Far-right foreign fighters and Ukraine: A blind spot for the European Union?

Conflict Context, Objectives, Opportunities, and Long-Term Participation

When seeking to evaluate the threat of foreign fighters, one of the first issues to consider is why people travel to join conflicts. Over the years, a variety of factors and motivations have been advanced in answer to this question. ⁴⁸ In order to better understand the cause being fought for and what pulls individuals in, it is necessary to identify the main protagonists and the dominant belief systems in circulation. ⁴⁹ One has to take into account the possibility that the leadership of an organisation or network will actively attempt to send back foreign fighters to stir up trouble in their country of origin or that individuals will use the arena as a training ground for their own objectives. Opportunities for networking and learning skills, as well as the long-term hospitality of the state in question, must also be considered. For instance, the establishment of training camps in Afghanistan enabled the professionalization of many jihadists, who gained a range of skills through training. ⁵⁰ It has been estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 individuals attended the Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and that fourteen camps were registered with the Taliban until about the year 2000. In addition, there were other training camps run by the Taliban and other Arab and non-Arab terrorist groups in Afghanistan. ⁵¹ This shows how close relations between a government and terrorist groups created the conditions that enabled the training of thousands of terrorists – albeit of varying abilities – and the opportunity for networking, with the end result being what has been referred to as a ‘global insurgency’. ⁵² Furthermore, Malet has suggested that the persistence of jihadism has been partially due to the policies of the home states of foreign fighters, which, in his view, prevented reintegration ‘and created cohorts of stateless, and now professionalized, actors who perpetuate in weakly-governed conflict zones’. ⁵³ Some of these individuals then travel the world to fight in other conflicts or become involved in terrorist activities. Similarly favourable circumstances have also been identified in other countries, such as Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan.

Physical Threat

The involvement of returning foreign fighters in terrorist attacks on domestic soil is undoubtedly one of the main issues of concern for governments. However, research has shown that returning foreign fighters may present other physical threats. In order to better ascertain them, one must begin by identifying the activities that returning foreign fighters have participated in or trained to carry out during the conflict in which they were involved. Quantitative estimates of how many foreign fighters eventually become domestic terrorists vary widely. For example, in an article published in 2013, Hegghammer argued that roughly one in nine foreign fighters returned to Western states to commit attacks after fighting abroad (i.e. 107 out of 945) between 1990 and 2010. ⁵⁴ However, a later study by Hegghammer and Nesser suggested that, with regard to foreign fighters involved in the war in Syria, the proportion was significantly lower. ⁵⁵ However, given that it only examined data collected until June 2015, these conclusions did not reflect the full picture of the actions of foreign fighters returning from the war in Syria and could not fully take lag effects into account. Regardless of the precise numbers, there have been several instances of foreign fighters of various persuasions committing attacks on return to Europe, such as the attacks in Paris in November 2015. ⁵⁶

The contrast between the results of the two studies reported above draws attention to the temporal aspect of the phenomenon of foreign fighters. In that regard, Malet and Hayes have examined 134 foreign fighters who returned to Western states between 1980 and 2016. They have shown that most attacks occurred within a year (more precisely, ten months on average) of the foreign fighter’s return. ⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Milton has urged caution when it comes to focusing on the short-term threat of returning foreign fighters, showing with the case of the 9/11 attackers that the average lag between foreign fighter experience and the terrorist attacks was nine years. ⁵⁸ Thus, one must be careful not to overly focus on the short term. It is necessary to go beyond terrorist attacks in order to also consider the possible involvement in wider political violence and dissent through membership of extremist groups. Many foreign fighters had criminal pasts. It should therefore come as no surprise to see involvement in criminal activities once they return. Indeed, experts have been concerned that foreign fighters returning from the war in Syria might join or re-join ‘radical milieus or criminal gangs’. ⁵⁹ Their involvement in foreign conflicts may have developed skills that will enable them to be more ‘successful’ criminals, ⁶⁰ thereby contributing to the so-called ‘crime-terrorism nexus’. ⁶¹ Thus, as argued by Ritzmann in a tweet written during the Annual Conference of the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (EENeT) in 2017, ‘[considering] increasing extreme right/left polarisation and violence, having more battle hardened militiamen/women around is surely a security concern’. ⁶²

Organisational Challenges

As shown notably by research into the foreign fighters who travelled to Iraq and Syria, returning foreign fighters may pose a series of challenges to the authorities, which go far beyond their perpetration of a terrorist attack. ⁶³ The first of these challenges is the provision of leadership to others. Nesser has argued that foreign fighters have often played the role of entrepreneurs, developing terrorist cells and networks and being granted respect thanks to their experience. ⁶⁴ Entrepreneurs are generally considered to be credible and inspirational to others on the basis of their combat experience and training. Without such figures, it is likely that many terrorist cells would never have been formed. Examples of such leaders include Djamel Baghel, who ran an Al Qaeda network in Europe in 2001, and Mohammad Siddique Khan, the leader of the cell that undertook the London attacks in 2005. ⁶⁵ It appears that experiences abroad may render foreign fighters more competent individual terrorists.

A second matter to consider is that of ideological guidance and influence. Entrepreneurs tend to be influential because they appear more knowledgeable about religious or political affairs than their followers. ⁶⁶ Some conflicts involving foreign fighters have gained almost mythical status. This is notably seen in the case of the Soviet-Afghan War, which is recounted as a conflict where a group of holy warriors with very few means apparently defeated a superpower. The foreign fighters concerned have been held in high regard in jihadist circles and may return to their home country or travel to the next conflict with greater conviction, knowledge, and respect due to being veterans. Noted fighters, such as Usama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman al Zawahiri, notably derived their leadership from their involvement in such conflicts and inspired others as a result. Furthermore, conflicts such as Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia provided greater credibility to Al Qaeda’s ideas of defensive jihad. ⁶⁷ The involvement of foreign fighters in these conflicts, including their presence in training camps, such as in Sudan in the early 1990s, greatly facilitated networking amongst jihadists and led to the development of lasting ties. In a similar fashion, some right-wing fighters returned from the conflict in Nicaragua in the 1980s and benefitted the white supremacist cause in the US, as shown by Belew. ⁶⁸ Of course, times have changed, in particular with the development of the internet. This tool has been shown to play a crucial role for many right-wing extremists when it comes to learning, spreading ideas, communicating, and recruiting co-conspirators. ⁶⁹

The third organisational element to consider concerns training and logistical support. In a study of foreign fighters, Milton has shown how 11 out of the 45 foreign fighters in his dataset can be categorised as providing logistical support, such as ‘financial, travel, research, or other support to the operatives who carried out the September 11 attacks’. ⁷⁰ Amer Azizi, for example, has been connected to both 9/11 and the Madrid bombings, seemingly playing the role of emissary for the Al Qaeda leadership and participating in planning meetings. ⁷¹ Mohammad Haydar Zammar is another individual who was involved in 9/11, specifically exercising religious influence and taking part in recruitment activities, although he has claimed to have had no idea what exactly was being planned for that day. ⁷² Overall, such individuals may be less dangerous than those who represent a direct physical threat. Nevertheless, they play a significant role with regard to the recruitment of individuals and the planning of terrorist attacks. Without them, a terrorist group or network would not be able to function effectively.

Wider Societal Consequences

Evidently, the potential ripple effects of foreign fighters go far beyond their involvement in direct violence or their contribution to the organisation of violent activities. In that respect, how governments deal with returning foreign fighters is key. This notably comprises how this is publicly communicated, although it may also depend on whether the foreign fighting was viewed as supporting a socially acceptable cause. If not, it is likely that citizens will be concerned about returning foreign fighters. European states have tended to treat jihadist foreign fighters rather harshly, notably by not assisting them (or their family) to return home, attempting to strip them of their citizenship, or threatening them with immediate arrest should they attempt to return. ⁷³ Such an approach is problematic in several respects. ⁷⁴ First, such measures raise important questions in relation to compliance with international law and human rights law, in addition to tarnishing the reputation of the states concerned. Second, these individuals may arguably become more of a security risk, notably by travelling to another conflict. Third, the families and communities of the individuals concerned may develop grievances, especially if they perceive other types of foreign fighters to receive more lenient treatment.

A potential ripple effect is that of social polarisation. Terrorist activities might affect social cohesion, foster extremism, and contribute to a cycle of violence. In the last few years, Europe has seen the rise of populist parties, many of which have been critical of migrants and asylum-seekers, notably by linking them to terrorism. ⁷⁵ As a result, overall, the political environment in Europe has become less hospitable to minority groups, as seen in the case of the AfD, for instance. This party has recently met with some electoral success, having included in its manifesto that ‘Islam is not part of Germany’. ⁷⁶ In an even more extreme fashion, the English Defence League (EDL) can be seen as a reaction – however paranoid and fuelled by untruths – to jihadism and terrorism, albeit expanded to all Muslims. ⁷⁷ Finally, it is necessary to also consider the wider consequences of the phenomenon of foreign fighters at the individual level. Given the negative experiences that they may have had during the conflict in which they took part, they are more likely to face mental health challenges, without being able to access to the kind of support normally available in militaries.

Conflict Context, Objectives, Opportunities, and Long-Term Participation

Against the backdrop of largely incompatible visions for their own future, ⁷⁸ the tense relations between Russia and Ukraine turned into an open conflict in 2014, when ‘anonymous troops bearing no insignia [but] being widely recognized as belonging to the Russian army’ invaded and seized the Crimean Peninsula. ⁷⁹ Following a show referendum, the territory was then annexed by Moscow. Subsequently, pro-Russian militants and protesters – some local, others having travelled from further afield – began to seize government buildings in eastern Ukraine and demanded the organisation of similar referenda. ⁸⁰ In summer 2014, Russian armed forces units also entered the Donbas region and fighting intensified. As a result, it was estimated that, even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there had been about 10,000 civilian casualties in this conflict. ⁸¹

Foreign fighters began to appear on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and joined the units that accepted foreigners. Pro-Ukraine military units that have comprised foreign fighters include the Georgian Legion, the Aidar Battalion, and – arguably the most noted – the Azov Battalion, ⁸² the latter of which was described by Umland as having been ‘created, in May 2014, by an obscure lunatic fringe group of racist activists’ ⁸³ . According to Murauskaite, ‘[by] various estimates between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign fighters from 54 different countries [came] to take part in the conflict in Ukraine on either side of the battle between 2014 and 2019’, ‘no small number of [whom] were ethnic Russians and/or Russian-speaking citizens of the foreign countries’. ⁸⁴ However, following the so-called Minsk II agreement, an end was put to the Ukrainian volunteer battalions, including some that had hosted foreign fighters. Those battalions were then integrated into the National Guard or the military. ⁸⁵

Amongst the foreign fighters having travelled to Ukraine were a few hundred Western individuals with far-right views. ⁸⁶ The aim for many appears to have been obtaining experience of fighting. It is important to note that the Ukrainian authorities have neither sought to deliberately attract foreign fighters with far-right leanings nor hosted them in their military units with a view to training far-right terrorists. ⁸⁷ Nevertheless, the conflict in Ukraine has provided far-right fighters with an opportunity to network transnationally. ⁸⁸ Importantly, although the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to a renewed influx of foreign fighters in the conflict, albeit in smaller numbers than anticipated or initially announced, this new cohort of foreign fighters has been described as largely apolitical. ⁸⁹

Physical Threat

As previously mentioned, one of the most pressing concerns for Western governments when dealing with foreign fighters is the direct physical threat that they may pose upon their return. ⁹⁰ This threat not only encompasses terrorism, but also other forms of criminality and political violence.

Regarding the foreign fighters in Ukraine, there have been a number of documented instances of human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and torture, in which foreign fighters from the then Azov Battalion participated. ⁹¹ Thus, although this only concerns a small number of individuals, some foreign fighters may have operated with impunity in conflict zones, before returning with experience and skills that will make them higher security risks. They may have also gained access to weapons and ammunition during the conflict. The fact that there appears to have been very limited control from European authorities over the movements and activities of these foreign fighters only heightens this problem. ⁹²

With regard to the specific issue of the possible linkages with terrorist activities, one can also point at some cases. For instance, French right-wing extremist, Grégoire Mouteaux, before being arrested, had obtained weapons from eastern Ukraine and had planned to carry out attacks against mosques and synagogues during the 2016 European football championship. ⁹³ As is often the case, major conflicts become areas from which weapons can be sourced for other purposes. Moreover, it has been shown that two organisations linked to Russia and the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) have used the conflict in Ukraine for learning skills with the intention of using them back home, namely the Czechoslovak Soldiers in Reserve and the Nordic Resistance Movement. ⁹⁴ The latter, a neo-Nazi organisation, was notably responsible for an attack on a Gothenburg refugee centre in 2017. ⁹⁵

Turning to other forms of political violence, several of the extremists involved in the conflict appear to see it ‘as one of the front lines in a global war between competing ideologies’, with some of them viewing Syria as another part of the same fight. ⁹⁶ Moreover, there have been examples of some using the so-called ‘Yellow Vest’ protests as an opportunity for disorder. ⁹⁷ Thus, the physical threat posed by returning foreign fighters is not limited to acts of terrorism, but may take the form of other acts of political violence.

Organisational Challenges

In addition to the direct perpetration of violence, returning foreign fighters may pose longer-term challenges. An important factor to consider in that respect is the possible pool of extremists with whom foreign fighters can link up once returning home. For instance, it has been suggested that there may be as many as 32,000 right-wing extremists in Germany - 1,000 of whom would be primed for violence. ⁹⁸ There have been reports of attempts to recruit for Ukraine in the British far-right scene by, among others, an Italian neo-Nazi known as Francesco Saverio Fontana. ⁹⁹ If these fighters could tap into or offer leadership to these existing groups or form their own groups as entrepreneurs, violent activity could significantly rise. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that several prominent right-wing terrorist attacks were actually carried out by lone attackers – rather than groups – in recent years, although such individuals may have belonged to broader, social extremist networks. ¹⁰⁰

Another challenge concerns ideological diffusion, in the sense that terrorists often inspire each other with their writings and actions. For example, Breivik’s manifesto has been widely distributed and has often been cited by other right-wing terrorists as a source of inspiration. Brenton Tarrant, who committed a terrorist attack in Christchurch (New Zealand) in 2019, has notably declared that he had been heavily influenced by Breivik. ¹⁰¹ Foreign fighters and far-right groups and individuals have attempted to disseminate their materials online and through other means. They have also used religious symbols to appeal to a wider audience. For instance, right-wing extremists fighting in Syria have used crusader symbols on Facebook and Twitter. ¹⁰² This could be seen as an attempt to mimic jihadists in order to ensure that their message resonates with a wider and more powerful transnational identity movement. Such a strategy may be seen as more likely to succeed than highlighting overt links to fascism. Conspiracy theories have also become an important aspect of extreme beliefs, particularly on the far right. ¹⁰³ For example, ‘white genocide’, that is, the idea that mass immigration and high birth rates among non-white groups will lead to the extinction of white values and western civilization, has become popular among white supremacists. ¹⁰⁴

Such beliefs are shared by some of the foreign fighters who have travelled to Ukraine. Those may not present themselves as belonging to the far-right and may prefer to be viewed as conservative or nationalist. ¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, as shown earlier in this article, hostility to liberal democracy would locate them on the far right. It is also interesting to see the mention of ideas of a ‘European Reconquista’, harking back to the Christian defeat of the Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula a few centuries ago, thereby suggesting that Islam would represent a problem for Europe. ¹⁰⁶ As shown by Rekawek, some extremist foreign fighters in Ukraine have ‘limited historical knowledge’ and exhibit ‘puzzlement when confronted with the “inappropriate” nature of their messaging’. ¹⁰⁷ From that perspective, the fact that they cannot see themselves as being on the extreme right, but rather as individuals holding perfectly acceptable views, suggests that these foreign fighters could attempt to normalise such discourse in their home countries among those willing to listen. An enhanced status through their experience in Ukraine might make them more successful in their attempts.

Thus, the danger here is that extremist ideas are increasingly normalised and become therefore more difficult to dislodge from the public discourse. ¹⁰⁸ Worse still, they may incite individuals to commit acts of violence, as seen in the case of the October 2018 Tree of Life synagogue attack. Another example is that of Darren Osborne, who carried out a terrorist attack against Muslims in London in 2017, having been significantly influenced by extremist content posted online. ¹⁰⁹ Foreign fighters could perform particularly important roles in spreading extremist ideas over time, notably through posting propaganda online, inspiring and connecting with other like-minded individuals. In that respect, one can highlight the activities of the Azov Battalion, which, according to the Soufan Center, ran at some point ‘a “Western Outreach Office” to help recruit and attract foreign fighters that travel to train and connect with people from like-minded violent organizations from across the globe’ ¹¹⁰ , as well as youth camps teaching basic military skills and ideology. ¹¹¹ Some individuals were caught distributing propaganda for the battalion, providing advice about how foreign fighters might travel to Ukraine and offering information on building weapons. ¹¹² However, it is important to note that several researchers have suggested that the foreign fighters now active in Ukraine are overall more apolitical than the foreign fighters who had arrived in the early stages of the conflict ¹¹³ , which may therefore decrease the likelihood of their involvement in propaganda activities.

Wider Societal Consequences

Beyond the risk of violence by the foreign fighters themselves or by those groups and individuals who might be susceptible to their influence and direction, there may also be wider societal consequences to the return of foreign fighters. This is because right-wing foreign fighters may not only connect with far-right extremists, but also with a much wider right-wing audience. Indeed, various issues related to culture, language, and religion have become more debated in Europe in recent years, just as asylum and migration have become more salient issues, notably through the construction of linkages with terrorism, especially after several terrorist attacks in 2015-2016. ¹¹⁴ These political dynamics may render some political leaders more wary of highlighting the issue of right-wing terrorism for fear of alienating some of their existing or potential supporters. ¹¹⁵ Over time, this likely empowers extremist individuals and gradually legitimises their beliefs, which may eventually encourage violence. Byman, for example, has shown that hate crimes jumped by 200 per cent in those American counties that hosted Trump rallies. ¹¹⁶ Across many European states, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim language has become more widespread, as epitomised by the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán. ¹¹⁷

Such dynamics may arguably have three significant consequences in Europe. First, governments and security services might turn a blind eye to right-wing terrorism, individualise it ¹¹⁸ , or otherwise attempt to downplay it due to the politics of the time. Second, these political developments may potentially legitimate far-right movements and contribute to enabling, possibly even encouraging, violence. Third, they might lead to the mobilisation of targeted groups who might seek to defend themselves if they perceive efforts from the authorities to defend them as insufficient. Thus, tensions may be brewing in society, with the possibility of escalations in violence, especially if it is perceived that some individuals or groups inciting or enacting violence are not appropriately stopped and punished. In that respect, the more robust EU approach to jihadist foreign fighters stands in contrast to what appears to be a lack of common European strategy on the matter of foreign fighters travelling to Ukraine.

As with right-wing terrorism more generally, there has been a tendency to view far-right individuals in EU states as lone actors or individuals suffering from mental health issues. This may lead to accusations that right-wing terrorism is not being taken seriously by authorities ¹¹⁹ , which will only heighten tensions amongst communities. ¹²⁰ Consequently, this may embolden such individuals and groups, allowing them to seek out like-minded people on their return, as limited thought appears to be given to their disarmament, demobilisation, deradicalisation, disengagement, and reintegration. The fact that such individuals do seem to have been ignored by the authorities might also generate fear among the minorities that right-wing individuals target. The worst-case scenario would be reciprocal violence, as foreseen by theories of cumulative and reciprocal radicalisation. ¹²¹ With right-wing, left-wing, and religious extremists returning home and present in societies, violence amongst them in Europe is possible. In addition, individuals might play a role in radicalising others, which would point towards greater political polarisation.

Finally, attention is drawn to the social consequences on an individual level. One of the most important is the occurrence of mental ill-health as a result of conflict experiences, including post-traumatic stress disorder, in the same way that some members of armed forces have been affected (the so-called ‘veteran effect’). ¹²² Such problems might be even more challenging for foreign fighters because they are unlikely to receive the support that armed forces often provide (although it is not always taken up by those in need). ¹²³

In sum, there is some evidence that far-right foreign fighters on both sides have used Ukraine as a training ground, with seemingly greater organisational support from Russia, although it is important to emphasise that the number of European far-right foreign fighters who have travelled to Ukraine is very small. Nevertheless, those may prove to constitute a challenge to the EU and its Member States, especially when adopting a long-term perspective. In particular, these foreign fighters may tap into existing extremist networks, behave as entrepreneurs or offer ideological guidance.