Abstract
If you haven’t guessed by now, Critical Research on Religion (CRR) is a left-leaning journal. Nevertheless, we are open to all carefully considered critical perspectives on religion, including those which we view as conservative (whether or not those who hold them think of themselves as such). Despite several editorials explaining our critical approach, certain misunderstandings continue to arise, which are apparent particularly in the review process. Many of these have come from those who understand themselves as secular. For some secularist critics, religious or theological perspectives have no place in a critical journal on religion. At the same time, we often receive submissions by those who engage with theological questions or are religiously sympathetic but who are not critical enough and seem not to understand what the journal is about.
This underlying tension between those on the theological or religious side and those on the secular or social scientific side is manifest not only in the journal’s review process but in our academic associations as well as the political sphere. These tensions have come to the surface in “The Great Divorce” between the American Academy of Religion and the Society for Biblical Literature and between the sociology of religion associations and the American Sociological Association, although in recent years these differences have become less pronounced. In academia, they come to the surface in the divide between academics who understand themselves leaning more towards the humanities (religion and theology) as opposed to those who understand themselves more as social scientists (including those in religious studies). But even among social scientists, these divisions exist between those who are more sympathetic to religion as opposed to those who are not. In the political sphere, these frictions cause tension between the secular and religious left, in discussions at places such as the World Social Forum. We at Critical Research on Religion find these conflicts to be highly unproductive and an obstacle for creating a broader coalition united in a common purpose based on shared ideals.
We therefore wish to us reiterate some of the guiding principles of CRR that we have laid out in previous editorials. First, our conception of “critical” is based on the Greek word κριτικός (kritikós), which means to judge or discern. Contrary to positivism or value free social science, we have argued that to do so, one needs to work based on an explicitly stated value or set of values (for example: equality, freedom, justice, democracy, etc.). To be critical (an adjective) is to engage in critique (which can be both a noun or a verb). While criticism is a judgment, critique is a tool that does the work of transformation. It is a lens or method of interpretation, which creates something new. Thus, we indeed see ourselves following the position of critical theory, which is normative or value driven and aims not just to understand society but to intervene in its betterment (see Horkheimer, 1982).
Regarding religion, critique can be aimed in two directions. First is a critique of religion, based on these stated values to discern its positive and negative aspects. We do not think that critique should only come from within religious traditions (see, e.g., Habermas, 2002, 150) but also from without. Through critique, these traditions are judged based on values, often their own. Although hardcore secularists understand the aim of the critique of religion to be its negation, for those who have a more capacious attitude, the aim of critique of religion is in its reformation. And for scholars of religion, critique could result in the transformation of our understanding of religion and thus of the field itself. The second trajectory of critique of religion—and this is where those who are ideologically secular misunderstand us—stems from the insight that the values which guide our critique or our ideological stances have their roots in the various religious traditions, and thus religion can provide both a powerful critique of society and indeed of the religious traditions themselves. This is in accordance of Theodor W. Adorno’s understanding of inverse theology—the notion that theological and utopian ideals, whether one believes in them or not, can provide a critique of a fallen or damaged world (Brittain, 2010, 104–105).
Thus, what the secular and religious left have in common is a guiding set of values—in particular, emphases on equality, justice, and democracy. We think that ontological differences between metaphysical and empirical orientations often get in the way of working towards achieving common goals based on these values through coordinated action. A way to get past this is by separating metaphysical claims from moral imperatives. To the extent that the metaphysical claims act as an obstacle, separating them from the moral imperatives could lead to far more agreement. In a quest for greater knowledge, we encourage open discussion of all beliefs whether they be religious or secular. However, these critiques should not stand in the way of mutually coordinated action based on a common set of values.
Unlike postmetaphysical thinking (Habermas, 2002, 76), in the public sphere of this journal, we do not think that theology must necessarily translate itself into secular language to be understood. The language need not be secular but it must be academic and scholarly—that is, those who are writing it need to understand that the audience of CRR will for the most part be outside the traditions they are discussing and that professions of one’s own faith can easily come across as neither scholarly nor academic. The theology should be critical—that is self-conscious of its own propositions and the tradition from which they emanate—and it should aim to have a broader reach, resonating with those outside the relevant traditions as well as those within them. At the same time, we concur with Habermas (2002, 138) that secularists too need to be self-critical and aware of their own assumptions—in particular, their evaluations of those who are religious or sympathetic. Indeed, one of the purposes of this journal is to promote a mutual learning process between the religious and secular (or non-religious), but unlike Habermas (2002, 111, 140), we do not believe such learning need be contingent on secularization. Again, this perspective leaves room for critical theology.
While there are differences between the secular and religious left, there is a far greater difference between them and those on the secular and religious right. Indeed, when it comes to values, the secular and religious left have much more in common with each other in their political positions than they do with those across the aisle. Not only do the left and the right place a primary emphasis on different values (e.g. economic freedom on the right vs. economic equality on the left), they are also driven by different types of rationality and have a different relation to orthodoxy or tradition (see Weber, [1922] 1978, 24–25; Kalberg, 1980; and Hunter, 1991, 44). In such a situation, while articulating the differences between the secular and religious left on key issues may remain useful, finding their commonalities is much more important. At Critical Research on Religion, we have forged a global following of authors, reviewers, and readers, many of whom live in countries (such as Nigeria and Iran) who understand this need all too well.
While we encourage communication and dialogue with those who have more conservative positions on religion, Critical Research on Religion is intended to forge a coalition of the secular and religious left-wing academics who study religion (as stated in our aims and scope: “critical theory of the Frankfurt School, Marxism, post-structuralism, feminism, psychoanalysis, ideological criticism, post-colonialism, ecocriticism, and queer studies”). And whether the orientation is religious or secular, theological or empirical, humanistic or social scientific, or anything in between on these spectrums, we encourage all sides to keep an open mind, to engage in civil discourse, to achieve mutual understanding, and if possible to coordinate action, with the aim of moving the many societies, in which the scholarly community around this journal lives, in the direction of realizing our shared values.