Abstract
This article looks into the architecture of remedies for breaches of the right of prisoners not to be subjected to inadequate conditions of detention under the revised 2020 European Prison Rules (EPR). It seeks to expound the consistency and rationality of the relevant provisions of the 2020 EPR from the perspective of relevant principles and specific prescriptions of European prison law. For the purpose of the present article, the term ‘European prison law’ encompasses rules and standards set out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, practice of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the provisions of the EPR. The article finds that, in this context, there is sufficient coherence in the relevant principles of European prison law – faithfully codified in the 2020 EPR – providing clear guidance to European States on how to put in place a system of remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights and how to ensure its effective operation in practice.
Keywords
Introduction
The European Prison Rules (EPR) inscribe to a list of international standard-setting mechanisms and reflect a European perspective on the matter of proper management of prisons and just and fair treatment of prisoners. 1 Formally adopted as a recommendation – and thus an instrument of ‘soft law’ – the EPR reflect the state of not only legal but also political, cultural and social assumptions about the prison and prisoners’ rights in Europe. 2 Moreover, they have received significant attention and judicial recognition in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) and represent an important source of reference standards for the monitoring work of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).
The 2006 version of the EPR (the 2006 EPR) – which remained in force for some fourteen years – was adopted as an appendix to the 2006 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2006)2 on the EPR. The Committee of Ministers also adopted an official commentary accompanying the EPR. Among other substantive provisions on the management of prisons and treatment of prisoners, the 2006 EPR contained an important provision on internal ‘housekeeping’. In particular, r 108 – which aimed at keeping pace with penological and social developments in the field of prison management and treatment of prisoners – required a regular update of the Rules. 3
Since 2006, there have been many changes in the field of prison management and treatment of prisoners, which created an impression that the 2006 EPR were in some parts outdated. In particular, the Court has increasingly started dealing with cases concerning conditions of detention and various aspects of imprisonment, thereby developing its ‘penological case law’. The CPT has also further developed various standards related to the treatment of prisoners. The Council of Europe in general has been active in adopting recommendations on various specific issues of imprisonment and the general issues of treatment of offenders, some of which will be discussed below. At the United Nations (UN) level, the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Sanctions for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) were adopted, 4 and the 1955 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (UNSMR) were updated and revised 5 by the adoption of the Nelson Mandela Rules (NMR). 6
In view of these developments, the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) first entrusted the Council for Penological Co-operation (PC-CP) to carry out a revision and update of the Commentary to the 2006 EPR with a view to incorporate all relevant developments in the field. 7 However, following the work on the Commentary and observations received from experts in the field, 8 the PC-CP suggested the revision of not only the Commentary but also, on a limited basis, some of the rules. 9 The CDPC accepted this suggestion and mandated the PC-CP to prepare a revision of the 2006 EPR and the accompanying Commentary, in the relevant areas. The final text of the revised EPR was accepted by the CDPC at its plenary meeting in December 2019. 10 The revised EPR were adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 1 July 2020. 11
The revision process included, inter alia, the rule on the complaints mechanism for the allegations of breaches of prisoners’ rights (r 70). 12 In this connection, it was considered necessary to adjust the 2006 EPR with (1) the Court’s case law on the right to an effective remedy, as required by Art 13 of the Convention; (2) the standards set out in the CPT Annual report for 2017; 13 and (3) the NMR (rr 56–57). It was also necessary clearly to differentiate between the issue of ‘remedies for prisoners’ (the right to have complaints dealt with effectively by an independent authority vested with remedial powers) and the inspection and monitoring (general supervision and guidance to the prison authorities in the performance of their tasks).
This article seeks to analyse the duty to provide effective remedies for prisoners’ rights in European prison law, as codified in the revised 2020 version of the EPR. It expounds the relevant principles and specific prescriptions of European prison law and human rights law concerning, in particular, the issue of remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights (the second section), and then analyses the specific rules of the revised 2020 EPR in this respect (the third section). The article finally seeks to determine the extent to which the relevant principles of European prison law – as codified in the 2020 EPR – are coherent in relation to the system of remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights (the fourth section). It thereby aims to advance the understanding of the revised 2020 EPR 14 and to fill a gap in legal literature 15 related to the elaboration of standards of imprisonment and treatment of prisoners at the European level.
Two observations on the scope and methodology of the article are in order.
First, the article is concerned with mechanisms capable of providing individual justice to prisoners for breaches of their rights. It is not concerned with mechanisms of internal and external oversight of prisons to the extent that such mechanisms are intended to operate in abstracto and proactively rather than addressing and, if appropriate, providing immediate and effective relief for the specific inadequate conditions of imprisonment. 16 In other words, this article is not concerned with the activities of different inspection and monitoring mechanisms which perform a proactive and pre-emptive, rather than a reactive and remedial, role. It is understood, of course, that in practice it is not always easy to draw a clear line of distinction between the two types of activities 17 and that the effective protection of prisoners’ rights rests on an effective and integrated operation of both oversight and remedial activities.
Secondly, the article provides an overview and assessment of remedies for prisoners in European prison law. It seeks to elaborate, in particular, on the level of coherence between the different standards and requirements set out in the three pillars of that law: the European Convention on Human Rights (and the case law of the Court), 18 the CPT standards and the EPR. However, nothing in this article should be understood as an assertion that the operation of these standards and requirements is absolutely ensured and properly operates in practice at the level of any particular national jurisdiction in Europe. 19
The prisoners’ rights and remedies in the European legal landscape
In the contemporary European setting, it is uncontroversial to assert that prisoners have rights. The rejection of the idea that prisoners could be treated as persons who, as a consequence of their crimes, have forfeited not only their liberty but also all other personal rights, and could thus be considered as ‘slaves of the state’, 20 is deeply rooted in the precepts of European prison law, practice and constitutional traditions. 21 Indeed, in Europe, particularly from the mid-19th century, the concept of prison was seen as a result of necessity to reform the methods of punishment and to find more enlightened, humane and effective response to crime. 22
The necessity of recognition and regulation of prisoners’ rights has been clearly acknowledged in the EPR. Thus, according to the basic principles of the EPR, ‘[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for their human rights’ (r 1) and ‘[p]ersons deprived of their liberty retain all rights that are not lawfully taken away by the decision sentencing them or remanding them in custody’ (r 2).
The EPR as a whole, including the above-cited provisions, are largely inspired by the earlier developments in prison standards at the European level and the 1955 UNSMR. However, it should be noted that, unlike the EPR, these earlier European standards 23 and the UNSMR (including their revised 2015 version) do not refer to prisoners’ human rights as such. Nevertheless, these standards rely on the concept of ‘human dignity’, which, for all intents and purposes as will be elaborated further below, must be seen as the generic good from which ascription and content of all other prisoners’ rights follow. 24 This is particularity true if the international human rights developments related to the treatment of prisoners are seen as an attempt by the international community to recognise that prisoners, who are perceived as outcasts and enemies of society, do in fact have inherent dignity and must be protected from dehumanisation. 25
The most important basis for the recognition of prisoners’ rights in Europe is the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). The Convention is largely understood as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order in the field of human rights’ 26 and represents a source of binding law on prisoners’ rights in Europe. However, the Convention does not contain any explicit provision concerning rights of prisoners, 27 which probably reflects different priorities of the post-Second World War European societies but arguably also a narrower understanding of what rights prisoners actually retained and how they related to the rights recognised under the Convention. Indeed, although prisoners were among the most numerous applicants at the initial stages of development of the Convention system, the then Convention mechanisms – namely the European Commission of Human Rights and the Court – only dealt with their complaints on a limited basis and mostly from the perspective of the procedural guarantees of the right to liberty under Art 5 of the Convention. 28
A shift in the approach to prisoners’ rights occurred with the recognition that respect for human dignity, as the generic concept underlying the rights of prisoners, forms the very essence of the Convention. 29 Thus, in the Court’s early case law concerning prisoners’ rights, the concept of human dignity was placed at the centre of the Court’s assessment of whether a particular measure or treatment to which a prisoner was subjected breached one’s rights under the Convention. 30 It was on this basis that the Court later developed an abundant body of case law concerning different aspects of life in prison, including those related to the material conditions of detention. 31 As a result, it is now well entrenched in the Court’s case law that there can be no question that a prisoner forfeits Convention rights merely because of his or her status as a person detained following conviction 32 or, for that matter, during pretrial detention. 33 Prisoners enjoy a variety of fundamental rights and freedoms, save, of course, for the right to liberty, provided that the deprivation of liberty was lawfully imposed. In other words, to paraphrase another Court adage, fundamental rights do not stop at the prison gate. 34
In Convention law, there is a particularly strong link between the concepts of ‘degrading’ treatment or punishment under Art 3 of the Convention and respect for ‘dignity’. 35 This is therefore a provision of paramount importance for the recognition and protection of prisoners’ rights in the European system of human rights protection, in particular in relation to the requirement of adequate conditions of detention. This provision enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society and prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour. 36
The fact that Art 3 is an ‘absolute norm’ does not mean that the protective perimeter of its protection is unlimited. 37 Not every disagreeable aspect of imprisonment will fall under the definitional scope of one of the proscribed forms of treatment under that provision. In the context of deprivation of liberty, Art 3 requires that the suffering and humiliation involved must not go beyond the inevitable suffering and humiliation associated with detention. Thus, it is the duty of the state to ensure that a person is detained in conditions that are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject the prisoner to unnecessary distress or hardship and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, one’s health and well-being are adequately secured. 38
The state’s responsibility in this context is objective. 39 Under Art 3, it is immaterial that the state has no intention to humiliate or debase a detainee by placing him or her in poor conditions of detention. Moreover, the state cannot invoke financial or logistical difficulties to justify poor conditions of detention. 40 The state simply has an obligation to organise a penitentiary system that ensures respect for the dignity of detainees.
In practical terms, all this may be regarded as a duty of the state to organise its penitentiary system and to provide adequate conditions of detention to prisoners. Such a duty translates into a specific set of standards related to sufficient personal space and adequate material conditions of detention. The most pressing aspect of this duty concerns the issue of adequate personal space and overcrowding in prisons. 41
A more complete examination of specific requirements under the Convention related to the state’s duty to provide adequate conditions of detention goes beyond the scope of this article. However, for the present discussion, it is important to note that the development of these specific requirements under the Convention can be observed as a form of translation of human rights from broad visions of justice and order into technocratic prescriptions and policy directions, 42 which have further developed their own systems of recognition and enforcement primarily through inspection, monitoring and individual complaints mechanisms.
An important source of standards of European prison law related to prisoners’ rights and the proper treatment of prisoners is the practice of the CPT. The CPT was established by the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 43 as a body to examine, by means of visits, ‘the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of such persons from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (Art 1). 44 The CPT is not a judicial body. It does not settle disputes and its work is normally proactive, rather than reactive, to the indications or risks of inadequate conditions of detention or ill treatment of prisoners. Its activities do not aim at ‘conflict resolution’ but rather at ‘conflict avoidance’ on the practical level. As the CPT itself explains, its aim is to assist states in finding ways to strengthen the ‘cordon sanitaire’ that separates acceptable and unacceptable treatment or behaviour. 45
Since its establishment, the CPT has played a key role not only in making sure that prisoners’ rights are recognised and respected in European prisons but also in shaping European penal policies and laws concerning the treatment of prisoners. Through its activities, the CPT has developed particular ‘jurisprudence’ or standards in this respect. These standards – although formally not representing a binding law – are, as commentators explain, practically more important than those prescribed under the EPR and are also more detailed than those flowing from the EPR or the Court’s case law. 46 They include matters such as living accommodation and allocation of personal space in prison; hygiene; lighting, heating, ventilation and cell facilities; nutrition; prison regimes; prisoners’ contact with the outside world; staffing; medical care; and, importantly for this article, accountability mechanisms. 47
The above three pillars of European prison law, namely the EPR, the Convention and the CPT standards, are interrelated and – as will be seen with regard to the accountability mechanisms or remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights – on the whole, coherent. Thus, the EPR have received significant attention and judicial recognition in the case law of the Court. The EPR have been referred to by the Court’s Grand Chamber in cases concerning: solitary confinement, 48 life imprisonment, 49 visiting rights, 50 special prison regimes, 51 prison work, 52 prison leave, 53 prison overcrowding and conditions of imprisonment 54 and discrimination in penal policy. 55 Moreover, the Court has been guided by the EPR in its pilot judgments addressing structural problems of inadequate conditions of imprisonment in various Council of Europe States, including in relation to the absence of effective remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights. 56 Thus, although nominally adopted in the form of a recommendation, this judicial recognition makes the EPR more than mere ‘soft law’ in the overall architecture of European prison law. Indeed, in its case law, the Court often draws the authorities’ attention to ‘the importance of this recommendation, notwithstanding its non-binding nature’. 57
The EPR have also found recognition in the work of the CPT. The CPT has referred to the EPR on more than 400 occasions in its various documents when developing and elucidating different standards related to the treatment of prisoners and conditions of life in prison. 58 At the same time, the CPT has the right, but is not bound, to rely on legal standards contained in any specific instrument of international law or any international case law and practice when carrying out its functions. 59 Indeed, the CPT tends to develop and apply its own standards, taking into account, of course, the relevant international standards that may guide it in its work. 60
The relationship between the CPT standards and the Court’s case law is also complex but certainly not discordant. Since the Court, for various reasons (the elaboration of which falls largely outside the scope of the present article), normally does not conduct fact-finding visits to places of detention, when it is faced with conflicting accounts of facts by the parties concerning the conditions in a particular prison facility, it readily relies on the findings of the CPT. 61 At the same time, the Court has stressed, as also recognised by the CPT, 62 that it performs a conceptually different role to the one assigned to the CPT. The thrust of CPT activity is pre-emptive action aimed at prevention, which, by its very nature, aims at a degree of protection that is greater than that upheld by the Court when deciding cases concerning conditions of detention. In contrast to the CPT’s preventive function, the Court has a reactive function and is responsible for the judicial application in individual cases of the relevant standards under the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court stressed that it remains attentive to the standards developed by the CPT. Indeed, in Muršić v Croatia, while not applying the CPT standard of 4 sq. m of personal space in multi-occupancy cells in prison and instead upholding its long-established minimum standard of 3 sq. m, the Court emphasised ‘the importance of the CPT’s preventive role in monitoring conditions of detention and of the standards which it develops in that connection’ and stressed that ‘when deciding cases concerning conditions of detention it remains attentive to those standards and to the Contracting States’ observance of them’. 63
In addition to the three pillars of European prison law discussed above, standards on the rights and treatment of prisoners are also shaped through various activities at the level of the Council of Europe elaborating on further details of prisoners’ rights and life in prison. The Council of Europe has dealt with matters such as specific standards of treatment of special categories of prisoners: dangerous offenders, 64 foreign prisoners, 65 juvenile offenders, 66 long-term prisoners and those serving life sentences; 67 and with different organisational issues of imprisonment such as overcrowding, 68 provision of healthcare 69 and education. 70
The issue of prison conditions has also been gaining prominence in European Union (EU) law. This was prompted, in particular, by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case of Aranyosi and Caldararu, 71 where the question of inadequate conditions of detention was put at the forefront of operation of the principles of mutual recognition and cooperation. 72 However, due to a complex institutional arrangement of EU law, there is no EU legislation on prison conditions. Nevertheless, the issues relating to prisons and imprisonment are starting to attract academic interest 73 and different other initiatives are being developed by the EU institutions. In particular, the EU Commission has published a Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention 74 but has not so far proposed any legislation. More recently, the Council and Parliament of the EU have proposed several ways in which the matter can be taken further within the Union. 75
An aspect of European prison law that is often not given sufficient attention in the debate on prison standards and policies at the European level is the question of remedies available to prisoners to vindicate their rights. Thus, for instance, the basic principles of European prison law as elaborated in Part I of the EPR make no mention of the right of prisoners to challenge measures affecting their conditions of imprisonment or different aspects concerning their life in prison. Likewise, as already noted above, legal research and writing are disproportionately silent on remedies for prisoners compared to the elaboration of other standards of imprisonment and treatment of prisoners. 76
At the same time, the logic of law rests on the premise that whenever there is a right there should also be a remedy to correct and ensure the observance of that right. 77 If a prisoner has the right not to be subjected to adverse conditions of detention, then he or she should also have a remedy to cure a possible infringement of that right. In other words, prisoners have rights and must therefore also have remedies. Thus, discussing rights without examining remedies is a deficient and futile exercise. In sum, it could be asserted that remedies for prisoners concern the most crucial and yet generally neglected and least understood aspect of European prison law. 78
In human rights law, the right to a remedy generally implies the procedures and institutions for the enforcement of a right as well as the actions and measures providing redress for violation of a right. In other words, effective enjoyment of a right presupposes the existence of remedies ensuring affirmation and reinforcement of the right through condemnation of its breach and sanctioning of wrongdoers. This also creates an important deterrent effect: a rational potential wrongdoer will engage in a cost-benefit assessment of the breach and the expected advantage. 79
Recourse to remedies normally designates a positive action and is sometimes viewed as an aspect of positive obligations in human rights law. 80 The right to a remedy is also considered to be a procedural matter aimed at sanctioning violations and protecting substantive human rights without any self-standing normative value. 81 However, as Dinah Shelton explains, the right to a remedy essentially has dual meaning: procedural – related to the process through which human rights claims are examined and decided; and substantive – related to the requisite outcome of a successful use of the remedy in question. 82
The key consideration concerning the right to a remedy in international human rights law is the principle of effectiveness. 83 In practical terms, it designates various procedural aspects related to the due process expectations in the use of a remedy, 84 and the achievement of a substantively adequate redress for the breach of a right. 85
The central legal basis of European prison law concerning the right to a remedy is Art 13 of the Convention. This article, in so far as relevant, provides that ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority…’ 86 In general, the Court has interpreted the scope of Art 13 as guaranteeing the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the legal order concerned. This article requires the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an arguable complaint under the Convention and the granting of appropriate relief. However, it is important that the remedy is effective in practice as well as in law. 87
In the context of imprisonment and conditions of life in prison, the Court differentiates between two types of remedies under Art 13: preventive and compensatory. Preventive remedy aims at the cessation of the impugned situation and, to be effective, it must be capable of rapidly bringing the ongoing violation of a prisoner’s right to an end. Compensatory remedy has to ensure an enforceable right to compensation for any breach that has already taken place. The two types of remedies are not alternative. In this domain, preventive and compensatory remedies have to be complementary to be considered effective. 88
This structure of the right to a remedy can be seen as a mechanism ensuring that ‘rights of prisoners’ are not merely imperfect aspirations at the discretion of prison authorities but entitlements which can be claimed and enforced. In other words, remedies are important to ensure that the rights of prisoners under European prison law and the corresponding national legal framework are practical and effective, rather than theoretical and illusory. 89
It would be difficult to imagine that imprisonment – as punishment in itself and not as a means of punishment – does not require remedies ensuring that possible deviances in the execution of the prison sentence are elucidated and corrected. Sentencing a prisoner to confinement for violations of the criminal law does not under any standards imply that he or she must endure, for instance, sexual abuse by a prison guard or a fellow inmate. 90 Thus, remedies are important as a means of correction of any such potential or actual deviations in the course of execution of a sentence. Indeed, the requisite operation of remedies – as provided in European prison law – must lead to a cessation of the impugned situation and the provision of redress. In some instances, redress may entail an earlier release from prison, 91 which can be a corrective measure for a treatment going beyond the scope of an otherwise legitimate and lawful confinement.
It should also be accepted that prisons – like any other public service – can no longer be regarded, as they perhaps once were, 92 as the sole province of the administrative branch. Unfettered discretion of prison officials to guarantee the rights of prisoners and, if considered appropriate, ensure their application would be tantamount to denying that such rights exist. In other words, the very logic of ‘retained rights’ would be meaningless if such rights would depend on the discretion of the administration and could not be recognised and vindicated in an effective manner. Many Court cases finding a breach of the Convention in the administrative restrictions on prisoners’ rights amply support this proposition. 93
In this context, it is also important to note that the rejection of the ‘slave of the state’ doctrine at the level of national constitutional and wider European discourse, and acceptance of the fact that prisoners have rights, is not immune from the contemporary populistic tendencies. 94 Prisoners are persons under full control of the state who are in a situation of vulnerability and dependence. Their special status as persons who deserve punishment, coupled with complete and effective control by the state over every aspect of their lives, makes them an easy target for the exercise of various oppressive actions through which a particular political establishment wishes to assert its moral authority in the eyes of – usually, insufficiently informed – general public. 95 Moreover, there are tendencies of some politicians and the media to create myths to disparage prisoners’ assertions of rights by suggesting that such claims are extravagant, exaggerated and frivolous, which is rarely the case in reality. 96 Remedies for prisoners capable of legally forbearing such tendencies are thus needed as an expression of the rule of law.
Remedies for prisoners also have an important dignitarian or ‘psycho-hygienic’ aspect. 97 They empower prisoners vis-à-vis the prison administration, reducing their sense of vulnerability and dependence. Prisoners live in a coercive atmosphere and the very fact of incarceration hinders many aspects of their dignity: limited privileges, regulated movement, limited freedom in exercising daily choices and literal physical restraint. 98 In such instances, the existence of mechanisms ensuring that any such coercion and restraints are constricted by law and that competing claims of prisoners and prison officials are justly weighed has an important role for the prisoners’ self-perception and their perceived dignity as human beings with ‘retained rights’ by the prison administration. 99
In sum, the very fact of recourse to incarceration creates a duty on the state to put in place remedies allowing prisoners to assert and protect their rights. 100 The purpose of remedies is to strike a balance between discourses of ‘rights’ (prisoners) and ‘risks’ (prison administration) associated with imprisonment. 101 In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that prisons are complex bureaucracies and by their very nature closed institutions where risks of abuse are very high, 102 simply because there are unequal dynamics of power between the prison administration and those under their authority and control. 103 Remedies should thus be taken seriously as a means of ensuring legitimacy and sound exercise of authority by the prison administration in its treatment of prisoners and observance of prisoners’ rights.
Remedies in the EPR
Structure of the complaints mechanism under the EPR
The central provision of the EPR articulating the relevant standards on remedies for prisoners is r 70. In observing the already discussed differentiation between the complaints mechanisms, on the one hand, and different inspection and monitoring mechanisms, on the other, this provision should be differentiated from the provisions concerning governmental inspection (r 92) and independent monitoring (r 93). In particular, r 70 is concerned with the provision of individual justice for breaches of prisoners’ rights while rr 92–93 intend to ensure that the treatment of prisoners in a particular prison system meets the relevant requirements and standards of national and international law, including the EPR.
It is, however, worth reiterating that although the two lines of protection of prisoners’ rights are conceptually distinct, in practice it is often impossible to observe a strict differentiation between them. Thus, for instance, in an international context, when carrying out its monitoring work, upon being informed of a particular breach of prisoners’ rights, the CPT may take measures to ensure that there is an adequate follow-up to such events. 104 Similarly, when examining allegations of individual breaches of prisoners’ rights, the Court may instruct the authorities to take adequate general measures to address a systemic problem of the prison system, which was exemplified in the particular case examined by the Court. This is done in the Court’s pilot and leading cases. 105
Nevertheless, in this context, it should be stressed that, as the CPT’s experience has shown, the capacity and competence of a body dealing with the observance of prisoners’ rights need to be clearly established. In particular, the CPT has argued that it is inadvisable for the monitoring bodies to deal directly with formal complaints as well. However, where the same institution handles complaints and monitors places of detention, both functions should preferably be kept separate and performed by clearly distinct entities. 106
For analytical purposes, the structure of r 70 can be observed in the following manner: paras [1] and [7] define the requisite nature and scope of the complaints mechanism; and other provisions of r 70 (paras [2]–[6] and [8]–[13]) address proper operation of the mechanism. The latter aspect of r 70 is complemented with other provisions of the EPR, as will be discussed further below.
Nature and scope of the complaints mechanism
Pursuant to r 70(1), prisoners must have ample opportunity to make requests or complaints ‘to the director of the prison or other authority within the prison system and to a judicial or other independent authority with reviewing and remedial power’. According to para [7] of the same Rule, if a request or complaint is rejected, reasons shall be provided to the prisoner without delay. If the decision was adopted by the prison director or another authority within the prison system, the prisoner shall have the right to appeal to a judicial or other independent authority with reviewing and remedial power.
Rule 70 refers to ‘requests’ and ‘complaints’ of prisoners. According to the official Commentary to the EPR, ‘requests’ concern favours or facilities to which prisoners ‘are not entitled by right’, but which may be granted by the prison management or other competent authorities. The Commentary cites as examples extra visits or permission to leave the prison to attend the funeral of a relative. On the other hand, ‘complaints’ concern formal objections against decisions, actions or lack of action of the prison administration affecting prisoners. 107
In a certain sense, this differentiation between ‘requests’ and ‘complaints’ may seem to obfuscate the operation of the remedy under r 70. However, any uncertainty in this context appears to be of a purely conceptual rather than practical nature. The particular conceptual difficulty arises with regard to the cited understanding of ‘requests’. If those are demands that cannot be justifiably claimed, then there is little logic in subjecting them to the same system of review and vindication as ‘complaints’, namely demands or duties directed against the relevant authority that some state of affairs be obtained. In other words, if ‘requests’ do not typically represent a case in which one has a right that another do something or make something happen, 108 then legally speaking there is no need for a system through which such demands (or social claims) can be enforced. 109
However, the examples to which the Commentary refers are in fact (albeit qualified) demands that have merit under Art 8 of the Convention. 110 It would therefore appear that although ‘requests’ may concern favours or facilities to which prisoners are not entitled by some internal prison regulation or national prison law, it should not be ruled out that they may concern wider rights recognised by way of constitutional or international human rights law. In such a case, adequate review process in the vindication of these rights will be of crucial importance. 111
There is therefore a strong rationale in requesting the authorities to provide effective remedies for ‘requests’ comparable to that for ‘complaints’ of prisoners. Indeed, from a comparative perspective, the rationale behind the provisions on the complaints mechanism in rr 56–57 of the NMR – which also mention ‘requests’ and ‘complaints’ – is the necessity to ensure legal checks and balances to administrative discretionary power in all matters concerning prisoners, namely the legality of their detention, conditions of confinement and disciplinary measures imposed on them. 112
According to r 70(1), prisoners must have ‘ample opportunity’ to make requests or complaints. The concept of ‘ample opportunity’ is not defined in the EPR or its Commentary. However, drawing from the general principle of ‘availability’ – as construed by the CPT –, 113 it could be interpreted to require an easily and genuinely available effective complaints mechanism giving prisoners a realistic possibility to convey their complaints to the competent authority. For its part, r 56(1) of the NMR provides that prisoners must have an opportunity to make requests or complaints ‘every day’, which, insofar as understood as a temporal indication, was not retained in the EPR.
The central issue in the operation of the complaints mechanism under r 70 of the EPR is the competent authority to examine the requests or complaints of prisoners. That competent authority, pursuant to the cited Rule, may be the director of the prison or other authority within the prison system, or a judicial or other independent authority with reviewing and remedial power. 114 In fact, when creating a link between the two types of authority (prison director or other authority within the prison system and judicial or other independent authority), r 70(1) uses the conjunction ‘and’, suggesting that both avenues should be open to prisoners.
However, Commentary to the EPR explains that r 70(1) makes a clear distinction between internal and external complaints mechanisms, in line with the Court’s case law and CPT practice. Thus, national systems may provide for the possibility that a request or complaint be made first before an internal complaints mechanism (director of the prison or the central prison administration) or directly to an external complaints mechanism (judicial or other independent authority). However, if a legal system does not allow a direct complaint to a judicial or other independent authority vested with reviewing and remedial power, it should ensure that the decisions of the prison administration are subject to a review by an independent external authority. 115
The distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ complaints mechanisms, as explained above, is conveniently made in the CPT standards. According to the CPT, there should also be an effective complaints mechanism within the prison administration (preferably at two levels of authority) but prisoners should be able to turn to an external complaints body (general or specialised) empowered to make binding decisions concerning prisoner’s complaints. 116
The Court’s case law does not use the terminology ‘internal and external’ complaint mechanisms. From the perspective of the requirements under the Court’s case law, different bodies may exercise the function of a complaints mechanism and different manners of operation may exist in national systems. However, in this context, the Court has explained that an authority referred to in Art 13 of the Convention must satisfy the following criteria: it (1) must be independent of the authorities in charge of the prison system; (2) must secure the inmates’ effective participation in the examination of their grievances; (3) must ensure speedy and diligent handling of the inmates’ complaints; (4) must have at its disposal a wide range of legal tools for eradicating the problems that underlie these complaints; and (5) must be capable of rendering binding and enforceable decisions. 117
The relevant authority in this context is normally a judicial one but there it may be possible for administrative authorities to satisfy the Art 13 requirements. Moreover, from the perspective of Art 13, it is possible that a complaint would first have to be decided within the prison system by bodies not meeting all the requisite criteria – notably independence – under the Court’s case law, if a further complaint lies before a judicial or other authority meeting all those requirements.
For instance, the Court has not accepted that a complaint mechanism before the prosecutor (which does not give an individual right) or that before an Ombudsman (who cannot issue binding and enforceable decisions) represent effective remedies. 118 On the other hand, it has accepted that complaints made directly before a sentence-execution judge 119 or an administrative court, 120 or before the prison administration first and subsequently before a sentence-execution judge (where necessary), 121 represent – in principle – an effective remedy.
The nature and scope of an effective complaints mechanism as devised in the above discussed sources of European prison law (and as codified in r 70(1) of the EPR) open up two critical questions: the appropriateness of judicial involvement in the administration of prisons; and – once that is accepted – the necessity of a prior exhaustion of an otherwise, in itself, inadequate remedy provided within the prison system.
The criticism towards the model of judicial involvement in ensuring prisoners’ rights principally rests on the premise that judges lack the capacity or competence, or both, to administer prisons and decide on the manner in which prison administrations should ensure proper treatment of prisoners and operation of prisons. 122 Moreover, it is suggested that judicial involvement in this context complicates the operation of prisons 123 and that it may create a certain backlash from the judiciary (judges who may become overburdened with different complaints by prisoners); public perception (justice system dealing with ‘frivolous’ complaints by prisoners); and, consequently, the legislature (which may seek to limit prisoners’ recourse to complaint mechanisms). 124 Thus, from this perspective, it is suggested that the most appropriate form of judicial involvement – if any – is the one which is based on a ‘hands-off approach’, where substantial deference is given to the prison administration concerning the treatment of prisoners and observance of prisoners’ rights. 125
However, from the perspective of prisoners’ rights, at least as understood in European prison law, this debate is largely misconceived. The question is not merely about the administration and running of prisons – a field where a great majority of judges most probably lack capacity, or competence, or both – but also about the observance of prisoners’ constitutional and international human rights. In this regard, there is no doubt that judges and courts are best placed – in terms of capacity and/or competence – to decide on prisoners’ claims. Indeed, as suggested in legal theory, those who do not understand freedom cannot understand the prison. 126 Accordingly, as judges and courts do understand rights and freedoms, they are well placed to ensure that such constitutional and international law values are duly weighed against the legitimate interests of safe and proper operation of prisons. Moreover, as already discussed above, absence of a judicial involvement in this context leaves an impression of unconstrained administrative power, which is in itself an unacceptable concept of administrative governance.
This does not, however, mean that the judicial involvement in the operation of complaints mechanisms does not have certain real limits. These are limits inherent in the courtroom’s capacity to secure meaningful redress for an individual grievance. For instance, researchers have observed that there are technical limits to prison laws, which are primarily designed to enable the government to manage its prisons than to spell out prisoner rights. 127 Thus, although this is not a decisive argument from the constitutional and/or international human rights point of view, insofar as prison litigation primarily relates to the enforcement of prison laws, courts’ capacity to balance the individual rights of prisoners and the interests in proper operation of prisons may be hampered since the two (potentially) conflicting aspects of imprisonment are not regulated with equal rigor and care in the relevant law.
Moreover, there are various procedural limitations, such as complexities in judicial procedures and costs of proceedings that inhibit prison litigation. Furthermore, uncertainty or delay in enforcement may have a chilling effect on potential claimants. There is also a risk of over-judicialisation of the process of observance of prisoners’ rights as attention may be diverted from proactive initiatives aimed at the search of solutions for structural deficiencies in prisons. A view is thus expressed that judicial intervention should be geared at addressing extreme cases, rather than encouraging routine improvements in prison operations. 128
Although these arguments are valid from the perspective of real limits of judicial intervention to protect prisoners’ rights, they still do not call into question the fundamental importance of judicial intervention whenever a particular breach of a prisoner’s right reaches the level of severity triggering redress under constitutional or international human rights law. However, they do demonstrate that, preferably, judicial intervention is a subsidiary source of protection of prisoners’ rights. Mechanisms should be put in place ensuring that prisoners’ grievances are first resolved within the prison system and that judicial intervention comes as a measure of last resort. The courts’ main function should be to ensure that the legitimate interests in safe and proper operation of the prison – as invoked by the prison authorities – are appropriately balanced with the fundamental rights of prisoners.
Lastly, r 70 is silent on compensatory remedies for inadequate conditions of detention which a prisoner has endured in the past. However, as the EPR are primarily concerned with the treatment of prisoners and effective management of prisons, the guidance on the principles related to the compensatory remedies should be sought elsewhere, primarily in the manner in which they are construed in the Court’s case law, as already explained above. It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that they form part of the overall architecture of an effective remedy for prisoners’ rights under Art 13 of the Convention.
Practical operation of the complaints mechanism
In the practical operation of the complaints mechanism, the authorities must primarily ensure that requests and complaints can be made without censorship of substance (r 70(1) of the EPR). Rule 56(3) of the NMR providers likewise. This provision should be read in the light of the principle of confidentiality, stipulated in rr 23(4) and 70(8) of the EPR.
According to the CPT, direct and confidential access to complaints bodies can be secured by different means, such as by installing locked complaint boxes accessible in appropriate locations, to be opened only by persons specifically charged with ensuring the confidentiality of complaints. Moreover, staff directly in charge of the prisoner should not be in a position to filter his or her complaints. 129 For its part, the Court has developed a well-established case law according to which any interference with or censorship of a prisoner’s correspondence raises an issue under Art 8 of the Convention and must be justified within the meaning of that provision. 130
Rule 70(2) of the EPR privileges informal alternative methods of resolving a dispute arising out of a prisoner’s request or complaint. However, pursuant to para [3] of r 70, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are to be excluded from consideration in cases of ‘ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations’. Such instances, including in particular a prisoner’s death, must be subject to an effective official investigation conducted by the competent authority (r 70(5) of the EPR). Moreover, this provision must be read together with r 55 of the EPR, which concerns the general duty to investigate criminal acts.
The Commentary to the EPR explains that informal alternative methods of conflict resolution can be useful in preventing antagonism between prisoners and prison administrations. 131 In this context, reference is made to various mechanisms that can normally be found in the context of restorative processes in criminal matters such as mediation and reconciliation meetings and, if appropriate, restorative conferencing and peacemaking circles. 132 However, informal alternative methods of conflict resolution are not a substitute for the formal complaints procedure. It must always be open to a prisoner to lodge, at any point, a formal complaint if he or she considers it appropriate and necessary. 133 Moreover, to prevent abuse, any request or complaint of a prisoner must be properly documented in accordance with r 70(13) of the EPR, and this must accordingly apply to the requests and complaints subject to alternative dispute resolution as well.
The cited provisions of the EPR make it clear that some breaches of prisoners’ rights may be so grave that any alternative dispute resolution is excluded. This view was also advocated by the PRI and APT in their written submissions to the PC-CP WG. 134 In this context, the EPR makes reference to ‘serious human rights violations’, which encompasses deaths, ill treatment and other serious –usually intentional – 135 breaches of international human rights law. 136 In this context, the 2020 EPR fill an important gap in the 2006 EPR which had made no explicit mention of the duty to investigate suspicious deaths, ill treatment and other serious allegations of human rights in prisons. At the same time, this is an obligation flowing from the Court’s well-established case law, 137 the CPT standards 138 and rr 57(3) and 71(1) and (2) of the NMR.
Furthermore, r 70(4) refers to the provision of adequate (effective) information to prisoners concerning the operation of the complaints mechanism. This provision needs to be read in conjunction with r 30(1) of the EPR on the right to information about prisoners’ rights and duties in general. The Commentary to the EPR explains that the provision of information needs to pay due regard to the prisoners’ linguistic and mental capabilities. Thus, special attention is required when providing this information to foreign nationals 139 and prisoners with disabilities. 140 The same requirements follow from the CPT standards 141 and rr 54 and 55 of the NMR.
In this context, it should also be noted that neither the EPR nor other international standards require that a complaint or request be made in a particular form. Thus, any request or complaint can be made orally or in writing. 142 The CPT has explained that, where complaints are made in writing, availability of standard complaints forms is highly desirable. However, this does not mean that a complaint on a non-standard form should not be examined. The CPT has also stressed that, as regards indigent prisoners, measures should be taken to provide them with writing material, envelopes and postage free of charge. 143 Similar requirements flow from the Court’s case law. 144
Paragraph [6] of r 70 of the EPR sets out the duty of prompt examination of complaints, which ensures, to the maximum possible extent, effective participation of prisoners. This provision needs to be read in conjunction with paras [8] and [9] of r 70, which relate to the principles of confidentiality and safety from any form of retaliation against using the complaints mechanism. It builds on the former r 70(4) of the 2006 EPR, the CPT standards 145 and rr 56(3) and 57(2) of the NMR. In this context, it is particularly important to ensure perceived fairness of a complaints system and diligent examination of complaints, 146 since excessive delays in examination can make an otherwise acceptable complaints mechanism ineffective in the particular circumstances of a case. 147 Moreover, unfounded complaints should be subject to a reasoned decision 148 and cannot be answered, for instance, by a simple letter. 149
According to r 70(9) of the EPR, prisoners cannot be exposed to any sanction, retaliation, intimidation, reprisal or other negative consequences as a result of having submitted a request or complaint. The same is provided in r 57(2) of the NMR. This also follows from the CPT standards 150 and the Court’s case law. 151 However, as the Commentary explains, r 70(9) protects prisoners who make complaints in good faith, rather than encouraging malicious complaints. 152 In this connection, it should be noted that whether a complaint is malicious or bona fidei will have to be determined in the circumstances of each case, taking due account of the prisoners’ rights to submit their grievances through the complaints mechanism as part of their freedom of expression under Art 10 of the Convention. 153
Paragraphs [10]–[12] of r 70 make it clear that the right to lodge a request or complaint is a right of the prisoner concerned which he or she can exercise personally or through the available legal assistance. Third parties may also make complaints for the benefit of prisoners in cases where, for instance, a prisoner’s mental or physical condition prevents him from acting by himself and he does not have a lawyer to act on his behalf. 154 These third parties may be relatives or organisations concerned with the welfare of prisoners. 155 Domestic law must make provisions to accommodate such situations. In any event, the prisoner concerned can always oppose the bringing of such a complaint by a third party.
Lastly, an important provision in the practical operation of the complaints mechanism is para [13] of r 70 of the EPR. It obliges prison authorities to keep records of the complaints made, with due regard to the principles of confidentiality and safety. It is thus similar to the requirement of traceability of requests and complaints made by prisoners as established in the CPT standards 156 and the general provision on record-keeping under r 16(A.2.d) of the EPR.
Conclusion
There are two important conclusions to be drawn from the overview and assessment of European prison law related to the remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights.
First, there is sufficient coherence in the relevant principles of European prison law providing clear guidance to European States on how to put in place a system of remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights. There is, in particular, consistency between the requirements of the Convention law, the CPT standards and the EPR on the necessity for states to put in place a system ensuring that all prisoners have a possibility to bring their complaints before the relevant independent authorities and to have those complaints examined in an effective and speedy manner. In this connection, there is also a pressing need for the EU to further its activities in the field and to ensure that the CJEU’s case law relating to the issue of prison conditions is translated into concrete initiatives, including those – as appropriate – of a legislative and institutional nature.
Secondly, the relevant principles of the Court’s case law and the CPT standards regarding remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights have been faithfully codified in the 2020 EPR, which also accordingly reflect the relevant standards developed in the NMR. The 2020 EPR thus ensure that European prison law keeps pace with the penological, social and legal developments and understandings of effective complaints mechanism for prisoners. It remains for the national authorities to implement these standards in their legal orders and to ensure their effective operation in practice.
However, the creation of remedies in itself, without the overall improvement of conditions of detention, is clearly insufficient for securing the observance of prisoners’ rights. 157 The system of remedies cannot be seen in isolation, rather it must be seen as a one part of a properly functioning prison system. It is therefore critical for states to incorporate the relevant rules of the 2020 EPR concerning remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights by ensuring, in the first place, that the EPR provisions on the proper management of prisons and just and fair treatment of prisoners are duly complied with.
Footnotes
Author's Note
Author declares that Opinions expressed are personal.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
