Initiation of negotiation and its role in negotiation research

Abstract

Most psychological studies about negotiation examine processes, strategies, and outcomes by providing a context with given roles, issues, and resources to the parties involved. We argue that this research is incomplete as psychological variables and processes, antecedent to the initiation of negotiation, are excluded. A theoretical model is developed which explains the initiation of negotiation by the key motivational process of discrepancy reduction, which arouses an emotional reaction. It integrates valence, expectancy and instrumentality considerations as moderating variables. The model serves as a research agenda for the psychological study of the prenegotiation phase, and for answering the questions of when and why people initiate (or suppress) negotiations, thereby offering grounds for probing how subsequent negotiations might be affected by characteristics of the prenegotiation phase. The overall aim is to foster our understanding about the psychological origins of negotiations to complement what is already known about the negotiation process.

Keywords

Cognitive-motivational process model initiation of negotiation

The broad field of negotiation research puts strong emphasis on studying the processes and outcomes of negotiation. Typically, experimental studies are conducted which place subjects into a social context that implies a negotiation. Thereby real-world factors and psychological processes are left out that are antecedent to a state of affairs where a negotiation may come into existence or not. Negotiations can be entered in different ways, for example by being invited to negotiate by another person, by having to negotiate because it is one’s job to do so, by taking part in a psychological negotiation experiment, or by proactively and deliberately initiating a negotiation. For a deeper psychological understanding of the negotiation process within applied contexts it is important to know what makes people initiate a negotiation (or not) in the first place, because what happens before individual agents initiate a negotiation (or not) can have a significant impact on subsequent negotiation processes or on the development of affairs in case the initiation of a negotiation had been abdicated by a person. The initiation of negotiation by individual behavior is one starting point of the negotiation process (regardless of whether the initiation is successful and the process actually continues). And, an individual’s decision to negotiate for advantages, change of circumstances, or any other reason, and consequently taking the first step towards negotiation, marks the beginning of the negotiation process.

Some authors have drawn our attention to the entry phase of negotiation as an important determinant of the subsequent negotiation process. For example, Rubin (1989) and Zartman (2000) argue that finding out when a situation or a conflict is “ripe” for negotiation helps to prepare the negotiation process more adequately and start negotiating at the right time. Bloomfield, Nupen, and Harris (1998) use similar terminology by stating that “ripe” moments must be recognized, seized, and used. The question addressed in the theoretical model presented here is, what makes an individual decide to initiate a negotiation or to abstain from showing respective behavior.

The notion that a “negotiation begins, unfolds, and concludes” (Holmes, 1992, p. 83) is not new. There are several models of negotiation phases in the literature most of which include an initiation phase where relationships are determined, problems are identified, and incompatible goals are discovered and defined, a problem-solving phase which centers around information exchange and a movement towards a joint solution, and a resolution phase where settlement for incompatible goals is undertaken (Adair & Brett, 2005; Holmes, 1992). However, not very much is known about the psychological antecedents to the beginning (or suppression) of negotiation-initiating behavior. It is proposed here that psychologically the question as to whether a negotiation is initiated (or not) needs to be considered by an individual before the “initiation phase” of negotiations is entered. Extending the argument of Saunders (1985, p. 252) who notes that if “we do not understand where we are in the negotiating process, we may use the wrong instruments in trying to move the process forward,” it is argued here that if we do not understand the individual initiation process of negotiation, the wrong instruments might be used in trying to initiate negotiations and to move a negotiation forward (once it has begun). Accordingly, the theory presented here focuses on the initiation phase of negotiation and the psychologically relevant antecedent conditions for initiating (or suppressing) negotiation behavior. It refers to the individual negotiator, who deliberately decides to negotiate with another “social unit” (Walton & McKersie, 1965). As the model offers a general perspective on the initiation of negotiation by drawing on key motivational mechanisms it is not limited to specific negotiation situations or conflict types but is applicable to general interaction situations in which an individual is planning to define or redefine his or her interdependence with another social unit (Walton & McKersie, 1965) by negotiating. However, depending on the context, the specified model components will be pronounced differently.

Initiating negotiations in different applied research contexts

The initiation of negotiations plays a crucial role in organizations. In order to meet the requirements of the changing business environment, organizations are reengineering themselves to be more flexible and adaptive (Cooper, 1999). Following this emerging flexibility, organizations have the opportunity to increasingly individualize working conditions and contracts to adapt to the disparate needs of individuals and shift from the “one-size-fits-all” approach (Lawler & Finegold, 2000, p. 3) towards greater tailoring. Thus, employees have options to fulfill their personal needs and to achieve organizational goals by using the increasing negotiability of terms of employment and working (e.g., Hornung, Rousseau, & Glaser, 2008). Negotiating for resources, fit, support, or strategic positioning is an important factor in the personal and career development of employees “but also has implications (many with financial benefit) to their organizations in terms of motivation and turnover” (Kolb & Kickul, 2006, p. 3). Initiated negotiations may also serve to clarify work procedures, the interpretations of facts, opinions, and beliefs (Pruitt, 1998), or to define or redefine the terms of interdependence (Walton & McKersie, 1965) within or between organizational units.

Initiating negotiations is also relevant for buyers and sellers in a consumer context. Many consumers have a tendency to bargain and many merchants are willing to negotiate prices with consumers (Alserhan, 2009) as initiating negotiations can be beneficial for both buyers and sellers by haggling for the best deal (Harris & Mowen, 2001). By recognizing and using the possibility to bargain for individual advantage, buyers can take influence on the pricing of products so that the same product may be sold to different consumers at different prices (Alserhan, 2009). Advancing a bargaining culture (as opposed to fixed prices) might enhance the joy of a shopping experience for consumers who like or even expect to negotiate prices (Alserhan, 2009). But whether a person exploits the full extent of his or her bargaining advantage depends on his or her propensity to bargain as well as on the relative bargaining skills of both parties (Moyer, 1971). Some researchers in the context of consumer research have suggested focusing on an understanding of negotiation antecedents and explicitly point out the importance of the assessment of pretransaction conditions that influence consumers’ negotiated pricing orientation (Evans & Beltramini, 1987).

In summary, in real-world contexts of organizations and markets, it is important to think of a process larger than what happens around the negotiation table (Saunders, 1985) and to turn one’s attention also to the prenegotiation phase. The importance and functions of the prenegotiation phase in a larger theory of negotiation has often been stated (e.g., Poitras & Bowen, 2002; Poitras, Bowen, & Byrne, 2003), mainly because it is believed that good procedural prenegotiations facilitate good substantive negotiations and help to develop a vital working relationship (Bloomfield et al., 1998). The “if,” “when,” and “how” of initiation of negotiation may offer significant insights into the conflict’s nature and may help to manage conflicts constructively (e.g., Coleman, Kugler, Bui-Wrzosinska, Nowak, & Vallacher, 2012).

Antecedents and consequences of (not) initiating negotiations

Research demonstrated the relevance of contextual variables, such as offer characteristics (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991), negotiation topic (Bear, 2011), cues of negotiability (O’Shea & Bush, 2002; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007), situational framing (Small et al., 2007), or culture in general (Alserhan, 2009; Lee, 2000; Volkema & Fleck, 2012) for people’s decision to negotiate. Interindividual variables, such as characteristics of the negotiation partner (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Hederos Eriksson, & Sandberg, 2012) or power differences (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007; Small et al., 2007) were also shown to have an influence on the initiation of negotiation. Most previous research on initiation of negotiation focuses on intraindividual variables for predicting the decision to negotiate, such as gender (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006; Greig, 2008; Hederos Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012; Schneider, Rodgers, & Bristow, 1999; Small et al., 2007), prior work experience, and the recognition of opportunities (Babcock et al., 2006; O’Shea & Bush, 2002), as well as on various personality variables (e.g., extraversion, neuroticism), norms, and attitudes (Harris & Mowen, 2001; Lee, 2000; Volkema & Fleck, 2012; Volkema, Kapoutsis, & Nikolopoulos, 2013).

Initiating negotiations can have positive consequences for one’s career or salary. Evidence that initiating negotiations is associated with quicker career advancement is provided by Greig (2008) and the effect of the initiation of a compensation negotiation on one’s salary was examined by Gerhart and Rynes (1991). They found that bargaining for higher salary did indeed lead to higher final salaries. Similar results are presented by O’Shea and Bush (2002) who demonstrated that individuals who negotiated raised their salary offers significantly more than those who did not negotiate. These findings indicate a substantial positive effect of the initiation of negotiation on economic outcomes.

Although “it obviously pays to ask” (Kolb & Kickul, 2006, p. 7), not all individuals detect the negotiability of situations and do not initiate negotiations which can result in a huge disadvantage compared to initiators (Babcock & Laschever, 2004). Thus, not initiating negotiations can have dramatic implications. Babcock and Laschever (2004) point out that women initiate negotiations less frequently than do men and due to this fact women have to “pay an astonishingly high price” (Babcock & Laschever, 2004, p. 3): small disparities can transform over the years into dramatic differences (Babcock & Laschever, 2004).

However, initiating negotiations can have negative effects too. Bowles et al. (2007) examined social costs resulting from an initiation of negotiation in order to increase job compensation: asking for higher compensation had a significant negative effect on the decision whether to hire the applicant or not, but the effect was much larger for women than for men. Moreover, they showed that the attempt to negotiate for higher compensation reduced the evaluator’s willingness to work with the job candidate, but only if the candidate was female. Taken together, initiating negotiations and not initiating negotiations can have severe positive and negative implications for different kinds of outcomes.

Despite this increasing amount of research on the antecedents and consequences of initiating negotiations, little conceptual work exists which is dedicated to the general exploration of key psychological variables and mechanisms driving the decision to initiate negotiations. A psychological theory explaining when and why negotiations are actually initiated would help to (a) structure the growing field of research on the topic, (b) stimulate the systematic detection of further relevant antecedent conditions, (c) identify and empirically test the underlying psychological mechanisms, and (d) to integrate the phenomenon into negotiation research in general. As “researchers have traditionally concentrated their work on identifying and understanding variables involved in negotiation once the process has begun” (Poitras & Bowen, 2002, p. 212), we agree with Saunders (1985) who states that a larger theory of negotiation is needed. For the development of such a larger theory from a psychological viewpoint we focus on the questions of when and why people do or do not initiate negotiations.

A cognitive-motivational process model of the initiation of negotiation

What are the basic psychological mechanisms that underlie the initiation of negotiation? In an attempt to answer this central question and to stimulate negotiation research that incorporates the initiation of negotiation we propose a psychological process model. It builds on a theoretical model about complaining,¹ presented by Kowalski (1996), and Vroom’s (1964) Expectancy x Value approach to motivated behavior and applies to within-person decisions to initiate a negotiation, not to negotiations on behalf of others. The model explains the initiation of negotiation by the key motivational process of discrepancy reduction, which arouses an emotional reaction. It integrates valence, expectancy and instrumentality considerations as nonmultiplicative and moderating variables, and thus, offers a new way to the psychological exploration of negotiations’ initiation.

Discrepancy reduction as a key motivational process

In her theory of complaining, Kowalski (1996) describes two different processes that can cause complaining behaviors. While one process influences complaining through the subjective experience of dissatisfaction, the other leads to complaining simply through analyzing its subjective utility. Predisposition for both processes is a state of self-focused attention which initiates a comparison of current states with the individual standard for those states. Positive affect is experienced if the current state exceeds the individual’s standard (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Dissatisfaction and negative affect result if a negative discrepancy between actual states and the individual’s standard is perceived. Consequently, the individual’s motivation to reduce the discrepancy increases (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1988). Before this motivation leads to a behavior to reduce the discrepancy and the negative affect, people calculate the perceived utility of complaining, which means the “degree, to which a person perceives that a complaint will be instrumental in promoting the achievement of desired intrapsychic or interpersonal goals” (Kowalski, 1996, p. 181).

The theory of complaining (Kowalski, 1996) serves as an appropriate guideline for the examination of the initiation of negotiation as it allows two psychologically distinct states of motivation: the one, in which dissatisfied people initiate an action in order to reduce the negative affect of dissatisfaction, and the other one, in which not dissatisfied people still initiate an action, because the cognitively anticipated utility of the behavior is higher than when action is suppressed.

A cognitive-motivational approach

Thompson (1990, p. 1515) has argued that “a psychological theory of negotiation should begin at the level of the individual negotiator” and should integrate features of motivational and cognitive models. Thus, cognitive processes need to be considered, as is also argued by Kowalski (1996). Because valence, expectancy, and instrumentality considerations are key factors when thinking about initiating an action (Diefendorff & Chandler, 2010), we reason that a psychological Expectancy x Valence perspective is a sensible complement along with the motivational-affective discrepancy hypothesis derived from Kowalski (1996). In her theory, she defines the “utility” component as the weighing of instrumental thoughts—how useful it will be to complain in order to achieve the desired goals. These instrumentality considerations are also part of motivational theories, especially Vroom’s (1964) valence–instrumentality–expectancy (VIE) theory. In his theory, Vroom (1964) combines a valence, an instrumentality, and an expectancy component to explain motivationally driven behavior. The valence component is defined as all possible affective orientations towards outcomes such as the “importance, attractiveness, desirability, or anticipated satisfaction with outcomes” (van Eerde & Thierry, 1996, p. 576). Instrumentality is defined as the relationship between an outcome and another outcome, which means the probability that a certain outcome or performance leads to a second outcome (van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). The third component, expectancy, can be interpreted as one’s confidence about what one is capable of doing.

Applying the VIE theory (Vroom, 1964) to the initiation of negotiations we suggest using the three components in the following manner: (a) valence as an individual’s affective orientation towards the subject of negotiation, or towards the anticipated outcome after negotiation; it can include the importance, attractiveness, or desirability of the negotiation subject as well as the anticipated satisfaction with the negotiated outcome; (b) instrumentality as the perceived association between initiating negotiations and reaching of valued outcomes; in terms of Kowalski (1996), this component corresponds to the perceived utility of the initiative behavior; and (c) expectancy as the subjective probability of being capable of successfully initiating a negotiation or of successfully negotiating for the desired outcome. It can include feelings of certainty or efficacy regarding the initiation of negotiation.

We propose that integration of these cognitive, affective, and motivational components into a process model helps to explain the origin of negotiation behavior, that is, the initiation of negotiation (Figure 1). The model consists of five core elements: discrepancy, affective response, valence, instrumentality, and expectancy and explains how situational conditions translate into mental states underlying the initiation of a negotiation.

Figure 1.

A cognitive-motivational process model of the initiation of negotiation.

Discrepancy and affect as driving mechanisms

People have to face discrepancies in everyday life. Discrepancy arises if a current, real state deviates from a person’s desired standard for this state (i.e., her aspiration, expectation, reference value, or ideal state) or if someone’s actual state is pushed out of a desirable goal state that he or she aims to maintain (Custers & Aarts, 2005; Hyland, 1988). For example, a person who has to finish an important task on Friday afternoon while her family is waiting at home to have dinner together might experience a high negative discrepancy, as she wanted to be at home in time but now realizes that she has to stay at work longer than she planned. Another example, referring to justice perceptions would be a student who experiences a negative discrepancy because she received a worse grade for an examination compared to her fellow student although this fellow student did not learn as much as she did.

If people want to reach or maintain a desired goal state, they have to react to discrepancies (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996), thus, the perception of such a discrepancy plays a crucial role in selecting and initiating instrumental action (Custers & Aarts, 2005; Diefendorff & Chandler, 2010). We argue that perceiving a negative discrepancy is a main driver for initiating a negotiation as people may interpret a negotiation as one way to reduce the discrepancy by reaching the desired goal state. By contrast, perceiving no discrepancy or even a positive discrepancy should have no activating potential as the reality and the goal state are accordant which should inhibit people from initiating a negotiation. For example, students should experience no discrepancy if they receive a grade which meets their expectations or even exceeds them. Taken together, discrepancy should directly influence initiating behaviors. The direction of the behavior (initiating vs. not initiating) depends on discrepancy’s polarity (negative discrepancy, no discrepancy, or positive discrepancy).

Proposition 1: The perception of a negative discrepancy (no discrepancy or positive discrepancy) between a current state and an individual’s standard can have a direct effect on action in the form of (not) initiating a negotiation.

A negative discrepancy can be seen from two different points of view. First, a person may experience a negative discrepancy if the current state is neutral and the desired state is more positive. This “pulling” type of discrepancy may be the case, if an employee seeks to develop further personally or professionally or if an employee has suggestions how to further improve processes, workflows, or structures within the organization. Second, a negative discrepancy could also result from a negative current state and a neutral desired state, for example, if an employee is burdened by overtime or extreme workload. This type of discrepancy may be perceived as “pushing.”² Regardless of the origin of the negative discrepancy, it is expected to drive action.

As mentioned before in the context of complaining, the perception of a discrepancy can lead to an affective response; exceeding a standard produces a positive affect whereas falling short of a standard leads to a negative affect (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2005; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Higgins (1987) also suggests that different types of discrepancies are related to different types of emotions: people believing that their personal hopes or wishes have not been fulfilled will experience disappointment, dissatisfaction, or frustration. Feelings of having lost standing or esteem in the opinion of others will come along with shame, embarrassment, or feeling downcast. If danger or harm is anticipated, people will experience fear or feel threatened. Guilt, self-contempt, and uneasiness occur “when people believe they have transgressed a personally accepted … moral standard” (Higgins, 1987, p. 323).

Proposition 2: The perception of a negative discrepancy (no discrepancy or positive discrepancy) between a current state and an individual’s standard leads to a negative affective (no affective or positive affective) response.

Affect plays a fundamental role in motivating human action (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2005). It has pervasive effects on behavior and outcomes in negotiations (van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004) and is crucial to understand how individuals behave within bargaining situations (Barry, 1999). Barry and Oliver (1996) also suggest that affect influences the decision to negotiate. According to emotion theory claiming that different specific emotions can have different behavioral tendencies and behavioral consequences (e.g., Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994), specific emotions should be linked to initiation, whereas others should be linked to noninitiation. Negative affect in the form of injustice, dissatisfaction, and anger may arouse behavioral activation in the form of initiating a negotiation. Anger, for example, is often described as an emotion with approach-related tendencies and relates to an appetitive motivational system (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). However, negative affect does not have to be activating per se: feelings of sadness, disappointment, or embarrassment (which are also kinds of negative affect) may come along with withdrawal tendencies or behavioral inhibition, which in turn may inhibit the initiation of negotiation. Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, and van der Pligt (1998, p. 228), for example, showed that experiences of disappointment involve “feeling powerless, feeling a tendency to do nothing and to get away from the situation, actually turning away from the event, and wanting to do nothing.” Positive emotions such as being content should also not activate behaviors in order to change the status quo (Seo, Barrett, & Bartunek, 2004). For example, an employee who is completely satisfied with her working conditions is unlikely to initiate a negotiation with her supervisor in order to change them whereas an employee who is angry about the low speed of her personal computer is much more likely to initiate a negotiation in order to improve her working conditions.

Thus, disregarding the detection of a discrepancy, we state a direct way from affect to the initiation of negotiation as the experience of affect also directly impacts discrepancy- reducing behaviors (e.g., Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) and is inherently linked to motivation (Diefendorff & Chandler, 2010).

Proposition 3: A state of strong negative activating affectivity increases the tendency to initiate a negotiation. A strong negative inhibiting affectivity as well as a positive affectivity decrease the tendency to initiate a negotiation.

Dissatisfaction and negative affect result if a discrepancy between actual events and the individual’s standard is perceived. As a consequence, the individual’s motivation to reduce the discrepancy increases (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Scheier & Carver, 1988). Similar assumptions are made by self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987): incongruity between psychological states is seen to engender an aversive affective state within the individual which, in turn, motivates the individual to redress the aversive condition (Fromson, 2006). Transferring this general indirect effect of discrepancy, via affect, on behavior to the context of negotiation initiation and considering the postulated direct path from discrepancy to the initiation of negotiation we propose the following partial mediation effect:

Proposition 4: The effect of discrepancy on the initiation of negotiation is partially mediated by the affective response.

Moderating effects of valence, instrumentality, and expectancy

Whether a negative discrepancy and, going along with it, a negative affective state actually lead to initiating a negotiation or, on the other hand, whether no discrepancy and no (or an inhibiting) negative affective state actually cause noninitiation of negotiation may also depend on cognitive-motivational factors. We argue that valence, instrumentality, and expectancy can alter the effect of discrepancy and affect on negotiation initiation in a way that they either inhibit or facilitate it. In agreement with Kowalski (1996), who suggests two different processes leading to initiating behavior (with and without discrepancy), we state that an initiation can also occur when there is no discrepancy or no feeling of negative affect but a high instrumentality of initiating a negotiation or a high expectancy to be successful and a highly valued outcome. Imagine a context, which is perceived as one where negotiation usually occurs, for example, a salary negotiation when entering a new organization, that is, a context in which discrepancy may not necessarily be the driving mechanism. In such a context, high expectancy (one might be used to negotiate in such contexts and thus feel certain and self-efficient), positive instrumentality (no risk in terms of relational outcomes as it is clear to each party that negotiation is appropriate), or high valence (it is very attractive to oneself to receive a high starting salary) may be the driving forces and thus facilitate the initiative behavior. Likewise, imagine a situation in which a person perceives a strong negative discrepancy (her workload is too high) and coming along with it a negative affect (frustration or dissatisfaction) but does not initiate a negotiation. In this case, cognitive-motivational considerations may be the inhibiting forces: the person may think that initiating a negotiation would imply that she is not able to cope with her job demands (negative instrumentality) or think that she has not enough negotiation ability to start negotiating in this matter (low expectancy).

Weighing costs and benefits, getting aware of the valence of outcomes, and estimating the probability for success are judgments people make deliberately (Vroom, 1964). However, calculating these judgments rationally requires mental capacity and access to information. Therefore, we suggest that the moderating VIE effects operate especially in situations involving low time pressure and low general cognitive load. By contrast, the more people have on their minds, the more being stressed and under time pressure, the more likely they should initiate negotiations out of the experience of discrepancy and negative affect (see also Bazerman & Moore, 2009).

Valence

The subject towards which the potential action directs has to be of a certain valence (e.g., Vroom, 1964), has to be desired and to be considered worth pursuing (Custers & Aarts, 2005). Valence is strongly emphasized as a variable predicting goal striving and pursuit in most current theories of motivation and goal-directed behavior (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Custers & Aarts, 2005; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Locke & Latham, 2002; Vroom, 1964) and is of special importance in the understanding of action tendencies (Weiner, 1985). If a goal state is more desired, the effort to reach the state is more pronounced (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004). Thus, if a goal state is highly valued in terms of desirability, attractiveness, or importance, this high valence should facilitate initiation tendencies also in cases with no perceived discrepancy or no affective experience, whereas low valence of a potential outcome should inhibit initiation (even if there may be a perceived negative discrepancy and feelings of negative affect in a situation). For example, if a person perceives a negative discrepancy in that her colleague has better access to personal development opportunities and additionally, personal development is very important to this person, this perceived valence should strengthen the link between discrepancy, affect, and initiating behavior. However if personal development is not very attractive to this person, this subjective low valence should inhibit the initiation of negotiation.

Proposition 5: The effect of discrepancy and affect on the initiation of negotiation is moderated by the perceived valence of the negotiation subject or outcome: high (low) valence facilitates (inhibits) the initiation of negotiation.

Expectancy

However, motivation is not only shaped by what one can get (i.e., the goal state which has a certain valence), but also by the likelihood of getting it, that is, one’s expectancy (Weiner, 1985): “Every major cognitive motivational theorist includes the expectancy of goal attainment among the determinants of action” (Weiner, 1985, p. 555). Expectancy in this context is related to the subjective probability of being capable of successfully initiating a negotiation or of successfully negotiating for the desired outcome and includes feelings of certainty or efficacy. “People will try to reduce a discrepancy only when they feel self-efficacious with respect to goal-directed actions … [and try] to close discrepancies only when outcome expectations are high” (Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001, p. 343). By contrast, if the expectancy is low, people will avoid discrepancy-reducing behaviors (Karoly, 1993). In the literature, expectancy is often associated with the probability of future success (Meyer, 1973), confidence about future success (McMahan, 1973), or anticipated performance (Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976). In Ajzen’s (1985) model of planned behavior, the expectancy of successfully executing an intended action appears in the form of behavioral control (Custers & Aarts, 2005), and Heider (1958) states that in achievement-related contexts, goal expectancies are determined, for example, by perceived ability. Thus, perceiving a positive expectancy going along with confidence about success or high perceived ability to perform the planned behavior should be positively associated with the initiation of negotiation whereas perceiving low expectancy (i.e., a low probability of being successful when trying to initiate a negotiation) should inhibit approaching behaviors resulting in not initiating a negotiation.

Proposition 6: The effect of discrepancy and affect on the initiation of negotiation is moderated by the perceived subjective expectancy of being able to successfully initiate a negotiation: high (low) expectancy facilitates (inhibits) the initiation of negotiation.

Instrumentality

Besides valence and expectancy, another key mechanism driving motivated behavior is instrumentality. Actions (such as initiating a negotiation) can become instrumentally linked to specific goals in memory as people “have the ability to mentally represent their overt actions in terms of possible means for goals and to store, access, and retrieve these representations from memory” (Custers & Aarts, 2005, p. 262). Instrumentality in our context refers to the anticipated consequences or outcomes of initiating negotiations (costs and benefits) which come along with it. Research shows that humans have a tendency to perceive, adjust, and control their action in terms of expected outcomes (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005) and that the decision to negotiate depends on the consequences individuals expect from initiating negotiations (Kong, Tuncel, & McLean Parks, 2011; Miles, 2010).

As outcomes of negotiations can vary on qualitatively different levels (e.g., subjective value vs. economic outcome; see Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006), instrumentality considerations can also refer to different types of outcomes: economic outcomes resulting from an initiated negotiation are material (not necessarily financial) outcomes that objectively impact on one’s current “debit and credit,” such as increased salary, better terms of employment, keeping one’s job, or obtaining more resources for one’s project.

Following Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, and O’Brien (2006), we suggest that the instrumentality of an initiated negotiation not only refers to the accumulation of one’s economic capital, but also to one’s relational outcomes, that is, to social rewards or social punishments. Relational outcomes include assets of mutual liking, knowledge, trust, and commitment to continuing a relationship (Gelfand et al., 2006). Bowles et al. (2007) suggest that the anticipation of social costs resulting from an initiated negotiation might be crucial for the decision whether to negotiate or not.

Besides relational and economic outcomes, issues related to the self are weighed when contemplating a negotiation: on the one hand, initiating a negotiation requires time and effort and depletes personal energy and resources (e.g., Shepperd, 1993), but on the other hand, negotiating can be experienced as personal challenge or fun (Olekalns & Kulik, 2009). Kong et al. (2011) showed an effect of anticipated happiness which was positively related to the propensity to initiate a negotiation, and Miles (2010) proposes that people are less likely to negotiate if they believe that negotiating will result in a loss of face. Subjective outcomes are also considered in a utility function developed by Babcock, Bowles, and Bear (2012) regarding the engagement in negotiation. Besides perceived consequences of a salary negotiation on future payment this function includes the impact of negotiating on personal identity factors.

Thus, when weighing costs and benefits of initiating a negotiation, people can do this with regard to their economic, relational, and self-related punishments or rewards. Signals of punishment or reward are triggers for the behavioral activation and the behavioral inhibition system (Carver & White, 1994). The behavioral inhibition system is sensitive for example to signals of punishment or nonreward (Carver & White, 1994). Accordingly, the activation of the behavioral inhibition system causes inhibition of movement towards goals. In the context of negotiation, an apprehension of hurting the relationship with the negotiation partner or fear of being punished in the form of future repressions (signals of nonreward and punishment) may activate behavioral inhibition and thus lead to noninitiation of negotiation. In contrast, the behavioral activation system is sensitive to signals of reward and nonpunishment and, thus, causes a person to begin (or to increase) movement towards goals (Carver & White, 1994). Thus, receiving signals of reward such as the expectation of improving one’s situation by negotiating may activate the behavioral activation system and, therefore, make people initiate a negotiation. Taken together, the instrumentality of initiating a negotiation is high when the gains are assumed to be larger than the costs (see also Kowalski, 1996).

Proposition 7: The effect of discrepancy and affect on the initiation of negotiation is moderated by the perceived instrumentality of a negotiation with regard to the desired outcomes: positive (negative) instrumentality facilitates (inhibits) the initiation of negotiation.

In sum, our model explains from a cognitive-motivational and affective perspective, why individuals do or do not initiate negotiations. It explains how the perception of discrepancy and the experience of affect lead to the decision to negotiate and how this decision is further shaped by valence, instrumentality, and expectancy considerations. Thus, it explains negotiations that are initiated by individuals spontaneously “in the heat of the moment” and negotiations which are the result of dithering and strategic calculations. Moreover, by differentiating three types of instrumentality, the model is not limited to settings in which people may or may not initiate a negotiation for their individual economic benefit but also applies to situations in which people strive for relational or self-related outcomes. In this respect, our model can be applied to the initiation of both distributive and integrative negotiations: distributive negotiations, where negotiators make decisions based on principles of economic rationality and pursue behavioral strategies that will maximize economic outcomes (Lewicki, Weiss, & Lewin, 1992), may be primarily driven by economic instrumentality considerations whereas integrative negotiations, in which values such as interpersonal trust, cooperation, and a search for mutually acceptable outcomes are stressed (Lewicki et al., 1992), may especially be influenced by relational instrumentality considerations.

As our model distinguishes these different types of instrumentalities that are considered when contemplating an initiation of negotiation it is also applicable to negotiations that stem from various types of conflict situations. In interest conflicts over substantive issues (such as money, physical resources, time, etc.; Moore, 1996) or economic conflicts over scarce resources (Fisher, 2006), the decision to negotiate will be influenced by instrumentality considerations in terms of economic outcomes (is negotiating helpful to get a considerable piece of the pie?). In value conflicts involving differences in what persons believe in (Fisher, 2006) and different deeply rooted goals or criteria on how to evaluate things (Moore, 1996), self-related instrumentality considerations may be foregrounded as an initiation of negotiation can support a person’s expression of her emotions, perspectives, values, and beliefs for acknowledgment by the other party. Self-related instrumentality considerations may also explain why negotiations may sometimes be initiated for symbolic reasons or because of identity-relevant issues. For example, a person who is caught for riding a train without a ticket may start a negotiation about being fined, in order to present herself as an honest traveler, even though avoiding the fine is impossible.³ Power or relationship conflicts occurring when people strive to maximize their influence (Fisher, 2006) or feel depreciated and rejected through interaction partners may trigger instrumentality considerations in terms of relational outcomes, such as regulating the relationship, making the negotiation partner realizing an issue or point of view, demonstrating one’s negotiation ability, gaining appreciation, or pointing out personal limits to the negotiation partner.

The role of the potential negotiation partner

Negotiations are inherently relational (Gelfand et al., 2006), so, how does the potential negotiation partner influence an individual’s decision to negotiate? Attributes of the negotiation partner may influence instrumentality and expectancy considerations regarding the initiation of a negotiation. If the relationship with the counterpart is perceived to be not a good one, people may fear that the relationship will become even worse, or that the counterpart will interpret the initiation as an offence which negatively impacts instrumentality considerations in terms of relational outcomes. By contrast, if the relationship is based on principles of fairness and trust, people may not have to worry about negative long-term consequences. Furthermore, knowing one’s negotiation partner very well will help to predict his or her reactions and behaviors to a certain extent, which in turn may increase one’s perceived chances of success (i.e., expectancy). However, if the negotiation partner is unpredictable and impulsive, people might feel helpless, doubtful, or blocked and experience low chances of success. These assumptions go along with previous research showing that people feel safe to speak up if the counterpart is seen as accessible, interested, or open in communication (Edmondson, 1999) and are afraid to speak up if the counterpart is abrasive, abusive, or ambiguous (Ryan & Oestrich, 1998).

Discussion

Traditional negotiation theory and research has largely neglected a central phase of the negotiation process, its initiation, although it is considerably important for negotiation to come about at all. Following Saunders’ (1985) call for a larger theory of negotiation, we explored the initiation phase of negotiation and propose a process model, which incorporates cognitive-motivational and affective factors as antecedents of the initiation of negotiation: (a) the perception of discrepancy, (b) the experience of affect, (c) the assessment of the valence of the goal state, (d) the perceived instrumentality of initiating a negotiation regarding reaching one’s goals, and (e) the expectancy of being able to successfully negotiate for the desired outcome. The proposed model captures basic elements of motivated behavior and meets the requirements of a sound motivational theory such as theoretical integration in the field of motivation research and consideration of affective processes (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002).

The model illustrates a way to explain when and why people do (not) initiate a negotiation and proposes that negotiations may be initiated for psychologically different reasons. The process model is not limited to a specific negotiation context which broadens its applicability to various negotiation settings and thus comes up to the diversity of negotiation research fields.

There are only few models of negotiation phases and processes that include the initiation of negotiation in the description of the negotiation process (e.g., Barry & Oliver, 1996; Olekalns & Kulik, 2009). Most negotiation models make general assumptions of which many exclude per se the possibility of not initiating a negotiation. The here suggested model challenges classical assumptions of negotiation research, such as “All types of problems are negotiable”, “All parties want to negotiate and are able to negotiate”, or “The essential part of negotiation takes place at the negotiation table” (Lewicki et al., 1992, p. 229). Instead, it proposes that not all types of problems are equally experienced as negotiable by everyone, not all parties strive to negotiate equally strongly and are convinced to have the necessary abilities to do so. And, from the perspective of the individual, the essential part of negotiation does not necessarily only take place at the negotiation table, but also on the way to the table.

Implications for theory and research

By showing that the initiation of negotiation is a complex decision-making process we highlight the need to make negotiation research more realistic. Negotiation research should investigate negotiations as embedded within particular situations and within a broader inter- and intraindividual context, because everyday negotiation situations always have a future and a past, and take place in a context of relationships and networks, preset interests, motives, and emotions. In this context, our model offers significant starting points as to how situational conditions could be integrated to the exploration of negotiations’ beginning by influencing instrumentality or expectancy considerations. For example, situational circumstances such as having fixed meetings with one’s supervisor may offer a natural setting for getting into a conversation and employees may feel more prone to initiate negotiations within the context of such meetings. Consequently, they will experience a higher expectancy of being able to initiate a negotiation. Furthermore, if an employee knows that the organization is in financial trouble (situational cue) the employee may refrain from initiating a salary negotiation as he or she assumes that the situation is inadequate to “ask for more” and negotiation would not bring about a change in salary (low economic instrumentality).

Stating that emotional and motivational processes play a pivotal role in the decision to negotiate, we provide a possible explanation for the origin of the moody, motivated negotiator: emotions and motives may be brought to the table resulting from different reasons for initiation. The role of motivation and emotion is a central part of negotiation research (Barry, Fulmer, & van Kleef, 2004; De Dreu, 2004) but, so far to our knowledge, researchers did not ask the question where emotions and motivations come from in everyday negotiations. Integration of these ex ante processes into negotiation theory may provide a better understanding of motivational and emotional processes at the negotiation table.

Our model advances an understanding of the causal path leading to the initiation of negotiation via perceived discrepancy between an actual and desired state and respective experiences of affect. Furthermore, proposing estimations of valence, instrumentality, and expectancy as moderating factors, we specify motivational boundary conditions under which the link between the two key variables (discrepancy, affect) and initiation of negotiation becomes more or less pronounced. In this respect, our model goes beyond a mere application of expectancy theory. Furthermore, combining the rational, calculative, “cold” VIE components with a “hot” way of action via discrepancy and affect we overcome a main weakness of “pure” VIE theory. Additionally, the often criticized multiplicative connection of V, I, and E is abandoned in our model in favor of three single components, which also goes along with van Eerde and Thierry’s (1996) meta-analytical results suggesting the use of the VIE components rather than multiplicative models of the single components. Moreover, the components are further specified and applied to the negotiation context. Instrumentality is differentiated regarding three different types of outcomes: economic outcomes, relational outcomes, and self-related outcomes. Future research should empirically test the relationships proposed in the model and probe in which way the moderating factors may interact. Beyond an application of the model in the field, experimental research in the laboratory would be an important step in testing the model.

Being aware of the different motives that make people initiate negotiations we propose investigation of the influence of the “why” (motives, valences, goals) on the “how” (strategy, timing, method). Poitras et al. (2003) show that different reasons for entering negotiations may be followed by different kinds of negotiation processes, which supports the view that antecedent conditions of a negotiation can affect the further negotiation process.

Furthermore, we want to encourage future research to regard the initiation of negotiation as independent variable. The initiation of a negotiation could serve intrapsychic goals such as venting emotions and decreasing one’s dissatisfaction solely by speaking out and could also impact feelings of instrumentality and expectancy in terms of our model. However, initiating a negotiation at the wrong time could have negative consequences in terms of hurting social relationships and impairing economic gain.

Finally, we suggest embedding our model in classic organizational behavior research by linking the phenomenon of initiating negotiations to other forms of initiative, for example proactive behavior at the workplace (Tornau & Frese, 2013). An organizational setting could be a fertile ground for further model enlargement.

Implications for practice

The process model of the initiation of negotiation could be a guideline for an adequate preparation when employees consider initiating a negotiation. Reflecting about consequences, chances, and risks of (not) initiating a negotiation in a systematic way can foster more accurate judgments about oneself, about the negotiation partner, and about the negotiation situation before acting. Being aware of motives, emotions, values, and goals brought to the table by the negotiators and using them for sense-making prior to negotiation may help negotiators to predict or actively create more successful negotiation processes.

From an employer’s perspective, knowing the reasons for the initiation of negotiations may help to prevent dispensable negotiations that may arise from perceptions of injustice or dissatisfaction by establishing structures and systems that are transparent and comprehensible to employees. On the other hand, knowing the reasons for not initiating a negotiation concerning the improvement of work procedures and processes that could help the organization act more flexible and efficient, the organization could facilitate initiating behaviors by relieving fears and worries concerning speaking out.

Considering the reasons for (not) initiating negotiations is also an important issue in consumer research and marketing research. Being aware of the daily practice of negotiated pricing in some cultures (Alserhan, 2009) buyers may make better deals. Sellers who want to increase consumer satisfaction have to adapt to the disparate needs and expectations of consumers, concerning the negotiability of pricing and pursue both approaches to pricing: fixed prices and prices ready for negotiation (Alserhan, 2009).

In a conflict management context, an essential step for problem solving is that parties come to the table and a negotiation process is initiated. Knowing about barriers for such an initiation can help to avoid or remove the barriers and make the problem-solving process start (e.g., Poitras et al., 2003).

Focusing on the initiation of negotiation and considering it in the investigation of negotiation may not only foster an understanding of the occurrence of negotiations, but may also help to explain why some negotiations may fail to be initiated, why initiations themselves may fail, and why some negotiations may be initiated by mistake. Examining the antecedents, functions, and consequences of initiating a negotiation (or not) will help to gain a better understanding of the whole negotiation process. Previous and emerging research has shed some light on the phenomenon, and there is a growing body of answers to the question of when and why people initiate negotiations.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Some elements of the ideas described in this paper were presented at the American Psychological Association 119th Convention, Washington DC, USA. The research further draws on a dissertation completed by Julia A. M. Reif at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet Muenchen.

Notes

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