Abstract
This study investigates the relationships between religious fundamentalism, collective identity, and individuality. The questions addressed in this research are: Who is joining fundamentalist student organizations? Why and how are they doing so? And, how do these organizations maintain their collective identity in the face of ever-growing individualism? To gain an adequate understanding of the fundamentalist characteristics of such organizations, we first explored the existing theoretical literature. Then, we performed a qualitative case study of two student organizations at the University of Guilan: the Basij and Welayat Lovers. Our findings indicate that although these organizations strongly tend to define and impose a unified collective identity on their members, some important social trends, such as the expansion of secularist higher education and rising levels of students' knowledge, skills, and their reinforced individuality, leave little room for the growth of a fundamentalist collective identity.
Introduction
Modernity is not a monolithic phenomenon (Rabasa and Stacie 2010, 5) or even, as Habermas (1993, 98–109) says, an “unfinished project of Enlightenment.” In the face of modernization, non-Western countries, including Muslim ones, adopt aspects of individualism as well as new forms of ideology and collective identity, in a dialectical manner (Behnam 1990, 347–374; Therborn 2003, 293–305) in the same way that the relationship between liberalism and socialism, both as secularist political philosophies, influenced the formulation of modernity.
Some scholars argue that the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism and the formation of fundamentalist networks is a reaction against the West which led to an identity crisis in Islamic societies. As a result, important questions were raised (Giddens 2011). Why, and through what mechanism, do individuals and groups turn to religious fundamentalism? How does the construction of an autonomous agency lead to the formation of a collective identity in the form of membership in an Islamic fundamentalist group?
It is necessary to mention that religious fundamentalist ideas are not a new phenomenon or unique to a region. Although religious fundamentalism has a Protestant-Christian origin, acknowledged by many experts (Bakhash 1986; Bruce 2011, 387–405; Moore 2007; McCune 1996; Ruthven 2007; Salzman 2008; Freedman 1996), it has become a global phenomenon, mostly as form of resistance to modernity and has been observed in other areas, especially in the Islamic world (Tibi 1998). Some believe that after the collapse of communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall, religious fundamentalism became the new challenge confronting the modern world (Freedman 1994).
Islamic fundamentalist groups take many forms (Halliday 1994, 91–113), and their diversity and differences are due to the different roles religion plays in the public sphere in Islamic countries (Boubekeur 2007, 75–94). The structure of the institution of religion in Islamic societies is one of the factors affecting the formation of fundamentalist groups and networks; there is especially a difference between Shiite and Sunni groups in this regard. Among Shiites, fundamentalist groups such as the Houthi Movement in Yemen, which is officially called Ansar Allah (Supporters of God) (Juneau 2016, 647–663), tends to be centralized and corresponds to the hierarchy of the official Shiite institution, while in the Sunni world, many fundamentalist groups, such as al-Qaeda and Daesh (ISIS), act as a centrifugal force and reject the mainstream Sunni clerical institution (Alagha 2016, 29; Khosrowkhavar 2017; Stern and Berger 2015; Hashim 2014, 69–83).
This article seeks to examine the perspective and actions of religious fundamentalist groups and to demonstrate how the process of undermining individuality and constructing a new collective identity is achieved through group membership and participation in collective actions. Using problem-focused interviews and collaborative observations, we studied the perspectives and behaviors of the members of the Basij 1 called Student Basij 2 and the Lovers of Welayat 3 at the University of Guilan 4 in Iran. The article, first, assesses the presence or absence of religious fundamentalist ideas among the Basiji students and Welatyat Lovers, the second which is ideologically and religiously related to the first. This project, then, investigates the identity seeking mechanisms among the Basiji students. In these organizations, individuals enter a new cycle of socialization and face a transformation in their identity and values. In the process of this re-socialization, their individuality is challenged, and the collective identity is strengthened in accordance with fundamentalist values and norms.
Religious fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism
The term fundamentalism can be used in very different religious contexts and texts to describe the devotion and strict loyalty to a set of principles or ideas. Religious fundamentalism is the approach of those religious groups that look for the literal interpretation of original religious texts or books believing that teachings obtained from this kind of reading must be used in all social, economic, and political aspects. Religious fundamentalists believe that only one view of the world can be true, and their view is the only one; there is no room for ambiguity or multiple interpretations. According to Anthony Giddens (2006, 571) in the movements of religious fundamentalism, access to holy texts is restricted just to a group of privileged “interpreters” of priests, pastors, or other religious leaders.
In his definition of religious fundamentalism, Manuel Castells ([1999] 2005, 30) notes the attempt to unify the identity: According to my understanding, religious fundamentalism is constructing an identity to unify the individual and community institutions’ behavior with the norms that come from God's laws, and their interpretation is the responsibility of the powerful reference, which is the mediator between God and humanity.
Regarding the Islamic form of fundamentalism, John Esposito, Jay PJ Vatikotis, and Michael Fisher, referring to political developments and events in Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, Bangladesh and Libya in the late 1970s and 1980s, described them as “Islamic Revival.” Bobby Sayyid (2003), while criticizing the widespread view of the West, which portrays fundamentalism as synonymous with Islamic revival, suggests that instead of “Islamic fundamentalism,” a more general concept of “Islamism” is better and has more explanatory power.
Demant (2006) identifies three waves of Islamism. The first wave occurred between 1967 and 1981. Sayyed Ghotb was the prominent theorist and the Sunni jihadist idea became fruitful during this period. The second wave was a Shiite wave starting with Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979 and extended into the 1980s. The third wave of Islamism arose after September 11, 2001 and had significant differences with the objectives and scope of practice of the two previous waves.
Investigating Islamic fundamentalism, many scholars, like Demant (2006), consider the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 as a historical milestone, leading to the rapid growth of (Islamic) religious fundamentalist groups and movements in the world (Abrahamian 2008). Therefore, it is important to study the groups and organizations that have contributed to the Islamic Revolution and the consolidation of the Islamic state in Iran. In this regard, studying the Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij (Mobilization Resistance Force) or briefly “Basij,” as the volunteer-based branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 5 is of great importance. Since 1979, the Revolutionary Guard Corps have played a pivotal role in the consolidation of the Islamic regime, and its Basij branch in the mobilization of the oppressed (Wehrey and Green 2009).
The Basij, as an organization, has several branches, segments, and guilds. Each university in Iran has a Student Basij that are not a part of the organizational charts of universities or the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. These branches aim to implement the instructions and views of Imam Khomeini, the founder and leader of the Islamic Republic, and “to prepare for the comprehensive defense of the achievements of the Islamic Revolution in various cultural, scientific and defense fields” (Ministry of Science, Research and Technology 2013, 446–451).
To appoint the head of the Student Basij, at each university, the Basiji (individual members of Basij) students at each university recommend three individuals in writing to the university president, and, by agreement between the parties, one of the named persons is appointed as the head of the Student Mobilization Branch at that university. In order to realize its goals, the Student Mobilization must accomplish a set of tasks (Supreme Cultural Revolution Council of Iran 2000):
To attract, train and organize volunteer students. To familiarize students with the culture of sacrifice and martyrdom and to introduce the swords of the Islamic Revolution and the Holy Defense. To collaborate in the development of scientific and defense research and research which promotes progress and construction in Iran. To maintain and promote the spirit of Anti-Arrogance in students. To conduct conferences, conferences, festivals, and competitions that are required. To conduct courses, camps and cultural, scientific, and defense classes including academic defense courses outside the university. To publish the books and magazines of the Student Mobilization in accordance with the standards approved by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution and relevant guidelines. To cooperate with the authorities of the university and the academic institutions according to the guidelines and instructions of the Basij Resistance Force.
Since its formation on December 5, 1979, and the adoption of its law in the parliament, the Basij has played a significant role in all major political developments in Iran (Ostovar 2013, 345–361). Moreover, the Student Basij was established in 1988, at the order of Ayatollah Khamenei, and has since become the most important arm of the government to supervise and control the universities, and actively inhibit critical students and student organizations. During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005), during the so called reform era, the Student Basij and other Islamist student organizations, frequently disrupted speeches given by the reformers and critics of the government at universities, participated in sit-ins in front of the parliament, and organized protests outside various ministries and embassies of foreign countries (Mason 2014, 88). During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency (2005–2013), on November 29, 2011, a protest was organized in front of the British embassy in Tehran by various student-run university-based Islamic organizations. The embassy was temporarily occupied by an action which led to its closure for four years (Kemp and Gay 2013, 165).
In addition to the Student Basij, as the most influential Islamic university based and student-run association, there are other such organizations, including, but not limited to, the Islamic Association of Students, the Islamic Students’ Society, and the Lovers of Welayat. Among these organizations, with the exception of the Islamic Association of Students, the overall goal is to further reinforce and reinvigorate the (Islamic) state, as opposed to focusing on democratic values and strengthening civil society. The Islamic Association of Students, however, moved away from its early radicalism, towards a more reformist approach. What almost all of the Islamic student organizations have in common is a fundamentalist, intellectual, and ideological context that converges with the official ideology of the state.
In Iran such student groups are understood as part of Osul-Garâyân (The Principlists) (Mozaffari 2007, 17–33). Osul-Garayan is a Persian term given to the conservatives in Iran, and in the past the Right-Wing was referred to as them. Those who are classified as Osul-Garayan tend to regard themselves as the real supporters and followers of the supreme leadership of Iran. They support the official ideology of the state more than other parties and individuals. The Osul-Garayan are religious in their thinking and lifestyle, and are supported by religious clerics residing in Qom more than their political rivals, known as The Eslâh-Talabân (The Iranian Reformists) (Mousavian 2012, 486). The Basij and other Osul-Garayan are considered a fundamentalist faction in the international community (Mozaffari 2007, 17–33); reformist factions, however, are not labeled the same way. As Bayat (2013) maintains, the reformist groups can be perceived under the concept of post-Islamism, which seeks the construction of a democratic society based on justice, in which religion and faith are mixed with rights, freedom, and democracy at the political level presenting a new form of government and society.
In relation to the two student associations mentioned above, the focus of this research is not the application of the general concept of Islamism, as Sayyid intended, but on the form of Islamism that features religious fundamentalism. This form of Islam is a political ideology rather than a set of religious beliefs (Tibi 1998). If we accept that religious fundamentalism could be a social movement or an ideology of identity, it can be said that its purpose is to strengthen collective identity and collectivist spirit. In contrast, in this type of social group, individualism is corrupted, excluded, and excommunicated as the achievement of the West, which is mainly considered as an enemy (Castells and Cardoso 2005), while individuality and individualist values are incompatible with the fundamental principles and attitudes.
Religious fundamentalist groups, and the redefinition and reconstruction of identity
To better understand religious fundamentalist movements, the characteristics of the individuals involved, and the principles and conditions governing the intellectual and practical policy of such groups, we sought answers for the following three questions:
Before joining the group, what individual and contextual characteristics did fundamentalists have and how did they interpret the “truth” and the meaning of life? After joining the religious fundamentalist groups, how do they see the world? And what is their emotional orientation and vision? What principles and mechanisms do religious fundamentalist groups use to construct a new collective identity?
These are the main questions of the current study, which are our guide for formulating the conceptual framework of the research. These three questions provide the conceptual framework for this study. They are meant to discover the narrative of the subjects’ lives, which we shall analyze.
1. Non-based individuality: conditions before joining the group
In this section, the factors that influence people to join fundamentalist religious organizations are classified in the order of importance and priority. Indices 1.1 to 1.5 below are contextual ones. When these five indices are brought together with a harmonious and imitative character (index 6) and then combined with moving away from the motherland and feeling threatened, individuals seek a replacement, replacing their identity with fundamentalism or reconstruct their identity through fundamentalist beliefs. In this situation, since the individual’s collective identity is more fertile than their own individuality, he/she will reconstruct or redefine his/her collective identity. Fundamentalism as a religious ideology has consequences for fundamentalists and gives them immunity against disruption, existential anxiety, frustration, and confusion.
The following traits, which are the main characteristics of religious fundamentalism, will be considered in this study:
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
2. Transition to certainty: construction of a coherent collective identity
After a person joins one of the religious fundamentalist organizations, there are consequences and implications of his/her membership and s/he experiences identity changes. We have categorized these consequences and results into eight indices:
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
3. Mechanism of action of fundamentalist groups in members’ identification
After joining religious fundamentalist groups and constructing a collective identity based on fundamentalist ideology, collective actions affect individual actions and cause people to act according to certain mechanisms. The mechanism of action of fundamentalist groups in the construction of fundamentalists’ collective identity and behavior pattern after joining the group is based on a long-term strategy and clear objectives, which will be addressed in the form of six categories:
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
Research methodology
This study was conducted using qualitative methods which allow us to consider a handful of trends such as “new ambiguities,” the growth of individual “lifestyles and biographical patterns,” and the dissolution of “old” social inequalities in new social environments, sub-cultures, lifestyles, and ways of living. Looking at these trends creates a new sensitivity toward the empirical study of issues (Flick 2009, 12).
This is the point, which is the focus of this research. Ontologically, epistemologically, and in terms of life strategy, religious fundamentalists spent all their energy on strengthening collective identity and unifying their lifestyle and worldview. They strongly resist pluralism, which is the emergence of individuality and personal identities, and consider diversity of lifestyle an error, perversion, or even a sin. In contrast, in modernity, there is increasing individualism, which provides the context of the societal changes which fundamentalists are reacting to.
Accordingly, it is apparently expected that the followers of fundamentalist attitudes should have the same lifestyles and follow the same patterns in their views, opinions, and life. They show similar actions and choices in different situations. However, in this article, it will be shown that at least at the University of Guilan, which may inferred to the larger Iranian community, this pattern of constructing similar identities and a consistent and dominant collective identity is not formed as is expected by the ideology and mechanisms of these groups; significant differences are observed among its members. These people face many contradictions in the tension between collective identity and interests and their own personal identity.
Accordingly, we shall follow a method that is able to probe the person’s innermost personality layers and reveals the experiences and events that have influenced their life and led them to join fundamentalist organizations. Quantitative methods are not able to capture this. Therefore, we attempted to develop a daily and close relationship with these students, to explore more about their life stories considering their membership in the student groups. We formed these relationships over a nine-month period, at the end of which our subjects engaged in self-disclosure, which is an important part of the information we sought.
The research strategy of this study is deductive. We have elaborated an eclectic theoretical framework that logically seemed to be a coherent and convincing theoretical synthesis, and then we have sought to assess this theoretical synthesis with empirical facts obtained from a qualitative research on the members of two fundamentalist student organizations.
We used theoretical saturation to develop the conceptual framework of this research. In other words, to analyze different aspects of the subject, there was no need for more concepts. As a result of studying our sources, and their adaptation to interviews and empirical observations, we have formulated a conceptual framework to guide our research and analyze the data.
Data collection method
To collect the data, we used “problem-centered interviews” and “participant observation” methodologies. In input talks, efforts were made to avoid the initial weight derived from knowing that it is an interview by greeting and speaking about scattered topics. When self-disclosure occurred in the relationship between researcher and participant, we quietly got into biographical questions. Without any detailed and clear explanation of the research subject to the participants, and to prevent bias in the answers to questions, we went into contextual information such as place of residence, family, high school period, and the time before and after it. Depending on that, we asked which parts, what people, what periods of life were more important for them and had more influence on them. We controlled the dialogue to achieve the desired data.
The purpose of contextual data acquisition was to understand the collective identity, family, ethnic, and religious situation of the person compared to his personal identity before and after joining the student organization under study. After the acquisition of introductory information, we probed the religious beliefs and political views of participants and investigated their sensitivity to Islam, Shiism, Islamic government, and “the international system” (a term that was often used by them). Sometimes, after one or several detailed meetings where we engaged in dialogue with them, we assessed the person's sensitivity towards the issues above opposed to his convictions and considered his responses. In this regard, we considered the determination and confidence of participants and investigated if they were willing to contemplate and even revise their beliefs when facing different but logical and friendly positions, or to confront them and to start to question and disagree with them.
In the participant observation part, researchers participated in some ceremonies, gatherings, and meetings of the organizations involved. Notes were taken after each observation.
Target group and sample selection method
As mentioned earlier, the group we studied were the members of student Basij and “The lovers of Welayat” of the University of Guilan. The reason for this choice was that these two organizations had the characteristics of most religious fundamentalist groups in terms of their structure, ideology, and purpose. The sampling method, in this study, was “cumulative sampling.” This means that by conducting an interview with the head of the main committees, we would be able to communicate with the other students in the groups. After we gained their trust and established close and friendly relations at the stage called self-disclosure, interviews were carried out. The purpose of self-disclosure is to share information, views, positions, and personal experience, which the person might not otherwise disclose.
In most cases, the interviewees have a common vision, and only the formations and organizations which they belonged to varied. Student Basij is an organization with a military structure that has a top-down hierarchy and division of labor, but “the lovers of Welayat” has a structure based on religious content.
The selection of interviewees was also based on the logic of obtaining “empirical saturation” in qualitative studies. Empirical saturation means that after the twelfth interviewee, no other new data were found that provided new information for researchers to analyze the research findings or to confirm the conceptual framework of the research. So, to achieve the empirical saturation, interviews continued until the fifteenth interviewee. In the next step, with more than eight months spent on establishing close relationships with people and conducting frequent interviews, we implemented interviews and categorized our observations. It should be noted that the existence of time constraints, as well as the existence of a security-driven and sometimes pessimistic outlook among some interviewees or potential interviewees, affected the research process.
Research findings
As a requirement of qualitative methods, the findings of this research has been based on moving back and forth between theory and data—between theoretical literature on religious fundamentalism and the data we collected. The findings of this field research are highly consistent with what is suggested theoretically. In this section, we will present our findings in connection with the theoretical literature.
In this study, it was observed that almost all the fifteen respondents have entered college from very religious families, and only one of them had less religious or secular relatives outside his family, which led him to have negative reactions against them. Both organizations have female and male members. However, mostly males (around two thirds) dominate the organizations. We had a female colleague as an interviewer to talk to women because they mostly avoid talking to males especially if they were not the member of Basij. They were mostly undergraduates (eleven out of fifteen); the rest were masters students.
On the question of “giving meaning and purpose,” all respondents had a religious narrative of their own families and their life experience, which made them feel useful and rewarding. Their narratives of their beliefs included absolute, fundamental, and infallible truth; they did not tolerate pluralism or different views and interpretations of Islam.
The holy book is the only true source of truth in the interviewees’ perspective, and any other reference and source is verified in relation to it. They consider it to be defaced when there are conflicts or differences with it. In their view, the holy book contains a clear and comprehensive philosophy from birth to death to life after death, and every true Muslim should organize his life accordingly.
Abdollah:
I believe that our religion (Islam) is the superior and most complete religion and Shiism is the most complete religion and we always tell the truth. But in Western countries with secular systems, since they do not have any reference point and it is unclear who is right and who is wrong, they are experiencing a kind of chaos and confusion.
Religion seems logical and answers all the questions I have, and complies with wisdom.
Abdollah states this harmony and imitation as follows: “I do believe that everyone in their lives should have someone to rely on a leader. There are fourteen infallibles in Shiism which do not exist in any other religion.”
Hassan talks about accountability and Islam’s emphasis on it, and says: “If I could control and manage my own behavior, it is better for my own character; accordingly my position gets better in the community.”
From this point on, we observed the emphasis on a sense of belonging and solidarity with their respective groups as well as the members of the group as the best friends of a student; they placed less importance on teachers, classes, classmates, and other scientific, artistic, and literary groups. They talked with self-esteem and a sense of competence and self-righteousness and had a completely different feeling than other students. In some cases, they considered other students perverted, non-observant, and negligent. In this regard, they mentioned the past where young people were faithful and honest, especially in the first years of the revolution or the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq.
Jafar states his sense of belonging to the group and positive feeling towards the other members in this way:
I was a junior when I went to a mosque for a group prayer with my older brother for the first time. My mother is very religious and she gave me the first mystical–religious book to read. My religious tendency grew at the University of Guilan because I met religious people. They were the members of Basij and the Islamic community and “the lovers of Welayat.” All of them were good but the members of “the lovers of Welayat” were more sincere.
Here, you could see that the mechanism that participants defined for their actions involved the six indices mentioned above (3.1 Unified leadership, 3.2 Authoritarianism, 3.3 Unity and organization, 3.4 Joint action, 3.5 Resistance identity, 3.6 Negation of individuality and individualist values) in the theoretical literature. The long-term strategy of having others who had different thoughts and ideology joining them was their instruction. All of them supported a unified leadership, which originates from the holy book, the prophet, and the imams of Shiism and extends to Waliye Faghih (Supreme Leader).
Accepting the domination of a unified leader and commitment to his beliefs, anger, and aggression toward others who are different was evident in their speech and actions. These groups were unified and organized in the same way, but still Basij students were stronger in their commitment compared to the members of Moheban-e Welayat community.
In this regard, Reza says:
When we say the supreme leader is chosen by God, sometimes it is mistakenly perceived that God directly determines the supreme leader but actually we do not mean that. It means that God says we should refer to such a person at the time of Imam Mahdi's absence. We must refer to a person who is pious, righteous, jurist and politic.
On the one hand, the inability to attract the majority of the students and to be effective in the public space of the university and the society, sometimes pushed them to criticize their partners, and the uncertainty about following existing practices and relying on the help of these partners who are not active or firm believers, was expressed in their speech. On the other hand, there were signs of growing individuality and instability in their collective identity, especially in students who were in graduate or doctoral programs. In the case of two or three members, there was a deep anger because many of the promises of the organizers were not fulfilled, but they tried to console themselves by their individual knowledge and abilities, and their individual pursuit of the group’s ideals and lofty goals but not within the framework of their respective group.
Sajjad warns that if our young people do not pay attention to issues of religious beliefs and domestic and international political conditions, we will not win the conflict against the West: “If this does not happen, human beings will be destroyed. This is what is happening now more than ever. We are literally being destroyed.”
Sadegh states the anxiety derived from these threats on two different levels, personal and social:
I strongly believe that I will lose my faith and belief in the absence of a favorable social context [personal level]. Without the filtering of pornographic sites, young people will be perverted [social level]. If the government is neutral towards the beliefs of people, we cannot have much impact on the international system and international relations.
Overall, the research findings show that the theoretical literature can provide a good analysis of why and how some students join fundamentalist organizations. Although there are some differences among the participants, most of them join these organizations through the same mechanisms. The outcomes and results of their tendency and membership in both organizations of the student Basij and “the lovers of Welayat” are somewhat similar. The difference is that some are more committed and adhere more to the values and norms of the group, and some less.
It would appear that a college education and the individual experience of students as well as the diversity of sources of knowledge at the university make it difficult to form the collective identity in which these organizations are interested. Even if the collective identity is formed, due to the diversity existing in the university and Iranian society, the fundamentalist students' social practices are hardly aligned with the strategy and behavioral pattern of these organizations. As far as we can tell, half of the participants have many internal conflicts and lose their hope to have a significant impact on the other students and the university as a whole at the end of their educational career.
Discussion and conclusion
This case study shows that many of the characteristic of fundamentalists holds true in some Iranian student organizations and that these groups act based on the principles and mechanisms similar to other religious fundamentalist groups. In this section, we conduct a final analysis of individual and contextual factors influencing people to join religious fundamentalist groups, regardless of political and cultural geography, and demonstrate how these groups are trying to form individuals’ identities as well as create a collective identity in accordance with the values of the group.
The intellectual foundation of fundamentalists lies in three ontological characteristics: they believe in the absolute, fundamental, natural, and infallible truth, and that the holy texts and religious leaders are the undisputed carriers of this truth. They also seek a single philosophy for life and avoid any other peaceful way of life. In fact, with such views, they lose any possibility for compromise with the other, and wherever they show tolerance, their tolerance is of the kind that Zygmunt Bauman (1992, xxii) says, “they still consider themselves legitimate and the different other falsehood, but since they see no context to guide the perverted, negligent or guilty, they tolerate him as long as he can understand their fundamentalist beliefs.”
They have conformist personalities on the one hand and are authoritarian on the other. While they surrender to their religious leaders whose beliefs and opinions they adhere to, when in a position of power, they are aggressive to the different other and try to guide or dominate him and impose upon him their own beliefs. Belief in absolute truth and possessing the truth through the holy book and religious leaders gives them self-esteem and comfort, and that is how many of their curiosities and skepticisms are answered. Anxiety can be overcome only when the uncertainties have no opportunity to emerge. They wrap such beliefs in an aura of sanctity in such a way that they refer to the early history of Islam instead of attempting to convince others by logical reasoning. With a selective interpretation of the events of that period, they emphasize that we must imitate the utopia of early Islam in all areas and construct the correct society with regard to the social norms and values of ancient Islam.
They believe that the historic duty of Islamic government is to restore and return its history to the right track and their duty is to defend and support it to achieve that purpose and consider any opposition or criticism of the effort an attempt to prevent the realization of Islamic values. They do this to the extent that it gives the political system an aura of sanctity. Any criticism of it is considered to be opposition against Islam. Therefore, they divide the community into supporters and opponents of their ideology expanding this dual vision to all aspects of personal, social, and global relationships. They think they absolutely have the right position and that the different others are evil, vicious, corrupt, and sinister with no interest in the truth, no matter who they are and what believe. That is why they perceive them as enemies who deserve hatred and hostility and who must be transformed or excluded.
Such thinking requires a unified leadership and coherent organization so that no interruption can enter its beliefs. When this attitude is associated with a unified leadership and an organization similar to the military forces, authoritarianism is the least that can be expected from it. The identity that is gradually established in these people is the resistance against alteration, especially when there is an opposition to their ideology which poses an alternative to it. Modernity and its cultural values are the biggest alternatives and competitors of religious fundamentalism. However, fundamentalist groups want to benefit from all the tools and products of modernity and also resist absolutely against all its values and tolerate none of them. Beyond that, fundamentalists want the failure and annihilation of modernity because according to their ideology, it is a culture that moves societies away from human nature and what God has ordained.
Given that most of the participants are a minority in the community, they confess that they are defensive while explaining their beliefs. They feel they have lost their status which has the potential to impact all social, cultural, economic, and political structures based on their ideological worldview in post-revolutionary Iran. Therefore, it can be said that the participants have a defensive identity. They notice the criticisms in the community when explaining their opinions, and sometimes without any question asked in this regard, they seek to answer these doubts (in their own words).
The participants are caught in a paradoxical relationship between collective identity and their individuality. They must adhere to their collective beliefs and when speaking of their individuality, they define it within the framework of their religious, social, and family identity; they see no need for individual freedom in this regard. But in contrast, the development in their education leads to development in their individuality, and this results in a constant conflict between their collective identity and individuality. This often ends in suppressing and ignoring their individuality based on their religious beliefs. However, it is very difficult to establish a collective identity in the modern era, and their individuality overcomes many aspects of their collective identity although without them consciously and deliberately willing it. For this reason, as Bauman (1992, xxii) argued, their communities are imagined communities too.
Perhaps these kinds of organizations are imagined communities which each of their members joins with a different prospect, motivation, and conception. Joining these authoritarian organizations creates a social and psychological structure that is very difficult for them to leave. Even with the formation of aspects of individuality, due to its weakness and freshness, there is no ability to lift themselves out of the abyss of totalitarian collective identity. For this reason, their withdrawal often takes place after university in a silent way, because withdrawal by criticism could impose a high cost.
However, for Iran, if we accept that religious fundamentalism is far from a widespread social movement, it can be said that based on research findings (Herriot 2009; Weinberg and Ami 2004; Rabasa and Stacie 2010, 5; Dawe 2015) religious fundamentalism in Iran is mostly a personal approach, which is rooted in traditional-religious families. Nevertheless, due to diverse sources of knowledge in today’s Iranian society, religious beliefs and traditional social norms cannot continue in the minds of youths and students who are familiar with modern science. Signs of this issue can be seen in the debates between fundamentalist students and other non-fundamentalist ones, who can no longer offer their holy texts or religious leaders as the sole and ultimate justification for their claims to others. Faced with such debates, they have to practically accept that they should become familiar with modern science.
To summarize, as we have argued, in the conflict between secular academic thought and fundamentalist religious values which is supported organizationally, academic teachings could overwhelm and give strength to the individual. In other words, there is an internal conflict between secular academic teaching and religious values and beliefs which are supported officially. For the majority of university students, modern rational thinking has advantages over the dogmatic teaching of religion, especially in the extremist fundamentalist version. Accordingly, many college students avoid religious and political extremism and even oppose the official system. Everything suggests that values such as individualism, rationalism, freedom, and democracy are growing and expanding among students and fundamentalist groups may lose ground.
It can be concluded that individuals attracted to fundamentalist groups always live in paradoxical conditions. These groups and organizations ask their members to be sympathetic with their values, striving to keep them in the groups by giving them material privileges and support. In addition, with social changes, the observation of contradictions in the fundamentalist groups, the presence of the Internet, and exposure to different data and values, individuals’ mindsets and critical thinking abilities grow. Accordingly, individuality is reinforced in these individuals so that in their personal lives, they demand behavioral standards different from the formal values and norms of the groups and organizations. Since one does not want to lose the privileges of being a member of a group and paying the cost of changing their mindsets and behaviors, he/she must lead a double life.
Most of people will move away from these fundamentalist groups in the long run, but those remaining in them to continue to enjoy the benefits of membership that lead into a double life. That is, in private circles, family life, and communication with relatives and acquaintances, they have different and sometimes conflicting standards with the values of the fundamentalist groups, but in the workplace and in places where other members are involved, they are sympathetic with the groups’ values such as styles of dress, behaviors, and discourse. However, there are a small number of members of the fundamentalist groups whose thoughts and behaviors are consistent with the groups’ values and standards and do not have the intrinsic contradictions. The fact that people who are fully in tune with the values and principles of the group are in the minority reflects the predominance of individuality among people and the failure of the fundamentalist group to build a lasting collective identity.
