Scapegoating in media coverage: Analysing blame-giving rituals in the public sphere

Abstract

This article explores scapegoating in media coverage by analysing news reports on three former CEOs of large German corporations (Deutsche Börse, Deutsche Bank, and Deutsche Bahn) during crisis situations. Scapegoating is defined as a social mechanism including its linguistic construction as an archetypal narrative. The scapegoat role for each CEO was analysed by using content analysis of business news reports (n = 864) from eight print newspapers and one online paper. A new methodology was developed based on a combination of the Linguistic Category System proposed by Semin and Fiedler and the rhetorical approach of Narrative Theme Analysis formulated by Boje. In addition, eight semi-structured expert interviews were conducted with Hartmut Mehdorn (former CEO of Deutsche Bahn), two communication directors, and five business journalists. The results revealed differences in attribution of the so-called ‘sacrificial marks’ or ‘stigmata’ related to a CEO’s group affiliation and personality. A scapegoat index value S is presented as the measurand to capture the scapegoat role of a person in media texts. The limitations of the study are linked to the small number (three) of case studies and the new methodology that needs further testing.

Keywords

Business journalism CEO communication scapegoating

Introduction

There are ancient rituals of blame-giving that exist in almost every culture influencing our perception of public figures. The scapegoat ritual is based on a biblical one in which a goat laden with the sins of the community was chased away into the wilderness (Girard, 1989; Perera, 1986; Pillari, 1991). The symbolic projection of evil from one individual or group to another still exists in various contexts in the form of magical thinking (Allport, 1958, 1979; Lévi-Strauss, 1983). However, scapegoating is a rather unconscious dynamic process that we mostly believe to be happening somewhere else, in the shadows of the past or in dark predictions of the future. The scapegoat is hard to recognize in our communities or in ourselves, but we will most likely see the personification of evil in others (Arendt, 2010; Girard, 1979, 1989; Ricoeur, 1986).

Today, we figure that scapegoating is diminished by pluralistic democracy, which assures that every voice has worth to be heard. The ideal that no human being or minority group should be alienated is a core value of Western societies derived from the ideals of enlightenment (Habermas, 1991; Kant and Banham, 2008). However, just because the projection of evil is condemned by society, it does not mean that the phenomenon does not exist anymore. This is the underlying research thesis: Scapegoat rituals still exist in modern societies. In fact, ancient rituals influence our perception of contemporary communication processes. Although we might not see real scapegoats in our own group contexts, we instinctively recognize the narrative behind discrimination.

In these times of neo-liberal economy and global conflict, powerful social actors, such as politicians and corporate leaders, symbolize societal hopes and fears. In particular, CEOs are often viewed as something that goes beyond their functional roles. They become the projections of people’s expectations from the business or political system. In other words, their actual tasks as CEOs become less important than their status as the substitute for a greater problem or issue. In this perspective, CEOs become protagonists of public narratives that shape our perception of how industries work and what they stand for in the public sphere. This paper aims to provide insights into the media coverage of CEOs. The analysis of the scapegoat-mechanism was applied to the media coverage of three former German CEOs and their corporations. The research question – ‘How does the scapegoat narrative manifest itself in media coverage on CEOs of German corporations?’ –implies a narrative approach (Fisher, 1989; Heath and Millar, 2004a, 2004b) from a structuralist perspective (Lévi-Strauss, 1955, 1983; Turner et al., 1995) referring to the central elements of the scapegoat ritual in the context of business journalism.

Theory

Allport (1979) refers to the belief of symbolic transfer of guilt as a universal phenomenon (p. 5). Approaches from philosophical linguistics (Burke, 1969; Carter, 1996) and cultural anthropology (Frazer, 2009; Girard, 1989; Lévy-Bruhl, 2012) confirm the presence of the scapegoat as a social mechanism (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996; Mayntz, 2004) in almost every group context throughout time. The scapegoat basically encompasses the struggle for survival in social groups (Colman, 1995; Douglas, 1995; Gemmill, 1989). The process of the attribution of symbolic responsibility is still relevant today (Daniel, 1998: 7–8; Weick, 1988). In his “History of blaming other people” Campbell (2011) is referring to many groups and individuals who incorporate the role of the scapegoat in today’s societies: the opposite sex, foreigners, people of different religious beliefs but also football managers, politicians or bankers. Social actors of the economic system provide a surface onto which to project collective hopes and fears. This article will shed some light on the rhetorics in German business journalism, a field that is usually based on financial performance and facts instead of personal stories of blame-giving. The analysis is based on the following interdisciplinary view on the theory of scapegoating.

Scapegoat will be defined here as a social mechanism including its linguistic construction as an archetypal narrative. It is a communicative problem-solving process in which an actor A projects his or her own ambivalent conditions Z onto a passive actor B. The actual responsibility of actor B for Z is less relevant than his or her specific characteristics of victim selection, the so-called sacrificial marks. This definition not only includes the basics of the process of scapegoating, but its representation as an archetypal narrative as well. The motive of repulsion and the process of projection are subsumed under the term ‘problem-solving’.

Sacrificial marks or stigmata (Devine, 1989; Goffman, 1986; Katz, 1979) can be described as important indicators for scapegoat analysis. Recapitulating the scapegoat selection process, one can differentiate between four major groups of sacrificial marks: (1) culturally independent archaic or archetypal figures (e.g. the devil, evil, etc.); (2) time- and culture-dependent stereotypes, prejudices, and characteristics of the collective memory (e.g. the foreigner, the stranger, etc.); (3) norms of social behaviour (e.g. the greedy, the envious, etc.); and (4) individual character traits or personality (e.g. the angry guy, the narcissist, etc.).

The motivation behind the scapegoat mechanism can be a consciously executed hostility or an unconscious psychological conflict. The process of symbolic projection has short-term stabilizing effects, which could be seen as the main functional aspect of scapegoating in any context. At first, the self-confidence of groups or individuals can be enhanced through the symbolic punishment of a culprit. However, the results from studies in social psychology and organizational sociology show that these short-term effects of appeasement do not solve the structural problems in the group context (Bonazzi, 1983; Daniel, 1998; Gollwitzer, 2004; Pillari, 1991; Scheidlinger, 1982). Hence, the consequence of the scapegoat phenomenon is a series of effects of relief that hinder acknowledgement of the actual problems. Scapegoating is a form of avoidance behaviour led by the ‘fundamental attribution error’, which means people’s tendency to attribute negative outcomes to personal or internal factors rather than to external circumstances (Kelley, 1973; Ross, 1977; Weiner et al., 1988).

Referring to the scapegoat phenomenon in the context of the public sphere, we instantly think of the public as a collective consciousness and as a tribunal for critical issues and incidents (Lamp, 2009: 77). According to Bentele and Nothhaft (2010), the notion of public sphere can be defined as a complex ‘network of points of interest’ (p. 112). The concept of public opinion can be compared to a ‘corridor’ of unspoken norms in which the narratives compete for attention (Bentele, 2008). The attention of various audiences shaping the abstract public reminds the individual of being watched and judged. There are unspoken norms that manifest themselves through the isolation of perceived minorities for breaking ‘the rules’ (Lamp, 2009: 79–81; Noelle-Neumann, 1993).

According to Noelle-Neumann (1993) and other researchers following her approach (Hallemann, 1990; Justl, 2009; Lamp, 2009), social sciences have traditionally avoided a discussion on what she called ‘our social skin’, the fact that we fear being isolated by perceived public opinion. In accordance with the pioneer of analytical psychology, C. G. Jung, the scapegoat is a visible metaphor of the archetype of the shadow that is the fear of acknowledging the evil side of human nature and the dependence of the individual from group contexts (Jung, 1981). Famously published studies and experiments on bullying and other forms of discrimination have verified the fact that in certain group contexts, punishment is something that people not only engage in frequently, but they even enjoy (watching) it, especially in anonymous situations (De Quervain et al., 2004; Milgram, 2009; Zimbardo, 2008). This corresponds to the results derived from studies analysing group cohesion processes (Asch, 1963; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Tajfel and Billig, 1974).

By viewing the public sphere as a rather anonymous network of group cohesion, we can distinguish three different clusters of news factors (Staab, 1990) that influence blame-giving dynamics. According to Schulz (1982), the three dimensions of news factors are closely linked to scapegoating: (1) status (élite person, power and sensation); (2) identification (personalization); and (3) valence (conflict and damage). In the public sphere, scapegoats tend to be personalized in media coverage that somehow fosters negativity. Thus, scapegoating in media coverage is a very promising narrative because three different aspects of news factors help to tell the story of the black sheep by incorporating sacrificial marks. Since the essential structure of the scapegoat narrative corresponds to an ancient ritual and therefore to an archetypal story, it has also become a central reference point in our collective memory (Assmann, 2011; Jacobi, 2008) Whereas archaic societies were consciously built on rituals of sacrifice in order to substantiate their collective identity, contemporary societies are built on enlightenment and the avoidance of the persecution of minorities (Schwager, 2000). However, our collective ritual heritage still influences our way of making sense of ambiguous situations and crises. Rituals have been transformed into myths that strongly shaped our way of telling stories (Daniel, 1998: p. 6). In times of increasing uncertainty, social acceleration (Rosa, 2013) and flexible structures (Sennett, 2000), ancient ritual stories are reliable anchors that everybody can relate to. According to the rhetorical approach proposed by Heath (2004: 183), the transformation of sense is always bound to the attribution of responsibility. To sum up, the scapegoat narrative in the public sphere can be viewed as the substitute of an archetypal ritual in our collective memory trying to make sense of uncertain situations involving stigmatizing groups or individuals.

Methods

The research question of ‘How does the scapegoat narrative manifest itself in media coverage on CEOs of German corporations?’ was addressed by conducting a content analysis (Frueh, 2011) and semi-structured expert interviews. The content analysis followed in the lines of the structural study of mythology by Lévi-Strauss (1955, 1983). He viewed rituals as early forms of myths that turned into societal narratives. Media coverage, in this case the texts written by business journalists, might still show structural elements of the scapegoat ritual that can be analysed by using case study research (Yin, 2009). This structuralist procedure implies a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which allows the researcher to track specific aspects of scapegoating and systemize them into categories.

Three CEOs were selected as possible scapegoat case studies: Werner Seifert (CEO of Deutsche Börse AG from 1993 to 2005), Josef Ackermann (CEO of Deutsche Bank AG from 2002 to 2012), and Hartmut Mehdorn (CEO of the German railway company Deutsche Bahn from 1999 to 2009). All the three corporations are associated with special expectations concerning citizenship. In fact, these three large and traditionally renowned corporations in Germany have become objects of collective memory (Assmann, 2011). By selecting the cases based on their commonality of representing national crises of the economic system in Germany the researcher made sure that the narratives analysed were not only based on personal stories. The intention of the study was not to analyse personal tragedies in tabloids but to describe how public actors could stand for larger societal concerns. For each case study, the selected sample covered a crisis situation linked to the CEO. For better understanding the crisis context, the plots of the three CEO crises will be summarized.

In 2005, Deutsche Börse CEO Seifert had to resign because of public pressure by a hedge fund named The Children’s Investment Fund (TCI) and its CEO Christopher Hohn. The hedge fund corporation requested the management not to engage in an acquisition of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The public debate on the power of minority shareholders and the role of hedge funds in the German stock market were the key issues in this CEO crisis. The period of investigation encompasses the media coverage before and after Seifert’s resignation (1 January 2005 to 30 June 2005).

From 2004 to 2006, Ackermann, the CEO of Deutsche Bank, went through a court trial. In his function as a member of the supervisory board of Mannesmann, a former large German corporation in the telecom sector, he had supervised the acquisition of the corporation by Vodafone. He allegedly approved high bonus payments to the former managers. During one of the biggest trials in German economic history, Ackermann became infamous for the ‘V-for-victory’ sign he made in front of the cameras at the beginning of the trial in January 2004. The court dismissed the case after an agreement on payments. Ackermann again became an object of news when he announced the cutting down of 6400 jobs even while presenting record profits during the annual general meeting of Deutsche Bank in 2006. The period of investigation covers the whole legal proceedings from 1 January 2004 till 31 December 2006.

The third case study is about Hartmut Mehdorn, the former CEO of Deutsche Bahn. In 2009, news reports hinted at an abuse of personal data at the German railway company. Mehdorn denied having any knowledge of spying on more than 1000 employees. However, he had to resign ultimately because of public pressure. The period of investigation includes the timeframe from the days of the first reports about the scandal till Mehdorn’s resignation and the post-reporting phase (1 January 2009 till 15 May 2009).

On the whole, 864 press articles¹ were analysed. The sample comprised two daily newspapers (Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), one daily tabloid newspaper (BILD), two weekly newspapers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung and Die ZEIT), three news magazines (Der Spiegel, Stern and Focus), and an online news portal (Spiegel Online). The criteria of sample selection were the numbers of circulation (e. g. BILD) and a balance of different political spectra and publishing companies represented (e. g. FAZ as a conservative newspaper, SZ as a rather liberal newspaper) in order to represent a pluralistic view on published opinion. The sample includes Germany’s so-called “prestige media” which still shape the agenda setting process within the public sphere (Kepplinger et al., 2012). The importance of online news reports is taken into account by including the German online news portal “Spiegel Online”.

According to the three different periods of investigation, the number of articles varied between the case studies (n_WS=179; n_JA=527; n_HM=158).² Each article was analysed on the basis of 23 variables in six categories: The coding process started with the categories of (1) formalities–item number, publication date, name of the medium and the positioning of the article (page number), the formalised source, the journalistic presentation form and the size of the article³. Subsequently, the (2) top four topics of the article and the event behind the reports were coded. The frequency of references to the CEO’s name in headlines and/or figure captions in an article was measured as the indicator for the category of (3) personalization. The categories for (4) crisis framing encompassed the crisis history of the CEO, the crisis history of the organisation, the perceived crisis type and the perceived crisis response strategy of the organisation (Coombs, 1995, 2006). After the (5) narrative analysis the (6) evaluation of the tonality of the whole article was categorized based on a five-point-scale (1=negative, 2=slightly negative, 3=neutral, 4=slightly positive, 5=positive). All articles were coded by the researcher herself. For 10% of the material of the three case studies an intra-coder-reliability test was conducted measuring the Holsti-Index for all categories (>.87). The narrative analysis comprises the major part of the study by visualizing the structural elements of the scapegoat narrative. For better understanding the methodology of this coding complex the two methods involved will be explained in detail.

The Linguistic Category System (LCS) proposed by Semin and Fiedler (1988) and adapted by Schoenmakers (2007) is a method for tracking personal attributions and characterizations. In news reports written by business journalists, CEOs usually stand for their functional roles as decision makers. However, according to the theory of personal sacrificial marks or stigmata (Goffman, 1986; Katz, 1979), they mostly refer to the perceived aspects of personality or group affiliations rather than to the actual functional roles. Thus, for identifying the scapegoat potential of the three CEOs under consideration, all the adjectives and nouns were coded and categorized into three different categories: (1) the perceived functional role of the CEO acting on behalf of the organization, (2) the CEO’s perceived group affiliation in any social context, and (3) the CEO’s perceived personality.

For further analysis, the words were clustered into five groups in combination with the evaluation of their tonality in the text (negative, ambivalent, neutral or positive): (1) place/matter, (2) action, (3) functional position, (4) personality or interaction type, and (5) long-term conditions or circumstances. The adjectives and nouns that described a negative or ambivalent evaluation of group membership or personality trait that referred to typical interactions or basic character traits as well as long-term conditions were considered as direct indicators for scapegoat coverage about the individual CEOs. By analysing the relative frequency of the adjectives and nouns that fitted into these specific categories of negative or ambivalent evaluation, the researcher was able to calculate a scapegoat index value S.

The second method used for the narrative analysis of the journalistic texts was the concept of Narrative Theme Analysis (NTA) formulated by Boje (2001). Narrative themes (NT) are symbolic long-term frames or figurative language referring to larger rhetorical metaphors in the texts. This semantic analysis allowed the researcher to conceptualize major narrative images behind the media coverage of public figures (Ball, 2001). These metaphors or frames were again categorized into the four groups of sacrificial marks: Archetypal figures, stereotypes, social behaviour, and personality for which word groups or headlines were found in order to describe the narrative. Not every description of a public person can be considered as a narrative theme for a text. The main focus of this part of the content analysis was to find general schemes and narratives that show the character of an individual within a larger story frame and to name those narratives, e.g. “good versus evil”.

In addition to the content analysis, eight semi-structured expert interviews were conducted. The leading RQ was: ‘How do the interviewees describe the phenomenon of scapegoating in media coverage in general and in reference to the respective case studies?’. The purpose of this method was to gain more insights into the narratives behind the case studies from an expert’s perspective. All interviews were structured by three different categories of leading questions: (1) How do the interviewees describe the phenomenon of scapegoating within the public sphere? (2) How does scapegoating influence the daily work routine of journalists, communication directors and CEOs? and (3) How do the interviewees evaluate the case studies they were selected for? After recording and transcribing the interviews the texts were analysed referring to the leading questions. The former CEO of Deutsche Bahn, Hartmut Mehdorn, gave a personal face-to-face interview. Moreover, two communication directors who had worked with one of the three CEOs and five business journalists who had published reports during the crises were also interviewed. Three journalists were selected for the Ackermann case study. For the Seifert and the Mehdorn cases, the researcher interviewed one communication director and one journalist each.⁴

Results and discussion

Description of the material, personalization and crisis communication

The results revealed that the media coverage on Ackermann comprised not only the highest number of articles (n_WS=179; n_JA=527; n_HM=158) but the average size of the articles in the Ackermann case study was larger in comparison to those in the other two case studies (up to 50% of a page in an A₄ format). However, articles concerning the Mehdorn crisis were published more frequently on the first two pages of print newspapers, which indicated the importance of this particular CEO crisis as a topic in the overall news agenda. In all three cases, the number of articles that directly addressed the person of the CEO as the main topic of the report was rather high (Seifert: 36.3%, n=65, Ackermann: 34.2%, n=180, Mehdorn: 58.2%, n=92). In 52.5 percent of the articles (n=83), Mehdorn’s name was mentioned in the headlines or figure captions. Ackermann’s percentage of explicitly personalized articles comprised more than one-third (35.9%, n=189) of the material. The least personalized coverage was found for the Seifert case (21.8%, n=39). After this short analysis of formalities such as the size of the articles and tendency for personalization, a difference between the Seifert case and the two other CEO crisis cases became apparent. Ackermann and Mehdorn were more frequently mentioned and more prominently reported about than Seifert.

Furthermore, the crisis contexts of the three cases were analysed. Accordingly, the perceived crisis history and the perceived crisis type of the respective corporations and CEOs were coded in detail. Especially, the crisis history of the German railway company, Deutsche Bahn, was mentioned rather often (27.8% of articles, n=44). However, all the three CEOs were presented as active protagonists of the crises rather than victims of their corporation’s crisis history. In all, 33.5 percent of the articles (n=53) mentioned Mehdorn’s personal involvement in past crisis situations. Ackermann and Mehdorn were both described as active actors in permanent public conflicts in the past. In all, 32.6 percent of the articles (n=172) referred to a personal crisis history of Ackermann, whereas only 8.2 percent (n=43) mentioned a crisis history of the Deutsche Bank. Seifert’s crisis history was mentioned in 12.3 percent of the articles (n=22). His corporation, Deutsche Börse, was only mentioned in 3.9 percent of the descriptions of past crises (n=7). The results indicated that especially Ackermann and Mehdorn took the blame for past crisis situations in their corporations, which consequently implied a long-term attribution of responsibility and therefore a possible scapegoat role.

Another important difference between the three case studies was offered by the analysis of the perceived crisis types (Coombs, 1995, 2006). While Ackermann and Mehdorn were mostly framed as active protagonists in a preventable crisis type, the Seifert case was perceived as an accidental or even victim crisis⁵. These results once more suggest an important difference between the Seifert case and the two others: Seifert faced a rather low attribution of crisis responsibility in media coverage. Therefore, a symbolic blame-giving process or scapegoat role may not be applicable to him as a person. Ackermann and Mehdorn, however, were viewed as being responsible for their respective corporation’s disadvantageous situations in the past as well as in the present, and thus fitted into the possible attribution of the scapegoat role through sacrificial marks.

Lexical analysis: LCS and scapegoat index

The relative frequency of scapegoat attributions was measured by the LCS methodology described above. The percentage of the scapegoat potential for the three CEOs varied. Figure 1 shows the results for all the adjectives and nouns coded by the LCS – regardless of their evaluation or tonality.

Figure 1.

Categories of the LCS (total number of words coded: n_WS = 481, n_JA = 2260, n_HM = 451, n_CH = 463).

Figure 1 shows the differences in the media coverage about the three (or four, with the CEO of TCI, Hohn) analysed CEOs. All three were reported foremost for their actual functional roles. However, in more than one third of the coverage, Ackermann represented societal groups. Mehdorn’s personality was seen to be more important in comparison to the other case studies. Since Seifert was mostly characterized in his functional role as the CEO, he was not likely to be seen as a scapegoat in media coverage. However, since the story behind the crisis situation was a power struggle with another CEO, the researcher also coded all the adjectives and nouns of Seifert’s ‘opponent’, Christopher Hohn. In all, 63.5 percent of all the adjectives and nouns written about Hohn framed him as a group member (i.e. hedge funds, the locusts, the foreigners, etc.). In fact, the coverage focused on Hohn fulfilling his functional role as the CEO only encompassed 30.2 percent (n=140) of all the words coded by using the LCS methodology (n_CH=463). This could be a typical structure of the scapegoat story: In leadership disputes between two important public figures, it is more likely to have an overall framing of only one culprit. Assuming that the number of possible sacrificial marks coded is a crucial factor for scapegoat potential, there are clear implications that Seifert’s scapegoat potential was only marginal. On the contrary, Ackermann and Hohn had the highest scapegoat-potential because of their perceived group affiliations. In almost 20 percent (n=90) of the words coded in the LCS (n_HM=451), Mehdorn is characterized for his personality traits. His scapegoat potential is moderate, but it needs to be considered in the context of his perceived character traits.

The scapegoat potential does not correspond to the actual negative or ambivalent tonality in the analysed articles. By considering the additional categories of evaluation and selected word groups (typical interactions or character traits and long-term conditions), the actual scapegoat index can be measured. The scapegoat index value S⁶ of Seifert is rather low (S_WS = .129). In contrast, more than 40 percent of all the coded adjectives and nouns show Hohn as a possible scapegoat (S_CH = .406). In every third article, Ackermann is characterized with negative or ambivalent attributions, indicating a scapegoat role (S_JA = .315). The scapegoat index value of Mehdorn is higher than that of Seifert, but lower than that of Ackermann (S_HM = .213). Figure 2 shows all the results with the corresponding number of adjectives and nouns coded for the scapegoat categories in relation to the total number of all the words coded using the LCS methodology.

Figure 2.

Scapegoat index value S (total number of words coded: n_WS = 481, n_JA = 2260, n_HM = 451, n_CH = 463).

In the following section, the coded adjectives and nouns (in quotation marks) help to reconstruct the scapegoat narrative or framing behind the published articles. The most frequent adjectives and nouns coded in the scapegoat categories for Hohn mostly implied negative group memberships: ‘the Anglo-Saxons’, ‘the locusts’, ‘the leader of the guerrilla rebellion’ of the dreaded ‘hedge fund managers’ who are seen as ‘mutineers’ in the context of the German economic system. Seifert, on the other hand, was viewed as a ‘captain’ defending his sinking ‘empire’. He was described as someone belonging to the group of ‘bankers from Frankfurt’ who, notwithstanding their ‘arrogant’ character traits, stand for stability and long-term decisions compared to the ‘short-term-oriented’ hedge funds.

Ackermann, the CEO of Deutsche Bank, seems to belong to a number of groups that are disliked in published opinion: ‘the Suisse bankers’, ‘the bosses’, and ‘the top brass’. He was viewed as one of the most ‘powerful’ and ‘rich men’ in the country. However, this power became critical because his personality was brought into question, especially after the V-for-victory sign incident. Ackermann’s behaviour in front of the court was described as ‘disrespectful’, ‘cynical’, and most of all as ‘arrogant’. He was presented as a substitute for the growing gap between those down here and ‘those up there’.

The coded words in the scapegoat categories of the LCS comment differently on the polarizing personality of Mehdorn. Some journalists characterized him as a ‘culprit’, as someone who was incredibly ‘stubborn’ and ‘intransigent’. For others, it was precisely his stubbornness that made him ‘authentic’. Some journalists called him ‘Rumpelstiltskin’ and even ‘Lady Macbeth’. However, there is a group of coded words that separate this case study from the other two: Mehdorn was described as a ‘scapegoat’, ‘bogeyman’, or ‘buffer of the nation’. These words were coded as scapegoat categories, but they actually indicate an exposure of the scapegoat attribution and therefore a public defence of the CEO. The results of the narrative theme analysis (NTA) implied similar interpretations.

Semantic analysis: Narrative theme analysis (NTA) for scapegoat narratives

For every article, one dominant narrative theme (NT) encompassing an interpretation of the whole story presented in the article was coded. NTs were not found in every article. The researcher had to evaluate the overall figurative language or metaphors that referred to the crisis narrative. The NTs were coded and then clustered into the four groups of sacrificial marks: Archetypal figures, stereotypes, social behaviour, and personality.

For the Seifert case, NTs for the crisis were coded in 143 of the 179 articles (79.9%). The most frequent NT for the Seifert case study can be summarized as an archetypal narrative of a ‘battle for power’ (n=22) between him and the CEO of the hedge fund TCI, Hohn. Thus, in 22 out of the total 179 articles, the rhetorical image of the ‘power struggle’ was predominant. The second-largest group of NTs were stereotypes–‘the locust plague’, referring to the pejorative term for ‘hedge funds’ (n=14), followed by ‘the shareholders from Britain’ (n=11) and ‘the mutiny/the revolt’ (n=10). The five most important NTs all referred to Hohn. Seifert was described as the counterpart, and not as the active or evil opponent.

NTs were coded in 68.9% (n=363) of the analysed reports about Ackermann. By interpreting the NTs for the Ackermann case study, the symbolic blame-giving became obvious: Ackermann was described as a stereotype for ‘the typical manager’ (n=58) and as an ‘allegoric figure’ (n=48) for his ‘ruthless reforms’ (n=34) and the whole downfall of the economic system. His personality was viewed as a ‘successful’ (n=34) and very ‘powerful man’ (n=27). Ackermann seemed to function as a projection surface for ‘conspiracy theories’ (n=19). He was seen to have a large influence on the industry and politics. His arrogant behaviour was not only perceived as a personal character trait, but as an inherent attribute of the ‘arrogance of the mighty ones’ (n=25) as well.

For Mehdorn, 132 NTs were coded (83.5%). The most important NT was the ‘permanent crisis of the Deutsche Bahn’ (n=17). This relativized the crisis responsibility of the CEO because the corporation as a system was criticized as well. The main metaphoric image coded for 11 articles was his personality trait of ‘stubbornness’, but at the same time he was also described as a very ‘successful manager’ (n=9). His resignation was even framed as the ‘end of an era’ (n=8). Combining the results of the NTA with the LCS data, we see a clear correspondence between the exposure of the ‘buffer of the nation’ and the corporation as the supposed culprit behind the CEO.

Expert interviews: The context of the case studies

The first section of the semi-structured interviews was dedicated to the overall description of scapegoating in media coverage. The results revealed that there might be slightly different terms and words used in order to describe scapegoating, but the significance of the phenomenon of symbolic blame-giving in media coverage was confirmed by all the eight interviewees. Combining the personal definitions of scapegoating by the experts, three commonalities could be identified: Scapegoating is described as a combination of negative evaluation, personalization and scandalization transported via texts and images. Every expert was able to name at least two famous public figures in media coverage seemingly blamed for circumstances that they could not be responsible for as a person. Of course, this does not prove the existence of the phenomenon, but the relevance of the problem.

The interviewees indicated that some CEOs were more likely to become victims of public scapegoating than others. Important variables such as industry affiliation, corporate history, and size of the corporation influenced the probability of symbolic blame-giving. With regard to the Mehdorn case study, a permanent crisis or a change process in the industry seems to have enforced the attribution of crisis responsibility to the CEO. The experts mostly named branches or industries with a high potential of scapegoating that faced major external or internal changes. Moreover, the interviewees saw narcissistic and advice-resistant CEOs as being more likely to be exposed in public than others. Referring to the three case studies of Deutsche Börse, Deutsche Bank, and Deutsche Bahn, three of the interviewees implied that the public perceived these corporations differently because the national collective memory associated with the names of the companies was bound to very high expectations by the stakeholders. Furthermore, three experts described a special German culture of resignation.

The second section of the interview addressed the ethical dimensions and the ability of communication professionals to manage their CEO’s scapegoat potential. According to four of the experts, scapegoating is an increasing phenomenon in media coverage because of the downturn in the journalistic system and the battle for attention in public discourse. Corporations must react adequately to the growing societal need for personalization and identification. Taking into account all the mentioned variables that influence the process of CEO scapegoating, the communication directors as well as the journalists saw strong limitations in strategic CEO positioning. CEOs who incorporate many of the above-mentioned variables that predestine them to become public targets should better avoid being actively personalized by their corporations. Non-positioning would be a better alternative when the risk of scandalization is very high.

The third part of the interviews dealt with the case studies for which the experts were selected. The two experts selected for the Seifert case described the power struggle between Seifert and Hohn as an unequal fight. According to the experts, if anyone had to be characterized as the scapegoat, it had to be the CEO of the hedge fund, Hohn. Seifert as a person was characterized as an ‘advice-resistant’ traditional leader who was chanceless against the ‘clever young guerrilla warrior’ Hohn. The experts imply that this case study stands for the societal fear of a new way of doing business in Germany. Hedge funds were described as typical ‘anglo-american phenomena’ designed to destroy traditional German corporations like a ‘swarm of locusts’.

All the experts instantly referred to Ackermann as a scapegoat. Even interviewees who were selected for another case study mentioned Ackermann as a typical scapegoat in German media coverage. Most experts viewed his ‘V-sign’ as a symbol of ‘arrogance’. According to three business journalists, the image of the V-gesture has become part of the collective pictorial memory in Germany. Ackermann was described as a large surface for the projection of collective fears in times of economic downturn and high rates of unemployment. According to the interviewees, there were no metaphors for Ackermann as a public figure because he was functioning as a metaphor himself. Interestingly, no expert criticized Ackermann for his actual work as CEO, but rather blamed him for his lack of sensibility for public opinion. Two experts called Ackermann ‘a typical banker’. Another expert described him as ‘the Suisse banker in Germany’. The public figure of Ackermann seems to have combined a common scapegoat stereotype with a rather provocative perception of social behaviour.

Mehdorn was presented as a very polarizing person not only in media coverage but also by the interviewees. Three experts described him as a model for a scapegoat. Others indicated that there were two frames in media coverage about his public image: The role of a scapegoat and the role of a hero. This assessment corresponds with the results of the LCS and the NTA. The experts perceived Mehdorn both as a culprit and as a victim. Mehdorn protected his corporation by offering the press an authentic angry face instead of disappearing or letting someone else take the blame. Mehdorn and two other experts even viewed the scapegoat role as a basic CEO competency: ‘[The CEO] has to be someone who takes the bullet, so the others can get back to work. If you do not want that, you must not become the CEO’ (Mehdorn, 21 August 2012). Being asked if and how the communication department could manage CEO communications, Mehdorn replied, ‘Communication cannot lead a corporation. […] Communication is a service provided by the communication department’ (Mehdorn, 21 August 2012). For him, the communication department’s task was to formulate and adjust strategy, and not to make strategic decisions. A majority of the experts felt it was rather unrealistic to assume that a communication director would be able to control the positioning of the corporation’s CEO. However, communication professionals and CEOs can develop a new sensitivity and consciousness for scapegoating in the public sphere.

Conclusion

A new definition of the term scapegoat was proposed and a new methodology based on the LCS was developed to analyse the central structural elements of the ancient scapegoat ritual: The so-called ‘sacrificial marks’, negative or ambivalent adjectives or nouns referring to a person concerning his or her group affiliations and personality. Furthermore, the narrative frames behind these sacrificial marks were evaluated using NTA, an analysis of metaphors and figurative language.

According to this combination of lexical and semantic analysis, the research question of ‘How does the scapegoat narrative manifest itself in media coverage on CEOs of German corporations’? can be answered by referring to the results of the case studies. Seifert was not made a scapegoat in media coverage. However, since all the metaphors of symbolic blame-giving referred to his opponent Hohn, he could be seen as a potential scapegoat in the crisis narrative. The Ackermann case mostly referred to a scapegoat role bound to stereotypes or group affiliations, while the Mehdorn case referred to a figurative language describing a scapegoat personality.

The limitations of the study are linked to the small number (three) of case studies and the new methodology. The calculation of the scapegoat potential and the scapegoat index value are only initial attempts to capture the scapegoat role of a person in media texts and need further testing for statistical significance. Moreover, the methodology presented only allowed the researcher to analyse published opinion and the narratives presented by eight experts. For measuring the scapegoat attributions of news recipients, there is need to apply other methods such as surveys or in-depth interviews.

Scapegoating is an inevitable communicative problem-solving process. As long as people are communicating through narrative structures, symbolic blame-giving will offer short-term appeasement effects that help groups to develop a sense of unity. In times of information overload and social acceleration (Rosa, 2013), these hostile narratives about archetypal figures are very effective strategies to be heard since they correspond to the basic dimensions of the psyche (Jung, 1981) and to a set of news factors that include status, identification and valence (Schulz, 1982). In times of lower resources in journalism and the increasing pressure on corporations to gain attention in the public sphere, scapegoating seems to be increasing. However, this development could be rather dangerous considering the fact that scapegoats are merely the substitutes for real societal problems.

In the cases studies analysed we witnessed a business journalism based on personality issues instead of facts explaining complex crisis situations of large German corporations. Scandals involving individuals or small groups of people might be indicators for narratives of fear that journalists and recipients do not want to acknowledge. Taking a closer look at the case studies of Seifert (Deutsche Börse) and Ackermann (Deutsche Bank), we see individual CEOs standing for changes in the economic system and a perceived final collapse of the former ‘Deutschland AG’—a network of traditional German companies tied together by history and values. Journalists did not cover the fears of employees and customers who wondered how their corporation will be operating in a globalized world. They did not address the societal fear of business managers seemingly forgetting their home markets. The fears of loss of control and change surrounding these narratives might have been unwarranted but not addressing them seemed to be a bad idea since we all see that today suppressed emotions can come back in forms of outrage and dangerous economic and political conflicts. Not addressing the negative emotions that come with real change processes can result in producing victims. To be clear: scapegoats may not always be legally or morally innocent but they are always victims of society. The scapegoat narrative within journalistic texts stands for our denial of change and our inability of discussing complicated issues. It is our natural instinct to turn to the divine offering victims rather than asking ourselves about our own responsibility. We may not overcome this human condition but we can be more vigilant especially in the context of published opinion. As a personified false solution, the scapegoat hinders public discourse and the process of questioning one’s own self and complex structures. In the long term, this might pose a real threat to democracy.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The results presented in this paper are based on a PhD thesis published in 2015. For not interfering with blind peer review the publication has not been referred to in the text and was not included into the list of references.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article: This research project was funded by Hering Schuppener consulting, Germany.

Notes

ORCID iD

Christine Viertmann

Author biography

Christine Viertmann is a post-doctoral researcher, freelance communications consultant at Leipzig University and lecturer at DHBW Heilbronn. She graduated in Communication and Media Studies and French at Leipzig University and Université Paris-Sorbone (Paris IV), France. From 2010 to 2013, she received a doctoral scholarship from Hering Schuppener consulting. From 2014 to 2016, she worked for the Chair in Strategic Communication at Leipzig University and the Academic Society for Management and Communication.

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