds). The group selecting the reversible version because of a desire for options fell in between those groups on the Maximization Scale.

These results suggested a possible curvilinear relationship between maximizing and reversibility preferences. I tested this possibility using a logistic regression predicting preferences for reversible versus irreversible options using maximizing and its quadratic term, both mean centered, as predictors. Results revealed that the model including both terms predicted reversibility preferences, χ²(2) = 8.47, p = .01, with the maximizing score significantly predicting preferences (B = 2.93, p = .04) and its quadratic term marginally predicting preferences (B = −.30, p = .06). These results suggest that, although there was an overall linear trend in which increasing maximizing scores predicted a heightened likelihood of preferring the reversible option, preferences for the irreversible option emerged again at the upper end of the maximizing scores.

Summary and Concluding Discussion

The present studies provide support for the hypothesis that maximizers and satisficers differ in their satisfaction with and preferences for reversible versus irreversible decisions. In Study 1, satisficers were more satisfied with their selection of a poster when it was a permanent choice rather than a changeable one, consistent with results obtained in several other studies of decision reversibility (Bullens et al., 2012; Frey et al., 1984; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). In contrast, maximizers showed the opposite pattern: Maximizers were more satisfied with their selection when it was a reversible rather than an irreversible choice. These results replicate and extend earlier findings that maximizers are less satisfied than satisficers with irreversible choices (Sparks et al., 2012). It is important to note that maximizers in the reversible condition and satisficers in the irreversible condition were equally satisfied with their selections. Previous research has found that maximization is associated with lower satisfaction with previous choices (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz et al., 2002), but the present results suggest that, when maximizers are told explicitly that they may alter their decision, they can be as satisfied with their choices as satisficers.

Study 2 presented a new group of participants with the outline of Study 1 and asked them to pick their preferences for the reversible versus irreversible versions of the study. This study replicated a previous finding (Sparks et al., 2012) that higher maximizing tendencies predict a preference for reversible decisions over irreversible decisions. Further, when groups of maximizers and satisficers were created by including roughly the top and bottom third of scorers on the Maximization Scale (as was done to create the maximizer and satisficer groups in Study 1), maximizers showed a preference for the reversible condition (62% vs. 38%), whereas satisficers showed a preference for the irreversible condition (56% vs. 44%). However, follow-up analyses indicated that, at the highest levels of maximizing, participants again showed a preference for the irreversible condition (this curvilinear relationship is addressed more shortly). Leaving aside that group of participants with very high maximizing tendencies, maximizers and satisficers generally predicted accurately which condition they would find more satisfying, based on the results of Study 1. These findings suggest that people sometimes may be better at predicting their emotional reactions to events that the affective forecasting literature would suggest. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of affective forecasting studies (Mathieu & Gosling, 2012) found that, when affective forecasting is assessed in a relative sense (i.e., how people will feel relative to others in future situations), rather than in an absolute sense, people are somewhat accurate in their affective forecasting.

The coding of participants’ rationales for their decision reversibility preferences revealed interesting patterns of motivations. Nearly all the participants preferring the reversible condition explained this preference in terms of the desire for choices, options, or the freedom to change their minds. In contrast to predictions that high maximizing would predict a stated preference for the reversible condition as a means of reducing regret and second-guessing, few participants elaborated on why choice, options, and freedom are desirable; perhaps they thought that the value of such things is assumed in their cultural context. Participants offering this rationale scored around the mean for the sample on maximizing.

Participants preferring the irreversible version offered a greater variety of explanations for this preference. One group indicated that irreversible decisions help them minimize insecurity, worry, or tendencies to second-guess themselves. Consistent with the literature linking maximizing tendencies with negative affect, the participants possessing this motivation scored high on maximizing, and the existence of this group may account for the curvilinear relationship between maximizing and reversibility preferences (with some people very high on maximizing preferring an irreversible decision). In contrast, other groups of participants chose the irreversible condition because they see themselves as confident in decision making or as unwilling to exert effort to reverse their decisions over a trivial choice. Not surprisingly, these participants scored low on maximizing and could be described as satisficers. These findings on participants’ rationales for their preferences show that the relationships between maximizing and preferences for decision reversibility are complex. Although most maximizers prefer reversible decisions, other, more extreme maximizers recognize that final decisions may offer them a useful strategy for coping with negative emotions. Some satisficers feel confident in their decision-making skills and thus prefer irreversible decisions, whereas others are lured by the options and choices offered by reversible decisions.

Several directions for future research seem promising. First, the findings from Study 1 should be examined across other decision-making contexts to determine the robustness of the finding that maximizers are more satisfied with their reversible choices. I used the poster selection paradigm so that the results could be compared to the original Gilbert and Ebert (2002) study, but future work should examine new decision-making paradigms. Few studies have been conducted on the topic of satisfaction with reversible versus irreversible decisions, and this is an issue worthy of more research attention. Second, it will be helpful to explore maximizers’ and satisficers’ long-term satisfaction with reversible versus irreversible decisions. The present study assessed satisfaction after only a 15-min delay, so it is not clear whether the findings would hold long term. Maximizers may not remain satisfied with their reversible choices after a longer period. Further, maximizers’ avoidance of commitment (Sparks et al., 2012) may have negative long-term consequences for their satisfaction, particularly with significant decisions (e.g., choices about jobs or relationships). Third, although previous research supports the possibility that maximizers may be more satisfied with reversible decisions because those decisions satisfy maximizers’ desires to manage anticipated regret, it would be helpful for future research to test possible mediators of this process more explicitly. Fourth, maximizing involves several underlying dimensions—tendencies to search broadly for options, struggle with making decisions, and maintain high standards (Nenkov, Morrin, Ward, Schwartz, & Hulland, 2008); it would be informative to test whether it is only the first two of these that shape responses to reversible versus irreversible decisions (low internal consistencies for the maximizing subscales prevented investigation of this possibility in the present study). Fifth, the findings on participants’ rationales for their decision-making preferences encourage future work on how people’s individual differences lead them to develop explicit strategies for approaching decisions. Taken together, the present findings serve as a reminder that individual differences are likely to moderate even robust patterns of decision making and affective forecasting.

Rationale for Preferring Reversible Versus Irreversible Study Version	% Total Sample	M Maximizing Score/Percentile
Prefer reversible
A reversible decision offers options or the opportunity to change one’s mind	54.0%	4.51^a (.72) 53rd percentile
Prefer irreversible
Final decisions help the participant minimize worry or prevent second-guessing	9.6%	4.87^b (.94) 74th percentile
Final decisions are preferable	8.1%	4.31^ac (.67) 46th percentile
The participant would not want to reverse such a trivial decision	12.6%	4.12^cd (.87) 33rd percentile
The participant is good at making decisions	8.1%	3.75^d (1.03) 20th percentile

Footnotes

Acknowledgment

The author thanks Stephen Behymer, Victoria Filler, and Elisa Payne for assistance with study design and data collection.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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