Culture,Fixed-World Beliefs,Relationships,and Perceptions of Identity Change

Abstract

Personal identity continuity has been a focus of much philosophical inquiry, yet lay perceptions of identity continuity and their psychological bases are not well understood. We hypothesize that cultural differences in lay beliefs about the fixedness of the world promote different intuitions about identity continuity: People from a society with rigid social systems should perceive more identity discontinuity when a person’s social relationships (vs. internal traits) change, whereas those from a society with more flexible social systems should perceive the reverse. We tested this hypothesis by comparing fixed-world beliefs and perceptions of identity discontinuity in India and the United States. Results of two studies (N = 863) showed that Indians perceived more identity discontinuity than Americans when relationships (vs. internal traits) changed, which was explained by Indians’ stronger fixed-world beliefs. Moreover, in Study 2, cultural differences in perceived identity discontinuity mediated cultural differences in trust when a target’s relationships (vs. internal traits) changed.

Keywords

identity continuity fixed-world beliefs lay theories relationships culture

Suppose that you wake up some day to discover that, although you still think, feel, and act the same as you always have, your friends and family suddenly start treating you very differently. Would you say that you are now a changed person? Your answer may depend on your cultural worldview, in particular, the expectations about social change that your culture promotes. If your culture has relatively rigid social roles and relationships, then you may rely on your social positioning to define your identity and conclude that you are a changed person. On the other hand, if your culture has relatively fluid social roles and relationships, then you may rely on internal attributes to define identity and conclude that you are the same person.

For centuries, influential thinkers have considered thought experiments like this to debate which features of the self are critical for determining the temporal continuity of personal identity (e.g., Fred, 1991; Parfit, 1971). Western theories have emphasized internal essences, including subjective conscious experience, the ego, and the “soul.” This work has often suggested that change in such essential internal characteristics could threaten the perceived continuity of someone’s identity. Recently, psychologists have started investigating laypeople’s intuitions about what types of changes have the potential to alter someone’s identity, making them into a different person, and again their focus has been on changes in internal attributes. For instance, Americans tend to judge changes in moral and personality traits (e.g., psychopathy, shyness) as the most indicative of identity discontinuity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Perceived identity discontinuity draws wide interest across disciplines because of its crucial and diverse psychological implications. It signifies the impacts of life transitions or traumatic experiences and motivates diverse psychological processes, including nostalgia, cultural adjustment, and self-harm (e.g., Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, Hallett, & Marcia, 2003).

The notion that identity continuity depends on some unchanging internal essence is prominent in Western traditions. However, other cultural contexts seem to promote the idea that identity continuity is rooted in enduring attributions to the social environment (Su et al., 1999). Specifically, we propose that cultures, which have more rigid social roles and binding relationship ties should encourage people to believe social relationships are fixed and enduring. Therefore, changes in someone’s relationships would have the potential to threaten the perceived continuity of that person’s identity.

Indian society is an example of a highly rigid social system that might promote the belief in fixed social relations. Indian culture emphasizes the enduringness of relationships in many ways. India’s traditional caste system “stamps an individual [with a certain role] from birth” and in such system “one’s status, social relations are fixed” (Ram, 2014, p. 142). People living in such rigid social systems may share the belief that one’s external relationships (e.g., social roles and ties) are relatively enduring qualities that can serve as meaningful coordinates to define a person’s identity. Therefore, changes in someone’s relationships would have the potential to threaten the temporal continuity of their self. Some ethnographic observations support this idea. For example, traditional Indian practices that treat widowhood as a state of “social death” (Chakravarti, 1995) illustrate how the loss of social ties can compromise continuity of personal identity in this cultural context. Chakravarti (1995) writes, “once a woman ceases to be a wife (especially a childless wife) she ceases to be a ‘person’—she is neither a daughter nor a daughter-in-law” (p. 2248). Even outside a caste system, other social factors seem to maintain modern India as a rigid social system with enduring relationship qualities, such as low social mobility and strong social norms (e.g., low residential mobility, arranged marriage; e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011). To the extent that external relationships are expected to be the stable, defining elements of one’s identity, any significant changes in these features have the potential to disrupt the perceived continuity of identity perhaps even more so than changes in internal traits would.

By contrast, societies with strong libertarian traditions emphasizing individual rights may lead people to see their social reality as malleable. Take the United States as an example. Compared to India and many other Asian countries, U.S. culture emphasizes individuals’ uniqueness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Savani, Morris, & Naidu, 2012) and their autonomy to opt into or out of social roles and relationships (Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010). People raised in flexible social systems like the United States may believe that individuals have the agency to shape their social world as they see fit (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Heine, 2001). Indeed, the United States has the highest world protest rate (The Occupy Directory, 2015), which arguably reflects Americans’ conviction that their world can be changed. As a result of growing up in a cultural setting that emphasizes flexible social arrangements, Americans may expect changes in external relationships as a matter of course. Unlike Indians, Americans thus should not view such external changes as undermining a person’s identity continuity. However, in the U.S. cultural context, dramatic changes in someone’s internal traits should be considered identity threatening because such changes may alter the perceived essential substance of the self.

Variability in laypeople’s belief that the social world has an unchanging, entity-like character is captured by a psychological construct known as the “fixed world” theory (Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 2009; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). People who subscribe to a fixed (vs. malleable) world theory typically expect individuals to adjust actively their internal psychological characteristics to fit into their social environment (Chen et al., 2009; Morling & Evered, 2006; Yang & Hong, 2010). Scholars have proposed that people from different cultures could vary in their endorsement of a fixed-world theory. However, only one study has indirectly explored such cultural variations (e.g., Chen et al., 2009), comparing East Asians and North Americans. Moreover, how fixed-world beliefs would affect perceived identity continuity remains unknown. The present studies aim to address these questions.

Furthermore, we explored whether one’s identity continuity has downstream social consequences, in particular, by affecting interpersonal trust. The stability of a person forms a core foundation of interpersonal trust (i.e. integrity; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). We speculate that perceived identity discontinuity would undermine the person’s trustworthiness because someone whose identity changes should seem relatively unpredictable. Furthermore, trust research suggests that trust antecedents are culture specific (e.g., influenced to different degrees by social roles, norms), but little is known about their mechanisms (see Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010). Drawing on this prior research, it is possible that due to their stronger fixed-world beliefs, Indians (compared to Americans) perceive more identity discontinuity in targets whose external relationships change and, in turn, trust that person less than they trust someone whose internal traits had changed.

Research Overview

We test whether cultures differ in fixed-world beliefs and how these differences inform perceptions of identity change. We compare people from India and the United States as representatives of societies with more and less rigid social systems (Gelfand et al., 2011). We hypothesize that Indians, compared to Americans, would endorse stronger fixed-world beliefs. Moreover, we hypothesize that Indians, having stronger fixed-world beliefs, perceive changes in people’s external relationships to be more identity altering than changes in their internal traits and vice versa for Americans. We tested these predictions by measuring fixed-world beliefs and examining whether these beliefs mediate cultural differences in a target’s perceived identity discontinuity and interact with the type of change (internal vs. external). In Study 2, we also measured the downstream effects on perceived trustworthiness. Comparing Indian and American participants also enabled us to use English-language materials for both samples, eliminating language confounds (e.g., Grossmann & Na, 2014; Harzing, 2006).

Study 1

Methods

Participants and Procedure

We recruited participants through Mechanical Turk© (MTurk; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) to complete an online survey for US$0.50. We set the location restriction to be only the United States and India. A statistically significant small-to-medium interaction effect (i.e. η _p ² = .03 and p = .05) would require around 140 people per culture to attain 80% power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). To be conservative, our goal was to collect at least 200 participants per culture to ensure sufficient power for analysis; however, we expected missing data or careless responses, so we recruited at least 300 from each culture, 643 responses in total. We ensured English-language comprehension by examining responses to open-ended questions, excluding 76 participants (90% of those were Indians), resulting in a final N = 567. Among these, 241 were Indians (92 females; M _age = 27.96) living in India and 326 were Americans residing in the United States (141 females; M _age = 27.48). Table 1 compares demographic characteristics vis-à-vis national averages for adults: Our samples were more educated than the national average. The Indian samples also have slightly more males and Christians than the national census. The American samples are in general younger and less religious than the national average.

Table 1.
Indian and U.S. Demographics in National Adult Censuses, and Study 1 and Study 2 Samples.

Indians Americans

Census Study 1 Study 2 Census Study 1 Study 2

Median Aage 36 28 30 45 27 28

Male (%) 58.7 60.6 63.0 47.6 56.7 49.0

Education Attainment (%)

Middle school/High school 25.0 0.4 0.7 33.5 12.9 9.0

Some college 4.4 7.9 8.5 21.8 36.8 40.0

Completed college 45.6 52.9 43.6 32.6 42.0 38.1

Graduate studies 25.0 38.8 47.2 12.2 8.3 12.9

Religion (%)

Hinduism 80.6 72.2 66.2 0.7 0.9 1.9

Islam 13.1 11.6 14.1 0.7 0.6 0.6

Christianity/Catholic 2.4 10.0 14.8 70.6 27.3 31.0

Nonreligious 0.2 0.4 2.1 22.8 58.3 47.7

Other 3.7 5.8 2.8 5.2 12.9 18.7

Note. In Study 1, three participants did not report their age and gender, and one participant did not report education level. In Study 2, one participant did not report educational attainment. Median age census scores are based on total population estimates. Male % = percentage of male. Education attainment = percentage distribution of the highest education level within the sample. National education attainment statistics included adults with middle school education or above because middle school is compulsory in both countries and adults without middle school represent subpopulations that are very distinct from the national averages. Religion = percentage distribution of religious groups within the sample. India’s national demographics are based on the most recent India Census (2011), and the U.S. national demographics are based on the latest data from U.S. Census Bureau (2014), Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Flood, King, Ruggles, & Warren, 2015), and Pew Research Center (2014).

Fixed-World Beliefs

Participants first completed the 3-item fixed-world belief measure we created from the entity person theory scale (Chiu et al., 1997; ) (e.g., “The environment one lives in cannot be changed very much.” from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree; see the items in supplemental online material [SOM]). Items were averaged into a single index (α_U.S. = .82, α_India = .78).

Fixed-Person Beliefs

To explore whether fixed-world beliefs have a discriminant prediction of identity continuity over fixed-person beliefs and whether the prior relation is moderated by fixed-person beliefs, we asked participants to complete a 3-item entity person theory scale (e.g., “Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much that they can do to really change that.” from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = Strongly Agree; α_U.S. = .91, α_India = .77; Chiu et al., 1997).

Types of Change

Past research has shown that valence can moderate self-evaluation (e.g., Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014); therefore, we included valence as a factor in our model, resulting in a 2 (type of change: internal traits vs. external relationships) × 2 (valence of the change: positive vs. negative) between-subject design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Each condition had three scenarios. Each scenario described a gender-matched person undergoing a major life change, selecting culture-typical male and female names (see examples subsequently and all scenarios in SOM). In each scenario, the protagonist either experienced change in external relations and stability in internal traits, or change in internal traits and stability in external relations. Underlined text substituted by the text in the brackets in the positive change conditions:
In the past, Ryan was a polite and pleasant [rude and unpleasant] person. Now, he has become more rude and inconsiderate [polite and warm]. However, his relationships with his family and friends have remained the same throughout his life. As they always have, they continue to treat him coldly and do not spend time with him [warmly and spend time with him as they always have]. (Internal traits change)

Throughout his life, Ryan has always been a polite and pleasant person, and he still is today. In the past his family and friends were warm towards him and liked to spend time with him [treated him coldly and did not spend time with him]. Now, his relationship with his family and friends has become worse [improved]. They have become cold towards him and do not like spending time with him anymore [They are warmer and spend more time with him than they did in the past].” (External relationships change)

Perceived Identity Discontinuity

For each scenario, we probed participants’ perceptions of identity discontinuity with 2 items—“To what extent is [target’s name] [the same person/a different person] as he or she was before the described incident?” (both on the scale of 1 = Not at all to 5 = Completely). This design allows the exploration of cultural differences in response styles (e.g., acquiescence bias; Grossmann & Na, 2014). Indeed, Indians viewed the 2 items as significantly less opposing, r = −.54, than U.S. Americans did, r = −.79, p < .001. To control for such group differences, one proposed solution is to examine relative scores (see Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). Notably, because our samples differed in the magnitude of the association between the 2 items, we did not use difference scores. Instead, we regressed identity discontinuity scores on ratings of identity continuity and saved residuals for subsequent analyses (see Rogosa, Brandt, & Zimowski, 1982). This way, higher residual scores indicated perceptions of identity discontinuity (vs. continuity) that were not confounded by response styles and, critically, did not assume the same degree of opposition between items across cultures. The resulting scores showed a small-to-moderate range of bivariate correlations across three distinct scenarios within each condition, internal change: r _U.S. = .17–.33, ps < .04, r _Indians = .30–.37 ps < .001; external change: r _U.S. = .27–.46, ps < .001, r _Indians = .25–.34, ps < .01. For the sake of parsimony, we used averaged standardized residual scores within each type of change condition in subsequent analyses (see SOM for additional results by scenario).

Results

Unlike past research (Newman et al., 2014), valence of change did not predict differences in perceived identity discontinuity, F < 1, p = .83, nor did it influence the effect of culture or type of change, Fs < 1, ps > .77. Therefore, subsequent analyses have included valence only as a control. Men (M = .01, SD = .69) and younger participants perceived more identity discontinuity than women (M = −.12, SD = .69), F _gender = 5.87, p = .03, η _p ² = .01, and older participants, B = −.01, standard error [SE] = .01, t(562) = −2.05, p = .04, η _p ² = .01. Indians reported having completed more years of college (M = 3.31, SD = .88), than Americans (M = 2.48, SD = .65), F(1, 564) = 152.50, p < .001, η _p ² = .21.

Results of a between-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated a significant Culture × Type of Change interaction, F(1, 563) = 10.94, p = .001, η _p ² = .02. As Figure 1 indicates, Indians perceived more identity discontinuity when the change was external than when it was internal, t(564) = 2.27, p = .02, η _p ² = .02, whereas the opposite was found for Americans, t(564) = −2.33, p = .02, η _p ² = .02 (see SOM for detailed analyses).

Figure 1.
Study 1 estimates of perceived identity discontinuity as a function of culture and type of change.

We predicted that participants from the two cultures would differ in fixed-world beliefs, and such difference would explain why Indians perceived more identity discontinuity when external (vs. internal) characteristics had changed, whereas Americans would show the reverse pattern. Because of the between-subject design, we tested these hypotheses using the bootstrapping approach of moderated mediation with 1000 bootstrap samples described by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007). This analysis included a regression test for the effect of culture on fixed-world beliefs, along with a test for the mediating effect of fixed-world beliefs on perceived identity discontinuity at the two levels of change type (see Figure 2). As predicted, Indians in general endorsed stronger fixed-world beliefs (M = 4.30, SD = 1.08) compared to Americans (M = 3.45, SD = 1.32), B = 1.54, SE = .10, t(565) = 15.67, p < .0001, 95%confidence interval (CI) [1.35, 1.73]. Fixed-world beliefs in turn mediated the effect of culture on perceived identity discontinuity, B = .05, SE = .03, t(562) = 1.97, p = .049, 95%CI [.0001, .11]. This indirect effect was conditional on the type of change. As Figure 2 indicates, the effect of fixed-world beliefs on perceived identity discontinuity was moderated by the type of change, B = .09, SE = .04, t(562) = 2.02, p = .043, 95%CI [.0003, .18]. We observed that fixed-world beliefs explained a significant amount of variance in the relationship between culture and perceived identity discontinuity when the change was external, B = .15, SE = .06, 95%CI [.04,.26], but not when the change was internal, B = .01, SE = .07, 95%CI [−.12, .13]. A test of equality comparing the two conditional indirect effects (Hayes, 2015) suggested that they significantly differed from each other, t(562) = 1.70, p = .044.

Figure 2.
Moderated mediation analysis of the effect of culture via fixed-world beliefs on perceived identity discontinuity (Study 1). Estimates are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors reported in the brackets. p ≤ .001, p ≤ .01, and p < .05.

Fixed-person beliefs did not mediate the cultural difference, t < 1, p = .47, and neither moderated the effect of fixed-world beliefs, t < 1, p = .89, nor undermined the significance of the mediation model when entered as a control variable, indicating that fixed-world beliefs explained unique cultural influence on identity continuity. In sum, Study 1 provides evidence in support of our hypotheses that compared to Americans, Indians have stronger fixed-world beliefs. Moreover, preliminary evidence suggests that Indians’ stronger fixed-world beliefs partially account for their tendency to consider changes in someone’s external relationships to be more identity altering compared to changes in their internal psychological attributes. Main patterns of results remained identical even when controlling for age, gender, and level of education, Fs < 1.67, ps > .20.

Study 2

In Study 2, we aimed to replicate the Study 1 results. In addition, we explored whether cultural differences in perceived identity discontinuity have downstream effects on a person’s perceived trustworthiness. To the extent that Indians (vs. Americans) perceive more identity discontinuity in targets whose external relationships (vs. internal attributes) changed, Indians may, in turn, trust such a person less than they would trust someone whose internal traits changed.

We also refined our methodology in Study 2. First, we ramdomized the order in which internal and external characteristics were presented. We did this to eliminate an alternative explanation that the effect was driven by the way we described internal and external characteristics in the scenario. Second, we employed a within-subject design to minimize further response biases (see Fischer, 2004; Gudykunst et al., 1992).

Methods

Participant and Procedure

We used the effect size of the interaction and average intercorrelation of the scenarios from Study 1 as estimates for necessary power. For a within-subject design, we would need around 55 people per culture to attain a statistically significant effect with 80% power (Faul et al., 2009). To be conservative, we aimed to have at least 100 participants from each culture. Using the same recruitment protocol as Study 1, we recruited 315 participants from MTurk. We excluded 19 (80% Indians) respondents because of missing data or incomprehensible responses to a comprehension check question. In the final sample of 296 participants, 142 were Indians (52 females; M _age = 29.02) residing in India and 154 were Americans residing in the United States (78 females; M _age = 27.49). The demographics of the samples are very similar to those in Study 1 (see Table 1). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions with a 2 within-subject (types of change: internal vs. external) × 2 between-subject (valence of change: positive vs. negative) design.

Types of Change

Scenarios were similar to those in Study 1 except the presentation order of the information about internal and external characteristics was randomized within each scenario. Each participant read a series of six different vignettes.

Perceived Identity Discontinuity

We used the same measures as in Study 1, with higher overall scores indicating more perceived identity discontinuity. The measures demonstrated acceptable internal consistency with moderate intercorrelations across scenarios (internal change: r _U.S. = .30–.44, r _Indians = .37–.46; external change: r _U.S. = .22–.44, r _Indians = .41–.46; ps < .006). Replicating Study 1 results, Indians viewed the 2 items as significantly less opposing (r = −.23) than U.S. Americans did (r = −.71), p < .001. Therefore, we again used averaged standardized residual scores within each type of change condition in the subsequent analyses (see SOM for additional results).

Trust

For each scenario, participants reported trust toward the target by assessing a set of 4 adjectives used in past research (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Participants rated how much they thought the person is “sincere,” “trustworthy,” “dishonest,” and “untrustworthy” from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. The ratings for the last two were reverse coded. Further, we calculated average trust scores for the internal (α_U.S. = .84; α_Indians = .87) and external (α_U.S. = .87; α_Indians = .87) change conditions.

Fixed-World and Fixed-Person Beliefs

Participants completed the same 3-item fixed-world belief measure described in Study 1 supplemented with 3 items from the Perceived Malleability of the World Scale (Dweck et al., 1995). Scores across these 6 items showed high reliability (α_U.S. = .88; α_Indians = .84) and were averaged for subsequent analyses (see SOM for the items and factor analysis). We measured fixed-person beliefs as in Study 1 (α_U.S. = .93; α_Indians = .69).

Results

Valence of change again did not predict differences in perceived identity discontinuity, F < 1, p = .50, nor did it moderate the effect of culture or type of change, Fs < 1, ps > .50. Therefore, subsequent analyses have included valence only as a control. Women (M = .08, SD = .64) perceived more identity discontinuity than men (M = −.06, SD = .65), F = 3.56, p = .06, η _p ² = .01. Age was not significantly related to perceived identity discontinuity, B = .01, SE = .01, t(296) = 1.41, p = .16. Indians reported having completed more years of college (M = 3.40, SD = .72), compared to Americans (M = 2.57, SD = .89), F(1, 295) = 77.11, p < .001, η _p ² = .21.

A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a significant Culture × Type of Change interaction, F(1, 294) = 17.91, p < .001, η _p ² = .06. As Figure 3 indicates, Indians perceived more identity discontinuity when the change was external compared to when it was internal, t(295) = 3.31, p = .001, η _p ² = .07, and this pattern was reversed for Americans, t(295) = −2.71, p = .007, η _p ² = .05 (see SOM for detailed analyses).

Figure 3.
Study 2 estimates of perceived identity discontinuity as a function of culture and type of change.

We predicted that participants from the two cultures would differ in fixed-world beliefs, and such difference would explain why Indians perceive more identity discontinuity when the target’s external (vs. internal) characteristics changed while Americans perceive the reverse. Replicating Study 1, Indians in general endorsed stronger fixed-world beliefs (M = 4.02, SD = 1.00) compared to Americans (M = 2.82, SD = 1.03), B = 1.20, SE = .12, t(294) = 10.11, p < .001, 95%CI [.97, 1.43]. Because of a within-subject design for the type of change conditions, we tested the mediating effect of fixed-world beliefs on perceived identity discontinuity for external changes over internal changes. We subtracted each participant’s perceived identity discontinuity scores for internal changes from those for external changes to use as the identity discontinuity-dependent variable, with higher scores reflecting the stronger perception of identity discontinuity when changes are external. Fixed-world beliefs predicted the effect of culture on perceived identity discontinuity, B = .13, SE = .04, t(293) = 3.03, p = .003, 95%CI [.05, .22]. Using the bootstrapping approach of mediation, the indirect effect of fixed-world beliefs as a mediator was also significant, B = .15, SE = .06, 95%CI [.04,.28].

Finally, we explored the relation between perceived identity discontinuity and trust. Again, difference scores were created by subtracting the average trust scores toward the target in internal change scenarios from external change scenarios, with higher scores reflecting more trust when the change was external. The trust difference scores were negatively associated with perceived identity discontinuity and fixed-world beliefs, r(296) = −.23 and −.21, ps < .001. Using the bootstrapping approach of mediation, we conducted a serial mediation in which we added trust as the final dependent variable after identity change perceptions.

As Figure 4 indicates, perceived identity discontinuity predicted less trust, B = −.17, SE = .06, t(292) = −3.05, p = .003, 95%CI [−.28, −.06]. The serial indirect effect of culture via fixed-world beliefs and then identity change on trust was significant, B = −.03, SE = .01, 95%CI [−.06, −.01]. Altogether, this suggested that Indians, compared to Americans, perceived more identity discontinuity when the change was external (vs. internal) because of their stronger view that the social environment is unlikely to change. This cultural difference in identity discontinuity perception, in turn, explained why Indians would trust a person less when he or she experienced external (vs. internal) changes.

Figure 4.
Serial mediation model for the effect of culture on trust via fixed-world beliefs and perceived identity discontinuity (Study 2). Estimates are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors reported in the brackets. p ≤ .001, p ≤ .01, and p < .05.

Similar to Study 1, fixed-person beliefs did not mediate the cultural difference (t = 1.02, p = .31) and neither moderated the effect of fixed-world beliefs (t = 1.27, p = .21) nor undermined the significance of the mediation model when entered as a control variable. Main patterns of results remained the same even when controlling for age, gender, and education, Fs < 1.11, ps > .30.

Discussion

Across two experiments, we found consistent evidence that Indians when compared to Americans perceived that a person’s identity would change more if external relations (vs. internal traits) were altered. This cross-cultural difference was to some degree explained by Indians’ (vs. Americans’) stronger fixed-world beliefs. Also, we explored the downstream effects on perceived trustworthiness and found that cultural differences in perceived identity discontinuity mediated cultural differences in perceived trustworthiness. To our knowledge, this research is the first to demonstrate that cultural differences in lay beliefs that the world is fixed (vs. malleable) predict perceived identity discontinuity. It is also worth noting that we observed this cultural difference regardless of whether the change involved improvement or decline and people’s beliefs about the fixedness of personality.

Our research contributes to the literature on identity continuity by highlighting that people from different cultures may have different intuitions about what features of the self are essential for maintaining identity continuity. While Western philosophical discussions and recent psychological investigations (e.g., Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) have focused on continuity of internal essences as the source of identity continuity, our findings suggest that in other cultural contexts continuity of relational qualities may be a more compelling intuitive basis for identity continuity. It is also noteworthy that, overall, Indians perceived more identity discontinuity than Americans. Consistent with prior theorizing (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997), this may indicate that Americans have a stronger presumption that personal identity is continuous over time. Furthermore, when the target’s internal characteristics changed, Indians perceived as much (Study 1) or slightly more (Study 2) identity discontinuity as Americans did. Notably, the magnitude of a cultural difference in perception of identity was particularly large when the person’s external relationships changed.

The observed relationship between cultural differences in identity continuity and interpersonal trust further contributed to the culture and trust literature by providing a new culture-specific predictor of trust—external relationship stability. Perceivers trust a person less to the extent that they perceive less temporal continuity in their identity. The belief in a fixed world is the mechanism explaining why people in cultures with rigid social systems would trust a person less when that person’s external relationships (vs. internal traits) have changed.

Other cultural dimensions such as individualism/collectivism, tightness/looseness, or uncertainty avoidance also contribute to the rigidity of social systems. A fruitful direction for future research would be to explore whether fixed-world beliefs explain the effect of these cultural dimensions and compare multiple possible mechanisms by which fixed-world beliefs influence perceived identity continuity. For instance, fixed-world beliefs can affect perceived identity continuity through influencing people’s models of self (Chiu & Hong, 1999). People with stronger fixed-world beliefs may endorse an interdependent model of self and use social relationships as core definitions of the self (Su et al., 1999). Therefore, when their relationships have changed, people who endorse strong fixed-world beliefs would experience a change in the content of their self-definition and hence strong perceived identity discontinuity.

It is also possible that fixed-world beliefs influence perceived identity continuity indirectly by influencing the perceived interdependent agency of the self (Chiu & Hong, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Su et al., 1999). People with an interdependent model of agency may expect individuals to adjust themselves to fit into their social environment, instead of adjusting their social environment to fit themselves (Morling & Evered, 2006). As a result of social relationship changes, people who endorse strong fixed-world beliefs may believe that they need to change themselves to fit into the new environment. Perceived identity discontinuity could then be the by-product of these dynamic self-adjustment processes.

The present research aimed to use heterogeneous scenarios. While analyzing each scenario separately yielded very similar patterns of results compared to the analyses of the averages (see SOM), these scenarios showed variability in the identity discontinuity scores. Future work may explore whether social psychological factors systematically account for this variability. For example, changes in close relationships may be more identity altering than changes in work relationships. Another limitation of our research is the generalizability of our samples to Indian and American populations at large. As Table 1 indicates, our Indian samples appear to be more similar to the U.S. samples than the Indian population is, suggesting that our research may underestimate the magnitude of cultural differences in social perception. This might be why some effects captured by a between-subjects design (Study 1) were relatively small and had wide CIs. Future research will benefit from generalizing the observed effects across more heterogeneous populations from India, the United States, and other countries.

Conclusion

Western philosophical traditions and psychological accounts of personal identity emphasize inner qualities as the essential characteristics that define temporal continuity of identity. The current research challenges this emphasis on internal traits by showing that cultural differences in fixed-world beliefs explain the extent to which people perceive relationship changes to be identity-altering. These findings illuminate new directions for understanding cultural differences in assumptions about the basis of personal identity and have theoretical implications across disciplines.

	Indians	Americans
Median Aage	36	28	30	45	27	28
Male (%)	58.7	60.6	63.0	47.6	56.7	49.0
Education Attainment (%)
Middle school/High school	25.0	0.4	0.7	33.5	12.9	9.0
Some college	4.4	7.9	8.5	21.8	36.8	40.0
Completed college	45.6	52.9	43.6	32.6	42.0	38.1
Graduate studies	25.0	38.8	47.2	12.2	8.3	12.9
Religion (%)
Hinduism	80.6	72.2	66.2	0.7	0.9	1.9
Islam	13.1	11.6	14.1	0.7	0.6	0.6
Christianity/Catholic	2.4	10.0	14.8	70.6	27.3	31.0
Nonreligious	0.2	0.4	2.1	22.8	58.3	47.7
Other	3.7	5.8	2.8	5.2	12.9	18.7

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

We thank Nina Strohminger for advice on the manuscript and Fizza Jafry for research assistance.

Authors’ Note

I.G. and R.E. designed Study 1; all authors designed Study 2; I.G. performed Study 1 and F. K. performed Study 2; F. K. and I. G. analyzed data; and all authors wrote the paper.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research were supported by the Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship (to F. K.) and the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight Grant (to I.G.).

Supplemental Material

The online supplements are available at .

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	Indians			Americans
	Census	Study 1	Study 2	Census	Study 1	Study 2
Median Aage	36	28	30	45	27	28
Male (%)	58.7	60.6	63.0	47.6	56.7	49.0
Education Attainment (%)
Middle school/High school	25.0	0.4	0.7	33.5	12.9	9.0
Some college	4.4	7.9	8.5	21.8	36.8	40.0
Completed college	45.6	52.9	43.6	32.6	42.0	38.1
Graduate studies	25.0	38.8	47.2	12.2	8.3	12.9
Religion (%)
Hinduism	80.6	72.2	66.2	0.7	0.9	1.9
Islam	13.1	11.6	14.1	0.7	0.6	0.6
Christianity/Catholic	2.4	10.0	14.8	70.6	27.3	31.0
Nonreligious	0.2	0.4	2.1	22.8	58.3	47.7
Other	3.7	5.8	2.8	5.2	12.9	18.7