The role of play in strategic communication

Abstract

This article focuses on the issue of how players in strategic communication situations deal with apparently hopeless situations. The theory is that players in such situations sometimes engage in strategic communication play. Essentially, what strategic communication plays do, is help to continue communication. This article develops a theoretical concept of strategic communication. It is shown that strategic communication plays are found both in direct interpersonal communication and in communication via the mass media. Pursuant to the communication sociological approach, the theoretical basis is a differentiated and paradoxical definition of play, following Bateson, embedded in Goffman’s frame analysis. On this basis, two functions of strategic communication play are identified. These are as follows: on the one hand, expanding the sphere of possibilities and, on the other, by means of self-reference, the likelihood of increasing attributions of likability and trustworthiness.

Keywords

Constructivism frame analysis game play strategic communication

In a conversation with a journalist, a press officer attempts to invalidate rumours of corruption in the company. In order to underline the trustworthiness of his statements, he may attempt to appear particularly authoritative, to avoid contradictions, to cite supportive independent third-party opinions and so on. The journalist can accept all of this, or attempt, through questioning, to identify contradictions, to unnerve the press officer or to use further indicators, such as evaluating his voice, to assess trustworthiness. Finally, there is a third option: the journalist may in the course of the discussion increasingly call into question his ability to actually differentiate lies from the truth. If the journalist and the press officer both ultimately proceed from the assumption that indicators of trustworthiness can be instrumentalised, this situation can acquire an entirely new character by being transformed: the strategic communication situation between journalist and press officer becomes strategic communication play.

Comparable developments in strategic communication situations can be seen in many instances in everyday life. While, in the beginning, there is serious argument, after a certain amount of time, arguments begin to be repeated. In such a situation, the subjectivity and the contingency of the arguments – as well as the contingency of the entire negotiation situation, become clear. Strategic communication thus enters a dead-end and could come to a halt. Instead, both sides can themselves acknowledge and discuss the contingency and, thus, the openness of all arguments and the situation. With that, however, they leave the framework of a strategic communication situation and transform it into something new. In this article, the ‘new thing’ is conceived as strategic communication play: in strategic communication play, both sides (a) assume the contingency and, thus, the capacity for instrumentalisation of arguments or indicators. In addition, they also assume that (b) the other side assumes the same and (c) that both sides assume this of their respective counterparty. Such strategic communication play is observed in direct interpersonal communication – as in the introductory example – and in communication via the mass media. An example of strategic communication play in a mass media context is self-referencing advertising, which broaches the issue of the contingency of all arguments and the advertising situation itself.

Strategic communication plays are not the norm in strategic communication situations. A society that increasingly frequently recognises and discusses the contingency of a situation will engage in strategic communication plays more and more. This is why it is worthwhile for (strategic) communication research to explore the hitherto overlooked question of how to deal with the growing ‘crisis of confidence’ (Flusser, 1993: 19) in strategic communication situations. Practitioners profit in that, thus far, their communication plays have been carried out intuitively. The theoretical description of strategic communication plays allows them to act with greater reflection and to use strategic communication plays consciously.

Applying a differentiation theory and paradoxical definition of play following Bateson (1956, 2000 [1972]) embedded in the frame analysis of Goffman (1974), strategic communication play can be understood as the transformation of a strategic communication situation. Strategic communication is understood in a very wide sense – ‘any message that is intended to shape, reinforce, or change the responses of another, or others’ (Miller, 1980: 11). Thus, it includes forms of strategic organisational communication, as well as seduction.

This contribution presents in detail the benefit of a theory of strategic communication play. First, in strategic communication play, the scope of opportunity is expanded: the playful character encourages the creation and testing of new strategies and arguments. The approach therefore contributes to the ‘theory of evolution’ in strategic communication. Second, strategic communication plays can be specifically interpreted as the attempt to increase trustworthiness and attributions of likability. Third, strategic communication play as a rule explains how strategic communication is continued if both sides acknowledge the contingency of techniques and arguments and do not abandon the situation. These functions of strategic communications play are explained using the example of press conferences, TV debates and self-referencing advertising as examples of mass media strategic communication plays.

Game theory and play theory have been gaining considerable ground in various scientific disciplines for some years now (e.g. Johnson et al., 2015). While the terms ‘game’ and ‘play’ are, as a rule, clearly defined in mathematical economic game theory (e.g. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1972 [1944]), in the research on computer games (e.g. Raessens and Goldstein, 2011) and in more general terms on gamification (e.g. Reiners and Wood, 2015) or on the theory of play (e.g. Lynch, 2015; Møller, 2015), they are often used metaphorically in the research on strategic communication.

Literature review

While, overall, the research on game and play is highly diverse, there are only a small number of game- and play-theoretical considerations in the research on strategic communication (section ‘Play and game in strategic communication research’). Therefore, the literature review needs to take a more fundamental approach: first, the research on strategic communication is examined in terms of which reactions to the problem of the lack of trustworthiness are explained in strategic communication (section ‘The problem of trustworthiness in strategic communication research’). Then, general game theories and play theories are examined to determine which theoretical approach is best suited to the research question addressed in this article (section ‘Game theory and play theory’).

Play and game in strategic communication research

Games can be found in two places in particular in the research on strategic communication. On the one hand, games, such as computer games, are seen as an instrument of strategic communication to reach strategic communication goals (e.g. Pieczka and Wood, 2013; Seiffert and Nothhaft, 2014). Other than the term ‘game’, such perspective has little in common with the research question in this article and, as such, will not be explored further here. On the other hand, in public relations (PR) research, mathematical economic game theory describes various constellations between a company and its environment. It was on this basis that Grunig (1988) and Murphy (1987, 1989, 1991) described the management of (communicative) relationships between an organisation and its publics. In a zero-sum game with fully mutually exclusive interests, the company’s gain is the public’s loss – and vice versa. In a coordination game, by contrast, both sides can win. Fengler and Ruß-Mohl (2008, 2014) conceive of the relationships between PR and journalists in a similar fashion. Based on rational choice theory and game theory, they develop three interaction variants: cooperation as the ‘normal case’; defection as exploitation of readiness to cooperate by one player; and termination of interaction. However, the two last cases seldom occur, because both sides as a rule encounter one another again. The discussion thus focuses on the traditional question in mathematical economic game theory, which is how the players can find the optimum solution. As such, that approach is not conducive to the objectives pursued with this article.

The problem of trustworthiness in strategic communication research

The article focuses on the question of how players in strategic communication situations deal with the ‘crisis of confidence’ (Flusser, 1993: 19). At the latest since Packard’s (1957) proposition of advertising as ‘hidden persuaders’, research on strategic communication has dealt intensively with suspicions of ulterior motives and manipulation. Nowadays, there is widespread consensus that, for example, the target audience of advertising assumes manipulation and advertisers act on the basis of precisely this assumption: ‘Advertising seeks to manipulate, it works insincerely and assumes that that is taken for granted’ (Luhmann, 2000: 44). Schmidt (2007) assumes that the rule of ‘intentional blindness’ between advertisers and their audience has long since been collective knowledge. Journalists approach press officers in a similarly critical fashion when they call into question the reliability of press releases.

The answers provided in the research to the question of how strategic communication deals with the problem of lack of credibility are considerably less developed. Possible strategies are the avoidance of contradictions for example, by means of integrated communication (Langer and Thorup, 2006), promises of transparency (Vujnovic and Kruckeberg, 2016; Wehmeier and Raaz, 2012), or the involvement of independent experts (Hovland et al., 1953; Pornpitakpan, 2004). But what happens if even these strategies are unable to dissolve the stalemate in a strategic communication situation? To date, it has not been possible to find any answer to this question.

Game theory and play theory

There are numerous different theoretical approaches to game and play. This is due first and foremost to the many different understandings of the terms ‘game’ and ‘play’. This variety was made clear by Caillois (1961) more than 50 years ago in his cultural sociological description, in which he systematized the various kinds of game and play according to the basic categories competition (agon), chance (alea), simulation (mimicry) and vertigo (ilinx). The clarity and systematisation of the terms is compounded further by the fact that the use of the terms play and game is not always clear and selective. ‘Play’ is generally used to describe an activity for pleasure, while ‘games’ are understood to be play with rules.

To date, the most prominent theoretical approach to game and play has been mathematical economic game theory. The central goal of game theory is to identify an optimum strategy. The main assumptions of this approach, developed in the United States in the 1940s, by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1972 [1944]) among others, are that players make conscious decisions and at the same time assume that the other players also make conscious decisions. The decision-making behaviour of a player thus depends on his expectations regarding the decisions of the other players. Players behave rationally, pursue specific goals and select the means that they think are particularly conducive to the attainment of their goals. Game theory is thus a theory on the social interaction of rational players (Fligstein, 2001). Just how unsuitable the mathematical economic game theory is for the question explored in this article is especially clear when we consider that the beginning of play described herein is influenced less by the search for an optimum solution and more by a certain helplessness.

Therefore, for the purposes of this article, the play perspective appears more promising. However, the term ‘play’ suffers from being enormously vague. Indeed, sometimes, a definition is unconsciously (e.g. Crozier and Friedberg, 1980) or consciously (e.g. Wittgenstein, 2010) dispensed with altogether. Therefore, in the following, a theoretical framework for play will first be developed based on Bateson and Goffman.

Theoretical framework

Understanding play theory

Since the 1950s, Bateson (1956, 2000 [1972]) has been developing a theoretical approach for play, as distinct from game, which focuses on the paradox of play situations. This understanding was developed using the example of playing apes: ‘The playful nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be denoted by the bite’ (Bateson, 2000: 180). The paradoxical character of messages in play thus makes playing an in-between (Gordon, 2008). Playing, on the one hand, expresses the societal order of which it forms a part. On the other hand, playing also expresses uncertainty or disorder (Sutton-Smith, 1975). This in-between character will later be explored in more detail in the context of play in strategic communication.

The understanding of play outlined above can be embedded in social theory terms with the aid of Goffman’s (1974) action theory frame analysis. In his frame analysis, Goffman (1974) first further develops Bateson’s framework concept and, second, directly links to Bateson’s understanding of play (p. 40). The starting point for his considerations is frames, by which he means the definitions applicable to events and personal involvement therein, pursuant to certain organisational principles. Such frames are constructs that help us to identify and understand situations and to find our bearings in such situations, since frames are linked with expectations of the participants. Since, as a rule, several frames are always applied simultaneously, the primary framework answers the question of which framework is currently to the fore: ‘What is it that’s going on here?’ (Goffman, 1974: 25). An example of a primary framework is an interview between a journalist and a press officer in which the respective roles are unequivocally defined and allocated: the journalist assumes that, in his responses, the press officer will present himself, his organisation and the topics concerned in the most positive light possible. Meanwhile, the press officer assumes that the journalist will focus his questions on critical aspects. The more frequently journalists and press officers meet for such meetings, the clearer the definition of the expectations and, thus, the frame.

Goffman locates play on the level of ‘keys’, which can also be described as a secondary framework (Lauer and Handel, 1977). Keys are ‘a set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else’ (Goffman, 1974: 43–44). Play is an example of the key of make believe, which is an avowed, ostensible imitation or running through of less transformed activity, this being done with the knowledge that nothing practical will come of the doing (Goffman, 1974). Keyings are contingent, inter alia on the participants knowing and openly stating, that a systematic alteration is involved, one that will radically reconstitute what it is for them that is going on (Goffman, 1974).

To describe play, Goffman expands Bateson’s play theory considerations and develops rules or prerequisites for when serious, actual actions are to be transformed into something playful: these include, among other things, the execution of the play action in a manner that does not achieve its usual function, exaggerating the expansiveness of certain actions, the multitude of repetitions as well as any deviation from the sequence of actions:

The sequence of activity that serves as a pattern is neither followed faithfully nor completed fully, but is subject to starting and stopping, to redoing, to discontinuation for a brief period of time, and to mixing with sequences from other routines. (Goffman, 1974: 41–42)

In doing so, Goffman not only concretises Bateson’s play theory considerations, but embeds them in a larger social theoretical framework. Keyings and, thus, play, enable individuals to alter typical sequences of activity.

Therefore, Goffman’s frame analysis can be used to work out that the key play on the one hand has similarities to the primary framework, but on the other hand is a defined social situation. In addition, more specific issues of play in strategic communication situations can be categorised and explained among other things using the concepts of fabrication and misframing.

Strategic communication

Play in strategic communication is understood as a general concept encountered in widely varied situations. It is found in private situations and in strategic organisational communication.

Strategic organisational communication should be understood in the context of this article as ‘purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfil its mission’ (Hallahan et al., 2007: 3). It will be shown later that strategic communication play can be functional for strategic organisational communication, despite the fact it is only seldom mentioned in role expectations. Whether play occurs in a specific situation depends on several factors. On the one hand, formal rules and organisational culture influence the extent to which members are allowed room for manoeuvre in fulfilling their role. The room for manoeuvre to set a price is likely to be less for a cashier at the supermarket than for a used-car salesman; consequently, negotiation, which, at times is transformed into play, is hardly to be expected at the supermarket checkout. On the other hand, play in the defined understanding is not for everyone; thus, the individual character of the role player also influences whether or not play begins.

In addition, strategic communication play away from strategic organisational communication can also be observed in purely private contexts. Strategic communication in this context is to be understood as ‘any message that is intended to shape, reinforce, or change the responses of another, or others’ (Miller, 1980: 11) or, in accordance with Habermas, as a communicative act in which ‘the actor is supposed to choose and calculate means and ends from the standpoint of maximizing utility or expectations of utility’ (Habermas, 1984: 85).

The following considerations are in their general form intended to provide an appropriate description of strategic communication play in both contexts. Furthermore, a distinction must be made based on whether strategic communication situations take place in a direct interpersonal communication situation or in a communication situation via mass media.

Play in strategic communication as an ‘in-between’

In the following, the paradoxical understanding of play will be applied for strategic communication situations. To this end, a theoretical approach to strategic communication play will be developed. First, strategic communication play will be conceived of twofold as an in-between: in temporary terms as an in-between of the overarching strategic communication situation and, from a paradoxical perspective, as an in-between of description and non-description. Finally, in section ‘Functions of play in strategic communication’, the functions of play in strategic communications will be explained.

Play in strategic communications as an intermezzo of strategic communication

Play in strategic communications is understood here as an activity for pleasure – in the sense of playing. More specifically, play in strategic communication situations should be conceived of as everyday play (Table 1). In direct interpersonal communication situations, everyday play is characterised by unclear boundaries between non-play and play. Negotiations and seduction are examples. While the distance between play and non-play is greater in games with fixed rules and a formalised beginning, in everyday play, it is significantly smaller. Congratulations after losing a football game are presumably easier than after price negotiations considered to be a failure. In contrast to play with rules as ‘closed plays’ in everyday play, there are, at best, informal rules established over time, which change continuously – meaning everyday play is open play.

Table 1.

Everyday play.

Non-Play	Transition	Play	Transition	Non-Play
		• Everyday play
		• Unclear boundaries
		• Shorter distance from non-play
		• Open play
		• Examples: negotiation, seduction

As everyday play, play in strategic communications is embedded in strategic communication situations. In a strategic communication situation, the strategic communication play is, as a rule, an ‘intermezzo’. The strategic communication situation framing this play thus influences the strategic communication play: for this reason, it is more than just play; it is also strategic communication play. In other words: the primary framework of the strategic communication situation (e.g. negotiation) with its various roles is here transformed into a played strategic communication situation. However, the players retain their roles – even if these are transformed, but with the difference that, in strategic communication play, they merely pretend to be negotiation partners (Goffman, 1974). These similarities between strategic communication situations and strategic communication play mean that, often, it is not evident to outside parties that the negotiating partner has switched to play. In the case of strategic organisational communication, for instance, the result is that the negotiators do not fully surrender their roles and comply with role expectations in the role of the playing negotiator also.

Sometimes, however, the players themselves interpret the situation differently: while one already thinks they are playing, the other still assumes the negotiations are serious. This is not uncommon in keys: ‘In any case, brief switchings into playfulness are everywhere found in society, so much so that it is hard to become conscious of their widespread occurrence’ (Goffman, 1974: 49). Such problems are observed in particular during the transition phases between play and non-play. During this in-between period, extensive framework competence is required in order to prevent misframing.

Based on the foregoing, we can provide a definition of strategic communication play: In strategic communication play, both sides assume (a) the contingency and, thus, the capacity for instrumentalisation of arguments or indicators. Contingency is in this context defined as follows:

Something is contingent insofar as it is neither necessary nor impossible; it is just what it is (or was or will be), though it could also be otherwise. The concept thus describes something given (something experienced, expected, remembered, fantasized) in the light of its possibly being otherwise; it describes objects within the horizon of possible variations. (Luhmann, 1995: 106)

Furthermore, both sides proceed on the assumption that, (b) the other side assumes the same and (c) that both sides assume the same of the counterparty in each case. Presumptive assumptions and, thus, reflexive structures therefore influence play in strategic communications to a great degree. Since such constellations are also found in non-play, the commencement of play in strategic communications is contingent on the message ‘this is play’. It is only this message that transforms the serious interview situation into play, thereby establishing the paradoxical frame (Bateson, 2000). Like the majority of meta-communicative or metalinguistic messages, this, too, as a rule remains implicit. Therefore, in the transition from non-play to play for example, the messages of both players may become more and more evidently untrustworthy (Table 2). Nevertheless, in this transition to strategic communication play, there is a risk of failure that can furthermore be linked with escalation – the accusation of lack of credibility. This is because the message ‘this is play’ is in itself a playful act.

Table 2.

The transition from non-play to play in a strategic communication situation.

Non-play	Transition	Strategic communication play	Transition	Non-play
Possible starting point: dissent concerning the truth of a description or appropriateness of a price	The longer the duration, the greater the likelihood that the players are aware of the contingency, e.g. of indicators of trustworthiness or arguments. This ‘groping in the dark’ (Flusser, 1993: 20) is the prerequisite for strategic communication play	Both sides assume (a) the contingency and, thus, the instrumentalisation of arguments or indicators. Furthermore, they assume (b) that the other side assumes the same and (c) that both sides assume the same of the counterparty. This contingency or the non-binding nature of the situation – and, thus, the playful character – are as a rule implicitly dealt with or conveyed	The transition is characterised by the problem that, at some point, a decision has to be made	After the play, a decision, e.g. on the truthfulness of the description or price, is made. The development of the play influences, but does not determine this decision

The transient nature of play in strategic communication is further intensified by the fact that both players are aware that it will at some point be necessary to return to the primary framework: In strategic communication play, no decision is made – for that, it is necessary to return to the strategic communication situation. The development of the play influences, but does not dictate this decision.

Play in strategic communication as an in-between of reality and non-reality

In addition, play constitutes an in-between on the scale from a binding situation to pure fantasy. As a transformed strategic communication situation, play in strategic communications operates in the mode of

Make-believe: By this term I mean to refer to activity that participants treat as an avowed, ostensible imitation or running through of less transformed activity, this being done with the knowledge that nothing practical will come of the doing. (Goffman, 1974: 48)

Thus, in strategic communication play, participants act as if they were in a strategic communication situation. Such in-between situations are difficult to record and describe, which is probably why this has remained a peripheral topic in communication science to date. This is all the more surprising since it can be assumed that such situations, and thus strategic communication play, represent an increasingly widespread phenomenon.

Play operates at the boundary between reality and unreality and thus has a paradoxical nature: ‘These actions, in which we now engage, do not denote what would be denoted by those actions which these actions denote’ (Bateson, 2000: 180) (Figure 1). The special nature of play becomes clear when one identifies the distinctions between fighting and play fighting. In a real fight, biting represents aggression. In play fighting however, the message ‘this is play’ adds a second level, since the fight is merely imitated: pinching denotes a bite without actually being one. Thus, play combines the ‘light’ with the ‘serious’.

Figure 1.

The paradox of the understanding of play pursuant to Bateson (adapted from Neuberger, 1992).

Functions of play in strategic communication

What are the functions of play in strategic communication? In other words: which problems does it solve in strategic communication situations? Two main functions are identified, both of which share a common starting point: they begin with the ‘crisis of confidence’ (Flusser, 1993: 19) in strategic communication situations.

How does the crisis of confidence arise in strategic communication situations? Strategic communication is considered to be successful if the intended effect is observed, and is unsuccessful if the intended outcome is not observed. But what happens if the other side does not simply accept or reject the offer, the invitation, or the challenge, but instead begins a discussion? Arguments lead to counterarguments, which, in turn, are countered until at some point previous arguments are repeated. In this kind of situation, both the subjectivity and the contingency of the arguments, as well as the negotiating situation as a whole, become clear. The situation could be seen as a dead-end and brought to a close by abandoning discussions or conceding (‘to put an end to the drama’). Alternatively, the contingency of all the arguments can be acknowledged, thus allowing the focus to switch to the contingency of the current situation. The transition to play in strategic communication is thus linked with growing doubt and increasing helplessness. If the trustworthiness and, thus, the truthfulness of the statements, is called into question in the course of strategic communication, then this crisis of confidence is nothing more than doubting the possibilities for acknowledgement. Flusser (1993) describes this in a historical context:

In this description, a progressive loss of trust is observed first and foremost; an increasing ‘crisis of confidence’. On leaving the world that they specifically faced, human beings relied initially on their hands. They then checked the hands with the eyes. Then they didn’t believe their hands and checked with fingers and ears. Then they no longer trusted the fingers and ears and were left groping in the dark to find out anything at all. This ‘groping in the dark’ is referred to as ‘playing’. (pp. 19–20)

When someone no longer trusts his fingers and ears or levels allegations of falsification, within the definition of radical constructivism (Merten, 2004; Von Glasersfeld, 1995) an everyday realist is momentarily transformed into an everyday constructivist. In this situation, he questions his observations and becomes frozen in an extreme form of permanent reflection. Since there are always two diverging standpoints colliding in strategic communication situations, this increases the likelihood of insight into the contingency. After all, each side states its own arguments, questions and weakens the arguments of the counterparty, explains its own standpoint and points out the blind spots of the other perspective. In so doing, each strategic communication situation reveals the variety and contingency of society. Therefore, the more important strategic communication is in a society, the more prominent the ‘crisis of confidence’ will be (Flusser, 1993: 19). As a motor of contingency, strategic communication contributes to even everyday realists increasingly often becoming everyday constructivists for the moment (Table 3).

Table 3.

Everyday realists and everyday constructivists in non-strategic and strategic communication situations.

	Everyday realist	Everyday constructivist
Non-strategic communication	• Reality can be recognised	• Inaccessibility of ‘Reality’
Non-strategic communication	• Communication issues are attributable to incompetence, underhandedness, madness or similar (Krippendorf, 1993)	• Communication issues are an everyday occurrence and are solved by means of the common search for the definition of a situation, a term etc.
Strategic communication	• Self-descriptions can be reviewed directly	• The constructed desired realities (Merten, 2004) are contingent and cannot be reviewed
Strategic communication	• Possible results: (a) believe it; (b) accusation of lies	• Possible consequence: beginning of a strategic communication play

What is the purpose of strategic communication situations if both players ‘lose their footing’ because they no longer know what they can, or should, believe? In principle, negotiations and interviews could end here – and probably will in some situations. If not, there is much that speaks in support of players commencing strategic communication play, which helps to solve two problems in this situation.

Two functions to be explained are performed by play in both strategic communication and negotiations concerning the price of a CD at the flea market, as well as in peace talks. While the consequences of failure may be entirely different, both negotiating situations can involve a crisis of confidence and, thus, may result in the abandonment of the situation. In this context, commencing strategic communication play can, in addition to the functions to be performed, make a fundamental contribution to the situation not being abandoned; it can help bridge those ‘critical phases’ and ‘breaks up’ the existing framework.

Expanding the sphere of possibilities

The first effect of play in strategic communication consists in a considerable expansion of the sphere of possibilities (Figure 2). If, in a strategic communication situation, all arguments have been stated and discussed, strategic communication play can contribute entirely new arguments and strategies. Play, on the one hand, expresses the organisation of society of which it is a part, but on the other hand expresses disorganisation or uncertainty (Henricks, 2015; Sutton-Smith, 1975). Thus, play expands the sphere of possibilities of a defined social situation that is considered to be inflexible – at the price of its non-binding nature. This is the origin of Sutton-Smith’s (1975, 2001) function of play: play reveals a wide variety of responses initially only with potential value. Play thus provides an opportunity to contribute something new to a social situation. As such, the strategic communication play approach contributes to the theory of evolution of strategic communication.

Figure 2.

The expansion of the sphere of possibility through play.

This applies to a particular degree in respect of play in strategic communications that takes place as a non-public interaction. Within a relatively protected space, and largely without risk, both sides can contribute and test out new arguments, descriptive techniques and so on. If the technique proves successful within the play situation – similar to a playful attack in ape play – it can be tested under ‘real conditions’ in future strategic communication situations. Play and, thus, strategic communication play, therefore has the character of a testing laboratory.

Despite its non-binding nature, the embedding of strategic communication play in a serious strategic communication situation characterises the serious side of the play: even in this playful communication situation, each party wants to win – with the difference that losing results ‘only’ in loss of face and not, for example, the payment of a higher price. Such reference to the real world in particular is what renders the play not purely fantasy.

Increasing trustworthiness and likeability

In strategic communication situations as a primary framework, deception is not as a matter of course assumed, but is at the least considered possible. Every form of strategic communication must tackle this problem of lack of trustworthiness, an accusation that can also result in the crisis of confidence.

If strategic communication is ‘played’ in strategic communication plays, the players ‘are’ no longer purchaser and seller, they are now playing the role of purchaser and seller. Playing allows them to distance themselves from their original roles. Goffman (1961) understands this role distance as an expressed pointed separateness between the individual and his putative role or, as the case may be, actions, which effectively convey some disdainful detachment of the performer from a role he is performing. Thus, in performing his role, a player has the possibility to express that he, as a person, does not wish to be identified with the role he is playing. The seller could say that he does not personally care whether the customer purchases the product. The consequences of role distance can be greater trustworthiness and likeability. From this perspective, play in strategic communication can be consciously initiated to strengthen one’s own trustworthiness in order to then profit from that in the strategic communication situation.

Play in public and mass media strategic communications

To date, strategic communication play has, as a rule, been described using the example of direct interpersonal communication situations (face-to-face). These face-to-face situations can be found both in the private context and in the context of strategic organisational communication. For instance, a background meeting between a press officer and a journalist could at times take place in terms of strategic communication play, if both sides mutually assume that arguments or indications of trustworthiness can be instrumentalised. There are considerably more assumptions involved in the commencement of strategic communication play in interpersonal communication situations transmitted by media such as e-mail or telephone, because facial expression, for example, is not available to indicate ‘this is play’. Even more difficult are strategic communication plays in mass media communication situations such as, for example, advertising, in which feedback options are as a rule available only with a significant time delay. Thus, by tendency, the more indirect the communication situation, the more explicitly the message ‘this is play’ needs to be communicated, in order to reduce the risk of misframing.

The special features of play in public and mass media strategic communications will be highlighted below using the example of press conferences, self-referencing advertising and TV debates.

Press conferences

Press conferences, as the interaction between journalists and press officers, represent a direct interpersonal and simultaneously public communication situation. Such press conferences can, for various reasons, be transformed into communication play. In the course of press conferences in PR crises – similar to the introductory example – journalists may increasingly question their ability to even be able to separate the truth from the lies. The press conference can then be transformed into a strategic communication play. Whether there will in fact be strategic communication play also depends on the journalist’s basic opinion of PR. A minority of journalists have a “love/hate” relationship with PR or view it as a ‘necessary evil’ (Sallot and Johnson, 2006: 154) and, as a result, question the trustworthiness of PR statements (Aronoff, 1975).

However, press conferences in routine situations may be transformed into strategic communication play for another reason. Baisnée (2002) uses the example of Press Corps in Brussels to describe the way that press conferences can be social rituals, during which no journalist still seriously expects to obtain relevant news. This transforms the strategic communication situation of a press conference at which European Union (EU) press officers attempt to convince journalists into a press conference that is merely played. Its function is then to strengthen the allegiance to the group.

In both situations, strategic communication play demonstrates how ritualised the relationships between PR and journalists are. Experienced journalists know the techniques and arguments of PR, while experienced press spokespersons know the strategies employed by journalists – and both sides assume that knowledge on the part of the respective other party. The further professionalisation of journalism and PR thus leads not only to more complicated practices, but also to each side getting to know the other better and better. As a result, a crisis of confidence is reached considerably sooner.

Self-referencing advertising

While both advertising and media relations face the issue of lack of trustworthiness, advertising has an advantage: ‘Everybody is assumed to know that advertising does not and cannot lie, because everybody knows that ads are biased, one-sided and prejudiced in favour of the items advertised for’ (Schmidt, 2007: 50). Thus, advertising has often established a more open handling of hyperbole. When advertisements attempt to seduce the public, they can conceal the disadvantages because the ‘intentional blindness’ is collective knowledge among both advertisers and their target public.

But what is the position when advertising appears not as a ‘hidden persuader’ (Packard, 1957), but – quite the contrary – focuses on its own intentions and, thus, its own contingency? While at first glance this kind of strategy may appear counter-productive, this form of self-reference is used frequently in advertising. Advertising then focuses on itself in an ironic or humorous way, thereby playing with the collective knowledge of the public (Schmidt, 2007). Self-reference in advertising can be seen as a strategy of dealing with the issue of trustworthiness in a self-mocking fashion (Williamson, 1984). The self-reference approach was used for many years in Germany by cigarette brand Lucky Strike, for instance. Their advertising imagery usually comprised nothing more than a pack of Lucky Strike together with a headline, which often referenced the topic of advertising: ‘Please do not stop or park in front of this poster – you will conceal important information’ or ‘Our advertising could be better, but not our cigarettes’. Another motif showed a washing machine instead of the pack of cigarettes, accompanied by the headline, ‘Advertising always gives the wrong impression!’

If self-referencing advertising focuses on the contingency of all arguments and of the advertising situation itself, then every message has a paradoxical character. The product benefits communicated through such advertising are claimed while simultaneously triggering scepticism. In turn, the product advantage is based on a product characteristic that is also simultaneously claimed and called into question (Figure 3). Self-referencing advertising is thus located in an area in between conventional and (for the most part) serious advertising and an area of complete disorder.

Figure 3.

Self-referencing advertising as a strategic communication play.

Thus, in self-referencing advertising, the advertising is merely played. Through this transformation, advertising distances itself from itself. The advantage of this rule distance is clear: by doing so, the advertising organisation attempts to gain sympathy – and can then, by way of a detour, attain strategic goals. At the same time, self-referencing advertising again begins from the point of the crisis of confidence, like strategic communication play in the traditional sense: since it is assumed that the public does not in any case believe everything the advertisers claim, those very assumptions can themselves be focussed on. The risk in the kind of advertising play described is misframing (Goffman, 1974) – namely that recipients do not understand the transformation and think that they are in a conventional advertising situation.

TV debates

Strategic communication plays are more likely and take place at an earlier stage the more frequently players experience comparable situations. Politicians, who not only know their own arguments inside out but also those of their political enemies, are in a similar position to journalists. In discussions, they are unlikely to seriously expect to be able to still convince their political opponent using known or unknown arguments. The more ritualistic such situations are, the more likely it is that strategic communication play will begin at an early stage.

What changes when these frequently rehearsed debates take place in front of an audience – for example, in Parliament or in a TV talk show? According to Goffman (1974), the situation can be conceptualised as a final transformation of a transformation. After a political debate has (at times) been transformed into a strategic communication play in the first step, a strategic communication play is transformed into a public performance of a strategic communication play that imitates political debate. To be blunt: politicians play plays. The public performance changes strategic communication play to the same extent as non-play. The ‘placing in the limelight’ of the individual and the arguments can be seen in similar ways in both instances. However, the players are at a disadvantage compared with the non-players: Politicians who run the situation as strategic communication play no longer believe in the ‘power of their arguments’. They should not, however, publicly show this, since it could damage their trustworthiness.

In contrast to a theatre audience, the modes of reception among the audience of TV talk shows are significantly more heterogeneous. In particular, a distinction can be drawn between a naive and an educated reception mode. A naive public believes in the power of the arguments and the trustworthiness indicators and assumes that the debating politicians see these similarly. An educated audience, meanwhile, assumes both the enactment and the play character.

Conclusion

This article was developed as a theoretical approach to play in strategic communication based on a paradoxical understanding of play and the frame analysis. In very basic terms, play in strategic communication means the situation does not have to be abandoned and can continue even in the event of a crisis of confidence. More specifically, two functions of strategic communication play were identified: the expansion of the sphere of possibility and greater attributions of sympathy and trustworthiness.

For strategic communication research, two aspects in particular are revealed. While philosophy has for many centuries been interested in the constructive character of human perception, thus far, the issue of which consequences arise for social interactions if players gain insight into the contingency of constructions of reality has been a largely forgotten subject. How does the crisis of confidence affect everyday situations in which everyday realists are transformed into everyday constructivists? The theory of play in strategic communications is preceded by an explanatory framework in which the crisis of confidence forms the starting point. There is strong evidence that there are increasingly large numbers of educated players: the crisis of confidence is no longer limited only to academic epistemological discussions, and has, after the broadsheets, now also filtered down into conversations in more informal settings. Last but not least, professional strategic communicators in PR and advertising have with their contradictory descriptions, contributed insight into contingent descriptions of reality becoming widespread today. The result is that the number of strategic communication plays is likely to increase significantly.

Strategic communication plays thus deal with an issue that has been largely neglected to date, which is also linked with the fact that the players only play their original role in strategic communication plays, without fully surrendering their actual role. Strategic communication research is not yet accustomed to this kind of perspective.

Thus, the theory of play in strategic communication leads to new questions in strategic communication research. In principle, the issue is the extent to which players mutually assume the contingency, and, thus whether, for example, indicators of trustworthiness can be instrumentalised, and imagine themselves to be in a play situation. In addition, there is the question of structures and processes in strategic communication plays. In public strategic communication plays, the question is the extent to which different audience views alter the behaviour of the players. It is obvious that strategic communication plays are a difficult topic for empirical social research. The effects on trustworthiness and likeability are fairly straightforward to investigate. Experiments could be combined with follow-up surveys concerning trustworthiness and likeability. Using observations, one could examine, in general terms, whether and how the primary framework, for example, a press conference, is transformed into strategic communication play. The greatest empirical issues are likely to be encountered when it comes to the issue of whether an expanded scope for action gives rise to new strategies or arguments.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author biography

Olaf Hoffjann is a professor in the Department of Media Management at Ostfalia University for Applied Sciences in Salzgitter, Germany. His research interests cover trust in public relations, reality of public relations and public affairs.

References

Aronoff

(1975) Credibility of public relations for journalists. Public Relations Review 1(2): 45–56.

Baisnée

(2002) Can political journalism exist at the EU level. In: Kuhn

Neveu

(eds) Political Journalism: New Challenges, New Practices. London: Routledge, pp.108–128.

Bateson

(1956) The message “this is play”. In: Schaffner

(ed.) Group Processes: Transactions of the Second Conference, October 9, 10, 11, and 12, 1955, Princeton, N. J. New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, pp.145–242.

Bateson

(2000 [1972]) Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Caillois

(1961) Man, Play, and Games. Urbana, IL; Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Crozier

Friedberg

(1980) Actors and Systems: The Politics of Collective Action. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Fengler

Ruß-Mohl

(2008) Journalists and the information-attention markets: Towards an economic theory of journalism. Journalism 9(6): 667–690.

Fengler

Ruß-Mohl

(2014) Unternehmenskommunikation und Journalismus: Ökonomische Analyse einer ungleichen Partnerschaft [Corporate communication and journalism: An economic analysis of an unequal partnership]. In: Zerfaß

Piwinger

(eds) Handbuch Unternehmenskommunikation [Handbook of corporate communication]. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, pp.233–252.

Fligstein

(2001) Social skill and the theory of fields. Sociological Theory 19(2): 105–125.

10.

Flusser

(1993) Lob der Oberflächlichkeit. Für eine Phänomenologie der Medien [In Praise of Superficiality. for a Phenomenology of the Media]. Mannheim: Bollmann.

11.

Goffman

(1961) Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction. Indianapolis, IN; New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

12.

Goffman

(1974) Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

13.

Gordon

(2008) What is play? In search of a universal definition. Play and Culture Studies 8: 1–21.

14.

Grunig

(1988) The effect of excellence in the management of public relations on the relationship of organizations with the mass media. Unpublished manuscript accompanying the presentation at the Herbert Quandt Foundation Conference, Philadelphia, PA.

15.

Habermas

(1984) The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

16.

Hallahan

Holtzhausen

van Ruler

et al (2007) Defining strategic communication. International Journal of Strategic Communication 1(1): 3–35.

17.

Henricks

(2015) Play as experience. American Journal of Play 7(3): 18–49.

18.

Hovland

Janis

Kelley

(1953) Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change. New Haven, CT: Greenwood Press Reprint.

19.

Johnson

Eberle

Henricks

et al (2015) The Handbook of the Study of Play, vol. 2. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

20.

Krippendorf

(1993) Major metaphors of communication and some constructivist reflections on their use. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 2(1): 3–25.

21.

Langer

Thorup

(2006) Building trust in times of crisis: Storytelling and change communication in an airline company. Corporate Communications: An International Journal 11(4): 371–390.

22.

Lauer

Handel

(1977) Social Psychology: The Theory and Application of Symbolic Interactionism. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

23.

Luhmann

(1995) Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

24.

Luhmann

(2000) The Reality of the Mass Media. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

25.

Lynch

(2015) More play, please: The perspective of kindergarten teachers on play in the classroom. American Journal of Play 7(3): 347–370.

26.

Merten

(2004) A constructivistic approach to public relations. In: van Ruler

Vercic

(eds) Public Relations and Communication Management in Europe. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp.45–54.

27.

Miller

(1980) On being persuaded: Some basic distinctions. In: Roloff

Miller

(eds) Persuasion: New Directions in Theory and Research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp.11–28.

28.

Møller

(2015) Imagination, playfulness, and creativity in children’s play with different toys. American Journal of Play 7(3): 322–346.

29.

Murphy

(1987) Using games as a model for crisis communication. Public Relations Review 13: 19–28.

30.

Murphy

(1989) Game theory as a paradigm for the public relations process. In: Botan

Hazleton

(eds) Public Relations Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp.173–192.

31.

Murphy

(1991) The limits of symmetry: A game theory approach to symmetric and asymmetric public relations. Public Relations Research Annual 3: 115–131.

32.

Neuberger

(1992) Spiele in Organisationen, Organisationen als Spiele [Plays in organisations, organisations as plays]. In: Küpper

Ortmann

(eds) Mikropolitik. Rationalität, Macht und Spiele in Organisationen [Micropolitics. rationality, power and play in organisations]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp.53–86.

33.

Packard

(1957) The Hidden Persuaders. New York: Penguin Books; Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing.

34.

Pieczka

Wood

(2013) Action research and public relations: Dialogue, peer learning, and the issue of alcohol. Public Relations Inquiry 2(2): 161–181.

35.

Pornpitakpan

(2004) The persuasiveness of source credibility: A critical review of five decades’ evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 34(2): 243–281.

36.

Raessens

Goldstein

(2011) Handbook of Computer Game Studies. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

37.

Reiners

Wood

(2015) Gamification in Education and Business. Heidelberg: Springer.

38.

Sallot

Johnson

(2006) Investigating relationships between journalists and public relations practitioners: Working together to set, frame and build the public agenda, 1991–2004. Public Relations Review 32(2): 151–159.

39.

Schmidt

(2007) Modes of self-reference in advertising. In: Nöth

Bishara

(eds) Self-Reference in the Media. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp.47–60.

40.

Seiffert

Nothhaft

(2014) The missing media: The procedural rhetoric of computer games. Public Relations Review 41(2): 254–263.

41.

Sutton-Smith

(1975) Play as adaptive potentiation. Sportwissenschaft 5(2): 103–118.

42.

Sutton-Smith

(2001) The Ambiguity of Play. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

43.

Von Glasersfeld

(1995) Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning. London: Falmer Press.

44.

Von Neumann

Morgenstern

(1972 [1944]) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

45.

Vujnovic

Kruckeberg

(2016) Pitfalls and promises of transparency in the digital age. Public Relations Inquiry 5(2): 121–143.

46.

Wehmeier

Raaz

(2012) Transparency matters: The concept of organizational transparency in the academic discourse. Public Relations Inquiry 1(3): 337–366.

47.

Williamson

(1984) Decoding Advertisements. Ideology and Meaning in Advertising. London: Marion Boyars.

48.

Wittgenstein

(2010) Philosophical Investigations. New York: John Wiley & Sons.