Valuing Differences and Reinforcing Them: Multiculturalism Increases Race Essentialism

Abstract

A substantial body of research on diversity philosophies has shown that multiculturalism (i.e., emphasizing and valuing cultural/ethnic differences) is a more effective way to promote equality and reduce bias than color blindness (i.e., deemphasizing cultural/ethnic differences in lieu of similarities). However, across two experiments, we present evidence for an unexpectedly negative outcome of multiculturalism: increased belief in race essentialism, or the notion that racial group differences are valid, biologically based, and immutable. Study 1 (N = 165) shows that participants exposed to multiculturalism expressed greater race essentialist beliefs compared to those exposed to color blindness. Study 2 (N = 150) replicates this effect and also finds that exposure to multiculturalism, compared to color blindness, decreased participants’ belief that racial equality is a problem. These findings raise the ironic possibility that well-intentioned efforts to portray the value of differences may reinforce the belief that fixed, biological characteristics underpin them.

Keywords

discrimination group processes prejudice/stereotyping racism social cognition

It is an unfortunate but apparent truth that racial inequalities persist across legal, educational, organizational, and social domains. With the goals of reducing discrimination and increasing diversity in a wide range of institutions, researchers have investigated the influence of two contrasting philosophies for conceiving of and responding to diversity: multiculturalism and color blindness. These philosophies vary primarily in the way group differences or similarities are understood and highlighted. Multiculturalism advocates for recognizing, emphasizing, and finding value in group differences. By contrast, color blindness advocates for minimizing the salience of group differences and emphasizing commonalities. These philosophies address culture and ethnicity and thus refer to the traditions, practices, and values with which people can identity (Markus & Moya, 2010). However, their effects may extend to ideas about race, which most people believe represent distinct and stable groups primarily based on perceived physical characteristics (i.e., biology; Richeson & Sommers, 2015; Smedley & Smedley, 2005).

Currently, the weight of the experimental evidence indicates that multiculturalism is an effective way to promote diversity and reduce bias. Relative to color-blind (CB) messages, multicultural (MC) messages have been shown to increase ethnic minorities’ performance on a cognitive task (Holoien & Shelton, 2012), organizational engagement (Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Purdie-Vaughns, Steele, Davies, Ditlmann, & Crosby, 2008), and positive evaluations of fellow in-group members (Verkuyten, 2005). Multiculturalism has also been shown to reduce anxiety regarding anticipated interracial interactions (Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009), and in the course of such interactions, Whites who openly talk about racial differences (vs. avoid them) appear less prejudiced in the eyes of Black partners (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008). When exposed to MC messages in an academic setting, women of color reported decreased expectations of racial bias and showed increased math performance (Wilton, Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2015). MC strategies, in comparison to CB strategies, have also been shown to decrease Whites’ negative affect (Vorauer et al., 2009), implicit and explicit racial bias (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004), and increase their detection and reporting of racial discrimination (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, & Ambady, 2010).

While it is clear from existing scholarship that multiculturalism is often a more beneficial way than color blindness to improve diversity in many interpersonal and intergroup settings, this is not always the case (and sometimes the opposite can be true). For example, multiculturalism has also been associated with increased stereotyping (Gutiérrez & Unzueta, 2010; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000), which could complicate efforts to effectively promote diversity. Less clear from the now sizable research literature evaluating these diversity philosophies is a more complete picture of the limitations of multiculturalism including how and why it may become problematic. With growing evidence there is no one-size-fits-all approach to increase diversity (Apfelbaum, Stephens, & Reagans, 2016), a sharper and more comprehensive understanding of the ways in which diversity philosophies influence diversity goals—to both positive and negative ends—is necessary to fully inform efforts to meaningfully increase diversity and inclusiveness.

Here, we focus on a core theme undergirding the MC philosophy; namely, the notion that group differences must be viewed as real and valuable in order to realize their benefits. We evaluate one potential unforeseen consequence of multiculturalism in view of this theme: That multiculturalism reinforces the belief that racial differences reflect not only a valid and consequential—but essential—human difference (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). Specifically, we test the hypothesis that multiculturalism, as compared with color blindness, will increase individuals’ beliefs in race essentialism.

Multiculturalism and Race Essentialism

Race essentialism is a commonly held lay belief about the origins of race and racial differences. Individuals who hold essentialist beliefs about race conceive of racial groups as having inherent essences that are biologically based, stable, innate, and immutable (Haslam et al., 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Tate & Audette, 2001). They also perceive and enforce sharp, well-defined social and physical boundaries separating members of different racial groups (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Chen & Hamilton, 2012; Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam & Whelan, 2008; No et al., 2008). Critically, individuals who essentialize believe that social categories are highly informative of a person’s physical and psychological characteristics and attributes (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Thus, at its core, race essentialism is a belief about the inherence, meaning, and validity of racial differences.

Multiculturalism similarly advocates for recognizing, emphasizing, and finding value in cultural differences. That is, multiculturalism asserts that diversity and equality are best attained through acknowledgment of and esteem for cultural group membership. Thus, a core principle underlying multiculturalism is the idea that differences are worthwhile, and by extension, valid and meaningful.

This incidental focus on the validity and meaning of cultural differences raises the somewhat ironic possibility that advocating an MC philosophy may reinforce beliefs in race essentialism. The association between multiculturalism and essentialism may seem surprising at first blush because multiculturalism is often associated with the positive intergroup outcomes described earlier, such as reduced racial bias, whereas race essentialism is often linked to negative intergroup outcomes, such as increased racial bias or decreased interest in interracial contact (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Jayaratne et al., 2006; Keller, 2005; Verkuyten, 2003; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). Nevertheless, a key implication of multiculturalism—that group membership and differences reflect valid and meaningful distinctions—provides a foundation for beliefs in race essentialism.

Supporting the connection between multiculturalism and essentialism, several lines of past research have found that both multiculturalism (Gutiérrez & Unzueta, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2000) and essentialism (Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010; Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2001) are associated with greater racial stereotyping. For example, Gutiérrez and Unzueta (2010) found that when primed with multiculturalism, participants liked racial minorities who displayed stereotypical preferences (i.e., liking basketball and hip-hop) more than racial minorities who displayed nonstereotypical preferences (i.e., surfing and country dancing). In other words, exposure to an MC philosophy led participants to prefer targets who adhere to commonly held racial stereotypes. In related work, Wolsko, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2000) found that exposure to an MC philosophy led participants to stereotype racial out-group members more and to estimate that the values of Black and White Americans were more different to each other, compared to participants exposed to a CB philosophy (see also No et al., 2008). These results were observed in conjunction with a reduction in out-group prejudice, demonstrating that multiculturalism can lead to both more acknowledgment of difference and more positive evaluations of out-groups. Thus, multiculturalism can lead to the positive intergroup consequences that have been reported in the literature, while at the same time reinforcing—and attaching additional meaning to—intergroup boundaries.

Indeed, multiculturalism and essentialism are grounded in the importance of social categorization. An MC statement espousing the benefits of ethnic diversity affirms that ethnic group differences exist and that race is a valid dimension on which to categorize others. That is, in order to reap the benefits of racial diversity in an MC context, individuals must first recognize diverse individuals and categorize them as such. In this way, multiculturalism lays the foundation for essentialism, which begins with the recognition of racial differences as the basis for categorizing and understanding people. Essentialism is strongly tied to racial categorization; for example, individuals who are high in essentialism, either due to individual differences or priming through experimental manipulation, are more likely to categorize individuals by race, and are more sensitive to discerning racial group memberships, compared to individuals who are lower in essentialism (Chao, Hong, & Chiu, 2013; see also Eberhardt, Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003; Plaks, Malahy, Sedlins, & Shoda, 2011; Young, Sanchez, & Wilton, 2013). Social psychological theory and research has long warned about the potential pitfalls of overemphasizing social identity, including racial identity, in interpersonal or intergroup contexts (Allport, 1954; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2015; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Moreover, while the majority of the literature demonstrates that multiculturalism leads to positive racial outcomes, the primacy of multiculturalism as a mechanism for prejudice reduction or racial equality is not without question. White group members can feel threatened by or excluded from MC messages (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011; Stevens, Plaut, & Sanchez-Burks, 2008), causing MC messages to backfire. For example, multiculturalism has resulted in greater prejudice in the immediate aftermath of a high-conflict situation (Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008) as well as in a racially and ethnically diverse middle and high school (Wittig & Molina, 2000). Highly identified Whites (Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010), and individuals who highly endorse authoritarianism (Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner, & Wagner, 2013), may also resist multiculturalism. Additionally, in MC contexts, minorities have been found to prefer in-group members over out-group members (Wolsko et al., 2000), and they are more likely to see out-groups as homogenous (Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007). Organizational MC messages can also lead people to delegitimize racial discrimination claims (Gündemir & Galinsky, 2017). Consistent with our theorizing, these findings demonstrate that the affirmation of racial differences that is central to the MC philosophy can engender a complex range of outcomes.

In sum, an MC diversity philosophy seeks to support racial equality by affirming the value in cultural/ethnic differences, which suggests, at least implicitly, that racial differences are valid and meaningful. We suggest that attaching this added meaning to racial differences may reinforce beliefs that such differences are immutable, natural, and essential. In two studies, we evaluate the hypothesis that multiculturalism will increase beliefs in race essentialism as compared with color blindness. Full versions of all measures, manipulations, and exclusions are reported in the Online Supplement Material, as are additional data not included in this article. All exclusion criteria were established a priori, and no statistical analyses were conducted prior to concluding data collection.

Study 1

Method

Participants

Based on an a priori power analysis conducted in G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) assuming 80% power, the conventional standard for a medium effect size f(.25), and three cells, we set to collect at least 159 participants in a single wave before conducting data analyses. Because we were examining a novel effect, and thus did not have prior reported effect sizes to inform this analysis, we sought to collect a minimum of 40 participants per cell based on recommendations for between-subjects designs with unknown effect sizes (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), and we could collect data from 159 participants in a single academic year. The participants were 165 Rutgers University undergraduates (107 women, 58 men; M _age = 18.89, SD _age = 1.32; 47.9% White, 29.6% Asian/Asian American, 7.9% Latino/a, 4.8% Black/African American, 3.0% multiracial, 2.4% Middle Eastern, 2.4% Southeast Asian, 0.6% Pacific Islander, and 3.6% Other). Participants were recruited through the introductory psychology participant pool and received course credit.

Materials and Procedure

The ostensible purpose of the study was to obtain student feedback on the new strategic plan adopted by the university. In reality, the strategic plans expressed an MC, CB, or control diversity statement based on the Wolsko et al. (2000) manipulations. The only changes we made to the original materials were to substitute references to the nation and social scientists with references to the university (e.g., “concern for the United States” changed to “concern for the Rutgers University,” and phrases such as “within our borders” were changed to “within our campus”). An independent sample confirmed that the excerpts appropriately manipulated the concepts of multiculturalism and color blindness (see Online Supplement Material).

After providing consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of the three, approximately 200-word long excerpts supposedly from the university’s strategic plan. In the CB and MC conditions, the excerpt was titled “University Strategic Plan, Section 3A: Diversity on Campus.” The CB excerpt included statements such as, “We must look beyond skin color and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger group, ‘University community.’” The MC excerpt included statements such as, “Each group has its own talents, as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate the identity of each group and we recognize its existence and its importance to the social fabric.” We included a control condition to determine, in this context, what participants’ default level of essentialist beliefs were and thus whether the predicted difference between the MC and CB conditions would reflect a relative increase or decrease in race essentialism. In the control condition, the excerpt was titled, “University Strategic Plan, Section 3A: Research on Campus.” The excerpt was similar in tone to the other two excerpts but contained statements about student involvement in research.¹

After reading the excerpt, participants were directed to read the excerpt a second time. In keeping with the procedure used by Wolsko et al. (2000), they were then instructed to reflect upon the content of the strategic plan by generating five reasons why the plan could potentially strengthen the university. Next participants were shown a list of 16 statements supposedly generated by other students in response to the elaboration prompt just described. Participants were asked to select the responses that seemed most similar to their own. The CB and MC statements were taken directly from Wolsko et al. (2000); we generated the control condition statements for the purpose of the present research. After reflecting on the excerpt that they read, participants were asked to evaluate the quality of the strategic plan using 4 Likert-type self-report items (e.g., “I think the statement I read would add to the overall mission of the university.”). These 4 items were included only for consistency with the cover story and were not included in the analysis.

Next, participants completed the Race Essentialism Scale (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008), which consisted of 22 items rated on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The scale assessed participants’ agreement with the view that race is unchangeable and biologically determined. Example items included, “The physical features of different racial groups haven’t really changed much over the centuries” and “Siblings born to the same parents will always be of the same race as each other.” Scale reliability was good (α = .85), and mean scores were computed. Finally, participants completed demographic questions and were debriefed and thanked.

Results and Discussion

To test for differences in race essentialism as a function of the diversity philosophy manipulation, we computed a one-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). As displayed in Figure 1, the effect of diversity philosophy condition on race essentialism was significant, F(2, 162) = 4.47, p = .01, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .05. Post hoc Tukey’s tests revealed that participants reported greater race essentialist beliefs in the MC condition (M = 4.44, SD = 0.70, n = 53) compared to the CB condition (M = 4.01, SD = 0.85, n = 57), p = .01, Cohen’s d = .55, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.09, 0.79]. Essentialism scores did not significantly differ either in the MC and control (M = 4.28, SD = 0.77, n = 55) conditions, p = .54, Cohen’s d = .22, 95% CI [−0.19, 0.51], or in the control and CB conditions, p = .15, Cohen’s d = .33, 95% CI [−0.07, 0.63]. These results thus support our primary hypothesis that participants exposed to multiculturalism will express greater race essentialist beliefs than participants exposed to color blindness.

Figure 1.

Study 1 mean race essentialism scores across diversity philosophy conditions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. The y-axis has been abridged for simplicity of presentation. *p < .05.

Study 2

The primary goal of Study 2 was to replicate the central effect observed in Study 1: That multiculturalism engenders a greater belief in race essentialism as compared with color blindness. Given the research reviewed in the introduction documenting that multiculturalism can also increase stereotyping and bias, a secondary goal of Study 2 was to probe whether exposure to multiculturalism also reduces the perception that racial inequality in the United States is problematic. Individuals may view racial inequality as less problematic if they believe inequalities are rooted in real, unchangeable differences between racial groups. People who believe that others do not change are less likely to take a stand against racism (Rattan & Dweck, 2010), likely because they believe those racist sentiments are inevitable. Thus, Study 2 explored whether multiculturalism decreases participants’ belief that racial inequality in the United States is a problem.

Method

Participants

We decided to recruit a minimum of 150 participants, with the goal of approximately 50 participants in each of the three cells (cf. Simmons et al., 2011). A total of 151 participants completed the study online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in exchange for US$2. We interspersed four attention check questions in the survey (e.g., “select the number 7”; see Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). We excluded one participant who did not pass three of the four attention check questions. The final sample included 150 participants (70 women, 77 men, and 3 did not indicate; M _age = 35.47, SD _age = 11.16; 77.3% White, 11.5% Asian/Asian American; 9.3% Latino/a, 8.0% Black/African American, 2.0% multiracial, and 0.7% Native American.²

Materials and Procedure

The ostensible purpose of the study was to take a “snapshot” of Americans’ current opinions on various controversial issues. After providing consent, participants were told that this particular survey would focus on their perceptions of race and ethnicity in the United States. Participants were randomly assigned to read a brief essay featuring a CB, MC, or no diversity philosophy, borrowed from Wolsko et al. (2000). As in Study 1, the essays were approximately 200 words, with the CB essay emphasizing similarities among diverse groups, and the MC essay valuing differences between diverse groups. In Study 2, we retained the general societal context for the essays rather than rewording them to fit a university context as in Study 1. Thus, in Study 2, the MC and CB manipulations are the same as those reported in Wolsko and colleagues. In the control condition, rather than reading about Research on Campus as in Study 1, participants were told that they would be asked questions about their opinions regarding race and ethnicity in the United States but were not given a particular diversity philosophy. As in Study 1, after reading the essay twice, participants generated five reasons that CB/MC was positive (or five general thoughts about race in the control condition), then compared their list to a list of reasons supposedly generated by prior participants (Wolsko et al., 2000). Control participants did not view a list of reasons.

Next, participants completed the same 22-item, Williams and Eberhardt (2008) Race Essentialism Scale used in Study 1 (α = .92). Then, they completed a 5-item measure³ assessing their belief that racial inequality is a problem (α = .94). Three items were taken from Kaiser, Drury, Spalding, Cheryan, and O’Brien (2009): “The United States has further to go in order to achieve racial equality,” “There is little need for further efforts to achieve racial equality,” “When I think about racial progress, I think about how much improvement the US needs to make,” and we created 2 items: “There is a lot of racial inequality in the U.S. today” and “Racism is a big problem in the U.S. today.” Participants indicated their response on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Lastly, participants provided demographic information and were debriefed and thanked.

Results and Discussion

To determine whether diversity philosophy condition significantly affected race essentialism and beliefs that race inequality is an urgent societal problem, we conducted two between-subjects ANOVA, followed by post hoc Tukey’s tests. Consistent with Study 1, we observed the predicted effect of diversity philosophy condition on race essentialism, F(2, 147) = 5.19, p = .01, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .07. As Figure 2 displays, participants in the MC condition (M = 4.72, SD = 0.87, n = 52) reported greater essentialism than those in both the CB condition (M = 4.21, SD = 1.00, n = 51; p = .04, Cohen’s d = .54, 95% CI [0.03, 0.99]) and the control condition (M = 4.10, SD = 1.22, n = 47; p = .01, Cohen’s d = .59, 95% CI [0.13, 1.11]). The CB and control conditions did not differ significantly (p = .85, Cohen’s d = .10, 95% CI [−0.38, 0.61]).

Figure 2.

Study 2 mean race essentialism scores across diversity philosophy conditions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. The y-axis has been abridged for simplicity of presentation. *p < .05.

A significant effect of diversity philosophy condition on the belief that racial inequality is a problem also emerged, F(2, 145) = 4.22, p = .02, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .06. Participants in the CB condition (M = 5.56, SD = 1.03) believed racial inequality to be significantly more of a problem than those in the control condition (M = 4.72, SD = 1.83, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .57, 95% CI [0.12, 1.57]) and marginally more of a problem than those in the MC condition (M = 4.91, SD = 1.58, p = .08, Cohen’s d = .49, 95% CI [−0.06, 1.37]). The MC and control conditions did not differ significantly (p = .81, Cohen’s d = .12, 95% CI [−1.37, 0.06]). Furthermore, participants expressing greater essentialist beliefs were less likely to believe racial inequality is a problem in need of change, r = −.50, p < .01.

General Discussion

In two modestly sized studies, the present research demonstrated that exposure to multiculturalism (vs. color blindness) results in greater race essentialist beliefs. An MC diversity statement that affirms the value of cultural differences, even with the intent of fostering diversity and reducing prejudice, can also have the unintended consequence of promoting race essentialist beliefs. As Study 2 reveals, it may also motivate people to see racial inequality as less problematic, perhaps because they think inequalities are rooted in real, unchangeable differences between racial groups. These findings are consistent with a growing body of scholarship, suggesting that both multiculturalism and color blindness may have multifaceted psychological consequences depending on the social context (Apfelbaum et al., 2016; Hahn, Banchefsky, Park, & Judd, 2015; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). As such, our research adds important nuance to the literature on diversity philosophies, which has primarily shown multiculturalism to be a superior way to effectively promote diversity relative to color blindness. Moreover, our evidence extends this work by showing that MC philosophies—which stress the strengths that cultural variation can provide to society—may reinforce beliefs about the inherence of race itself.

Of course, we do not mean to imply that multiculturalism should be unilaterally discarded or that color blindness should be adopted carte blanche, based on this research. We also do not mean to imply that recognizing racial difference, in and of itself, is necessarily bad. Multiculturalism recognizes group differences in order to celebrate them and foster diversity and inclusion, which can lead to many positive diversity-related outcomes. Indeed, a prominent criticism of color blindness is that it can lead racial/ethnic minorities to feel that their cultural identity is ignored and invalidated (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Rather, neither multiculturalism nor color blindness offers a simple panacea for improving diversity. A hybrid approach that concurrently embraces the positives and addresses the difficulties of each philosophy may offer a more productive strategy for increasing diversity and minimizing bias. For example, polyculturalism emphasizes the interaction-based connections among groups and fosters a learning orientation in which people adapt and learn in response to difference (Bernardo, Rosenthal, & Levy, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010, 2012; Rosenthal, Levy, London & Lewis, 2016). Thus, polyculturalism avoids the problematic elements of color blindness created by forced or implied assimilation into a dominant or common culture. Moreover, although polyculturalism recognizes group differences, it construes cultural groups as interdependent as opposed to separate entities that must be bridged. Polyculturalism therefore avoids a problematic aspect of multiculturalism examined by the present research: MC messages that emphasize the importance of group differences may lead to negative intergroup outcomes. Indeed, Rosenthal and Levy (2010) suggest that MC messages that simply emphasize the importance of group differences, or which emphasize the value that diverse groups contribute to society, tend to be the ones that are associated with negative diversity outcomes. Instead, MC messages that focus on maintaining cultural groups and traditions tend to be associated with positive diversity outcomes (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Notably, the Wolsko manipulations used in the current research contain aspects of these problematic elements of multiculturalism. Much like research has demonstrated that biological explanations for mental illness can result in both positive outcomes (i.e., diminished blame) and negative outcomes (i.e., desire for increased social distance; Haslam & Kvaale, 2015; Kvaale, Gottdiener, & Haslam, 2013), the relation between multiculturalism and essentialism may help clarify why multiculturalism can both benefit and challenge diversity and inclusion efforts.

Future research should continue to probe the relation between multiculturalism and essentialism. This work could aim to identify a psychological mechanism that explains the relation between multiculturalism and essentialism. For example, because multiculturalism emphasizes group differences, it may reinforce group boundaries and increase perception that groups are discrete and unconnected, which in turn may increase race essentialism. It should also explore whether individual differences in egalitarian motivations or racial prejudice may moderate the link between multiculturalism and race essentialism. Additionally, Whites tend to express greater preference for multiculturalism (Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010), compared to racial minorities. Multiculturalism may therefore increase racial essentialism more for Whites than racial/ethnic minorities, suggesting one reason why they sometimes resist multiculturalism (Kauff et al., 2013; Morrison et al., 2010; Plaut et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 2008).

Future research should also explore whether individual differences in baseline preferences for diversity philosophy, in the absence of any diversity philosophy message, may also influence the relationship. For example, in our studies, we found that multiculturalism increased race essentialism relative to both CB and control conditions in Study 2 (which utilized a MTurk sample), but only in comparison to color blindness in Study 1 (which utilized a college sample). MTurk participants may carry a stronger preexisting CB stance (e.g., see Apfelbaum, Grunberg, Halevy, & Kang, 2017), which would lead this control condition to appear similar to the CB condition). Rutgers University is one of the most diverse college campuses in the United States (U.S. News & World Report, n.d.), and it is possible that these students may hold more MC views (and thus appear more similar to a manipulated MC condition). However, without knowing participants’ endorsement of multiculturalism or color blindness prior to reading our experimental materials, it is difficult to know whether exposure to multiculturalism increased, or exposure to color blindness decreased, essentialism relative to control. Additionally, future research should explore how changes to diversity philosophy statements (e.g., to their tone or ecological validity) may influence responses. The materials that we used to manipulate multiculturalism and color blindness are well-established and have been validated across several studies (e.g., Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wilton et al., 2015; Wolsko et al., 2000). They are meant to reflect the way that multiculturalism and color blindness are articulated in the real world. Nevertheless, future research should consider whether the construct of multiculturalism (as opposed to how it is commonly operationalized) is naturally more positive or approach oriented than color blindness, and whether this perception may have consequences for essentialism and race relations. This positivity may be an inextricable feature of multiculturalism; indeed, our exploratory work suggests that, in practice, it may be very challenging to craft an ecologically valid MC message that is viewed as similarly positive in tone to color blindness. Other researchers (e.g., Hahn et al., 2015; Vorauer et al., 2009) have addressed similar complexities regarding diversity philosophies; for example, Hahn, Banchefsky, Park, and Judd (2015) disentangle the emphasis on social distinctions and negative connotations related to segregationism. Finally, one may ask whether an MC message that is positively viewed, but improperly implemented (e.g., a “foods and festivals” approach to diversity; Plaut, 2010), could lead individuals to only superficially engage with diversity (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001).

Conclusion

Across two experiments, we show that multiculturalism, although generally viewed by researchers as the preferred way to promote diversity relative to color blindness, can lead to the unexpected consequence of reinforcing the inherence of racial differences. These data represent a novel perspective on diversity philosophies that extends and constructively complicates the social psychological literature on diversity philosophies and intergroup relations.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material, SPPS780728_suppl_mat - Valuing Differences and Reinforcing Them: Multiculturalism Increases Race Essentialism

Supplemental Material, SPPS780728_suppl_mat for Valuing Differences and Reinforcing Them: Multiculturalism Increases Race Essentialism by Leigh S. Wilton, Evan P. Apfelbaum and Jessica J. Good in Social Psychological and Personality Science

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

The supplemental material is available in the online version of the article.

Notes

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