Abstract
Both India and France have faced a high number of terror attacks in the twenty-first century. India and France are ranked, respectively, as the eighth and twenty-third most impacted non-conflict countries in the world (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017: 10). Nevertheless, France has faced a dramatic high number of victims of terrorism since 2002 (49). In both countries, terrorist attacks are strongly perceived to be connected to Islam. Although the secular governments of both countries guarantee neutrality on matters of religion, Islam is conceptualized politically and Muslims are cast as disloyal to their respective countries. Z. Fareen Parvez’s book investigates how Muslim communities in Lyon (France) and Hyderabad (India) participate in politics. Based on her PhD research, the book draws from the two years she spent conducting ethnographic research with Muslims in philanthropic associations, mosques, women’s training centers, and Quran and Arabic language circles in both cities. In her view, state authorities who want to manage the problem of “terrorism” have to focus on the class relations and economic conditions of Muslims, rather than on Muslim values and religious practices.
The book starts with a well-structured introduction. It presents Parvez’s reasons for selecting Lyon and Hyderabad for her comparative analysis. Both cities have experienced intense Islamic revivals and have the highest percentages of Muslims in their respective countries (8–9). Poor Muslims in both cities are more likely to return to traditional version of Islam (11).
Chapter 2 focuses on the contradictory history of secularism in France and India. Reviewing the history of the relationship between church and state, Parvez argues that after the decline of the Roman Catholic Church, the French secular state supported Catholic institutions on cultural grounds. The same did not happen for Islamic organizations, like mosques. These organizations were established after the migration of Muslims from former French colonies to work in French industry. The laïcité of France, which “emphasizes the neutrality and the elimination of religion from all public institutions in favor of civil culture” (37), perceives Islamic practices as religious, but Roman Catholic practices as cultural.
In the aftermath of the economic crisis in the 1970s, unemployment skyrocketed in industrial areas of France and consequently among Muslim immigrants. Unemployment led to insufficient schooling and poverty among Muslims. This situation resulted in some resistance from the immigrants and, in return, anti-immigrant violence. Since the early 1990s, when it became clear that Muslim immigrants would remain in France permanently, “the debates over laïcité dramatically shifted to limiting the public visibility of Islam” (42). The adoption of laws prohibiting the headscarf in public schools (2004) and face-covering veils in public spaces (2010) contributed to a crisis of secularism, right-wing policies, and anti-immigrant violence.
Secularism in India is connected to the composite nationalism. Unlike France, religion in India has not been a key element in shaping the nation. The post-colonial state of India was affected by the violent partition of Pakistan and India in 1947. A form of composite nationalism emerged from “the embers of impassioned debates about cast, class and religion” (50). The greatest challenges to Muslims in India are poverty and illiteracy. However, these problems are not handled by the state. Muslims are guaranteed the right of freedom of worship (which, based on the history of India, would not be a problem anyway), but they do not receive special protection (like the other backward classes1) beyond that. In 1979, with the help of the Janata government, eighty Muslim groups were counted as backward groups. Consequently, they have a potential to utilize affirmative action policies. According to Parvez, however, this process is slow.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the case study of Hyderabad. As Parvez explains, Muslim elites in Hyderabad struggle for a redistribution of power to benefit poor Muslims. They do so in two different ways. Some engage in politics and run for election with groups like Mjlis-e-Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (MIM). MIM is a mainstream political party which represents Muslim constituencies. It runs banks, colleges, and hospitals in order to establish a presence in poor Muslim neighborhoods. Other Muslim elites adopt a paternalistic approach by joining philanthropic, middle-class, and secular associations. These foundations have a visible presence in Hyderabad. They work to reduce child labor, build health clinics, educate women, and build women’s training centers (68). The work of such secular associations has not been without difficulties; however, for many, they present an opportunity to support liberal ideas.
One of the interesting cases Parvez outlines involves a disagreement between the female director of the Faiz Nigar School and teachers and parents of pupils, over the issue of veiling. The director attempted to reduce the presence of religion by banning teachers and students from wearing a burqa. Initially, this ban was resisted extensively. Nevertheless, she managed to institutionalize it and to earn the respect of her opponents. Overall, both political parties and philanthropic groups attempt to improve the situation of poor Muslims who are neglected by the state. As Parvez shows, there has been a power clash between these two groups, which compete for “political legitimacy among the urban Muslim poor” (81). Her analysis of both group’s relationship with lower class Muslims reveals both patrimonial and sympathetic modalities.
Chapter 4 concentrates on communities in a suburb of Hyderabad and emphasizes the experiences of women therein. In these communities, material, legal, and symbolic activities provide the foundation for a civil society. Most women in these communities are low income, even below poverty line. Most of their husbands have migrated to Arab countries to earn money in the oil business. In this context, the women try to practice their citizenship and learn about their rights. For instance, many are empowered to claim the Islamic right to divorce and waivers of dowry [gifts or money which has to be given at the marriage of a daughter]. Beyond these material and legal activities, Parvez demonstrates that the poor women in these communities enjoyed the “created and circulated honor, as well as a moral community based on trust” (112).
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the case study of Lyon. Chapter 5 explores how Muslim elites and political organizations attempt to dialogue with the state, protest specific laws, and hold public events to raise awareness of Islam. While many who work in these organizations experience discrimination, they, especially the second-generation Muslims, identify as simultaneously Muslim, French, and Maghrebi (125). They engage in a politics of recognition in two ways: by working with the state to achieve integration and by opposing the state through radical critique. In contrast to Hyderabad, the middle class and elites in Lyon are not well connected with the poor Muslims of the banlieues [suburbs].
Chapter 6 includes different stories of men who are poor, jobless, and trying to be self-employed by establishing Halal food eateries, supermarkets, and Islamic bookstores. It also offers stories of women who could not successfully graduate from schools, study in a university, or work in their desired job because of the state ban of headscarves. Instead, the women find a social life through participating in mosque activities or Arabic language courses. Here, Parvez provides context to understand how and why Muslims in banlieues isolate themselves from the state and the elites. Antipolitics emerges as “the state regulated women’s veiling, defeated Muslim political activities in working-class neighborhoods,” and as a result of the collapse of Muslim civil society associations in Lyon (152).
In Chapter 7, Parvez concludes her analysis with three theoretical interventions: (1) “the contradictions of secularism determine the nature of minority religious movements”; (2) Muslim class relations’ influence on “the agendas and political potentiality of Islamic movements”; (3) the difference between “instrumental” and “non-instrumental” concepts of politics (184). In this section, Parvez argues that it is imperative that poor and conservatively dressed women participate in political communities. She classifies such inclusion as a “feminist practice” (189).
Her conclusion, further connects the results of her study to common-place assumptions concerning the “war on Terrorism,” arguing that attempts to win the hearts and minds of Muslims mask the reality of class domination. Parvez is critical of those authorities who want to solve the problem of terrorism by closing down the Salafist mosques. As evidence, she draws from Oliver Roy’s argument that this policy is ineffective because “ISIS [so-called Islamic state] recruits among nonpracticing young people” (191).
The book’s comparative analyses are interesting, informative, and concise. The analysis of religious practices of Muslim women, especially in Lyon, is comprehensive and original. Parvez analyzes how faith becomes an orienting subject for these women: “given the uncertainty about their futures regarding marriage and employment, aggression from strangers, police harassment, and a state that viewed them simultaneously as criminals and as victims, fear presented a constant dark cloud that they had to work to sequester or eliminate. The only way to combat fear, they are taught, is through faith” (178). Wearing a hijab, for instance, besides being a religious practice, allows these women to express their identity. They see it as a sign of protest against the French state’s limitation of their freedom of choice of dress, even when it makes studying and finding a job more difficult. The headscarf is a personal statement, rather than a family choice. Some even wear a headscarf against their husbands’ will (166).
The book, nevertheless, has some weaknesses. Firstly, the book was published in 2017, a decade after the research was done (in 2006 and 2007). It is quite possible that the attacks in Paris and Nice (in 2015 and 2016) as well as terrorist attacks in Hyderabad in 2007 and 2013 changed the situation of the Muslim communities. Secondly, the title of the book, Politicizing Islam, is misguided. The book’s main focus does not outline attempts of the Indian and French states or their Muslim citizens to politicize “Islam.” It seems that the subtitle of the book, “the Islamic Revival in France and India,” fits its content better. Thirdly, checking consistency in the writing style would have been advisable. For example, unfamiliar terms sometimes are translated in square brackets (146) and sometimes in parenthesis (147). Fourthly, a few gaps (or biases) should have been avoided in argumentation. For instance, in Chapter 2, Parvez argues that the Indian state after 9/11 made the life of Muslims hard through the attempts to modernize their schools (56). This discussion neglects reference to the impact of Saudi Arabia and attempts to extend Wahhabism and radical Islam in India (Pant 2006; Sikand 2004, 2007). In Chapter 5, the “French law on colonialism” is mentioned very briefly in a quotation (137). A fuller picture could be offered through exploring the ways that French historians, teachers, and parties on the left criticized the law so strongly that it was repealed (Malley-Morrison, Mercurio, and Twose 2013, 363). Fifthly, the author briefly analyzes the veiling of Muslim women (30 and 221), but she does not deal with it in depth. Sahar Amer, for instance, has discussed different historic, economic, and aesthetic aspects of veiling (Amer 2014).
Despite some minor gaps, the book offers a substantive contribution to the literature on Muslim revivals. Politicizing Islam is recommended to those who wish to learn about complex Muslim communities in India and France.