Abstract
The UK government has been provided with evidence that minorities who are of South Asian origin suffer discrimination based on ‘caste’ which is a particular characteristic of Indian sub-continental culture and society. It is prevalent in the Hindu diaspora in the UK and beyond. The issue that needs to be addressed is whether caste hatred can become part of any statutory definition of criminal law that will bring it on the same level as religious and racial hatred. This requires an analysis of the general category of hate crimes with a focus on the racial and religiously aggravated offences. The article examines several trends within the domestic legislative framework and case law as well as international law. It is proposed that caste should be considered as part of race for the purposes of hate crimes and that in the UK jurisdiction specifically Section 9 of the Equality Act 2010 should be amended to include caste as part of race which will then lead to caste hatred falling within the definition of a racially aggravated hate crime.
Introduction
There is a large South Asian community in the UK, and many community members belong to the traditional clans that are stratified by a historic caste system. On the lowest rung are the Dalits who are also known as the ‘untouchables’. They are descended from the lowest rung of the strata in the Hindu religious pyramid. 1 The highest echelon are the Brahmins who traditionally dominate the formal structure of the Hindu faith and exercise the most influence. 2 The discrimination against the lower castes who occupy the bottom tier in this hierarchy has been the object of legal action in the civil courts for discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. 3 This article argues that remedies in civil/administrative law are not sufficient and that caste hatred should be criminalized as a form of racially or religiously aggravated hate crime. 4
Caste hatred is an insidious form of offensive behaviour. The definition of caste is based on very narrow criteria that are set out in the explanatory notes to Section 9 of the Equality Act 2010. These define caste as ‘[...] [a] hereditary, endogamous (marrying within group) community associated with a traditional occupation and ranked accordingly on a perceived scale of ritual purity. It is generally (but not exclusively) associated with South Asia, particularly India, and its diaspora. It can encompass the four classes (varnas) of Hindu tradition (the Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudra communities); the thousands of regional Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Muslim or other religious groups known as jatis; and groups amongst South Asian Muslims called biradaris. Some jatis regarded as below the varna hierarchy (once termed “untouchable”) are known as Dalit’.
5
Section 9(5) of the Equality Act 2010, headed ‘race’, contained a provision giving a government minister discretion to act via ministerial order to amend the section, ‘so as to provide for caste to be an aspect of race’. This section was amended by Section 69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, so as to make the effecting of this change mandatory. However, such a ministerial order is still missing at present, and until caste hatred is introduced into legislation as a form of self-standing racial discrimination, the legal protection against this form of victimization remains within the scope of racial and religious discrimination, if the racial and religious grounds for discrimination are proved. 6 The criminal law of England and Wales, therefore, does not specifically cover caste hatred including against the Dalit population who, in the meantime, suffer victimization in the community. 7
This article argues that hateful and offensive behaviour motivated by caste should be recognized as an offence targeting a form of hatred that is aggravated, as in race or religious victimization. These types of offences are defined as aggravated offences because of the words or behaviour that is intended to or is likely to cause alarm, distress and fear in the minds of the victim.
8
The need for protection by introducing racial and religious hatred offences has been recognized by the Law Commission according to which hatred alone could threaten people’s ‘sense of security and belonging in their communities and may undermine their ability to feel comfortable with personal characteristics’.
9
Recognizing caste hatred as part of the proscribed offence of racial hatred would be in accordance with the Convention against Racial Discrimination (CERD) 1966, Article 1 of which sets out the international legal obligations and emphasizes on descent, stating that: the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
10
By incorporating caste hatred into the criminal law of England and Wales as an offence in addition to caste discrimination in civil law, the racially aggravated offence of caste hatred will be criminalized as an either-way offence, namely, offences that can be tried in both the Magistrates’ Court and the Crown Court. Moreover, legislation on caste discrimination and caste hatred will remove the ‘cultural defence’ which is often invoked as a mitigating factor when offensive and harmful behaviours that are caste motivated are prosecuted.
To provide some clarification as to the terms used in this article, the term ‘caste discrimination’ refers to discrimination based on caste when dealing with it as a civil offence under the Equality Act 2010 within the context of racial discrimination. ‘Hate crimes’ refer to offences which are motivated by racial or religious hate; they are aggravated forms of existing offences and prosecuted as such. The term ‘aggravated offences’, therefore, refers to those offences punished by the criminal law where the penalty for the offence is increased when there is a racial and religious element in the offence, that is made more serious by its circumstances. This article defines ‘caste hatred’ as offensive and hateful behaviour based on caste and argues that crimes motivated by caste hatred should be considered akin to racial and religious hatred offences.
This article is arguing in favour of caste hatred being considered a hate crime within the framework of racial hatred. The next section is devoted to outlining the existing legislation on hate crimes in England and Wales. Then, this article discusses how caste hatred could be regulated in civil law and in criminal law. The following section addresses the different arguments raised against the criminalization of caste hatred and the debate on the cultural mitigation defence in this respect. A final section concludes the article.
Public order offences and aggravating factors
Legal framework
Aggravated offences are offences that stem from racial or religious hatred which arise in those circumstances where someone is insulted by reference to their ethnicity and faith. The implication is that the perpetrator’s intent was specifically to degrade the victim in addition to carrying out the actus reus of the offence. The criminal justice agencies record any offence as a hate crime when it is perceived by the victim, or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s actual or perceived race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity.
Offences to which hate crime aggravation may attach can be broken into three main categories: public order offences; personal crimes and household crimes. The personal offences include violence without injury, violence with injury, robbery and theft. The household crimes include criminal damage, burglary and various types of theft.
In England and Wales, hate crimes are regulated by three distinct sets of provisions: Aggravated offences under Sections 28–32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA, 1998), which deal with offences involving racial or religious hostility; Enhanced sentencing provisions under Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA, 2003), which apply to hostility on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity; Offences of stirring up hatred under Sections 18–23 and 29B–19G of the Public Order Act 1986 (POA, 1986), which apply to conduct intended, or likely, to stir up hatred based on race, religion and sexual orientation.
In particular, the CDA 1998 created a range of specific offences that criminalize racial and religious victimization. Section 28(1) provides that: ‘An offence is racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of Sections 29 to 32 below if— (a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group; or (b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group’.
11
Additionally, the following offences may be charged as racially or religiously aggravated under the CDA 1998 12 : malicious wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; common assault under Section 39 of the CJA 2003; criminal damage contrary to Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971; public order offences contrary to Sections 4, 4A and 5 of the POA 1986 (fear or provocation of violence, intentional harassment, alarm or distress or recklessly causing harassment, alarm or distress) and harassment and stalking (including putting people in fear of violence) contrary to Sections 2, 2A, 4 and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. These latter offences were added by s 4A of the POA 1986. The race/religious element became part of the circumstances of the offence and has to be proved before conviction rather than simply brought in as an aggravating factor to be taken into account at the sentencing stage and prohibits hatred on grounds of race or religion. 13
Section 39 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 amended Part 2 of the CDA 1998 by substituting in Section 28 ‘racially aggravated’ to ‘racially or religiously aggravated offences’. An example would be crimes against Muslims in which they are targeted as Muslims, as was the case with many incidents seemingly triggered by the 9/11 terrorist events. Previously, these could not be prosecuted as racially aggravated offences because Muslims are regarded under UK jurisprudence as a ‘poly-ethnic religious community and not a racial group’. 14 The extension of the Act to religiously aggravated offences is considered ‘an important device in the hands of Parliament to combat attacks on believers’ and distinguishes the provisions from measures which might offer a ‘safeguard of beliefs’ or of ‘religious feelings’. 15
Furthermore, Section 145 of the CJA 2003 may increase sentences for any other offences, not covered under the CDA 1998, which are racially or religiously aggravated. If the offence was racially or religiously aggravated, the court under section 2 of the CJA 2003 must treat that fact as an aggravating factor and must state in open court that the offence was so aggravated. Section 145 imposes a duty upon courts to increase the sentence for any offence committed that involves either the offender demonstrating towards the victim hostility based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group or the offence being motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group. These are ‘alternatives’ which means that in a case where a demonstration of hostility can be proved, there is no need also to prove motivation and vice versa. 16
According to the Crown Prosecution Service, the term ‘hostility’ is given its ordinary meaning, which includes ‘ill-will, ill-feeling, spite, prejudice, unfriendliness, antagonism, resentment and dislike’. 17 Section 28 of the CDA 1998 may be seen to have created two separate types of racial aggravation. These include a situation in which ‘the defendant either (a) has demonstrated racial hostility or (b) has a racially hostile motivation to commit the crime. These are alternative methods of proving the aggravating feature. However, it is not clear on whether it is sufficient to prove that, absent the defendant’s mental state, the conduct objectively demonstrated hostility’. 18 Walters has observed that ‘the defendant should at least be aware that his expression is likely to be perceived by other right-minded individuals as being one of racial or religious hostility’. 19 Section 28(1)(b) ‘requires proof that the offending behaviour was motivated by hostility’. 20 The protected characteristics have been broadly defined by the courts; however, as the next paragraphs explain a great deal of confusion arises from the case law which applies the norms in practice.
Case law
In R v Rogers,
21
the defendant addressed abusive language to a group of Spanish women and used the phrases ‘bloody foreigners’ and ‘get back to your own country’. He was convicted of racially aggravated threatening behaviour, contrary to Section 4 of the POA 1986 and Section 31(1)(a) of the CDA 1998. The defence had argued unsuccessfully that those phrases were not capable of demonstrating hostility based on membership of a racial group but that had the defendant used the phrase ‘bloody Spaniards’; then, he would be guilty.
22
Baroness Hale giving the main judgement for the House of Lords held that the ‘court must first be satisfied that the basic offence has been committed and then that it is racially or religiously aggravated within the meaning of Section 28 of the 1998 Act’.
23
Importantly, the definition of a racial group clearly goes beyond groups defined by their colour, race or ethnic origin and encompasses both nationality (including citizenship) and national origins and this was quite deliberate.
24
Her Ladyship further stated ‘that as a matter of policy the statute intended a broad non-technical approach, rather than a construction which invited nice distinctions. Hostility may be demonstrated at the time, or immediately before or after, the offence is committed (Section 28(1)(a)). The victim may be presumed by the offender to be a member of the hated group even if she is not (Section 28(1)(a)). Membership of a group includes association with members of that group (Section 28(2)). And the fact that the offender’s hostility is based on other factors as well racism or xenophobia is immaterial (Section 28(3))’.
25
The mischiefs targeted by the aggravated versions of these offences are racism and xenophobia. Their essence is the denial of equal respect and dignity to people who are seen as ‘other’. This is more deeply hurtful, damaging and disrespectful to the victims than the simple versions of these offences. It is also more damaging to the community as a whole, by denying acceptance to members of certain groups not for their own sake but for the sake of something they can do nothing about. This is just as true if the group is defined exclusively as it is if it is defined inclusively. 26
The House of Lords overruled previous decisions
27
; however, this interpretation of hostility has presented difficulties. In R v SH,
28
in annulling an indictment of aggravated racial hatred by use of the expression ‘black monkey’, the trial judge held that what was stated ‘could have been a result of hostility towards the man because of his race as opposed to personal dislike or loss of temper or both’.
29
The Court of Appeal ordered a retrial based on the fact that the judge had contorted ‘the distinction between hostile motivation in s.28(1)(b) and demonstrated hostility in s.28(1)(a)’.
30
Taylor argues that this has been ‘a common error in earlier years but has persisted despite the supportive analysis of the offences by the House of Lords in Rogers, and indeed [...]. in full knowledge of the appellate courts’ approach’.
31
This he argues is because of ‘the common misunderstandings of the case law on the degree of mutual exclusivity between the crimes underlying the aggravated offences and the more general aggravated sentencing provisions’.
32
Taylor further suggests that the ‘preferable course would be to abolish the aggravated offences and to focus on a broader and better articulated sentencing provision of general application which would be all the more effective without the complications of its uncertain relationship with an anomalously selected group of aggravated offences’.
33
Taylor was also concerned with the ‘difference between the aggravated public order offence based on s.4 of the POA 1986 and the basic non-aggravated offences under the POA that have expressly made alternative verdicts to their new aggravated forms’.
34
According to Taylor, ‘the more serious public order offences of violent disorder and affray do not have racially aggravated versions, and whilst an ordinary offence under s.4 of the Public Order Act (fear or provocation of violence) is an alternative verdict to either violent disorder or affray, there is no provision for the aggravated s.4 offence to be an alternative verdict to violent disorder or affray’.
35
This implies that there is a difference between the s.4 POA 1986 offence in the ‘regular form’ and in the ‘aggravated form’. In their regular form, it is possible to have an alternative verdict of racial aggravation but if ‘there is evidence of violent disorder or affray and of racial aggravation, whilst the racial aggravation can be taken into account in sentencing on either of those offences, if the actual conviction is of s.4 as an alternative verdict e.g. because there is no threat of unlawful violence, the racially aggravated version cannot be used because it is not made an alternative verdict and there is a further potential problem in reflecting the racial aggravation in the sentencing for the basic s.4 offence because there is in existence the aggravated s.4 offence which should have been charged if racial aggravation is alleged’.
36
The impact of this that ‘if the racially aggravated s.4 offence is included in case the jury do not convict of violent disorder or affray, the jury will again be confronted with the paradox that the racial aggravation is something of which they have to be satisfied on the less serious charge (aggravated s.4) but not for the more serious charge of violent disorder or affray which does not have a specifically racially aggravated form.
37
Owusu-Bempah and Wiedlitzka argue that this applies to ‘all cases involving alleged hostility on the basis of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’ and the contention is that ‘only the basic offence would be charged, and, if convicted, the hostility element could be determined and taken into account at sentencing’. 38 The advantage would be that the ‘inconsistent, and sometimes incorrect, application of ss.145 and 146 of the CJA could be alleviated through implementation of the Law Commission’s recommendation that new guidance be issued by the Sentencing Council’. 39
It would seem that this is an argument against the inclusion of caste hatred as a separate criminal offence that aggravates the original hate crime whether it is by words of speech or otherwise.
40
The additional aggravated offence, were it to be enacted, would be as the POA Section 4 liability offences. This would not prevent from pleading in the alternative, more serious offences that the behaviour might constitute in the indictment. Caste hatred at present does not qualify either as one of the aggravated offences or as a regular hate crime with aggravating circumstances. However, there are grounds to include caste as part of racial offence relying on Walter’s argument that ‘in order to provide greater clarity in law, the words ‘demonstrates...hostility’ must be interpreted to include, not only acts that are motivated by, or which are intended to express prejudice or hatred, but any conduct carried out during an offence where the offender is aware his behaviour is likely to be perceived by right-minded individuals as indicating hostility towards the victim’s identity’.
41
This would be a necessary ‘broad approach to conceptualizing hostility is justified based on the need for the state to expressly denounce all public displays of identity-based prejudice. It will also acknowledges the harmful effects that all expressions of hate (motivated by hostility or not) have on victims, minority communities and to the cohesiveness of Britain’s multicultural society’.
42
Considering caste offences as racial offences is certainly plausible and this would make the sentencing on a higher scale because it would constitute an aggravated offence, falling within the category of racial hatred. This will have to surmount the distinction between hostile motivation in Section 28(1)(b) of the CDA 1998 and demonstrated hostility in s 28(1)(a) of the CDA 1998, and the former will be culpable while the later act will exonerate the defendant if the offence fell with the category of offences committed in Sections 28–32 of the CDA 1998 to be part of the offence.
Proposals for reform
In its Consultation Paper on hate crime of 2020, the Law Commission includes several recommendations
43
following up from its 2014 report that discussed how the parameters of hate crime offences may be extended.
44
The Law Commission suggested to consider the incitement of hatred offences under the POA 1986 and to make recommendations on whether they should be extended or reformed; to consider the impact of changing the law relating to hate crime on other aspects of criminal justice, including other offences and sentencing practice and to consider the implications of any recommendations for other areas of law including the Equality Act 2010.
45
The Law Commission found that ‘[...] aggravated offences are among the most powerful forms of condemnation of characteristic-based criminal hostility [...] which has become well-established, and accounts for nearly half of all hate crime prosecutions [...] to remove these offences, and rely only on sentencing enhancement within existing maximum penalties, would be to reduce the force of laws currently available in respect of two key characteristic groups: race and religion... such a roll back of existing protections to be problematic, [...] as one of the key purposes of hate crime laws is to signal the unacceptability of this conduct.
46
The Law Commission was not concerned with broadening the range of hate crime offences. 47 Therefore, caste hatred as an offence was not on its agenda.
Its recommendation was for the law to adopt ‘a singular, hybrid approach to hate crime’, combining aspects of both the CDA 1998 (a separate, aggravated version of the offence and a requirement to prove the aggravation before a jury) and the CJA 2003 (enhanced sentencing which applies across all protected characteristics and all offences). 48 It also considered the category of ‘stirring up’ offences found in Sections 17 to 29N of the POA 1986, alongside laws relating to riot, affray, harassment and public assemblies and processions; since 1986, it has been possible to commit the offences in private, and many cases of stirring up now take place online. 49 The stirring up offences ‘are different from both the aggravated offences and the enhanced sentencing regimes’ and they are not reliant on the concept that there ‘is hostility on account of a protected characteristic’. Instead, these ‘are free-standing offences: there is no general offence of stirring up hatred’. 50 However, while the stirring up offences can be similar to the ‘offence of inciting or encouraging an offence’, they can be distinguished because ‘whereas the encouragement offences apply to the incitement of behaviour which is itself criminal, the stirring up offences criminalize the incitement of something which is not itself criminal’ but exists only in the realm of thoughts. 51 In terms of effect, the ‘stirring up offences rather concern the use of words or behaviour, or the dissemination or possession (with a view to dissemination) of material which is intended to stir up racial hatred or hatred on grounds of religion or sexual orientation, or likely to stir up racial hatred’. 52
Overall, the Law Commission has suggested that there are two sets of offences: firstly, those relating to stirring up racial hatred, which involve: (a) threatening, abusive or insulting words or material and (b) intended or likely to stir up racial hatred and secondly, those relating to religious hatred or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation, which involve: (a) threatening words or material and (b) intended to stir up hatred. 53 However, the Law Commission has not recommended that the range of ‘stirring up’ offences be extended. It rather reiterated its approach in the 2014 Consultation paper that ‘the correct approach is first to establish whether there is a problem and then, if there is one, to create the offence. To approach it in the opposite order is to use the criminal law as a tool of social research’. 54 The approach now would be to ‘also recognize that this means that we must rely on evidence other than recorded incidents of stirring up. To this extent, it is legitimate to read across from evidence of other hate offences’. 55
If caste hatred were made into an offence of racial hatred, then it could also be defined as a ‘stirring up’ offence contingent on the use of words or behaviour, by direct approach or in circulating information that is likely to stir up racial hatred. This would include racial hatred as an aggravated offence as is common with racial or religious hatred under the CDA. Therefore, the grounds exist for this to be a stirring up offence because of its existence in the perception of the maker of the statement or someone who indulges in the behaviour that amount to racial hatred.
Including caste into the definition of race
The initial step towards criminalizing caste hatred is the extension of the Equality Act 2010 so as to qualify caste as part of race. This is in light of national debates, case law and international law which have led to a consultation on a national level that caste be made a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010. Indeed, in March of 2017, the UK Government launched a consultation on caste discrimination to seek the views from all those potentially affected by a legal prohibition of caste discrimination and on whether legal protection against this form of discrimination is best ensured by developing case law under the Act or by making caste explicitly an aspect of race in the Act. 56 It also questioned how the law would be interpreted if caste became an aspect of race within the Equality Act which would mean that caste would be a separate, specific ground for claiming race discrimination. 57
The UK Government has stated that the current law was sufficient to cover caste-based offences and that case law would be the appropriate way forward in protecting the stigma of caste. 58 In the Government’s view, ‘[c]aste could not be defined in the Act: we would expect courts to use the Act’s Explanatory Notes definition to help them decide what caste is’. 59 In a debate before the House of Lords, Baroness Williams stated that the UK Government was ‘currently unaware of any cases of race discrimination with an alleged caste element coming before the courts since the Langstaff ruling (re: Chandhok v Tirkey and Anor) was delivered’. 60
In Chandhok v Tirkey and Anor, 61 the claimant, Ms Tirkey, was employed as a domestic servant in India and moved with the family to the UK. Her employers were aware that she was an Adivasi Christian, who historically have been outside the Hindu caste system, but was treated as being of the lowest caste similar in status to the Dalits. After her employment commenced, she was forced to live separately in servants’ quarters and compelled to work in breach of the Working Time Regulations (Statutory Instrument no. 1833) implementing the European Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC 62 with only a single day of annual leave in her entire employment of four and a half years. She claimed compensation to the amount of £175,000 in unpaid wages for the infringement of Section 9(1)(c) of the Equality Act 2010. Justice Langstaff ruled that the definition of race is not exhaustive, but it includes ‘ethnic origin and it could have been argued that the caste’, insofar as it was an aspect of ethnic origin was already included. The lack of a single definition of caste ‘does not mean that a situation to which that label can, in one of its manifestations, be attached cannot and does not fall within the scope of ‘ethnic origins’. 63
Importantly, whilst Justice Langstaff found that a claim under the Equality Act 2010 was possible on the ground of caste discrimination, upon the particular facts, his Honour refused to establish more general propositions, which he noted were ‘of no direct relevance to the case in hand’. 64 In a postscript to his judgement, his Honour noted that he had been ‘taken to seven Treaties, Conventions and UN reports; 19 authorities and 11 other publications in an initial bundle of authorities, together with a further 11 authorities, 2 publications and 3 Hansard extracts in a supplementary bundle of authorities’ 65 but refused to provide a definitive resolution to the question as to whether discrimination based on caste would always be sufficient ground for a claim under the Act. His honour inferred that ‘ethnic origins’ was a wide and flexible phrase covering questions of descent, but his judgement was based on this particular case, in its particular circumstances, and his role was not to establish more general propositions. 66
Tirkey succeeded in her claims for unfair dismissal, racial harassment and indirect religious discrimination and was awarded a substantial sum at a subsequent remedy hearing. The decision did not indicate, still less establish, that there is an existing legal remedy of caste-based discrimination, but it has brought into the ambit of Section 9(1)(c) in certain circumstances for caste to be part of ethnic or national origins. The defence relied upon Section 9(5) to argue that Parliament could not have intended caste discrimination to fall within the Equality Act 2010 until legislation was introduced under that subsection by Ministerial intervention. Justice Langstaff rejected this argument because prior to the Equality Act 2010, domestic law in the form of the Race Relations Act 1976 had already recognized that ethnic origins, which are part of the definition of race in Section 9 of the Equality Act 2010, could include descent from an actual or perceived ethnic group. The previous case law was relevant in coming to this decision that gave ‘a wide and flexible scope to the meaning of “ethnic origins”’. 67 Indeed, this earlier case law is informative. In R on the Application of E v Governing Body of JFS and Another (JFS), 68 the Supreme Court established the ‘wide and flexible test’ by ruling that the belief in Orthodox Judaism of matrilineal descent from a particular people was itself a test based on ethnic origins. 69 Their Lordships and Lady Hale ruled that there had been discrimination on racial grounds (defined by Section 3 of the Race Relations Act that included the ‘ethnic origins’). Lord Phillips held that the critical question is whether the requirements of Jewish identity as defined by the 1976 Act met the characteristics that define those who have them by reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins. 70
The Employment Appeal Tribunal in Chandhok held that Section 9(5) of the Equality Act 2010 was intended to widen, not narrow, the protection of the pre-existing law, and finally, Justice Langstaff was intending to bring the test to be consistent with the UK’s international obligations, including Article 1 of CERD, which defines racial discrimination as including discrimination based on descent.
71
In that respect, it has been argued that ‘not all forms of unequal treatment based on descent will amount to unlawful race discrimination under the EA: examples given in JFS were of discrimination because a person is not the son of a peer (why are lawyers’ examples always of this sort?) or the son of a member of the SOGAT union (that’s better). Although Langstaff P left open the possibility that some forms of caste discrimination will not as a matter of fact be covered by the existing concept of race discrimination, it is likely that most if not all will be. Caste, just like race, is a social construct. Where a “caste” is perceived as different owing to religious belief, to beliefs of innate difference, or to beliefs of descent from a distinct people, in each case the JFS test is likely to be met’.
72
Chandhok thus brings the domestic law in line with CERD. In its General Recommendation XXIX, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which reviews the national parameters of legislation within the framework of CERD, ‘strongly reaffirmed’ that discrimination based on descent includes discrimination ‘against members of communities based on forms of social stratification such as caste and analogous systems which nullify or impair their equal enjoyment of human rights’ and drew attention to factors that allow such communities to be recognized, including inability to alter inherited status, socially enforced restrictions on outside marriage and dehumanizing discourses.
73
In 2011, the Committee recommended that the UK Government invoke Section 9(5)(a) of the Equality Act 2010 to provide for ‘caste to be an aspect of race’.
74
Article 4(a) of CERD states the signatories ‘declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof.
75
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which the UK is a party provides that any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. 76 The UK did not enter any reservation or derogation in respect of this provision, the ambit of which is slightly less restrictive than Article 4 of CERD; ‘prohibited by law’ does not necessarily require criminalization. The Law Commission has stated that ‘for the same reasons as CERD, domestic law falls short of the ICCPR in that some forms of advocacy of hatred, in particular incitement to discrimination, are not covered by domestic legislation’. 77
At EU law level, CERD is referred to in the preamble of Directive 2000/43/EC on equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origins.
78
Before Brexit, one could rely on the argument that domestic law must be interpreted in compliance with EU law to reach the same result reached by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The Directive considers ‘the right to equality before the law and protection against discrimination for all persons constitutes a universal right recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination and the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all Member States are signatories'.
79
Furthermore, in 2016, the European Parliament issued a report inviting the European institution to adopt legislation in order to proscribe caste hatred. The European Parliament called for legislative intervention and condemned ‘the continuing human rights violations committed against people suffering from caste hierarchies and caste-based discrimination, including the denial of equality and of access to the legal system and to employment, and the continued segregation and caste-induced barriers to the achievement of basic human rights and development; is deeply concerned by the alarming rate of caste-based violent attacks on Dalits and of institutionalised discrimination with impunity; reiterates its call for an EU policy development on caste discrimination, and calls on the EU to use every opportunity to express its grave concern over caste discrimination’.
80
Against this background, Chandhok replicates the growing trend in domestic and European law on discrimination to ensure that domestic law accords with UN Treaties. In terms of protection available, this means that until caste is explicitly regulated by law, the possibility to sanction caste discrimination will depend on the courts establishing that caste is subsumed within an existing characteristic protected against discrimination. Of the nine protected characteristics in the Equality Act 2010, only race, and religion or belief, contend as possible legal basis for caste. There are demands for the existing categories of discrimination to be interpreted so as to include forms which are not expressly covered such as caste-based discrimination. Section 13(1) of the Equality Act 2010 explains that direct discrimination encompasses different treatment of an actual or hypothetical comparator. This means in practice that the comparative exercise can be an evidential device used in order to assist the Employment Tribunal to determine two issues: firstly, whether the claimant was treated less favourably and, secondly, whether the reason for less favourable treatment was a protected characteristic. 81 The finding of an appropriate comparator has posed a major difficulty in cases before the courts in evaluating the direct or indirect discrimination. 82 This can be brought into the framework of the law by extending the remit of intersectional discrimination by extending the adjudication net into several forms of liability that can form a set of accumulated characteristics. Bell argues that each protected characteristic needs to be defined separately. This is because the concept of ‘ethnic group’ suggests a uniformity of experience with all members assumed to share similar characteristics, and yet, ‘an individual’s ethnic origins will be combined with other personal characteristics such as gender, age, physical/mental abilities and sexual orientation’. 83
Anti-discrimination law suffers in cases where litigants raise several forms of linear discrimination.
84
For example, a Black person may face both racial and gender discrimination which would come under the umbrella term of ‘multiple discrimination’. This can be compartmentalized into several strands so that different forms of discrimination operate concurrently; then, they may be described as additive discrimination. These can reflect in the barriers to promotion that cover two different characteristics such as gender and race but that there is a ‘more complex’ concept of intersectional discrimination.
85
In terms of its impact on criminal law, the Law Commission has suggested that ‘[e]nhanced sentencing can better reflect multiple, intersectional forms of hostility than aggravated offences, without requiring separate charges and separate jury determinations in respect of each characteristic’.
86
In its view, ‘the flexibility of enhanced sentencing also provides greater scope to consider a wider, more open category of characteristics which could be protected’.
87
This could be achieved by ‘[p]otentially widening the availability of enhanced sentencing beyond the current five characteristics, and the creation of a more open test to allow for recognition of other groups; and [p]rohibiting the use of enhanced sentencing where an aggravated offence is available’.
88
Section 9 of the Equality Act 2010 should be amended to make caste a part of race discrimination, so that it becomes a form of racially aggravated hate crime. There would be no need to specifically legislate for the caste to be designated as a hate crime and it will fall within the concept of racially aggravated offences. This would create more conceptual clarity, and the focus will be on criminal liability under a public order offence for racial hatred. To be more explicit, the link between the criminal offences and those that are non-criminal is that in English law, the unlawful discrimination is regulated under Section 9(5) that sets out the protected characteristics under its Schedule. This leads to the demands for the existing categories to be interpreted so as to include forms of discrimination which are not expressly covered such as caste-based discrimination. If caste was made a protected characteristic in civil law, then it will allow in the criminal law for caste hatred to be prosecuted as it will come under the category of a racially aggravated offence.
Debating criminalization of caste hate and the ‘cultural defence’
In assessing the public law framework which may deter offences based on caste hatred, the likely impact on the Hindu community must be evaluated. This extends to the provision of goods, facilities and services, education and vocational training or the management or disposal of property. Certain retentionists of the Hindu faith in the UK such as Hindu Forum of Britain, National Hindu Students and Vishva Hindu Parishad, want to preserve caste differentials because they view it as an internal matter and have formulated a ‘cultural’ defence to pre-empt any legislation against caste hatred. 89 Their spokesman, Prakash Shah, is against any intervention in the form of legislation under civil law that will increase legal proceedings against Indian employers as their work may be affected. For example, ‘the holding of community events, such as Navratri or even weddings, could be questioned on grounds of caste preferences. The employment of personnel to perform rituals for weddings could also be exposed to charges of discrimination’. 90
Shah argues that civil law legislation will be a threat to Indian businesses and to the well-being and existence of the Indian communities’ and it would cause distress and create ‘a climate of intimidation’.
91
In his view, caste hierarchy only occurs in the non-regulated fields that are arranged informally and is a cultural characteristic that impacts on behaviour or conduct. The caste stratification is a consequence of the ‘motivation, opinions, beliefs, preferences and choices that are not unlawful unless they give rise to prohibited conduct or impacts’.
92
Shah’s greatest apprehension is that caste discrimination legislation will increase the threat of litigation against Indian employers because ‘the burden of proof initially lies with whoever is alleging the discrimination, but facts adduced by a claimant can lead to the reversal of such a burden to the defendant organisation employers, business, professional or other service provider. This means that the defendant must adequately defend the claim by showing that it is not proper to draw an inference of discrimination or else judgment will be entered against them. Given the civil context of lower standard of proof will apply’.
93
He argues that ‘a claim can succeed if on the balance of probabilities it can be shown that caste discrimination was present. This is unlike criminal law where a beyond - reasonable-doubt-standard applies for guilt or innocence. The possible reversal of burden of proof and the lower standard of proof might mean that a claim of caste discrimination against defendant organisation, employer, business, professional or other services provider is much more likely to succeed. This in turn may mean insurers not willing to back the costs of defending a claim could result in legal advice to settle a case, again depriving the employer etc. a chance to be vindicated’.
94
Shah opines that the ‘burden and standard of proof’ will be on the employers including the possible impact on charity status and fund-raising. Despite advocating against the enactment of caste into law, he considers the decision in Chandhok to have raised the ‘potential contradictions given that the Equality Act’s provision on caste has not yet been implemented’. 95 The ruling presents difficulties in interpretation if it is extended into legislation because he postulates that under provision Section 9(5), ‘it is now unclear what the reach of the existing law is and a question remains whether the Equality Act’s provision on caste should be brought into force’. 96
By contrast, Dhanda and others argue that ‘caste is positively a form of association and social capital among communities of South Asian origin, but negatively a form of social separation, distinction and ranking. In predominant usage in Britain, caste is used interchangeably for varna, jati, and biradari. The most typical usage, though, is of caste as jati’. 97 The second meaning of caste is rendered by the South Asian term jati. Jatis are not fixed units and may be divided into ‘sub-castes’ which are the socially significant identities and status groups. Unlike varna, the concept of jati is not connected to any one religious grouping but is found in all the major South Asian religious communities. Finally, caste encompasses biradari (brotherhood), also referred to by the term zaat, used interchangeably with biradari or in combination with it (zaat-biradari). Zaat is in turn related to ‘nasal’ (lineage), meaning race. 98
Waughray advocates for criminalizing caste discrimination based on Chandhok, which in her view acted as the catalyst for the surfacing of ‘the hidden phenomenon’ of caste discrimination. It would be necessary to not only repeal Section 9(5)(a) but also to augment ‘by secondary legislation, as decided by Parliament in April 2013, to include caste as an aspect of race (however, this is done), that offers legal certainty and proclaims publicly that discrimination on grounds of caste is both unacceptable and unlawful’. 99 Waughray further suggests the inclusion of an explicit form of discrimination as a protected characteristic included in the Equality Act 2010 and has observed that ‘successive governments have argued that caste could already be covered by race as currently defined in the equality act by virtue of the descent aspect of ethnic origins’, but she contends that ‘in order to construe caste as a part of race in domestic law following the Jewish Free School Case route, a three-fold interpretative leap had to be made; caste must be viewed as part of descent, itself part of ethic origins, which in turn is a subset of race’. 100
Caste offences are not a fringe problem. In its study on caste in Great Britain and equality law, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research describes instances of criminal offences being committed against the Dalit community. These consist of derogatory remarks about the lower caste people that were ‘chamar’ and ‘chura’ which translate as ‘filthy’ and ‘untouchable’ and violence against couples who had entered into mixed caste marriages that resulted in the lower caste man being beaten up. This led to ‘immediate problems reported by low caste respondents which were, firstly, discomfort, offence and fear and, secondly, the development of arguments and violence, with either the respondent or others participating’. 101 Overall, there is enough evidence of caste hatred to justify legislative intervention. This should proceed in a twofold manner: first, caste should become a protected characteristic (in civil law), and second, offensive and harmful behaviour motivated by this protected characteristic should then be recognized as a form of racially motivated hate crime, constituting an aggravated offence (in criminal law). The protection for victims of caste discrimination can emanate from race that is protected as a separate element in Section 9(5) of the Equality Act 2010, in addition, to those characteristics which are already included, for example, (a) colour; (b) nationality and (c) ethnic or national origins.
Conclusion
Legislation must be enacted in the UK to bring equality and race hatred law in accordance with CERD, whereby racial discrimination includes any victimization that is based on ethnicity, descent or physical characteristics. National Parliaments are bound under CERD to enact laws or to repeal those that are not competent in preventing racial discrimination. There is also a recommendation by the CERD Committee to amend the Equality Act and define caste as an aspect of race to ensure its protection in law. Furthermore, according to the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, participating states must respect the values and enact laws that respect human dignity. Directive 2000/43/EC also upholds the protection against victimization based on race and ethnicity to become a universal right. Therefore, under international law, there is tendency towards the enactment of legislation that prohibits caste discrimination and so that caste hatred is codified as an aggravated offence of racial hatred.
The aggravated offences that proscribe race hatred do not have an ambit that extends to caste. The amendment to Section 9(5) of the Equality Act 2010 has been overridden as a consequence of the Government Consultation of 2017, and the Minister cannot amend the statutory definition of race to include caste that was a duty in the Act, that applied to caste. This is because the Government considers that there are not enough cases where caste is a ground for victimization as the law does not provide for caste to exist as a ground to be pleaded in court or to raise as a motivation for a race-based aggravated offence. This means it has been pushed underground and there is a process for establishing a mechanism for caste hatred to be prosecuted. It should be included in racial discrimination, and then, it will be criminalized as a racially aggravated offence. Caste hatred has the propensity to cause alarm, distress and fear to the victim. This is sufficient basis for it to be governed by statutory law, so as to serve as deterrence to those driven by ancestral, ethnic or racial hatred.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
1.
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, one of the framers of the Indian Constitution who was from the Dalit background, defined caste as ‘an enclosed class’ and ‘endogamy is the only characteristic of caste’. See Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, ‘Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development’ in Valerian Rodrigues (ed.), The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar (OUP 2002) 241–262.
2.
The substantive and underlying principle of the caste system is Varna Dharma or in essence the division of labour. Marc Galanter argues that ‘the abolition of slavery at the middle of 19th century extended discriminatory rights to many untouchables’ including the untouchables who had access to the courts at least ‘formally’. The legal system was not organised to deal with ‘graded inequality’ and the overall British approach towards caste was a ‘policy of interference’. This was effected by the courts by the granting ‘injunctions to restrain member of particular castes from entering temples even ones that were publicly supported and dedicated to the entire Hindu community’. There were damages awarded for ‘purificatory ceremonies necessitated by the pollution caused by the presence of the lower castes; such pollution was actionable as a trespass on the person of the higher caste worshippers’. See Marc Galanter, ‘Untouchability and the Law’ (1969) 4 Economic and Political Weekly 131–133.
3.
Chandhok v Tirkey and Anor [2015] ET 3400174/2013.
4.
Also relevant is the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (amended by Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and Part 11 of Schedule 9 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012). This Act created a number of specific offences of racially aggravated crime, based on offences of wounding, assault, damage, harassment and threatening/abusive behaviour. See ‘Racist and Religious Hate Crime – Prosecution Guidance’ (Crown Prosecution Service, 21 October 2021) 
(accessed 17 March 2021).
5.
Doug Pyper, ‘The Equality Act 2010: ‘caste Discrimination’ (Briefing Paper Number 06862, House of Commons Library, 31 December 2014).
6.
Section 9 of the Equality Act 2010 sets out the definition of race to include: (a) colour; (b) nationality and (c) ethnic or national origins.
7.
There is a large population of Dalits in the UK who form part of the Hindu communities drawn from Indian and Sri Lankan expatriates in the UK. Lord Harries in the House of Lords debate on the proposed amendment to the Equality Act stated that there were 480,000 Dalits in the country. See HL Deb, 4 March 2013, Vol 743, Col 1296.
8.
Section 3(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
9.
Law Commission, ‘Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences?’ (Consultation Paper 213, 2014) para 4.44.
10.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (CERD).
11.
The terms ‘racial group’ and ‘religious group’ are defined in sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the CDA 1998.
12.
Sections 29–32 of the CDA 1998.
13.
Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 Part III (c. 64).
14.
Paul Iganski and others, ‘A Question of Faith: Prosecuting Religiously Aggravated Offences in England and Wales’ (2016) 5 Criminal Law Review 334.
15.
Javier Garcia Oliva, ‘The Legal Protection of Believers and Beliefs in the UK’ (2007) 9(1) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 66, 76.
16.
See n 4.
17.
Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Disability Hate Crime and other Crimes against Disabled People – Prosecution Guidance’ (2017).
18.
Abenaa Owusu-Bempah, ‘Prosecuting Hate Crime: Procedural Issues and the Future of the Aggravated Offences’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies 443.
19.
Mark Austin Walters ‘Conceptualizing “Hostility” for Hate Crime Law: Minding “the Minutiae” when Interpreting Section 28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (2014) 34(47) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 63.
20.
Ibid.
21.
R v Rogers [2007] UKHL 8, [2007] 2 AC 62.
22.
Ibid para 8.
23.
Ibid para 6.
24.
Ibid para 8.
25.
Ibid para 11.
26.
Ibid para 12.
27.
In DPP v Pol [2000] Crim LR 756, para 5–6, it was held that for a racially aggravated offence there must be evidence of racial motivation or hostility. The phrases ‘white man’s arse licker’ and ‘brown Englishman’ were not necessarily aggravating when both involved were of Asian origin.
28.
R v SH [2010] EWCA Crim 1931.
29.
Ibid para 19.
30.
Ibid para 58.
31.
Richard Taylor, ‘The Role of Aggravated Offences in Combating Hate Crime – 15 Years after the CDA 1998 – Time for a Change?’ (2014) 13(1) Contemporary Issues In Law 76.
32.
Ibid.
33.
Ibid.
34.
Ibid 78.
35.
Ibid.
36.
Ibid.
37.
Ibid.
38.
Abenaa Owusu-Bempah and Susann Wiedlitzka, ‘Racially and Religiously aggravated offences: God’s gift to defence?’ (2019) 6 Criminal Law Review 463.
39.
Law Commission (n 9) paras 3.49–3.51.
40.
The issue of the availability of alternative verdicts along with the limited list of offences which can be aggravated under the CDA 1998 also creates difficulties in charging decisions. See Richard Leng, Roger Taylor and Martin Wasik. Blackstone’s Guide to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Blackstone’s 1998) 48–50.
41.
Walters (n 20).
42.
Ibid.
43.
Law Commission, ‘Hate Crime Laws – A Consultation paper’ (Consultation Paper No 250, 2020).
44.
Law Commission (n 9) ch 2.
45.
Law Commission (n 44) para 1.58.
46.
Ibid para 16.32.
47.
Ibid para 16.161.
48.
Ibid para 16.160.
49.
Ibid para 18.1.
50.
Ibid para 18.2.
51.
Ibid para 18.3.
52.
Ibid para 18.4.
53.
Ibid para 18.20.
54.
Ibid para 18.218. See Law Commission (n 9) para 7.145.
55.
Ibid para 18.220.
56.
57.
Ibid para 3.24.
58.
Ibid para 3.25.
59.
Ibid para 3.26.
60.
HL Deb 11 July 2016, Vol 774.
61.
Chandhok v Tirkey and Anor (n 3).
62.
Council Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L 299/9.
63.
Tirkey (n 3) para 45.
64.
Ibid para 55.
65.
Ibid.
66.
Ibid paras 53–55.
67.
Ibid para 42.
68.
R on the Application of E v Governing Body of JFS and Another (JFS) [2010] 2 AC 728.
69.
Tirkey (n 3) para 44.
70.
Ibid para 27.
71.
Ibid para 52.
72.
73.
UN Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘CERD General Recommendation 29 on Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Convention (Descent)’ (2012).
74.
UN, ‘Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention – Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (CERD/C/GBR/CO/18-20, 14 September 2011) para 30.
75.
Although not a reservation or derogation, the UK Government submitted a statement in 1966 that it interpreted this provision as requiring legislation: ‘only in so far as it may consider with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention (in particular the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association) that some legislative addition to or variation of existing law and practice in those fields is necessary for the attainment of the end specified in the earlier part of article 4’.
76.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) UNTS 999, art 20(2).
77.
Law Commission (n 44) para 18.58.
78.
Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22.
79.
cIbid, Recital 3.
80.
European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world and the EU policy on the matter 2015’ (A8.0355/2016, 2015) para 130.
81.
In Shamoon v Chief Constable of the RUC [2003] ICR 377, para 8, Lord Nicholls suggested that the two questions are often better treated together: ‘No doubt there are cases where it is convenient and helpful to adopt this two step approach to what is essentially a single question: did the claimant, on the proscribed ground, receive less favourable treatment than others? But, especially where the identity of the relevant comparator is a matter of dispute, this sequential analysis may give rise to needless problems. Sometimes the less favourable treatment issue cannot be resolved without, at the same time, deciding the reason why issue. The two issues are intertwined’.
82.
In certain circumstances, the principles applicable to the comparative exercise are amended or increased within the meaning of the Act. Section 13(5) states that racial segregation is less favourable treatment so as to prevent employers from arguing that there is no discrimination in racial segregation as all races are being treated the same.
83.
Martin Bell, Racism and Equality in the EU (OUP 2008) 23.
84.
In the United States, multi-ground discrimination claims are often separated into different components by the courts. See Lynn Roseberry, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the US and European Community (DJOB Publishing 1999) 377; Gay Moon, ‘Multiple Discrimination – Problems Compounded or Solutions Found?’ (Justice 2007) 6.
85.
Hannett explains that ‘multiple discrimination’ may occur in at least two ways: ‘where the grounds of discrimination are additive in nature, and/or where the discrimination is based on an indivisible combination of two or more social characteristics’. See Sarah Hannett, ‘Equality at the Intersection: The Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle Multiple Discrimination’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 65, 68.
86.
Law Commission (n 44) para 17.49.
87.
Ibid para 17.50.
88.
Ibid para 17.53.
89.
90.
Prakash Shah, Against Caste in British Law: A Critical Perspective in the Caste Discrimination Provision in the Equality Act 2010 (Palgrave McMillan, 2015) 64.
91.
Ibid 67.
92.
Ibid 68.
93.
Ibid 71.
94.
Ibid 79. Shah refers to Hepple on the civil standard of proving caste discrimination. See Bob Hepple, Equality: The new Legal Framework (Hart 2011) 166.
95.
Shah (n 91) 80.
96.
Ibid 99.
97.
Meena Dhanda and others, ‘Caste in Britain: Socio-legal Review’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 91, 2014).
98.
Ibid.
99.
Annapurna Waughray, ‘Ensuring Protection against Caste Discrimination in Britain: Should the Equality Act 2010 Be Extended?’ (2016) 16(2–3) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 177.
100.
Annapurna Waughray, ‘Capturing Caste in Law: Caste Discrimination and the Equality Act 2010’ (2014) 14(2) Human Rights Law Review 359.
101.
Hilary Metcalf and Heather Rolf, ‘Caste Discrimination and harassment in Britain’ (National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 2010) 54–56.