Abstract
In
Solving encountered problems through religion, however, does not necessarily make religious practices instrumental, but it does clue us into how religion works. People engage with their everyday world through different religious practices—interventionist, behavior-regulating and discursive ones and the many ways these are articulated (he identifies for the reader 120 variations)—to self-empower, i.e., “in order to realize some desired outcome that they believe they are unable to realize on their own (42–43, 28, 72). More fundamentally, religion “works because humans attribute the causes of certain life events and experiences to the intervening influence of superhuman powers” (189). This is to say, religion, as a system of religious practices, teaches people how to attribute meaning to things. It teaches people, as with other systems of social practices, how to think. That is, how to interpret based on observation and depending on the interpretation how to assess, reconsider, adjust, maintain, or change the meaning of things. This process of reflection (or more appropriately cognitive attribution), moreover, is subject, again as it is the case with other systems of social practices, to “cognitive lubricants”: biases (nine are identified), effects (nine are identified), and fallacies (three are identified) (see 180–89 on the varied lubricants). Yet, Smith reminds the reader that it is important to recognize that attribution is not the same as “deductive, inductive, or retroductive reasoning,” three other distinct modes of thinking (159). Religion is more about abductive reasoning, and less about the latter three, although all these modes of thinking/reasoning are not mutually exclusive. The difference, however, does not discount religion as a system of social practices that facilitates thinking.
Why does religion matter? To answer this question, Smith relies on social scientific and neuropsychological studies as well as philosophical insights. In the most basic sense, Smith proposes, religion is an ontological attribute of the human condition. It satisfies for many their nature as believing animals (213). Self-empowerment and the natural drive to realize “human goods” are two other answers (206). Religion makes it possible for the religious to realize their “innate human ends, needs, and desires” (232). As a cultural toolkit the religious rely on, it facilitates the flourishing of their hermeneutic, agentic, and creative capacities (see 208). Religion allows the religious to cope with their limitations, crises, and contingencies. “The most commonly hoped-for results of prayer,” for example, “are inner peace, help, insight, power, and support” (195). But Smith also elaborates on the obvious. Religion strengthens community (by providing senses of belonging, solidarity, and support). It is a source of group, personal, and social identity. It gives meaning to life and the social order. Far from being an outdated source of meaning, Smith notes, religion “can endow human commitments and actions with a depth, intensity, and tenacity normally not found in non-religious contexts—even when the means and processes by which religion inspires those actions are similar to those in non-religious contexts” (97). Religion also manifests itself as individual, interpersonal, and social control. It “silenc[es], disempower[s], and marginaliz[es]” (127). It gives legitimacy to institutions and the political order. But it also gives legitimacy to dissent. Lastly, religion is a motive force and a source of emotional energy that gives meaning to human subjectivity.
Why make a case for religion? Before answering this question, it is important to recognize that Smith does not set out to make sense of “religious conversion, religion and immigration, and religious radicalization” (262). He does not set out to make sense of “politics, inequality, or social movements” either (263). He simply sets out to make sense of “religion in and of itself” (263). This latter point, of course, begs the question: Why? Smith sets out to challenge secular biases against religion, the religious, and the practices the religious engage in. Significantly, he also aims to challenge, if indirectly, the secular prejudice found in the study of religion. Smith engages in these challenges so that we may be able to come to terms with religious phenomena much more accurately and satisfactorily. Two sentences in the appendix aptly capture this point: If the goal of social science is to comprehend the full range of activities, conditions, and occurrences in human social life in order to understand the world and our own experience in it … then religion in and of itself has ‘real’ importance and merits serious scholarly attention. I hope this book’s theory helps promote that end (263, italicization in the original)
