Populism as Identity Politics

Abstract

Populists combine anti-elitism with a conviction that they hold a superior vision of what it means to be a true citizen of their nation. We expected support for populism to be associated with national collective narcissism—an unrealistic belief in the greatness of the national group, which should increase in response to perceived in-group disadvantage. In Study 1 (Polish participants; n = 1,007), national collective narcissism predicted support for the populist Law and Justice party. In the experimental Study 2 (British participants; n = 497), perceived long-term in-group disadvantage led to greater support for Brexit and this relationship was accounted for by national collective narcissism. In Study 3 (American participants; n = 403), group relative deprivation predicted support for Donald Trump and this relationship was accounted for by national collective narcissism. These associations were present even when we controlled for conventional national identification. We discuss implications of the link between collective narcissism and support for populism.

Keywords

populism collective narcissism in-group disadvantage relative deprivation

On October 25, 2015, Law and Justice, a national-conservative party, won the parliamentary election in Poland. On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union (EU). On November 8, 2016, Americans elected Trump for president. All these votes were in favor of nationalist populist ideas. According to Müller (2016), “populism is always a form of identity politics” (p. 3). He argues that populists combine anti-elitism with a conviction that they hold a morally superior vision of what it means to be a true citizen of their nation. Thus, despite its anti-establishment rhetoric, national populism seems to promote commitment to a group that needs recognition as the only legitimate representation of “the people.” Accordingly, any opposition to the populist agenda is condemned as a threat to national interests. In this article, we propose that construing such a defensive national identity can arise as a compensation for feelings of in-group disadvantage.

Although it was initially thought that poor economic conditions might be responsible for the recent rise of populism (Hernandez & Kriesi, 2015; Sides & Tesler, 2016), evidence for the role of economic hardship is mixed. There is some evidence that low-income households support the ruling Law and Justice party in Poland (Roguska, 2016), yet in the U.S. household income seems to play a minimal role in predicting support for Trump (Rothwell & Diego-Rosell, 2016). However, objective indices of material wealth might not accurately reflect how people experience their relative standing in the broader social system. Perceptions of relative deprivation capture a belief that one receives less than others or, raising this to the collective level, that one’s group receives less than members of other groups (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Such subjective perceptions might be better predictors of support for populist movements than objective indices of group status.

In line with this reasoning, Pettigrew (2017) suggested that support for Trump’s populism was associated with feelings that one’s group is in some way disadvantaged relative to others. He wrote: “Trump adherents feel deprived relative to what they expected to possess at this point in their lives and relative to what they erroneously perceive other ‘less deserving’ groups have acquired” (p. 111). In a similar vein, empirical research in Poland demonstrated that feelings of relative deprivation were indeed associated with support for Law and Justice (Winiewski, Jurczyszyn, Bilewicz, & Beneda, 2015). Furthermore, Mols and Jetten (2016) demonstrated that populist leaders can present situations of objective relative gratification (i.e., being relatively better off than others) under the guise of relative deprivation to manipulate the public. Such perceptions create feelings of injustice and resentment toward out-groups, including immigrants who might be perceived as threatening the disadvantaged group's interests (e.g., Cramer, 2016; Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013; Mols & Jetten, 2016). They might also kindle desires to glorify an allegedly deprived in-group.

A conviction that one’s group is disadvantaged relative to others might then be reflected in the way in which populists promote national identity. Specifically, it might foster defensive ideas about the in-group’s worth, which lacks acknowledgement from others. A belief in a great yet unappreciated in-group might help compensate for a threat one would experience admitting that the in-group deserves its disadvantage position (see Adorno, 1998; Fromm, 1973). Such a form of in-group positivity is captured by the concept of collective narcissism—an unrealistic belief in in-group’s greatness contingent on external validation (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). Collective narcissism extends the concept of individual narcissism to the group level of analysis. While individual narcissism predicts interpersonal aggressiveness, collective narcissism predicts negative intergroup attitudes, especially toward groups perceived as threatening (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; cf. Cichocka, Dhont, & Makwana, 2017). For example, collective narcissism predicted prejudice toward undocumented immigrants in the Unites States (Lyons, Coursey, & Kenworthy, 2013) and Jews in Poland (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). Collective narcissism tends to correlate with measures of conventional in-group positivity (such as in-group identification; Leach et al., 2008; or collective self-esteem; Luhtanen & Crocker 1992), as these concepts also reflect positive in-group evaluation. Yet, they have different consequences. When narcissistic and conventional in-group positivity are considered together as predictors of intergroup attitudes, collective narcissism predicts prejudice, while nonnarcissistic in-group positivity predicts less negative attitudes (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Collective narcissism is also associated with perceptions of other groups conspiring against the in-group (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016)—a belief often accompanying any failures of populist governments (Müller, 2016).

Past empirical work also suggests that collective narcissism might be a way to compensate feelings of in-group disadvantage. For example, collective narcissism was associated with perceived group relative deprivation. In a study conducted in the United Kingdom, ethnic collective narcissism among Blacks was associated with a stronger conviction that Blacks were deprived relative to Whites (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2009) theorized that relative deprivation might increase collective narcissism among the deprived in-group. Thus, collective narcissism may stem from feelings of resentment about the in-group’s disadvantaged position (see Cramer, 2016).

We expected collective narcissism to increase as a consequence of perceived in-group disadvantage and to account for the association between in-group disadvantage and support for populist ideas. We tested these predictions in three contexts. In Study 1, we examined the association between national collective narcissism (vs. identification) and support for the Law and Justice party in Poland. In Study 2, we manipulated in-group disadvantage and examined its consequence for national collective narcissism (vs. identification) and support for Brexit in the United Kingdom. We then tested whether collective narcissism accounted for the association between in-group disadvantage and support for Brexit. In Study 3, conducted in the United States, we examined whether national collective narcissism (vs. identification) accounted for the association between perceptions of in-group disadvantage and support for Trump. All studies included at least 400 participants, which gave us a power of .80 for detecting even small associations between variables (for r = .14; Cohen, 1988; G*Power yields a target of 395 participants).

Study 1

In Study 1, we used data from Poland to examine the relationship between national collective narcissism versus conventional national identification and support for the populist Law and Justice party and its leader.

Method

Participants and procedure

Study 1 involved a 2014 nationally representative sample of the 1,007 Polish adults¹: 472 men, 535 women, aged 18–87; 513 of them indicated the party they voted for in the 2011 parliamentary elections and 545 indicated the candidate they voted for in the 2010 presidential elections. Data were collected with the use of an address-based sampling method by the Public Opinion Research Centre. Several measures² and scales were presented to participants, including national collective narcissism, national identification, electoral preferences, and demographics (gender, age, and material status measured with 1 item: “How do you assess the current material conditions of your household?,” 1 = definitely bad to 5 = definitely good).

Measures

National collective narcissism was measured with the 5-item version of the Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), for example, “Polish nation deserves special treatment.” Participants responded on a scale from 1 = definitely disagree to 6 = definitely agree.

National identification was operationalized as the group level-self-investment dimension of Leach and colleagues’ (2008) social identification scale (Polish adaptation by Jaworska, 2016; see the Supplemental Material for analyses involving the full scale). Ten items measured satisfaction with the in-group, for example, “I am glad to be Polish,” centrality of the in-group, for example, “Being Polish is an important part of how I see myself,” and solidarity with in-group members, for example, “I feel a bond with Polish people.” Participants responded on a scale from 1 = definitely disagree to 6 = definitely agree.

Law and Justice vote in parliamentary elections was measured with 1 item: “For which party or organization did you vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections?” Out of those who voted in the elections, 160 participants declared voting for Law and Justice; 353 participants declared voting for another political party (e.g., Civic Platform, Democratic Left Alliance).

Jarosław Kaczyński vote in presidential elections was measured with 1 item: “For which candidate did you vote in 2010 presidential elections?” Participants indicated one of two candidates who came out ahead during the first round of the presidential election: Jarosław Kaczyński (Law and Justice) or Bronisław Komorowski (Civic Platform). Out of those who voted in the election, 147 participants declared voting for Kaczyński and 398 for Komorowski.

Results

Zero-order correlations between variables and scale properties are presented in Table 1. National identification was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism, so we accounted for their overlap in the regression analyses.

Table 1.

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 1).

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Law and Justice vote 1 = Law and Justice; 0 = other	M = .31, SD = .46
2. Jarosław Kaczyński vote 1 = Kaczyński; 0 = other	.80 [.74, .86], p <.001	M = .27, SD = .44
3. National collective narcissism 5-item scale from 1 to 6	.24 [.16, .31], p <.001	.18 [.10, .27], p <.001	M = 3.90, SD = 1.27 (α = .87)
4. National identification, 10-item scale from 1 to 6	.14 [.06, .22], p = .002	.07 [−.01, .16], p = .08	.60 [.56, .64], p <.001	M = 4.91, SD = 1.01 (α = .94)
5. Age	.10 [.004, .19], p = .024	.02 [−.07, .10], p = .70	.28 [.23, .33], p <.001	.33 [.28, .38], p <.001	M = 47.59, SD = 17.59
6. Gender 1 = woman; 0 = man	.07 [−.01, .15], p = .13	.03 [−.05, .12], p = .47	.05 [−.02, .11], p = .14	.03 [−.03, .09], p = .36	.06 [−.002, .12], p = .05	M = .53, SD = .50
7. Material status Scale from 1 to 5	−.19 [−.28, −.11], p <.001	−.14 [−.22, . −05], p = .002	−.05 [−.11, .02], p = .12	.03 [−.03, .10], p = .38	−.17 [−.23, −.11], p <.001	−.01 [−.07, .05], p = .77	M = 3.41, SD = 0.95

Regression Analyses

We conducted hierarchical binominal logistic regression analyses to investigate the effects of collective narcissism on populist votes for: Law and Justice as a party and Kaczyński as the presidential candidate. Voting for Law and Justice (or Kaczyński) was coded as 1 and voting for any other party (or Komorowski) was coded as 0. We also controlled for demographics (age, gender, and material status)³ and national identification.⁴

National collective narcissism as a predictor of Law and Justice vote in the parliamentary election

First, we regressed collective narcissism on Law and Justice vote (Table 2). In Step 1, we introduced national identification which was significantly positively associated with Law and Justice vote. In Step 2, we introduced collective narcissism and found its positive effect on Law and Justice vote. The relationship between identification and Law and Justice vote became nonsignificant, indicating that nonnarcissistic national in-group positivity was not associated with the Law and Justice vote. We also found a significant negative effect of material status on Law and Justice vote.

Table 2.

Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Law and Justice Vote in the Parliamentary Election (Study 1).

Predictor variable	Step 1				Step 2
Predictor variable	B (SE)	OR	OR CI_95%	p	B(SE)	OR	OR CI_95%	p
National identification	0.36 (0.13)	1.43	[1.10, 1.86]	.01	−0.01(0.16)	1.00	[0.73, 1.36]	.99
Age	0.002 (0.01)	1.00	[0.99, 1.02]	.80	−0.002(0.01)	1.00	[0.98, 1.01]	.75
Gender	0.24 (0.20)	1.27	[0.86, 1.87]	.23	0.24(0.20)	1.27	[0.86, 1.89]	.24
Material status	−0.47 (0.11)	0.63	[0.50, 0.78]	<.001	−0.47(0.11)	0.62	[0.50, 0.78]	<.001
National collective narcissism					0.44(0.10)	1.55	[1.27, 1.90]	<.001
Nagelkerke’s R²	.08				.13
2 log-likelihood	603.21				583.17
ΔNagelkerke’s R ²					.05
Δ2 Log-likelihood					20.04

Note. SE = standard error; OR = Odds ratio; CI_95% = confidence intervals based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples.

National collective narcissism as a predictor of Kaczyński vote in presidential elections

Second, we regressed collective narcissism on Kaczyński vote (Table 3). In Step 1, we introduced national identification which was marginally significantly positively associated with Kaczyński vote. In Step 2, we introduced collective narcissism and found its positive effect on Kaczyński vote. The effect of identification on Kaczyński vote became nonsignificant, indicating that nonnarcissistic national in-group positivity was not associated with the populist vote. Again, we found a significant negative effect of material status.⁵

Table 3.

Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Kaczyński Vote in Presidential Elections (Study 1).

Predictor variable	Step 1				Step 2
Predictor variable	B (SE)	OR	OR CI_95%	p	B (SE)	OR	OR CI_95%	p
National identification	0.22 (0.12)	1.25	[0.98, 1.59]	.07	−0.10 (0.15)	0.91	[0.68, 1.21]	.51
Age	−0.01 (0.01)	1.00	[0.98, 1.01]	.43	−0.01 (0.01)	0.99	[0.98, 1.00]	.18
Gender	0.12 (0.20)	1.13	[0.77, 1.66]	.54	0.13 (0.20)	1.14	[0.77, 1.69]	.51
Material status	−0.36 (0.11)	0.70	[0.57, 0.87]	.001	−0.36 (0.11)	0.70	[0.56, 0.87]	.001
National collective narcissism					0.41 (0.10)	1.51	[1.24, 1.84]	<.001
Nagelkerke’s R ²	.04				.08
2 Log likelihood	.04				.08
ΔNagelkerke’s R ²					.04
Δ2 Log likelihood					17.6

Note. SE = standard error; OR = Odds ratio; CI_95% = confidence intervals based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples.

The results of Study 1 provided initial support for our hypothesis that collective narcissism (and not nonnarcissistic national identification) would predict voting for the populist Law and Justice party and its leader. In line with previous findings (Roguska, 2016), low material status was a significant predictor of adopting populist views. Still, Study 1 did not account for subjective feelings of in-group disadvantage, which according to our assumptions should be an important predictor of support for populism. We address this issue in Studies 2 and 3.

Study 2

Study 2 was conducted in the context of the UK referendum to leave or remain a part of the EU. A populist rhetoric of the United Kingdom Independence Party aimed to fuel anti-European attitudes by provoking British citizens to fight against a supposed influx of immigrants and to put national interest over those imposed by the EU (Farage, 2016). The principal message of the Leave campaign was that over the past half-century the EU had systematically diminished British influence and its sovereignty, so the best solution was to leave the union.

Based on this rhetoric, we manipulated perceptions of British (in-group) disadvantage in the context of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU. In addition, we varied the perceived longevity of in-group disadvantage by making participants believe it was either short- or long-lived. We tested whether the perception of in-group disadvantage would result in a higher willingness to adopt populist views reflected in Brexit support. Moreover, we expected this relationship to be accounted for by national collective narcissism.

Method

Participants and procedure

Study 2 was conducted among 525 participants recruited via Prolific Academic approximately seven weeks before the Brexit referendum (May 5–10, 2016). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the only three experimental conditions (long-term vs. short-term in-group disadvantage vs. baseline).

We manipulated the perceived longevity of in-group disadvantage based on the procedure by Blanchar and Eidelman (2013). In the long-term in-group disadvantage condition, participants read an online article illustrating the history of the EU. The article emphasized the relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU as a long-term disadvantage to the United Kingdom. In the short-term in-group disadvantage condition, the article described the relationship as a recent development (though equally disadvantageous for the United Kingdom). In the baseline condition, the article described the history of the EU but omitted any indication of in-group disadvantage (see the Supplemental Material). Afterward, participants completed measures of national collective narcissism and identification. The order of scale presentation was randomized and did not moderate the effects. Afterward, participants were asked to indicate whether they thought the United Kingdom should leave the EU or not.

This study included an attention check. Participants were asked to indicate the main topic of the manipulation text. Twenty-four participants who failed the attention check were excluded from the analyses. We also excluded four participants who indicated their nationality as other than British. The final sample included 497 British participants, 212 men, 285 women, aged 18–72, 143 in the long-term in-group disadvantage condition, 175 in the short-term in-group disadvantage condition, and 179 in the baseline condition.

Measures

National collective narcissism was measured with a 9-item version of the Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Participants responded on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.

National identification was measured with the Social Identification Scale (Cameron, 2004) which includes 12 items, capturing in-group ties, for example, “I have a lot in common with other Brits,” centrality, for example, “In general, being British is an important part of my self-image,” and in-group affect, for example, “In general I’m glad to be British.” Participants responded a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.

Brexit support was measured with 1 item: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” Participants responded to a scale from 1 = definitely remain to 5 = definitely leave.⁶

Results

Zero-order correlations across conditions and scale properties are presented in Table 4. National identification was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism. Brexit support was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism and national identifications. Thus, both types of in-group positivity were positively related to adopting populist views.

Table 4.

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 2).

Measure	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Brexit support scale from 1 to 5	M = 2.56, SD = 1.41
2. National collective narcissism 9-item scale from 1 to 7	.47 [.40, .54] p <.001	M = 3.62, SD = 1.14 (α = .91)
3. National identification 12-item scale from 1 to 7	.19 [.10, .29] p <.001	.52 [.44, .58] p <.001	M = 4.51, SD = 1.09 (α = .93)
4. Gender 1 = woman; 0 = man	.03 [−.07, .11] p = .58	.03 [−.06, .13] p = .47	.06 [−.03, .15] p = .21	M = .57, SD = .50
5. Age, —	.26 [.17, .35] p <.001	.09 [.004, .18] p = .04	.09 [.01, .17] p = .04	.09 [.01, .17] p = .048	M = 34.39, SD = 11.64

Note. SD = standard deviation.

Regression Analyses

We performed multiple regression analyses to investigate the effects of the experimental manipulation. In all analyses, experimental conditions (long-term in-group disadvantage vs. short-term in-group disadvantage vs. baseline) were recoded into two dummy variables: one encoded the difference between long-term disadvantage and the baseline and the other one encoded the difference between short-term disadvantage and the baseline. We entered the two dummy variables into the regression, controlling for the overlap between the two types of in-group positivity, and demographics (age and gender).

Perceived in-group disadvantage as a predictor of national collective narcissism

We found a significant positive effect of long-term in-group disadvantage on collective narcissism, indicating that narcissistic in-group positivity was higher in the long-term disadvantage condition than in the baseline condition. We did not, however, find a significant effect of short-term in-group disadvantage on collective narcissism (Table 5).

Table 5.

Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting National Collective Narcissism (Study 2).

Predictor variable	Step 1
Predictor variable	B	t (489)	p	Partial r [CI_95%]
National identification	0.54	13.44	<.001	.52 [.45, .59]
Age	0.004	1.16	.25	.05 [−.04, .14]
Gender	−0.003	−0.04	.97	−.002 [−.09,.09]
Short-term in-group disadvantage (vs. baseline)	0.06	0.60	.55	.03 [−.06, .12]
Long-term in-group disadvantage (vs. baseline)	0.33	3.01	.003	.14 [.04, .22]
R²	.29
F	39.18

Note. CI_95% = confidence intervals based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples.

In-group disadvantage as a predictor of national identification

We found a marginally significant negative effect of short-term in-group disadvantage and significant negative effect of long-term in-group disadvantage (Table 6). Thus, long-term in-group disadvantage decreased nonnarcissistic in-group positivity relative to the baseline condition.

Table 6.

Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting National Identification (Study 2).

Predictor variable	Step 1
Predictor variable	B	t (489)	p	Partial r [CI_95%]
National collective narcissism	0.50	13.44	<.001	.52 [.45, .59]
Age	0.004	1.05	.29	.05 [−.04, .13]
Gender	0.08	0.95	.34	.04 [−.05, .13]
Short-term in-group disadvantage (vs. baseline)	−0.19	−1.92	.06	−.09 [−.17, .01]
Long-term in-group disadvantage (vs. baseline)	−0.26	−2.46	.01	−.11 [−.20, −.02]
R²	.28
F	38.57

Note. CI_95% = confidence intervals based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples.

Perceived in-group disadvantage as a predictor of Brexit support

To test the hypotheses that in-group disadvantage will result in higher willingness to adopt populist views reflected in Brexit support and that this relationship will be accounted for by collective narcissism, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Table 7).

Table 7.

Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Brexit Support (Study 2).

Predictor variable	Step 1				Step 2
Predictor variable	B	t (489)	p	Partial r [CI_95%]	B	t (488)	p	Partial r [CI_95%]
National identification	0.22	3.98	<.001	.18 [.08, .28]	−0.10	−1.76	.08	−.08 [−.17, .01]
Age	0.03	5.77	<.001	.25 [.17, .34]	0.03	5.84	<.001	.26 [.17, .34]
Gender	−0.02	−0.20	.84	−.01 [−.10, .09]	−0.02	−0.20	.84	−.01 [−.10, .08]
Short-term in-group disadvantage (vs. baseline)	0.07	0.46	.64	.02 [−.06, .11]	0.03	0.23	.82	.01 [−.08, .10]
Long-term in-group disadvantage (vs. baseline)	0.47	3.09	.002	.14 [.06, .23]	0.27	1.96	.05	.09 [−.01, .18]
National collective narcissism					0.60	10.67	<.001	.44 [.35, .51]
R ²	.12				.28
ΔR ²					.16
F	12.85				32.16
ΔF					19.31

Note. CI_95% = confidence intervals based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples.

In Step 1, we introduced national identification and two dummy variables. We found a significant positive effect of identification and a significant positive effect of long-term in-group disadvantage on Brexit support, indicating that Brexit support was higher in the long-term disadvantage condition relative to the baseline condition. We did not find a significant effect of short-term in-group disadvantage on Brexit support.

In Step 2, we introduced collective narcissism and found its positive effect on Brexit support. Nonnarcissistic identification was a negative (albeit marginally significant) predictor of Brexit support. Furthermore, after introducing collective narcissism, we found a marginally significant positive effect of long-term disadvantage on Brexit support and a nonsignificant effect of short-term disadvantage.

To perform a full test of our hypothesis, we checked for an indirect effect of long-term and short-term disadvantage on Brexit support via collective narcissism. We used Model 4 of PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bootstrapped samples. The indirect effect of the perceived long-term in-group disadvantage on Brexit support via collective narcissism was significant, with a bootstrap 95% bias-corrected confidence interval (95% CI_bc) of 0.06 to 0.35. The indirect effect of the perceived short-term in-group disadvantage on Brexit support via collective narcissism was not significant, 95% CI_bc [−0.08, 0.16] (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Indirect effects of long-term and short-term in-group disadvantage on Brexit support via collective narcissism. Entries are standardized coefficients. R ² represents percentage of the outcome variables variation explained by the model. +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .001.

We additionally checked for indirect effects of in-group disadvantage on Brexit support via identification. Both indirect effects via identification were not significant: for the long-term disadvantage 95% CI_bc [−0.001, 0.09] and for the short-term disadvantage 95% CI_bc [−0.002, 0.07].

Study 2 revealed that, relative to baseline, reading about the long-term disadvantage of the national in-group increased support for Brexit, and that this relationship was accounted for by national collective narcissism (and not nonnarcissistic identification). Reading about short-term in-group disadvantage was not enough to encourage participants to support Brexit. In fact, it also was not strong enough to increase collective narcissism.

Furthermore, national identification alone was significantly positively correlated with support for Brexit, but this association became negative (and marginally significant) when we adjusted for national collective narcissism. Although long-term in-group disadvantage decreased nonnarcissistic national identification, we did not find a significant indirect effect of in-group disadvantage on Brexit support via nonnarcissistic national identification. Thus, national collective narcissism, resulting from a perception of a long-term in-group disadvantage, was the form of in-group positivity related to adopting populist views.

Study 3

In Study 3, we sought to examine the role of in-group disadvantage and national collective narcissism in support for Trump. To this end, we examined whether support for Trump will be associated with group relative deprivation (Pettigrew, 2017), and whether this link will be accounted for by national collective narcissism.

Method

Participants and procedure

In Study 3, we used data from a survey conducted among 407 participants recruited via Prolific Academic approximately a month before the Presidential election (October 5–6, 2016). Several measures were presented to participants, including national collective narcissism, national identification, group relative deprivation, electoral preferences, and demographics (age, gender, family income over the last year measured on a scale from 1 = less than US$10,000 to 12 = more than US$150,000). We excluded data from four participants who reported their national identity as other than American or mixed American. The final sample included 403 American participants, 221 men, 182 women, aged 18–70. Most (n = 303) were White (not Hispanic), identified themselves as nonimmigrants (n = 386), and their mode income was between $50,000 and $59,999.

Measures

National collective narcissism was measured as in Study 1, with respect to the Americans as the in-group. Participants responded on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.

National identification was measured as in Study 2, with respect to the Americans as the in-group. Participants responded on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.

Group relative deprivation was measured with 1 item which depended on participant’s identity based on similar items used in the Eurobarometer (Pettigrew et al., 2008). Participants who identified themselves as nonimmigrants (n = 386) were asked about their situation in relation to immigrants; those who identified themselves as immigrants (n = 17) were asked about their situation in relation to new immigrants: “Would you say that over the last 5 years people like yourself in the United States have been economically 1 = a lot better off, 2 = better off, 3 = the same, 4 = worse of or 5 = a lot worse off than most [new incoming] immigrants living here?”

Preference for Donald Trump was measured with 1 item:

Now please consider the current presidential nominees. Using the slider, please indicate how much you prefer one candidate over another, if you prefer Hillary Clinton you should move the slider toward the left (0 = Hilary Clinton), and if you prefer Donald Trump move the slider to the right (10 = Donald Trump). If you feel neutral to both, then maintain the slider at 5.⁷

Results

Zero-order correlations and scale properties are presented in Table 8. National identification was significantly positively related to collective narcissism. Preference for Trump was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism, identification, and group relative deprivation. Group relative deprivation was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism. We did not find a significant relationship between group relative deprivation and identification.

Table 8.

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 3).

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Preference for Trump scale from 0 to 10	M = 3.16, SD = 3.34
2. National collective narcissism 5-item scale from 1 to 7	.29 [.19, .38], p <.001	M = 2.89, SD = 1.28 (α = .88)
3. National identification 12-item scale from 1 to 7	.22 [.12, .33], p <.001	.55 [.46, .62], p <.001	M = 4.38, SD = 1.12 (α = .91)
4. Group relative deprivation scale from 1 to 4	.38 [.28, .47], p <.001	.19 [.09, .30], p <.001	.03 [−.08, .14], p = .52	M = 2.62, SD = 0.95
5. Age —	.14 [.03, .25], p = .01	.17 [.08, .26], p = .001	.31 [.23, .39], p <.001	.13 [.01, .23], p = .01	M = 32.47, SD = 11.88
6. Gender 1 = woman; 0 = man	−.19 [−.29, −.09], p <.001	−.14 [−.24, −.04], p = .01	−.13 [−.21, −.03], p = .01	−.03 [−.12, .07], p = .57	.05 [−.04, .14], p = .30	M = .45, SD = 0.50
7. Income Scale from 1 to 12	.04 [−.06, .14], p = .39	.10 [−.002, .20], p = .045	.15 [.06, .25], p = .002	−.16 [−.25, −.06], p = .001	−.16 [−.25, −.06], p = .002	−.01 [−.12, .08], p = .78,	M = 5.77 SD = 3.26
8. Ethnicity 1 = white; 0 = other	.10 [.01, .18], p = .28	.05 [−.03, .14], p = .044	.04 [−.05, .13], p = .44	.01 [−.09, .11], p = .88	.22 [.14, .29], p <.001	−.03 [−.14, .07], p = .51	.02 [−.11, .08], p = .75	M = .75, SD = .43

Note. SD = standard deviation.

Regression analyses

We performed multiple regression analyses, in which we entered group relative deprivation, and controlled for national identification and demographics (age, gender, income, and ethnicity).

Group relative deprivation as a predictor of national collective narcissism

After the inclusion of control variables, we confirmed the significant positive effect of group relative deprivation on collective narcissism (Table 9).

Table 9.

Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting National Collective Narcissism (Study 3).

	Step 1
Predictor variable	B	t (395)	p	Partial r [CI_95%]
National identification	0.61	11.88	<.001	.51 [.43, .59]
Age	−0.002	−0.38	.70	−.02 [−.11, .08]
Gender	−0.16	−1.49	.14	−.07 [−.18, .03]
Income	0.02	1.06	.29	.05 [−.05, .15]
Ethnicity	0.10	0.82	.41	.04 [−.06, .15]
Group relative deprivation	0.25	4.37	<.001	.22 [.12, .32]
R ²		.34
F		33.64

Note. CI_95% = confidence intervals based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples.

Group relative deprivation as a predictor of preference for Trump

To test the hypotheses that group relative deprivation will predict support for populism reflected in preference for Trump over Clinton, and that this relationship will be accounted for by collective narcissism, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Table 10).

Table 10.

Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Preference for Trump over Clinton (Study 3).

	Step 1				Step 2
Predictor variable	B	t (394)	p	Partial r [CI_95%]	B	t (393)	p	Partial r [CI_95%]
National identification	0.48	3.29	<.001	.16 [.06, .27]	0.27	1.64	.10	.08 [−.03, .20]
Age	0.01	0.94	.35	.05 [−.06, .16]	0.01	0.99	.32	.05 [−.06, .15]
Gender	−1.09	−3.60	<.001	−.18 [−.27, −.08]	−1.04	−3.44	.001	−.17 [−.26, −.07]
Income	0.09	1.81	.07	.09 [.002, .20]	0.08	1.70	.09	.09 [−.02, .18]
Ethnicity	0.63	1.80	.07	.09 [.000, .18]	0.60	1.71	.09	.09 [−.01, .18]
Group relative deprivation	1.31	8.25	<.001	.38 [.29, .47]	1.23	7.59	<.001	.36 [.27, .44]
National collective narcissism					0.33	2.34	.02	.12 [.01, .23]
R²	.23				.24
ΔR²							.01
F	19.17				17.40
ΔF							1.77

Note. CI_95% = confidence intervals based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples.

In Step 1, we introduced national identification and group relative deprivation as predictors of preference for Trump (over Clinton). We found significant positive effects for identification, and group relative deprivation. In Step 2, we introduced collective narcissism and found its positive effect on preferences for Trump. After introducing collective narcissism, we found a slightly weaker, although significant positive effect of group relative deprivation and a nonsignificant effect of identification.⁸

We then checked for an indirect effect of the group relative deprivation on preference for Trump via collective narcissism, following the same procedure as in Study 2. The indirect effect via collective narcissism was significant, 95% CI_bc [0.01, 0.18] (identification did not show a similar indirect effect, 95% CI_bc [−0.10, 0.01]).

Study 3 corroborated the results of Study 2 by demonstrating that perceptions of in-group disadvantage (here operationalized as group relative deprivation) were positively related to populist views and that this relationship was accounted for by national collective narcissism. As in Studies 1 and 2, national identification alone predicted populist views. However, when we adjusted for national collective narcissism we did not find a significant relationship between nonnarcissistic identification with Americans and their preference for Trump.

General Discussion

In three studies, we demonstrated that national collective narcissism (but not nonnarcissistic national identification) is a robust predictor of adopting populist views. We confirmed this pattern of results in three countries: Poland (support for the national conservative Law and Justice party), the United Kingdom (support for Brexit), and the United States (preference for Trump over Clinton). The results of Studies 2 and 3 additionally pointed to perceived in-group disadvantage as a predictor of collective narcissism.

This research contributes to our understanding of the role of group identity in fostering support for populist ideologies. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that collective narcissism accounted for the links between perceptions of in-group disadvantage and support for populist ideas. Nevertheless, these results should be treated with caution given that our studies measured both the mediators and the outcomes. The significant indirect effects via collective narcissism indicate that this variable can help explain a certain amount of the variance shared between in-group disadvantage and populism support, but does not provide evidence for the causal model (see MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000, for a discussion on possible interpretations of indirect effects). More research is needed to establish causality of the observed relationships, for example, by manipulating collective narcissism as the mediator (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010). Future research would also do well to rely less on single-item indices (e.g., by including multi-item measures of relative deprivation or populist attitudes).

Our research focused on populism associated mostly with the right-wing side of the political scene, which often manifests in nationalist attitudes. Collective narcissism tends to be positively correlated with nationalism (e.g., Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010). Yet, it is a broader construct (it can be used in relation to national but also other social groups) and captures a concern with protecting the in-group’s image, rather than the need for dominance characteristic for nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; see Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Following Müller (2016), we argue that it is the need to be recognized as the only true and moral representation of a nation that drives populism. Nevertheless, it is of course likely that the relationships observed here are at least partially due to the associations between nationalism and collective narcissism. Future research would do well to explore these associations more closely. More work is also needed to examine the links between collective narcissism and populism in other socio-political contexts, for example in the context of left-wing populism in Latin America.⁹

Overall, our results might at least partially explain why populism is often linked to prejudicial attitudes and behaviors. Research demonstrates that both group relative deprivation (e.g., Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) and collective narcissism (see Cichocka, 2016, for a review) tend to predict negative intergroup attitudes. At the same time, research indicates that feelings of injustice and deprivation might stimulate increased collective action aimed at changing in-group’s undesirable circumstances (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spear, 2008). Indeed, some see populist movements as manifestations of those disadvantaged by the system “taking back control” (Farage, 2016). These attempts to tackle (perceived) inequality are likely to be at odds with positive intergroup attitudes (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012). It is important to note, however, that collective action can take more or less disruptive forms. There is evidence showing that collective narcissism stimulates disruptive forms of protest (Górska & Bilewicz, 2017), which might at least partially explain why we often observe violent behaviors at populist rallies (Jacobs, 2016; Kellner, 2016). Such defensive responses might be especially likely when objectively privileged groups are led to believe they are relatively disadvantaged and threatened by minorities (Mols & Jetten, 2016). This can lead to narcissistic ideas of threatened in-group greatness and, in turn, support for populist politicians.

The current work contributes to our understanding of support for populism, but it also has broader implications for the study of collective narcissism. While there is vast evidence for the correlates and consequences of collective narcissism (for overviews, see Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 2011), less is known about situational factors that contribute to the increase of this form of in-group positivity. Past work shows that it might strengthen when people lack personal control (Cichocka et al., in press), or when the group is criticized (Golec de Zavala, 2010). Study 2 demonstrated that collective narcissism increased in response to in-group disadvantage, especially when the disadvantage was perceived as long lasting. This suggests that the narrative of relative disadvantage, fuelled by populist leaders, might reinforce this defensive and destructive national in-group positivity. At the same time, it is also possible that the two variables reinforce each other, and that collective narcissism further increases perceptions of relative in-group disadvantage. Rather than unifying a people to make their nation great, it is more plausible that these dynamics would further foster intergroup divisions.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material, SPPS732393_suppl_mat - Populism as Identity Politics: Perceived In-Group Disadvantage, Collective Narcissism, and Support for Populism

Supplemental Material, SPPS732393_suppl_mat for Populism as Identity Politics: Perceived In-Group Disadvantage, Collective Narcissism, and Support for Populism by Marta Marchlewska1, Aleksandra Cichocka, Orestis Panayiotou, Kevin Castellanos and Jude Batayneh in Social Psychological and Personality Science

Footnotes

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank Giacomo Marchesi and Filip Łozowski for their comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The preparation of this article was supported by a grant from the National Science Center DEC 2014/15/B/HS6/03755.

Supplemental Material

The supplemental material is available in the online version of the article.

Notes

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