Abstract
In the first year of publication of Critical Research on Religion (CRR), we have become urgently aware of a significant difference of opinion about what it means to approach religion critically. The dispute turns on whether those writing and doing research from “within” a given religious discourse can be critical. Some of our colleagues apparently presume that only those following secular academic approaches are critical. We disagree, but we have also realized that there is more we need to say, especially since this issue affects our editorial choices.
In our editorial in the inaugural issue of CRR, 1(1), April 2013, we wrote that the journal “will critique religion not only from the outside but also from within.” By “critique,” we did not mean “undermine.” Our aim is not to diminish religion or make it obsolete. Religion evolves, in part, through “criticism and reformation from within,” and thus, critique can help strengthen religious ideologies, practices, and even institutions (Goldstein, Boer, and Boyarin, 2013, 1: 4).
One example of reformation from within is a forthcoming article in CRR, 2(2), August 2014, by Hanan Ibrahim, entitled “Intercultural communication in the Qur'an and the politics of interpretation.” Reviewers split over the evaluation of her article, based on their disagreement regarding whether a religious approach can be critical. Engaging in a reformist reading of the Qur'an, the author argues for a milder form of Jihad. In doing so, she sets herself against not only more Orthodox and Islamist interpretations but Western misconceptions as well. Her article is not a break from Islamic thought but operates within it. While from a Western secular perspective this may seem a mild exercise in criticism at best, it is critical since it aims to dispel Western stereotypes. Furthermore, from the author's situation in the Islamic world, it exposes her to criticisms of being complicit with the West and even to potential accusations of apostasy. We seek to give voice to this type of scholarship.
A recent article in The Journal of the American Academy of Religion that set out to evaluate the current status of religion in American sociology addresses the problems facing sociology of religion in relation to its parent discipline of sociology. Although we agree with much of their assessment, on some points we differ. While they argue that religious perspectives may have a proper place in the sociology of religion, they create an artificial dichotomy between religious and other “critical” approaches: Another rationale for intentionally integrating both knowledge about religion and religious knowledge into the discipline of sociology follows from the observation that at least some schools of thought in our discipline unapologetically begin with particular intellectual and moral locations, commitments, presuppositions, and interests; some even argue that these particular positions privilege their sociological understandings. Examples include feminist theory, Marxism, queer theory, some forms of critical theory, and projects of “real utopias.” One might ask why or how such value-committed scholarly approaches that start with particularistic intellectual and moral presuppositions are legitimate in sociology, while religious perspectives on human person and social life are a priori excluded. The uneven privileging of certain intellectual and moral positions deserves ongoing questioning and consideration. At the very least, examining such issues seriously will force sociologists to be more self-aware and self-reflexive. (Smith et al., 2013: 927)
Our own position on this is, we believe, slightly more nuanced. As evidenced by the forthcoming Ibrahim article, CRR begins from the presumption that scholarship whose starting point is a religious perspective can be just as critical as scholarship framed through secular paradigms. The parallels, however, are not perfect. Marxism, critical theory, feminism, and queer theory, like religious perspectives, presuppose sets of values as their starting point (equality—whether economic, gender, or sexual orientation). While for the most part, these paradigms are secular, there are scholars operating with them who are not, e.g. religious feminists. The starting point of these paradigms is equality, which serves both as a heuristic tool to analyze unequal economic, social, and political conditions and an ideal by which to guide social action. A religious perspective which is not critical can have a completely different starting point. Using equality as an analytic frame is not the same as presupposing the existence of metaphysical entities, which are not empirically verifiable, or privileging one set of practices, beliefs, texts, and discourses as closer to ultimate truth than others.
Theological and religious perspectives and critical paradigms have in common key normative principles. The values underlying critical paradigms have their roots in theology and religion. Belief in the value of equality in terms of wealth, gender, racialized identity, or sexual orientation has a precedent in the idea of equality before God. In this regard, critical approaches have an elective affinity with religious perspectives in juxtaposition to value neutral approaches (interpretive, phenomenological, or rational choice positions, although any of these can be conjoined with critical concerns). While it is necessary to understand religious actors from their own perspectives, we go beyond this and engage in critique. We believe that expanding the sphere of possible reflexivity within the framework of ongoing religious traditions could potentially alleviate the tendency to protect collective identities through a reactive withdrawal from general social change. Value neutral positions accept all aspects of religious beliefs and practices as they are and merely seek to understand them. Critical perspectives, like theological/religious perspectives, approach the world using values and make judgments. At the same time, critical approaches, like value neutral approaches, emphasize social scientific methodology. Religious perspectives, too, can make use of scientific methodology (within confined parameters). Thus, in our view a religious perspective is critical if it uses a scientific methodology combined with an articulated set of values to reflect back on itself or the world around it. After all, this is the core sense of kritikos, a discernment of what may hinder or foster human and social flourishing.