Is the Illusion of Authenticity Beneficial? Merely Perceiving Decisions as Guided by the True Self Enhances Decision Satisfaction

Abstract

Many people endorse a “true-self-as-guide” (TSAG) lay theory of decision-making that suggests following one’s true self is an optimal strategy for making decisions. Across five studies (N = 1,320), we test whether perceived use of the true self enhances decision satisfaction. Study 1 provides correlational evidence. Studies 2 and 3 provide experimental evidence that participants felt more satisfied with choices made under TSAG instructions, compared to alternate strategies. Critically, we argue that perceived use of the true self enhances decision satisfaction regardless of whether consulting the true self actually influences the decision made. Studies 4 and 5 find evidence in support of this perceptual mechanism. This research provides insight into one way by which people find satisfaction amid life’s uncertainty, extending existing research on the role of the concept of true selves in positive functioning.

Keywords

true self authenticity decision satisfaction lay belief

The “true-self-as-guide” (TSAG) lay theory of decision-making suggests that following one’s “true self” is a surefire way of making good decisions. This notion is widely and strongly endorsed (Schlegel et al., 2013). The current studies examine whether simply perceiving that one has followed one’s true self (independent of actually following one’s true self) can enhance decision satisfaction. We tested this in a series of studies examining satisfaction with both real and hypothetical decisions.

TSAG and Perceptual Mechanisms

Our studies examined whether the perception of consulting one’s true self is enough to contribute to decision satisfaction. Our perceptual mechanism ¹ approach explicitly takes a nonveridical perspective on true selves; true selves need not actually exist for them to facilitate decision satisfaction. This underscores how our TSAG perspective diverges from prior work pointing to the role of true selves in decision-making. For example, the self-concordance model (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999) suggests that decisions stemming from one’s intrinsic personality are more satisfying, and even objectively “better,” than those influenced by extrinsic sources. The current work, however, explicitly takes a perceptual approach and claims that the subjective experience that one has consulted the true self contributes to satisfaction, regardless of what choice is made. Choices need not actually be more or less in line with one’s true self; instead, merely believing that one has used the TSAG strategy can make decisions more subjectively satisfying.

The rationale for this hypothesis is 4-fold. First, the TSAG lay theory is widely endorsed, contributing to its perceived legitimacy as a decision-making strategy (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985). People who feel they have followed this strategy have “done what they were supposed to” as decision makers. Second, a judgment of fit with one’s true self is beyond reproach. This distinguishes TSAG from at least some other similarly widely endorsed strategies (e.g., rational thinking); someone can criticize whether a choice is rational, but no one else has higher ground in determining whether a choice is consistent with who you really are. Third, the TSAG lay theory maps neatly onto people’s conceptions of personhood (e.g., Strohminger et al., 2017) and taps into the potent value ascribed to true selves as morally good entities (De Freitas & Cikara, 2018; De Freitas, Cikara, Grossmann, & Schlegel, 2018; De Freitas, Sarkissian, et al., 2018). This distinguishes TSAG from other popular decision-making strategies that may be similarly beyond reproach (e.g., intuition). Finally, framing decisions as aligned with the true self provides a decision-making narrative (e.g., McAdams, 2001) that might be particularly satisfying. The TSAG narrative affords the individual an agentic role—eschewing external guidance, the person looks within themselves to make decisions. This experienced agency may directly contribute to satisfaction.

While prior research (Schlegel et al., 2013) suggests that general feelings of true self-knowledge are positively linked to feelings of decision satisfaction, these are the first studies to examine whether perceptions of consulting one’s true self also lead to satisfaction. Perceived self-knowledge and perceived use of the true self are conceptually separable constructs. A person might feel like they generally know their true self, while perceiving that they did not use their true self to make specific decisions. For example, perhaps I decided to forgo a career that felt consistent with my true self (e.g., social worker) in favor of one more lucrative and prestigious (e.g., lawyer). A similar distinction between self-knowledge and behavior is also consistent with prominent conceptualizations of authenticity (i.e., Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Wood et al., 2008).²

Overview of the Present Studies

We conducted five studies with seven independent samples to investigate our hypothesis that perceived use of the true self promotes decision satisfaction.³ Study 1 investigated whether perceptions of following one’s true self for past decisions predict current decision satisfaction. Studies 2 and 3 tested the causal influence of perceived true-self use on decision satisfaction by comparing TSAG to other decision-making strategies. Studies 4 and 5 directly tested our perceptual mechanism hypothesis by manipulating perceptions of past decisions. Sample sizes were not predetermined, but we recruited as many participants as possible based on available lab resources (with the exception of Study 5 which was preregistered at https://aspredicted.org/hx8np.pdf). No analyses were performed until data collection was completed.

Study 1

In Study 1, we measured perceptions of using the TSAG strategy, decision satisfaction, and self-concordance for several past decisions. We expected self-concordance (e.g., Sheldon & Elliot, 1999) and perceived use of true self to each independently predict decision satisfaction, given their distinct underlying mechanisms. Specifically, the self-concordance model suggests that decisions are satisfying to the extent that they correspond to one’s true implicit personality and meet basic psychological needs (i.e., veridical approach), whereas our TSAG perspective predicts that the perception of having followed one’s true self will uniquely enhance decision satisfaction regardless of whether it is concordant with any underlying personality (i.e., nonveridical approach; see Supplemental Materials for more details).

Method

Participants

Participants were 147 undergraduates (105 females, 42 males; M _age = 18.50 years, standard deviation [SD] = .85; 72% White, 82% non-Hispanic) from Texas A&M University.⁴ A power analysis via Optimal Design (Raudenbush et al., 2011) revealed that this sample size has statistical power close to 1 to detect a medium effect size (δ = .50) in multilevel modeling (assuming effect size variability σ² = .05, proportion of explained variance by the blocking variable as 0).

Materials and Procedure

Participants were asked to think about four decisions relevant to college students (e.g., decision to attend their current school). For each decision, participants rated their satisfaction by responding to 3 items (e.g., “I am completely confident I made the right decision”) on a 7-point scale (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree). Participants also responded to 2 items assessing their perceived use of TSAG (e.g., “I followed my true self”) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all because of this reason, 7 = completely because of this reason).

To assess self-concordance, we measured perceived locus of causality (PLOC) of each decision (Ryan & Connell, 1989). The PLOC represents the extent to which people view their behavior as caused by internal attributes (personal interests/values) or by external attributes (environmental forces/external rewards). The PLOC is computed by subtracting ratings of external and introjected reasons from ratings of intrinsic and identified reasons (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). We adapted 2 items for intrinsic (e.g., “I made this choice purely because of the fun and enjoyment that I expected to find”), identified (e.g., “I made this choice because this is something I consider important and valuable”), introjected (e.g., “I made this choice because I would have felt ashamed, guilty, or anxious if I had not”), and external reasons (e.g., “I made this choice because somebody else wanted or expected me to do so”). Participants indicated whether each item corresponded to their own reason for making each decision on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all because of this reason, 7 = completely because of this reason).⁵

Results and Discussion

Given that decisions were nested within individuals, we examined within-person correlations using the R statistical package rmcorr (Bakdash & Marusich, 2017). As presented in Table 1, we found that both perceived TSAG and self-concordance were positively correlated with decision satisfaction. In order to examine whether both self-concordance and perceived TSAG predicted decision satisfaction when considered simultaneously, we conducted a multilevel regression analysis using Mplus (Version 8.0; Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2017). The model included both TSAG and self-concordance as Level 1 predictors of decision satisfaction (no Level 2 predictors were included). Level 1 predictors were group-mean centered, and the slopes and intercepts were estimated as random effects. The results revealed that both perceived use of the true self, B = .26, standard error (SE) = .06, p < .001, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.15, 0.37], and self-concordance predicted decision satisfaction, B = .15, SE = .02, p < .001, 95% CI [0.11, 0.19].

Table 1.

Within-Person Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Study 1.

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Decision satisfaction	—
2. Perceived use of true self	.31**	—
3. Intrinsic reason	.42**	.31**	—
4. Identified reason	.37**	.25**	.50**	—
5. Introjected reason	−.07	.06	.003	.07	—
6. External reason	−.08^†	−.20**	−.12*	.07	.07	—
7. Self-concordance	.41**	.29**	.69**	.58**	−.50**	−.48**	—
M	5.54	5.05	4.81	5.42	2.62	2.78	4.83
SD	1.54	1.52	1.51	1.53	1.89	1.55	3.83
Internal reliability	0.94	0.80	0.62	0.78	NA	0.35	NA

Note. We used a single item for introjected reason (see Note 4). Self-concordance was computed with the sum of external and introjected reasons subtracted from the sum of intrinsic and identified reasons across decisions. Internal reliability for decision satisfaction is Cronbach’s α, and those for self-concordant variables are Spearman–Brown coefficients. NA = Not Applicable.

^† p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .001.

Study 1 provided initial “proof of concept” evidence consistent with our hypothesis that the perception of using the true self positively predicts decision satisfaction and that this relationship is distinct from self-concordance.

Studies 2A–2C

The goal of Study 2 was to establish that perceived use of TSAG causally influences decision satisfaction. In three substudies, participants either used their true self or another valued decision-making strategy (e.g., rational thinking) when making a series of occupational choices.

Method

Participants

Three hundred and eighty-four undergraduates (283 females, 101 males; M _age = 18.53 years, SD = .86; 79% White, 74% non-Hispanic) recruited from Texas A&M University participated in the study (n = 90 for Study 2A, n = 145 for Study 2B, and n = 149 for Study 2C). The sample size of Studies 2A–2C has a statistical power equal to about .99 to detect a medium effect size (d = .50) at an α level of .05 (two-tailed) in paired-samples t tests.

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed a choice task where they were presented with pairs of alternatives (e.g., chemist vs. dancer) randomly drawn from 51 occupations (Nakao et al., 2010). Participants completed two blocks of 30 choices and were given different instructions at the beginning of each block. One block had instructions to “Use your true self as a guide…” In the other block, participants were instructed to use “logic and rational thinking” (Study 2A), “[their] intuition” (Study 2B), or “[their] ideal self” (Study 2C) as a guide. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced in each substudy and did not influence the primary results.

Participants then reported their satisfaction with their choices by answering three questions (e.g., “On average, how satisfied are you with your occupational choices?”) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all satisfied, 7 = extremely satisfied). These items showed good reliabilities across three substudies (all αs ≥ .80) and were averaged within each block. Participants also answered manipulation checks assessing the extent to which they used the assigned decision-making strategy in each block (“On average, how much did you rely on your true self/logic and rational thinking/intuition/ideal self when making the career choices?”) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).

Results and Discussion

Participants reported using TSAG more in true-self blocks than alternate strategy blocks and reported using the alternate strategy more in alternate strategy blocks than true-self blocks (see Table 2). Further, participants reported that they were more satisfied with their choices when using TSAG relative to rational thinking, intuition, or their ideal self (though the difference between true and ideal selves was not significant; see Table 3).

Table 2.

Perceived Use of Each Strategy Across Condition in Studies 2A–2C.

Studies	TS Use		t	d	ALT Use		t	d
Studies	TS Block	ALT Block	t	d	TS Block	ALT Block	t	d
Study 2A	6.04 (1.01)	5.06 (1.58)	5.40*	.75	4.92 (1.53)	5.56 (1.28)	3.87*	.38
Study 2B	5.79 (1.15)	5.30 (1.37)	4.10*	.38	5.09 (1.35)	5.63 (1.15)	5.34*	.42
Study 2C	5.92 (1.12)	5.19 (1.40)	5.87*	.55	5.12 (1.33)	5.66 (1.29)	4.92*	.40

Note. n = 90 for Study 2A, n = 145 for Study 2B, and n = 149 for Study 2C. Parenthetical values represent standard deviations. TS = true self; ALT = alternate strategy (rational thinking for Study 2A; intuition for Study 2B; ideal self for Study 2C).

*p < .001.

Table 3.

Decision Satisfaction for Each Strategy Across Condition in Studies 2A–2C.

Studies	Decision Satisfaction		t	p	d
Studies	True-Self Block	Alternate Strategy Block	t	p	d
Study 2A	5.24 (0.92)	4.91 (0.95)	3.67	<.001	.36
Study 2B	5.17 (0.88)	4.95 (0.94)	3.53	.001	.24
Study 2C	5.18 (1.02)	5.06 (1.06)	1.93	.056	.12

Note. Alternate strategy block: rational thinking for Study 2A (n = 90), intuition for Study 2B (n = 145), and ideal self for Study 2C (n = 149). Parenthetical values represent standard deviations.

Finally, we examined whether the difference in decision satisfaction between true-self and alternate strategy blocks was mediated by the perceived use of the true self (see Figure 1). To this end, we conducted repeated-measure mediation analyses with 10,000 bootstraps using the MEMORE macro (Montoya & Hayes, 2017). As shown in Table 4, the analyses revealed significant indirect effects through perceived use of the true self in each study.⁶ Overall, these findings further supported our prediction that perceived use of the true self enhances decision satisfaction, relative to other highly valued decision-making strategies.

Figure 1.

A repeated-measure mediation model in Study 2. Path a indicates an estimated within-subjects mean difference in the perceived use of the true self between the true-self and alternate strategy blocks, Path b indicates an estimated effect of the within-subjects difference in decision satisfaction between blocks regressed on the within-subjects difference in the perceived use of the true self between blocks, and Path c (total effect) indicates an estimated within-subjects mean difference in decision satisfaction between the true-self and alternate strategy blocks.

Table 4.

Repeated-Measure Mediation Analyses in Studies 2A–2C.

Path	Study 2A		Study 2B		Study 2C
Path	B (SE)	95% CI	B (SE)	95% CI	B (SE)	95% CI
a	.99** (.18)	[0.62, 1.35]	.48** (.12)	[0.25, 0.72]	.72** (.12)	[0.48, 0.97]
b	.23** (.05)	[0.13, 0.34]	.17** (.04)	[0.09, 0.26]	.21** (.04)	[0.13, 0.29]
c	.33** (.01)	[0.31, 0.35]	.22** (.01)	[0.21, 0.23]	.13** (.01)	[0.11, 0.14]
c′	.10 (.10)	[−0.09, 0.30]	.14* (.06)	[0.01, 0.26]	−.03 (.07)	[−0.16, 0.10]
Indirect effect	.23 (.07)	[0.11, 0.40]	.08 (.04)	[0.03, 0.17]	.15 (.05)	[0.07, 0.27]

Note. See Figure 1 for what mediational component each path represents. Positive coefficients for Paths a and b indicate the greater perceived use of the true self and decision satisfaction in the true-self block than in the alternate strategy block, respectively. SE = standard error.

*p < .05. **p < .001.

Study 3

Study 3 further tested the causal link between perceived use of the true self and decision satisfaction with a nonhypothetical choice, by manipulating decision-making strategies for real decisions.

Method

Participants

One hundred forty-three undergraduates (95 females, 38 males; M _age = 19.09 years, SD = 1.11; 80% White, 88% non-Hispanic) from Texas A&M University participated in an online study. The sample size has a statistical power equal to about .90 to detect a medium effect size (d = .50) at an α level of .05 (one-tailed) in independent-samples t tests. Given it was an online study, we included one attention-check item (i.e., participants were asked to select a “quite a bit” option on a 7-point scale). We omitted seven participants for failing this attention check.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were informed that they would be asked to decide how to spend their free time on a specific day. At 8 a.m. of the scheduled day, participants received an e-mail containing instructions about how to decide how to spend their free time that day. Specifically, those in the true-self condition (n = 69) were told to “be authentic,” whereas those in the rational thinking condition (n = 67) were told to “think rationally.” Participants then made a plan for their free time and wrote about it. At 5 p.m. of the same day, participants received a link for the follow-up survey.

Decision-related measures

As a manipulation check, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they used the TSAG and rational thinking strategies when making their plans. There were 6 items with three representing TSAG (e.g., “I used my true self as a guide”) and three representing rational thinking (e.g., “I thought things through logically”). Responses were made on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal) and averaged for each strategy. We then asked participants to indicate how satisfied they were with their plans by answering 1 item (i.e., “How satisfied are you with how your plan worked out?”) using a 7-point scale (1 = not satisfied at all, 7 = extremely satisfied).

Results and Discussion

As shown in Table 5, TSAG use was significantly higher in the true-self condition than in the rational thinking condition, but the use of rational thinking and decision satisfaction did not significantly differ across conditions.

Table 5.

Means, Standard Deviations, and Internal Reliability for Decision-Related Measures in Study 3.

Measure	Total	Internal Reliability	Condition		t	p	d
Measure	Total	Internal Reliability	True Self	Rational Thinking	t	p	d
Use of true self	5.05 (1.44)	.87	5.49 (1.13)	4.59 (1.58)	3.84	<.001	.66
Use of rational thinking	5.05 (1.46)	.87	4.87 (1.49)	5.23 (1.42)	1.46	.147	.25
Decision satisfaction	4.64 (1.72)	NA	4.81 (1.72)	4.46 (1.73)	1.18	.239	.20

Note. n = 69 for true-self condition; n = 67 for rational thinking condition. Internal reliability is Cronbach’s α. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. NA = Not Applicable.

To test whether the manipulation indirectly influenced decision satisfaction, we performed a mediation analysis using the Hayes PROCESS macro (Model 4; Hayes, 2018). We estimated the bias-corrected coefficients from 10,000 bootstrap samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) and, as shown in Figure 2, found a significant indirect effect of the manipulation on decision satisfaction through perceived use of the true self. The total effect of the manipulation on decision satisfaction was not significant. However, according to recent theorizing on mediation analysis (e.g., Rucker et al., 2011), the presence of a total effect is not a necessary condition for observing a significant indirect effect through a theoretically meaningful mediator. Consistent with our hypothesis, these findings suggest that people instructed to follow their true self experienced enhanced decision satisfaction primarily through perceived use of the true self.

Figure 2.

A simple mediation analysis: the indirect effect of decision-making strategy manipulation on decision satisfaction through perceived use of the true self in Study 3. The true-self condition was coded as 1, and the rational thinking condition was coded as 0. The values in the parentheses indicate the total effect of the manipulation on decision satisfaction.

Study 4

Study 4 assessed the viability of a purely perceptual mechanism for the observed effects of true-self use on decision satisfaction by employing a retrospective approach in which participants recalled major decisions and thought of how they either used or did not use their TSAG when making them. Since this study focused on past decisions, a perceptual mechanism is the most likely explanation for any observed effects (whereas the manipulations in previous studies may have influenced what decisions were made).

Method

Participants

One hundred forty-eight individuals (86 females, 62 males; M _age = 36.71 years, SD = 12.88, ranging from 18 to 70; 78% White, 96% non-Hispanic) were recruited through MTurk and were paid US$0.50 in exchange for their participation in the study. The sample size has a power equal to about .92 to detect a medium effect size (d = .50) at an α level of .05 (one-tailed) in independent-samples t tests.

Materials and Procedure

Participants first listed a major decision they had made. Examples of listed decisions included getting married, accepting a new job, and moving to a new city. After generating a decision, they were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions.

Manipulating TSAG

Participants read a short paragraph that either accentuated or downplayed the importance of knowing one’s true self. After reading the paragraph, participants were asked to describe their decision-making process by focusing on how they made the decision either “using information about their true self as a guide” (n = 74) or “without necessarily using any information about your ‘TSAG’” (n = 74). Notably, the weak TSAG condition suggested that the true self is not necessary for good decision-making. In fact, the first part of the manipulation specifically stated, “people have the ability to make great decisions even when they lack self-knowledge.” Thus, in the weak TSAG condition, the plausibility of TSAG was challenged and participants generated other, potentially optimal ways they made their decision (e.g., using rational thinking). We suspected that participants would still be more satisfied in the strong TSAG condition, given that these alternate strategies still would not be as potent as TSAG.

Decision-related measures

After writing about their decision-making process, participants rated their decision satisfaction by responding to 3 items (e.g., “How satisfied were you with the decision you wrote about?”) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). As a manipulation check, participants also indicated the extent to which they used their true self by answering 2 items (e.g., “When making the decision I described, I used my true self as a guide”) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Responses to these items were averaged.

Results and Discussion

As presented in Table 6, the manipulation was effective in that participants in the strong TSAG condition reported greater use of the true self than their counterparts in the weak TSAG condition. Further, and consistent with our predictions, we found that participants reported greater decision satisfaction in the strong TSAG condition than the weak TSAG condition. Also supporting our hypothesis, a mediation analysis with 10,000 bootstrap samples found a significant indirect effect of the TSAG manipulation on decision satisfaction through perceived use of the true self (see Figure 3).

Table 6.

Means, Standard Deviations, and Internal Reliability for Perceived Use of the True Self and Decision Satisfaction in Study 4.

Measure	Total	Internal Reliability	Condition		t	p	d
Measure	Total	Internal Reliability	Strong TSAG	Weak TSAG	t	p	d
Use of true self	5.86 (1.31)	.89	5.85 (1.32)	3.59 (1.77)	7.39	<.001	1.21
Decision satisfaction	4.91 (1.82)	.92	6.09 (1.15)	5.64 (1.42)	2.15	.033	.35

Note. n = 74 for strong TSAG condition; n = 74 for weak TSAG condition. Internal reliability for decision satisfaction is Cronbach’s α and that for use of the true self is Spearman–Brown coefficients. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. TSAG = true-self-as-guide.

Figure 3.

A simple mediation analysis: the indirect effect of decision-making strategy manipulation on decision satisfaction through perceived use of the true self in Study 4. Strong TSAG condition was coded as 1, and weak TSAG condition was coded as 0. The values in the parentheses indicate the total effect of the manipulation on decision satisfaction. TSAG = true-self-as-guide.

In sum, the findings of Study 4 suggest that a purely perceptual mechanism is sufficient to explain the effects of true-self use on decision satisfaction. Because participants generated their decisions before the manipulation, the manipulation could not have affected which decision they recalled, but instead changed the way participants felt about the decision.

Study 5

In Study 5, our goal was to extend the evidence that TSAG can influence satisfaction with past decisions via a purely perceptual mechanism, by comparing a “true-self’” frame to the same alternate strategies used in Study 2.

Method

Participants

A sample of 498 individuals (238 females, 258 males, 2 unreported; M _age = 35.73 years, SD = 12.57, ranging from 18 to 85; 74% White, 84% non-Hispanic) were recruited through MTurk and compensated with US$0.50. This sample size was predetermined based on an a priori power analysis yielding that a minimum sample size of 280 (70 for each condition) is required to achieve a power equal to .95 with a medium effect size ( f ² = .25) at an α level of .05 in one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). As such, we planned to collect a sample size of approximately 400 (100 for each condition). As seen in our preregistered study plan, we included one attention check item. We excluded responses of 104 participants who failed to correctly answer an attention check item (n = 73) and/or who did not complete the writing task as instructed but wrote something irrelevant (e.g., “good study”; n = 57) from data analyses.

Materials and Procedure

As in Study 4, participants were first asked to think of an important decision they had made and briefly write about it. They were then randomized into conditions (n = 94 for true self; n = 99 for rational thinking; n = 105 for intuition; n = 96 for ideal self) and asked to describe how they made the decision with a focus on one of the four factors (“focus specifically on how you may have relied on your true self/rational thinking/intuition/ideal self to make the decision”). After completing the writing task, participants completed several questionnaires.

Decision-related measures

As a manipulation check, we assessed the extent to which participants believed that they used the four strategies when they made the decision by using 2 items for each strategy (e.g., “used my true self as a guide,” “used logical thinking,” “followed my gut,” “considered who I ideally want to be”) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). As in Study 4, we measured decision satisfaction with 3 items (e.g., “How satisfied are you with the decision you wrote about?”) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Each measure showed good internal reliabilities and the responses were averaged.

Results and Discussion

We found an overall difference in the perception of true-self use across conditions, F(3, 390) = 7.25, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .05, with perceived use of the true self in the true-self condition reported higher than that in other conditions (see Table 7 and also Supplemental Materials). Importantly, a one-way ANOVA found a significant overall difference in decision satisfaction, with decision satisfaction reported higher in the true-self condition than the other conditions, F(3, 390) = 3.62, p = .013, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .03. A post hoc Tukey test further revealed that decision satisfaction in the true-self condition was significantly higher than the rational thinking, mean difference (MD) = .55, SE = .21, p = .046, d = .39, 95% CI [0.01, 1.10], and intuition conditions, MD = .62, SE = .21, p = .016, d = .45, 95% CI [0.08, 1.16], and marginally higher than the ideal-self condition, MD = .52, SE = .21, p = .073, d = .32, 95% CI [−0.03, 1.07]. Other comparisons were not significantly different. Additionally, a contrast test (true self = 3, rational thinking = −1, intuition = −1, ideal self = −1) revealed that decision satisfaction was significantly greater in the true self than other three conditions combined, t(390) = 3.25, p = .001.

Table 7.

Means, Standard Deviations, and Internal Reliability for Decision-Related Measures in Study 5.

Measure	Total	Internal Reliability	Condition
Measure	Total	Internal Reliability	True Self	Rational Thinking	Intuition	Ideal Self
Use of true self	5.60 (1.33)	.84	6.13_a (1.03)	5.40_b (1.42)	5.36_b (1.43)	5.56_b (1.27)
Use of rational thinking	5.47 (1.40)	.84	5.77_a (1.28)	5.55_ab (1.48)	5.11_b (1.47)	5.51_ab (1.28)
Use of intuition	5.11 (1.51)	.80	5.46_a (1.34)	4.80_b (1.74)	5.05_ab (1.57)	5.15_ab (1.25)
Use of ideal self	5.59 (1.39)	.80	5.87_a (1.24)	5.57_ab (1.40)	5.27_b (1.54)	5.69_ab (1.29)
Decision satisfaction	5.77 (1.48)	.93	6.20_a (1.18)	5.65_b (1.58)	5.58_b (1.51)	5.77_ab (1.48)

Note. n = 94 for true-self condition, n = 99 for rational thinking condition, n = 105 for intuition condition, and n = 96 for ideal-self condition. Internal reliability for decision satisfaction is Cronbach’s α and those for other measures are Spearman–Brown coefficients. Means within the same row with nonoverlapping alphabet subscripts indicate that they are statistically different (p < .05; based on post hoc Tukey tests). Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.

Finally, we performed a mediation analysis with a multicategorical antecedent using the Hayes (2018) PROCESS macro (Model 4). As illustrated in Figure 4, we found significant indirect effects of the comparison between the true-self and alternate strategies on decision satisfaction through perceived use of the true self. In short, participants who thought about how their past decision may have been informed by the true self viewed their decision as more satisfying compared to those who focused on other strategies, and this was attributed to the ex post facto perceptions that they have followed their true self for making decisions.

Figure 4.

A simple mediation analysis with a multicategorical antecedent: the indirect effects of comparison between the true-self and alternate strategies on decision satisfaction through perceived use of the true self in Study 5. We used indicator coding with the true-self condition as the reference group (e.g., D ₁: true self = 0, rational thinking = 1, intuition = 0, ideal self = 0). To indicate the greater effect of the true self compared to the alternate strategy conditions, we reversed negative estimated coefficients into positive values.

General Discussion

Across five studies, we found that perceived use of the true self predicts decision satisfaction. Study 1 provided within-person correlational evidence for this relationship. In Studies 2A–2C, participants felt more satisfied with choices made under TSAG instructions, compared to alternate decision-making strategies. Study 3 extends these findings into a more natural setting. In the remaining two studies, satisfaction with past decisions was enhanced simply by making people think they followed their true self, demonstrating the viability of a purely perceptual mechanism for this relationship. Furthermore, Studies 2–5 found that perceived use of the true self mediated the effect of our manipulations on decision satisfaction.

While our studies speak to subjective-perceptual mechanisms linking the true self with decision satisfaction, they do not rule out the operation of veridical mechanisms. Our work does suggest that subjective mechanisms can operate even in the absence of veridical mechanisms. Studies 4 and 5 speak most directly to this issue in that there was no way for the TSAG manipulations to influence the decision that was made (or even the decision participants chose to think of). Since the decisions in question were made in the past, and participants selected their decisions prior to the decision-strategy manipulation, it is impossible that the manipulation actually affected decision-making. Thus, subjective perceptions of true-self use are the most plausible explanation for differences between conditions. This does not rule out the possibility that some decisions really are more authentic than others. However, the current work suggests that independent of “objective” authenticity, subjective perceptions matter in their own right. Indeed, our perspective is that TSAG effects can be observed even if there is no such thing as true selves or “objective” authenticity. Again, this does not mean that veridical mechanisms are not possible, only that they are not required for TSAG effects to emerge.

While we outlined four reasons in the introduction that we think TSAG effects emerge (i.e., cultural endorsement, beyond reproach, conceptions of personhood, agentic narratives), there also are two important (and potentially interrelated) features distinguishing the TSAG strategy from most of the comparison strategies examined in the present studies: self-relevance and positivity. Either of these factors, or their combined influence, could contribute to enhanced decision satisfaction. Perhaps perceptions of having followed one’s true self give rise to a more general feeling of self-relevance (cf. Setterlund & Niedenthal, 1993) that would be observed for any decision-making strategy that invokes the self. It is also possible that following the true self was simply the strategy most reliably associated with positivity in our participants’ minds. This suggestion accords with recent arguments that authenticity is difficult to empirically distinguish from positivity (Jongman-Sereno & Leary, 2019).

Notably, both self-relevance and positivity are also present in the “ideal self as guide” strategy examined in Studies 2C and 5, which, of the comparison strategies, yielded results most similar to the TSAG strategy. The relative similarity in results across the true- and ideal-self strategies may be driven by conceptual/content overlap between true and ideal self-concepts for most people (De Freitas, Sarkissian, et al., 2018) and may point to self-relevance and positivity as alternative explanations for our findings. The current data cannot definitively speak to this issue. However, it may be worth noting that our findings did suggest that the TSAG strategy results in somewhat greater decision satisfaction than the ideal-self strategy (marginally significant differences in both studies). To the extent that TSAG may differ from ideal self as guide, we suspect that it is the specific social value ascribed to “being oneself” that likely distinguishes the TSAG strategy from the ideal-self strategy, about which there is less social consensus (“Be yourself” is common advice, “Be who you want to be” is less common). Further research is needed to determine whether true-self-based and ideal-self-based decision-making strategies differ, as well as how TSAG compares to other self-concept-based decision-making strategies (e.g., considering the future, “actual,” or ought self).

The explicit instructional nature of our decision-strategy manipulations is a potential limiting factor in our studies. While our manipulation checks indicated that participants on average understood the instructions, we cannot be certain that all participants fully understood the instructions. This instructional approach also makes demand effects a possible explanation for the results; perhaps participants inferred our hypothesis that TSAG strategies were more satisfaction conducive and responded accordingly. However, we took care to avoid any cues signaling our hypotheses and aimed to avoid any message that conveyed judgments of differential effectiveness or social consensus of the strategies.

There are some constraints on generality of our findings (Simons et al., 2017). We speculate that (a) the effect size will be moderated by cultural differences in TSAG lay theories and (b) the effect size for the difference between TSAG and alternate strategies would similarly be moderated by the extent to which the true self is psychologically differentiated from other entities within each culture. For instance, in Eastern Asian societies where personal self-concept and identity are deeply merged with close others and significant in-group members (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), there may be more overlap between the true and ideal (or ought) self.

When it comes to many of life’s important decisions, there is little if any objective basis on which to judge whether a given decision was optimal. In the absence of agreed-upon norms for guiding behavior, where do we turn? Our results provide insight into one mechanism by which people may answer this question and find satisfaction amid life’s uncertainty. People feel better about the choices they have made when they feel they used their true self as guidance. The present research thus extends existing evidence documenting the role of the true self in positive functioning (Rivera et al., 2019). While perceptions of using the TSAG may be illusory, this illusion appears to be a beneficial way of solving one of life’s most basic problems: the problem of choice.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental_Materials - Is the Illusion of Authenticity Beneficial? Merely Perceiving Decisions as Guided by the True Self Enhances Decision Satisfaction

Supplemental_Materials for Is the Illusion of Authenticity Beneficial? Merely Perceiving Decisions as Guided by the True Self Enhances Decision Satisfaction by Jinhyung Kim, Andrew G. Christy, Grace N. Rivera, Joshua A. Hicks and Rebecca J. Schlegel in Social Psychological and Personality Science

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Jinhyung Kim

Supplemental Material

The supplemental material is available in the online version of the article.

Notes

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