Abstract
Around three million European Union citizens live in the UK. Most are not eligible to vote in British elections.
One common argument used in campaigns to lower the voting age to 16 is that the youngest citizens have the strongest interest in the decisions taken by government, yet currently have no say in its formation. This argument has become particularly popular since the EU referendum, where large age differences in choices emerged, which then persisted into the next general election.
Yet there is a far larger group of British residents with a strong stake in the consequences of the EU referendum and yet is almost completely disenfranchised in national elections: British residents who migrated from other EU countries. It is both puzzling and concerning that the political rights of the several million citizens resident in Britain, including many who have made this country their long-term home, have barely featured in debate before or after the EU referendum. It is about time they did.
EU citizens’ rights
The rights of EU citizens have been a major bone of contention throughout the Brexit negotiation process – with the British government agreeing the principle of guaranteed rights, yet still sketchy on the details of how this guarantee will operate. EU citizens do not yet know what paperwork they will need to fill in to secure their rights, or what information they will need to do it. Many are understandably worried about the terms on which they can secure their long-term residence rights, a fear the recent ‘Windrush’ crisis will only have exacerbated.
The situation might be different if MPs in Parliament had to worry about the votes of such frustrated EU residents – their large numbers and unusually even spread across the country would make them an important electorate in very many seats. Yet MPs can rest easy, because the vast majority of EU- born residents – including those here for decades – have no voting rights at all in general elections. They get no such rights as EU citizens and while they could secure such rights by taking out British citizenship, most have not done so.
This behaviour sets EU migrants apart from every other significant migrant population in Britain (see Figure 1). More than 40 per cent of every single large migrant group from outside the EU have British citizenship – in many cases large majorities have it. Migrants from many of these countries don’t even need British citizenship to vote in British general elections, as citizens of Commonwealth countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria have that right from the moment they take up residence in Britain. But even non- Commonwealth migrants have the potential to make themselves heard at general elections, as they tend to acquire citizenship at high rates.
Share of non-EU migrants with British citizenship
The contrast with EU migrants is striking (see Figure 2). Only one of the largest EU migrant communities has high rates of British citizenship – and that is a special case. Nearly two thirds of German born migrants to Britain have British citizenship – but many of these are the children of British servicemen born while their parents were serving on armed forces bases in Germany. After this, the next highest figure is for Ireland – one in five Irish migrants has British citizenship. But Ireland is an exception in a different way, as all Irish citizens resident in Britain have the right to vote in British elections.
Share of EU migrants with British citizenship
Citizenship rates for the rest of the EU migrant communities are very low – less than one in twenty of the Poles and Romanians living in Britain has British citizenship, around one in eight French born residents has it, and only around one in ten of the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese born migrant communities. These large communities are practically voiceless in British general elections – the 900,000 strong Polish born community in Britain can muster fewer votes between them than the 55,000 British residents who hail from Uganda.
The most likely reason for this from the point of view of the migrants themselves is fairly clear – EU residents came to Britain expecting their political and social rights to be guaranteed as part of Britain’s EU membership, which most assumed would be permanent. Migrants from other parts of the world face tough and inflexible Home Office rules, which recent events have shown can be applied even to people here for decades with full rights, so they have a strong incentive to acquire the security of British citizenship, despite the onerous paperwork and prohibitive (and rapidly escalating) costs involved.
This difference in behaviour, though understandable, has produced major democratic inequalities. One consequence has been to skew the migration debate – EU migrants have few votes, but those who dislike their presence have many, and have used them effectively. The guarantees offered by EU citizenship have, partly as a result, not turned out to be as secure as expected.
Votes for EU citizens?
Yet even after Brexit, the idea of extending the franchise to the millions strong community of disenfranchised EU born residents whose fundamental rights are now in question attracts little attention. This seems both politically unwise and inconsistent with democratic norms. Giving EU citizens easier access to the ballot would be a valuable way to demonstrate goodwill to this large and important community, who politicians regularly claim they value and wish to support. Actions speak louder than words – and the ballot is a powerful way to hold politicians to their promises. A generous reform of political rights would also help to demonstrate goodwill to the EU itself, perhaps aiding the often fraught Brexit negotiations process. It would be good politics, too: EU citizens newly armed with the ballot would be more favourably inclined to the party which helped them gain a political voice.
Two obvious objections arise. Firstly, that the native British population would oppose extending the franchise in this way. While polling on this matter is sparse, what evidence we have suggests opposition is not a major issue. There is widespread support for granting full political rights to long-term residents, even among those with negative views about immigration in general. Nearly 70 per cent of respondents in the 2013 British Social Attitudes survey supported giving EU migrants the right to vote in British general elections after five years residence or less – including around 60 per cent of respondents who saw the impact of migration as negative. Only a small minority supported the status quo of permanent disenfranchisement.
A second objection is that the right to vote in general elections is inextricably bound up with national citizenship. Extending it to non-citizens could harmfully dilute the meaning of citizenship itself. Yet Britain already severed this link long ago. Citizens of Commonwealth countries and the Republic of Ireland have the right to vote in general elections from the moment they arrive in Britain. This right has existed for many decades and has not proved controversial. Extending the franchise also need not take the form of granting the vote to non-citizens. The same goal could be achieved by making access to citizenship easier. This could be integrated with the registration processes the Home Office will anyway have to undertake for EU citizens. For example, EU citizens who register successfully with the Home Office as long-term residents could be offered a straightforward, voluntary path to British citizenship. This would overnight offer millions the option to join the political process – without obliging any to do so.
Offering EU born residents an easy route to voting rights would be a powerful way for the British government to demonstrate to people who have made their home in Britain that they are welcome here. It also respects a basic democratic principle with wide public support: that all those with a stake in political decisions, regardless of where they originally came from, should have a voice in those decisions. It would be a bold, ambitious, and generous move – something our often tempered debates over migration and Brexit sorely need. It is time for British politicians to respect an ancient Polish principle – ‘Nic o nas bez nas’: ‘Nothing about us, without us’.
Footnotes
Rob Ford is professor of political science at the University of Manchester.