Abstract
This article tries to discuss this claim that Shia or as Henry Corbin puts it, “Iranian Islam,” is a discourse of political spirituality based on sacred suffering and governmentality (in Foucault's terms). The author aims to answer these questions: What do sacred suffering and governmentality mean in Shia discourse? How does sacred suffering articulate and give meaning to concepts related to political spirituality? To answer these questions, the author applied Laclau and Mouffe's discourse analysis, arguing that the sacred suffering constructs Shia antagonistic approach and plays a key role in constructing these discursive moments: the Karbala paradigm as a paradigm of both spirituality and political action, oppression, and martyrdom (as the holy death with spiritual-political goals). Moreover, in this discourse, the suffering of awaiting the Twelfth Imam during his absence becomes an opportunity to restore Shia governmentality through the establishment of a political government by Shia clerics in Iran.
Keywords
Introduction
From the viewpoint of Muslims, Islam is the religion of the word: “Read, in the name of your lord, who created” (Quran 96:1), and from the Shia viewpoint, it is only through the Imam that the divine word can be interpreted and manifested for people. But why the Imam?
The most important reason for the importance of the Imam in Shia discourse 1 is the belief in the “continuity” of the divine word after the end of prophecy, which can only be achieved through the Imam (as a special and divine chosen one). Corbin (2000, 290) calls Shia “dynamic prophecy” and “religion of the Velayat.” 2 He describes Shia as an esoteric religion since from the Shia point of view, the mission of Islam's Prophet was to convey revelation and divine word to the people, which ended with his death. Another dimension of the mission is the “interpretive mission,” which refers to the interpretation of the divine word and the re-articulation of its esoteric meaning by the Imam. From this point of view; “the Qur'an is a divine book, but it has an exoteric or apparent aspect (Zahir) and esoteric meaning (Batin). The Prophet has communicated the actual words of the Qur’an to the people, but its esoteric meaning remains a mystery, which can only be interpreted by the Imam who has divine knowledge” (Corbin, 28). So, from the Shia viewpoint; “The Quran is the silent word of Allah, which is given the voice by the Imam” (512), As Imam Ali (the first Imam) said: “I am who is the speaking Quran, the one that can reveal all of its secrets for people” (Ali Ibn Abu Talib 2002, 201). Javadi Amoli, one of the Shia theologians and Quran’s interpreter, states: “The Holy Quran is the word of God and it contains all secrets of the world, but it does not speak, and the Imam is infallible, who can interpret the Quran and be the orator of revelation for people in the present and future” (Javadi Amoli 1999, 102).
Another important feature of Shia discourse is that it is strongly tied to political elements, concepts, and meanings. From the viewpoint of Shiism, which Corbin calls “Iranian Islam,” the Imam expresses the actualization of the word of God. This only happens under a socio-political circumstance led and determined by the Imam. In this discourse, the divine word does not merely have a mystical meaning, but it contains socio-political meanings that require pragmatic socio-political actions by Shia followers. The basis of this discursive meaning system is the inseparable combination of political liberation and mystical spiritual salvation, an approach that Foucault called “political spirituality” and which Corbin referred to as Shia spirituality. 3
Accordingly, this article argues that sacred suffering is one of the most important concepts in Shia discourse, which constructs, gives meaning, and articulates political spirituality. Without understanding the meaning and position of sacred suffering, one cannot understand the concepts related to political spirituality and how to construct them. Hence, the author seeks to answer these questions: why suffering is important in the Shia discourse? How is the suffering sacralized in this discourse? What effect does sacred suffering have on the construction of the political and political spirituality in Shia?
To answer these questions, Henry Corbin's concept of “Iranian Islam,” Foucault's “political spirituality” and Carl Schmidt's "the political" are used. In addition, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse analysis method has been applied to identify and comprehend these issues: The nodal point of Shia discourse (as a main concept that regularizes and gives meaning to other signs), the articulation process (constructing a new meaning relationship among signs which turns elements into moments), the equivalence and difference chain (concepts that are articulated according to the same nodal point), and the constitutive outside (the process of constructing the other, as an enemy, according to Mouffe's approach).
Shia, a discourse of political spirituality?
Henry Corbin believes that Iranian Shiism has a special kind of spirituality, which he calls “Shia spirituality.” It is a spirituality that, like other religions and denominations, is based on salvation. However, the “doctrine of salvation” in Shia has two special characteristics: At first, it is only achievable through the presence of the Imam and Velayat: “Mere belief in God and the Prophet does not suffice, but one must believe in the continuity of the chain of prophecy (Nubuwwat) through Imamate and should believe in the manifestation of God in the heavenly manifestations of the fourteen infallible (the Prophet, his daughter Fatima, Ali and their eleven children and descendants) is a requirement of faith” (Corbin, 494).
Secondly, the doctrine of salvation in Shia is based on the combination of political liberation and spiritual salvation. The spiritual has socio-political characteristics and the political has been linked to the spiritual and even mystical elements. The Imam’s Velayat is the nodal point of this discourse: "The concept of Velayat represents the fundamental principle of the spiritual and political charisma in Shia that can be considered as the heart of Shia discourse that has kept Shia followers united for centuries. It is also the basis of Shia motivation for political and social actions” (Dakake 2007, 7). In this discourse, the Imam is simultaneously a religious authority, a political leader, and a spiritual leader of the Islamic society (Motahari 1989, 32). Hence, “the concept of Velayat represents a spiritual loyalty that connects and commits Shiism to God, the Prophet, the Imam, and the Shia community at the same time. This concept includes a strong spiritual connection between the Imam and his followers, and while it includes spiritual and religious dimensions, it also has considerable political motivations” (Dabashi 1989, 43).
Corbin states that the Shia doctrine of salvation is based on an important principle: “the belief in the Imam's divinely exegetic mission in interpreting the esoteric meaning of the Qur'an in the present and the future” (Corbin, 510). Shia spiritual jihad 4 is another dimension of this doctrine of salvation, which is based on the continuation of hope, faith, and waiting, especially in the absence of the Imam. This jihad sometimes requires patience, hope, and silent waiting, and sometimes it requires active socio-political action. This approach resulted in the formation of the first religious government led by Shia clerics in Iran. Thus, what Corbin calls the specific spirituality of Shiism is a doctrine of political spirituality, and the inseparable combination of the spiritual, the political, and social practice, it is not considered a paradoxical concept or an oxymoron 5 and even according to Foucault, it constructs “the final truth” in this discourse.
In his first encounter with the 1979 Iranian revolution, Foucault called it a revolution based on political spirituality, and although he did not provide a clear explanation of the concept, he believed that in this discourse, the spiritual (the subject that takes a form of being) represents political power because the spiritual is the construction of the subject through a set of political power relations (Carrette 1999, 153). He believes that political spirituality requires “governmentality,” which is a combination of the spiritual, the moral, and the political in a single concept. In other words, in a discourse, all three of these, as three semantic elements that are represented in a concept, serve the mechanisms, techniques, and procedures of constructing the “truth.” This truth operates through discourse and regimes of power, and controls bodies and constructs mindsets (Foucault 1972, 73).
Foucault associated spirituality with the concept of ethical self-discipline, which is deeply connected to politics. That is why he proposes the concept of “state governmentality” to describe the political spirituality of Iranian Shia: “Governance over the people is always accompanied by an innovative balance, with techniques that complement each other and are in conflict with each other. These techniques force the individual to self-improvement and reform, and it guarantees its processes” (Ghamari Tabrizi 2016, 106). He believes that the Shia religion, in particular, had been effective and successful in bringing about a fundamental change in the Iranians: “They urge the change in their lives by resorting to spirituality and spiritual experience that they think is found in Shia Islam. This religion was able to create a continuous and active political order, an order that continued with ethical self-discipline and the experience of worship” (Ghamari Tabrizi, 109). In Foucault's view, spirituality does not exist apart from political structures, requirements, and laws, and religion is constructed as a political force that places people under a certain system of control (Carrette 2000, 52). Hence, he does not accept the common duality for distinguishing between the spiritual and the political and believes that the spiritual can be placed in the political, where the spiritual is political and the political is spiritual, and both are dissolved in the power of discourse (Carrette, 140).
In addition, Foucault states that political spirituality must be understood based on a distinction between right and wrong: “How can one choose between the methods of distinguishing right from wrong?” “Finding a new basis for distinguishing right from wrong or the way of governing (the will to discover a different way of governing through different ways of differentiating and distinguishing right from wrong) is what I call political spirituality” (Foucault 1982, 790).
Therefore, to understand what political spirituality is and its relation to sacred suffering (which is inextricably linked to the Shia doctrine of salvation), we must begin with how one differentiates, otherizes, and constructs oneself and another in the Shia discourse.
Shia otherization: Antagonism or Agonism?
Like any other discourse system, Shia discourse is otherizing, but what is the basis of this otherization, and with what concepts? How is it elaborated? To answer this important question, one must resort to Foucault. He considers “discontinuity” as one of the most important features of discourse analysis (Foucault 1972, 79). Although he uses discontinuity mainly for genealogy, it is also used to identify an important principle in discourse. That is the answer to this question: what is the specific historical event(s) of the moment of discontinuity in a discourse? Why is this question important in discourse analysis? And why is the moment of discontinuity in discourse used to describe Shia otherization?
An important reason is an ontological approach to discourse analysis, which is based on deep realism and attention to the multi-layered nature of reality. Deep realism considers a retrodictive strategy as the best strategy for analyzing reality, which examined why and how reality occurs (based on its meaningful distinction from existing reality). In this approach, the main emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of the phenomenon in a particular time and place, and the researcher is asked to search for a process that leads him to the “dense historical moment,” that includes different and new meanings with meaningful distinctions from current reality. This moment (which can be a relevant event is the moment of discourse discontinuity and the emergence of rival discourse. It should be noted that in Foucault's approach, discontinuity does not mean absolute rupture, but rather a historical moment (or event or phenomenon) that constructs novel meanings or even contradicts the historical process that precedes it. At this moment, new claims of truth and different meaning systems are constructed that can even act as a counter-discourse to the existing discourse.
Therefore, to understand how the “other” is constructed in the Shia semantic system, one must consider the moment of its discourse discontinuity. According to many Shia figures, including Allamah Tabatabaei, this moment in the Islamic discourse is the Saqifa Bani Sa'ida incident. 6 Allamah Tabatabaei believes that the basis for the formation of Shia and the announcement of its existence is mixed with a political incident that took place in Saqifa during the dispute between Muslims over the succession of the Prophet (as the ruler) and the election of Abu-Bakr by the majority of Muslims to lead and rule over them. This succession approach was strongly criticized by Shia followers, who believed that it was not possible for ordinary people to choose a successor to the Prophet and that this was solely the responsibility of God and the Prophet. According to the Shia, the only legitimate successor to the Prophet is Ali and his eleven decedents, who were chosen by Allah Therefore, the principle of the caliphate, in their view, had an illegitimate and non-divine basis. According to Allamah Tabatabaei (1979, 30), this point of difference can be considered the basis for the formation of two denominations: the dominant majority (Sunnis) and the defeated minority (Shia) in the history of Islam. Ali Shariati, a Shia socio-political theorist, considers this difference as the distinguishing line between the two types: exploitative state Islam (Sunni) and the savior Alawite Islam (Shiism) (Shariati 2003, 183).
The basis of this differentiation (in Schmitt's words) is the basis for the construction of the political, or, in (Mouffe 2005, 21) words, the “constitutive outside.” According to Carl Schmitt, the basis of politics is the construction of an antagonistic relationship based on a clear distinction between self and other (as an enemy). In fact, by emphasizing the centrality of the friend-enemy relationship in politics, he believes that politics is closely related to the element of hostility and enmity, and it is built from the heart of this distinction (Mouffe 2005, 25). Schmitt emphasizes that the concepts of friend and foe are understood in a completely objective and real space, not just through metaphors and symbols. The enemy is not merely a rival or a party to the conflict in the general sense, nor is it a private enemy, but it is a hostile and a public enemy. The most severe and acute type of enemy is the political enemy. Each objective enemy becomes more political as it approaches the ultimate point of enmity (Schmitt 1996, 55).
Therefore, it can be said that in the Shia discourse, this logic of distinction has constructed a completely antagonistic (and not agonistic) approach. “When we accept that every identity is relational and that the condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation of a difference, the determination of ‘the other’ that is going to play the role of a 'constitutive outside,' it is possible to understand how antagonisms arise” (Mouffe 2005, 25).
In Laclau's opinion, there are two criteria that define constitutive outside or radical exclusion: it has no “common measure with the ‘inside’” (Mouffe 1993, 18), and it is not ‘simply one more, neutral element but an excluded one, something that the totality expels from itself in order to constitute itself… (Mouffe 2005, 70). In other words, “radical exclusion refers to an unreachable outside and an act of exclusion” (Kitus 2019, 1239).
From the Shia point of view, there is no possibility of bargaining over the issue of the Imamate (as a divine matter and outside the will of ordinary human beings). Disagreeing with this principle means mere opposition and enmity. In this view, the basis of the distinction between us and them is not merely a conflict between two social views or a simple political disagreement; Shiism considers this distinction (in Mouffe 2005, 6 words) “a kind of moral confrontation between good and evil and a confrontation between moral values in which the other is not a rival but an enemy.” According to Dakak, an American Islamologist, acknowledging Velayat in the Shia view has been accompanied by acknowledging hatred and enmity, which leads to an absolute “black and white approach” within the Islamic community itself (Dakake 2007, 32), This Shia antagonistic approach is manifested in the principle of “Tawala-Tabbara,” 7 which is not only a distinction between oneself and another, it also means declaring absolute loyalty to oneself and open hatred toward the other—an approach that Mortada Motahari (1989, 76) interprets as “an inescapable necessity” to determine his position and not to be indifferent to “right and wrong” (Motahari 1989, 76).
Mouffe states that understanding how “they” and “'constitutive outside” is constructed in a discourse helps us comprehend why and how they are otherized. Because they are our constitutive outside and represent the condition and process of our meaning construction, the construction of a particular “us” is always dependent on those who are distinctive, and this distinction defines the discourse (Mouffe 1993, 21). The cruel “other” means the easier and deeper representation of this distinction, especially when this distinction, according to Mouffe, is based on absolute moral principles (oppressor-oppressed, aggressor, infallible). It must be pointed out that the basis of many of these radical meaning distinctions in Shia discourse is the very important concept of the oppressed and the construction of the oppressor-oppressed antagonist.
The oppressed a discursive moment
The oppressed-hood, in this view, has a completely political background that is directly related to the discontinuity of Shia discourse, and in fact, is the basis of otherization. According to many Shia scholars (Ulama), including Allamah Tabatabaei, Dakake, and Mahmoud Ayub, the starting point of this oppressed-hood is the incident of Saqifa and the election of Abu-Bakr as the successor of the Prophet and the ruler of the Islamic society (Tabatabaei 1979, 30). It was an obvious and unforgivable injustice to the family of the Prophet, even to the Prophet himself and the whole world of Islam (Dakake, 4).
According to Shia doctrine, the “election” of the ruler of the Islamic society by the Muslims is the beginning of a process of “oppression” and the violation of the “divine right” of the true rulers who were “divinely appointed.” From the Shia point of view, this right is socio-political, religious, and spiritual, because the Imam, unlike the caliph, is responsible for both the social, political, spiritual, and mystical leadership of Muslims and their salvation. Hence, all Imams share the sacred suffering they have endured with the aim of redeeming the Islamic Ummah 8 (Ayub 1979, 16).
This deprivation and suffering begin with Ali as the first Shia Imam who is Amir al-Mu'minin 9 and has a mythical and very special place in Shia discourse. From this point of view, he was a warrior, a nobleman, an unrivaled scholar whom the Prophet called the “gateway to knowledge” (Majlisi 2010, 56). He was a unique orator, a politician with morals, and at the same time a mystic who did not care about the world, on whose will the sun returned from the west (Koleini 1997, 346). For the Shia, Ali is a symbol of humanity and the first Imam to bear the burden of suffering of oppression: “I waited and suffered, and I saw with my own eyes that my heritage was being plundered” (Ali Ibne Abu Talib 2002, 310). And “there is no house of the Arabs, except that they are a place where I have been oppressed and my right is on their shoulders, and I have always been oppressed since I sat here” (317).
In addition to Ali, his wife Fatima (the daughter of the Prophet) also shares this suffering. Fatemeh, who described the current situation (the Imam's deprivation from governing) as “a sharp dagger and stabbing a spear in the abdomen” (Fadkiyeh sermon), is the first person to protest and speak in the mosque and then mourn in Beit al-Ahzan (the house of sorrow) as a symbol of belonging to the oppressed. The protest then ends due to her tragic death (which Shia followers believe was due to physical and psychological harm inflicted by other Muslims) (Ayub 1979, 34).
However, in this discourse, the person who became the symbol of oppression is Hussein, the second child of Ali and Fatima, who made the first actual protest against the existing political system. Shia called this the “Ashura Uprising” which led to the brutal killing of Hussein and all his companions. “He (and all the Imams after him) were oppressed and tragically killed because he was left ‘alone' by the socio-political activists of the Islamic community, something that had happened to his father Ali before” (Fuller 1991, 21). From the Shia point of view, Muslims are responsible for not helping the Imam and leaving him, who aimed to establish an Islamic society and facilitate justice” (Fuller, 22). Hence, in this discourse, the oppression of the Imam is related to a kind of inactivity and socio-political indifference of Muslims and their disregard for the fate of society. Hence, the concept of oppression for Shiism has been a stimulus for political and radical action, while also representing anger and a strong desire for revenge. George Jordac calls this approach the “emotion of sorrow and anger.” “Shia has two strong and evident emotions that are the source of Shia epic literature: the emotion of anger, sadness, and grief. Their anger is because they believe that their Imams have been deprived of their divine and political rights through oppression and enmity” (Jardac 2007, 56).
This combination of grief, anger, revenge, and socio-political activism has become a paradigm that Fischer calls the “Karbala paradigm.” It is not just a sort of collective religious ritual, but it is a kind of semantic motivation for constructing the socio-political practices in Shiism (Fischer 2003, 6). He, on the other hand, considers it an effective approach for constructing and raising political awareness and believes that the Karbala paradigm is, above all, a cultural and meaningful structure (Fischer, 11).
The Karbala paradigm
The incident of Ashura and mourning for it is the apex of emotional eruption that focuses on the commitment to the “pure truth” and confronting and fighting the corrupt and oppressive tyranny (Fischer 2003, 16). In this meaning system, Hussein is a symbol of the truth, spirituality, and the oppressed, and mourning for what happened to him on Ashura is the representation of the Shia collective effervescence that reproduce the Shia collective life, consciousness, and conscience. Durkheim states: “The spread of religious symbols and images in society causes the collective emotions based on these symbols to excite during the mourning rituals and make these symbols and collective feelings permanent. It is alive, active, and in daily contact with individuals, even when there is no ritual, to Re-establish a connection and reproduce and strengthen their position and responsibility towards the religious community which is the source of their identity and practice.” (Durkheim 2005, 302).
Thus, Fischer emphasizes that as a paradigm, Karbala models and creates a value-based and emotional framework for demarcating oneself and others, and for socio-political activism. It constructs an approach that Fischer calls the “behavior model,” according to which Shia should behave (Fischer, 21).
From Fischer’s viewpoint, there is a hermetic, recursive quality to the Karbala paradigm that can be expanded or elaborated: “Believers are witnesses (Shuhada) through their acts of worship ('Ibadat) to the metaphysical reality which is hidden (Gha'ib). This is the meaning of the Karbala paradigm. Note the play with the words. Shuhada means both martyrs and witnesses. Husayn, knowing he would die, went to Karbala to witness the truth, knowing that his death would make him a martyr—an enduring, immortal witness, whose example would be a guide for others. Gha'ib refers to a series of inner truths: a God who is not visible, a twelfth Imam who is in occultation, a personal inner faith, and the special light that created Muhammad, 'Ali, Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn. Ibadat is the formal acts of worship such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage; furthermore, it is the ten items of foru' id- din or religious duties: the five daily formal prayers (namaz, salat), the fast in Ramadan, the one-fifth tax (Khums), alms (zakat), the hajj, the defense of the faith Uihad), the urging of people to do good (Amr bi-ma'ruf), the dissuading from evil (nahy az munkar), the defense of those who support the message of God and the Imams Ttawalla), and the avoidance of or fighting against those who are the enemies of God and the Imams Ttabarra). Worship is everything a Muslim does. For Iman is not just faith or conviction, it is also professing with the tongue and acting according to the principles of Islam” (Fischer 2003, 26).
This is a model and paradigm that is considered a meta-narrative, which is beyond time and history. This Shia belief is well represented in this slogan: “the whole days are Ashura; the whole lands are Karbala.” According to Ali Shariati, it means trying to turn the tragedy of Karbala and the martyrdom of Hussein into a permanent revolutionary and radical practice in Iranian Shiism (Shariati 2003, 22),
In this discourse system, mourning is a meaningful moment (not an element) to represent the two concepts of oppressor and oppressed, and although the oppressor is still in the discourse of Islam, it is considered a symbol of absolute evil that is opposed to divine good and light. This antagonistic distinction has several important features:
First, it is based on anger and hatred of the “oppressors” and is completely irreconcilable, as the Shia believers say in Ashura supplication (Ziarat of Ashura 10 ): “O Hussein, may Allah curse the people who laid the basis of persecution and wrong against you, O Members of the Household. May Allah curse the people who drove you away from your position and removed you away from the ranks that Allah has put you in. May Allah curse the people who slew you. I ask God to keep me beside the leader coming from Mohammed’s family to take revenge. O Aba-`Abdullah, 11 I do seek nearness to Allah, to His Messenger, to the Commander of the Faithful, to Fatimah, to al-Hasan. I am at peace with you and I am at war against your enemies and murderers” (Qomi 2011, 98).
Secondly, this distinction constructs hope for the promised reappearance of the Mahdi, who is the last Imam of the generation of Ali and Fatima (Ayub 1979, 10), and thirdly, this mourning, according to Khomeini, is a spiritual political issue: “Keeping Ashura alive is a very important political-religious issue. Mourning for a martyr who gave everything in the way of Islam is a political issue … because our imams, with their divine vision, wanted to mobilize Shia followers… so that they would not be vulnerable” (Khomeini 2009, 66). The former Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi refers to the “mourning tactic” and Muharram mourning used by revolutionaries as a tactic to form and spread the Iranian revolution and calls it “shameless exploitation of someone’s death for political purposes” (Pahlavi 1980, 331).
It should be noted the Karbala paradigm plays a great role in articulating another empty signifier (element) into an important moment in the Shia discourse. This paradigm articulates death as an empty signifier (as a natural and biological event) into a meaningful and purposeful moment: martyrdom, the sacred, and purposeful death.
The Culture of Martyrdom
In the Shia semantic system, martyrdom means conscious and voluntary death and has two important semantic dimensions. First, death by martyrdom means a kind of practical testimony of complete faith (Makarem Shirazi 2008, 424). Secondly, martyrdom is an important way for achieving political and social goals: “There are days in the history of nations on which without self-sacrifice and altruism, the dangers are not eliminated and the holy goals are not preserved. This is where the group of altruistic believers must come to the fore. In the logic of Islam, such people are called “martyrs” (Tabatabaei 2001, 21).
This concept is still articulated around the Infallible Imam, who is just, oppressed, and martyred, as Corbin says: “The metaphysical dimension of the Shia Imam reaches its peak with the concept of martyrdom” (Corbin 2000, 530). In fact, in this semantic system, death as an empty signifier becomes not only purposeful but also includes a sacred meaning. This sacred meaning, like other concepts in this discourse, is inextricably linked to its political dimensions. It is noteworthy that one of the most famous slogans of the Iranian revolution, invented by Khomeini, is the slogan “Blood is victorious over the sword.” Blood and the sword are symbols to represent the two implicit concepts of oppressor and oppressed in an unequal battle. Blood, in this semantic system, is not a biological factor but has a highly sacred meaning that represents jihad, self-sacrifice, and salvation. Khomeini describes martyrdom with the following words: “Great victory,” “divine success,” “eternal redemption,” “guide to nations,” “eternal pride,” “the peak of servitude and conduct in the spiritual world,” “divine gifts for worthy people,” “freedom of the soul,” “release from prison,” “victory factor,” “sweeter than honey,” etc. (Khomeini 2002, 70-95)
The concept of martyrdom has completely been affected by the discourse of Karbala, a discourse that makes some concepts equivalent—such as uprising and jihad, reformism, the salvation of the Ummah, encouraging the good and forbidding evil, and consciously and eagerly accepting death and martyrdom. In this context and the political discourse of the current Iranian government, the concept of “martyrdom culture” has been constructed by Khomeini, which is a concept of political spirituality. He defines this concept as “not compromising with tyrants and oppressive governments,” “fighting against falsehood,” “self-sacrifice,” “determination and firm belief,” “putting others before oneself,” “distancing oneself from worldliness and welfare,” “sacrificing oneself for the reform of society, and the rule of religion and justice,” and “death with honor in the way of God” (Corbin 2000, 34).
Waiting for promised Mahdi; Suffering and opportunity together
Corbin calls Shiism “the dynamic prophecy” because of the belief in the continuity of the divine word through the guardianship of the Imam. He believes that Shia spirituality requires hope for the future and waiting for a promised savior that will reveal the truth and the inner essence of all divine religions (Corbin 2000, 151). Although waiting for the savior in this semantic system represents spiritual political suffering and deprivation, it also has other features that are meaningful in this semantic system:
First, in this discourse, waiting for the savior's appearance is semantically related to the concept of hope (hope for a future that will surely happen), and for this reason, Shia calls it “Intizar al-Faraj” (awaiting the relief and liberation by the last Imam). 12 To describe this hope, Corbin uses the concept of “spiritual jihad,” which means that Shia followers must fight on several fronts simultaneously and that Shia identity depends on these battles. The most important dimension of this battle is hope for the future despite difficult circumstances. To describe what he calls the “essence and basis of the Shia spirit,” he uses the concept of “confident hopelessness” 13 and emphasizes that in this meaning system, the perfect Shia is a believer who in all circumstances keeps believing in Velayat and hoping for the advent of the savior (Corbin, 277).
Secondly, waiting and hoping are accompanied by a severe emotional eruption revolving around the absent Imam, because he is “the owner and guardian of time” (Vali-asr), “the best divinely chosen one,” “the flag of religion,” “the remainder of Allah on earth,” (Baqiyyatullah), “the eradicator of the oppressors,” “the only hope for the destruction of oppression,” “the reviver of religion,” “the destroyer of the transgressors,” “the destroyer of polytheism,” and “the seeker of the revenge for Karbala.” 14 He is the promised savior who, according to the Prophet: “He is me and another Muhammad and the one who ends the Imamate, just as Muhammad was the one who ended the prophethood (Corbin, 154).
Third, hoping and waiting in this discourse are articulated in a purely antagonistic sense. The basis of this awaiting is the wrath and sorrow caused by the deprivation of the Imams of their divine right to rule, which led to their oppression and, as a result, the absence of the last Imam. Hence, Shia followers are waiting for a savior to establish justice in the world and an “avenger” to wreak severe revenge on the perpetrators of the oppression and historical deprivation of the Shia believers and their Imams, as they pray every Friday morning in Dua Nudba 15 : “Where is the avenger who demands the blood of the murder of prophets and their decendants? Where is he avenger of the blood of the martyr of Karbala?” (Qomi 2011, 102).
Fourth, the period of absence and waiting is “the most difficult and critical period in the history of Shiism” (Modarresi Tabatabaei 1993, 25), which is due to the crisis and the riddle of the leadership of society. However, some Shia Ulama 16 turned this crisis into a golden opportunity to establish a religious government led by Shia jurists in Iran. In fact, from the Shia point of view, all worldly governments are usurped due to the usurpation of the position of the Infallible Imam, and as a result, they are illegitimate and invalid.
However, there are two general approaches formed in connection with the formation of the government during the absence of the savior:
Following the principle of Taqiya 17 (the concealment of religious beliefs) is an important factor. Furthermore, Shia believers have no duty to establish a government during the era of occultation 18 and they only have to follow the jurisprudential orders and individual rules of Islam. 19 On the other hand, Shia followers believe that according to the rule of enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil, oppressive governments should be destroyed and the leadership of society should be entrusted to a knowledgeable jurist (Faqih), who is in fact “the representative of the absent imam and promised savior” (Desroche 1979, 87).
The proponents of the latter approach are Usulis, the majority of the Twelver Shi'a Muslim group. They differ from their now much smaller rival, the Akhbari group, in favoring the use of ijtihad (reasoning) in the creation of new rules of Fiqh 20 (Islamic jurisprudence). An important tenet of Usuli doctrine is Taqlid or “imitation.” 21 These higher religious authorities can be known as a “source of imitation”(marja taqlid). Taqlid has been introduced by scholars who felt that Quranic verses and traditions were not enough and that the ulama were needed not only to interpret the Quran and Sunna but to make “new rulings to respond to new challenges and push the boundaries of Shia law in new directions” (Nasr 1960, 69).
The most important reason for the supporters of this approach is to avoid inactivity, the necessity of implementing the rules of Islam, and trying to provide the conditions for the emergence of the absent Imam, who was able to expand this doctrine by increasing social, political, and economic influence. One of the important factors of this increase (for both groups, of course), was the influence of increasing the economic power of Shia religious scholars by establishing and popularizing the issue of purifying property through paying zakat 22 (financial obligation) and khums 23 (Imam's financial share) to Shia clerics (Tabatabaei 1979, 123). The combination of this great economic power with the gradual formation of the “institution of Marja” caused a number of clerics to be known as marja taqlid or the representative of the absent Imam. This was a serious introduction to the “Vilāyat al-Faqīh” approach, which denotes the official rule of the faqih as the representative of the absent Imam. In Desroche's words: “The jurist, by acknowledging a kind of representation, has no claim to be a savior, but he claims to be a representative of the true and final promised savior” (Desroche 1979, 87). This approach was first proposed by Imam Khomeini and implemented in Iran after the 1979 revolution.
Khomeini argued that Faqih should not only get involved in politics but must take over the power of the government and rule society. He believed that monarchy or any other kind of government is a “system of heresy” and Muslims must destroy it: “Our obeying Islamic jurists as the holders of true authority is the obedience to God. So, because of preserving Islam, Vilāyat al-Faqīh is more necessary than prayer and fasting (Khomeini 2009, 57).
It seems that similar to Shia religious economy that “purifies” properties through Khums and zakat, Shia religious politics seeks to purify the government by proposing Vilāyat al-Faqīh as the representatives of the absent Imam. This is because this political approach, which has established strong ties with the spiritual approaches of Shiism, still believes in the illegitimacy of the world governments due to the usurpation of the position of the Imam. However, the presence of the faqih, as the representative of the absent Imam and the one who is supposed to fight oppression and deliver the government to the last Imam, “purifies” the illegitimacy of the governments.
Therefore, in his book Vilāyat al-Faqīh, which can be considered a manifesto of the rule of the faqih, Khomeini (2009, 27) emphasized that “the establishment of a non-Islamic political system and any political system other than Islam means polytheism, and we must remove polytheism from the Muslim community. Moreover, more than a thousand years have passed since the absence of the Imam, and another hundred thousand years may pass, and it is not clear when the absent Imam may arrive, yet should the rules of Islam remain undone for so long?” He stated that the purpose of establishing the government of jurists is “laying the groundwork for the emergence of the promised Mahdi and handing over this government to him” (Khomeini 2009, 38). He believed the establishment of a political government under a Shia jurist leadership is “a divine duty” to “eliminate the oppression of all the oppressors,” “to support the oppressed of the world,” and “to pave the way for the emergence of the Hidden Imam.” He quoted Imam Ali: “I accepted the government because God has made a commitment to the jurists of Islam and obliged them not to remain silent when faced with looting oppressors, and hungry and deprived of the oppressed” (Khomeini 2009, 345). Thus, waiting for the advent of the savior is the greatest suffering and crisis of the Shia community. Waiting can be merged with the elements of the political spirituality of this discourse, and it can become an opportunity for establishing a government in Iran.
Conclusion
Shiism is a discourse of political spirituality in which the Imamate is a nodal point that constructs governmentality. The Imam is a point for the accumulation of the spiritual, the moral, and the political. Therefore, he has authority over Muslims. From the viewpoint of Shia believers, the Imam is the chosen by God, the silent voice of the Quran, and the carrier of the Quran's esoteric meaning. He is a unique person who maintains divine words in the present and future. One of the important features of this discourse is the fusion of the spiritual and the political with sacred suffering. It is based on the moment of discursive discontinuity, which is a wide-ranging confrontation between the two mechanisms of selection and appointment. This confrontation is the basis for the construction of Shia discourse, which is born out of socio-political suffering and deprivation and is therefore a type of protest and demand. What creates sacred suffering is the disruption of the governmentality process in Islamic society, which can only be achieved through the guardianship of the Infallible Imam.
In this discourse, there is a similarity between the regime of truth and the structure of governmentality, upon which Shia political spiritual identity (and the definition of self and other) is established. Hence, the Shia approach to constructing the other is highly antagonistic. In this discourse, the constitutive outside, while being in the discourse of Islam, is considered an outsider because of not believing in the truth of the Imam and preventing the realization of his rule. Salvation and redemption in this discourse are linked to the spiritual and the political, and concepts such as martyrdom, oppression, and waiting for the savior, which are all based on sacralized suffering, while being spiritual, are highly political. This is why in this discourse, the uprising of Ashura becomes a paradigm for constructing meaning and action, a paradigm of meaning in which it is not possible to separate the spiritual and the political.
While Hussein is a martyr and a mediator in the transmission of divine grace, he is a political activist who protests against wrongdoers. That is why mourning for him is a recurring ritual and a continuous process of constructing spiritual-political sorrow, wrath, protest, and hope. This hope is the sweet suffering of Shiism during the absence of the last Imam and waiting for the promised arrival. The promised savior is the remnant of the divine word and the revealer of the mysteries of all the holy books. He shall destroy oppression in the world. He is the political leader who will establish Mahdavi's utopia. In this regard, the formation of the Islamic government in Iran under the leadership of the jurist as the representative of the hidden Imam is a historic opportunity and an attempt to continue Shia rule. It is the Imam, who has spiritual and political guardianship over Muslims, but during his absence, the faqih finds guardianship on behalf of the Imam, and therefore, he has Vilāyat al-Faqīh.
Yet the question remains that despite the formation of a Shia political government in Iran, the issue of sacred suffering still stands: does the Islamic Republic of Iran still need to sacralize suffering? How is sacred suffering constructed and represented in this new discourse of political spirituality?
ORCID iD
Zahra Khoshk Jan https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9800-4357