Translating the Biblical Hebrew Word Nephesh in Light of New Research

Introduction

The way we translate the Bible is based on our way of doing exegesis. Every translation is an interpretation, but every translation is also based on interpretation. This may be an axiom, but nevertheless an axiom worth stating every now and then to remind us why we translate the way we do. If our exegesis in some respect changes, then the way we translate the Bible should change.

In 1976, Heber Peacock, a United Bible Societies translation coordinator for Africa, published an article in The Bible Translator called “Translating the Word for ‘Soul’ in the Old Testament” (Peacock 1976). In the short but informative article, Peacock discusses how the Biblical Hebrew word נֶפֶשׁ‎ (nephesh) should be translated. ¹ As noted by Peacock, traditionally the word had been translated “soul” (or with corresponding words in other languages, such as German “Seele” or French “âme”). This was the standard rendering in almost every Bible translation up until the middle of the twentieth century. But when Peacock wrote his article, something had changed. Peacock notes that the word נפשׁ‎ occurs more than 750 times in the Hebrew Bible, but, he says, “only in a few of these places is the translation ‘soul’ an adequate translation of what the Hebrew text means” (216). What he states here is a neat illustration of an idea in biblical scholarship that was full-blown at the time. This is the assertion that the anthropology of the Bible does not contain any dualistic (body–soul) or trichotomic (body–soul–spirit) conceptions. The Bible, it was said, knows nothing about a human “soul” in contrast to the human body. Instead, human beings are perceived in the Bible as monistic totalities, where different parts or aspects of humans together constitute an indivisible unity. These ideas have had a direct bearing on how to interpret and translate the word נפשׁ‎.

In this paper, I aim to give a background to Peacock’s paper and to his exegesis of נפשׁ‎. This is not because Peacock’s paper in itself merits such an interest, but because his statements are so representative for his time. Furthermore, my intention is to discuss in what ways these presuppositions have been challenged by recent research, and in what ways this affects the question of how we should translate נפשׁ‎. As I will argue, recent interpretations of Hebrew Bible linguistic evidence point out new directions for the understanding of נפשׁ‎. Thus, if the interpretation of נפשׁ‎ changes, this should affect our way of translating נפשׁ‎.

I will start the paper with a survey of the monistic נפשׁ‎ paradigm of Peacock’s time. I will then summarize how this is reflected in Peacock’s article, and in the examples he draws from different parts of the Hebrew Bible. I will then present an extensive amount of recent research on נפשׁ‎ that questions the presuppositions of the monistic paradigm. I will then re-examine Peacock’s examples and arguments in light of this research. Some concluding remarks will end the paper.

1. “The unity of human nature”—monistic interpretations of נפשׁ‎ in twentieth-century biblical scholarship

In a 1974 article in the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, French scholar Edmond Jacob stated the following:

Older distinctions between dichotomy and trichotomy must be abandoned so far as OT anthropology is concerned. Israelite anthropology is monistic. Man is always seen in his totality, which is quickened by a unitary life. The unity of human nature is not expressed by the antithetical concepts of body and soul but by the complementary and inseparable concepts of body and life. (Jacob 1974, 631)

This is a concise summary of a view of Hebrew Bible anthropology held by virtually every biblical scholar of the time. At the time of Jacob’s article, the widely influential work The Anthropology of the Old Testament by German scholar Hans Walter Wolff was published. In the introduction, Wolff said that the traditional renderings of Hebrew anthropological terms, such as “soul” for נפשׁ‎, gave rise to “misunderstandings . . . which have important consequences,” since “they lead in the false direction of a dichotomic or trichotomic anthropology, in which body, soul and spirit are in opposition to another” (1974, 7).

When it comes to נפשׁ‎, the consequence of these ideas was that the term should not be interpreted as an entity or essence that could be separated from the human body, as the translation “soul” implies. Such a translation automatically made the reader think of Plato’s dualistic differentiation between body and soul. This was not, it was being said, the Bible’s way of putting things. Israelite anthropology was not characterized by any such dichotomies. The word נפשׁ‎, then, should be understood as designating the whole human being or the whole person, the person as such. Thus, Edmond Jacob stated that “נֶפֶשׁ‎ is the usual term for a man’s total nature, for what he is” (1974, 620). Put differently, the Hebrew Bible does not acknowledge the idea that נפשׁ‎ is something human beings have—it is instead something they are. As Wolff put it, “man does not have n[epeš], he is n., he lives as n.” (1974, 10). British exegete Aubrey Johnson stated in his turn that נפשׁ‎ indicates “the complete personality as a unified manifestation of vital power,” and that it represents what Johnson calls “the grasping of totality” (1961, 2; see also Johnson 1964). This is an interpretation of the meaning of נפשׁ‎ that can be termed monistic, since it perceives נפשׁ‎ as a term that refers to the whole human being as such, in his or her “totality.” In the words of Matthew Suriano, the generation of scholars referred to above understood נפשׁ‎ as “a monistic entity consisting of a unified soul and body” (Suriano 2018, 136).

At the time of Peacock’s article, this was the general consensus among scholars as to how the term נפשׁ‎ should be interpreted, and in a broader sense what constituted Hebrew Bible anthropology. Thus, New Testament scholar Robert Gundry commented the same year as Peacock’s article that “we confront a current understanding of OT anthropology by now so common that its maxims need no quotation marks” (1976, 118–19). As noted by Gundry, virtually every biblical scholar at the time agreed about these ideas, and hence about how to interpret נפשׁ‎ (for an extended discussion of the exegetical consensus on נפשׁ‎ at this time, see Pleijel 2019).

2. Monistic interpretations of נפשׁ‎ in Peacock’s article

Moving back to Peacock, the ideas referred to above are clearly present in his article. It is evident for example in the following quote:

In a number of passages in the Old Testament it is clear that “soul” or “life” is not something that man possesses. The idea, rather, is that man as a whole is life; he is a living thing. This means that often the word for “soul” will have to be translated as “person” or “being.” This is quite clear in such verses as Genesis 2:7. (Peacock 1976, 219)

In the article, Peacock discusses how נפשׁ‎ should be translated under a number of different headings. These headings are: (1) “throat,” (2) “breath,” (3) “neck,” (4) “want/desire,” (5) “the center of man’s feelings” / “his state of mind,” (6) “life,” (7) “person/being,” and (8) “man/mankind.” Under each of these headings he discusses two to three instances from different biblical books where נפשׁ‎ according to his opinion has the meaning of the heading in question. For all biblical quotes, he gives the translations of KJV, RSV, and NEB. Generally, the NEB translation is favoured by Peacock.

What I want to discuss here is not the first three headings. That נפשׁ‎ in a number of instances has these meanings is not in dispute. What I want to discuss is those other headings where Peacock interprets נפשׁ‎ in line with the exegetical consensus of his time that נפשׁ‎ is not something human beings have, but something they are. I will refer to Peacock’s discussion of the different instances, generally giving the translation of NEB, since this is obviously the one preferred by Peacock in the sense that, according to him, it conveys the source text’s sense most correctly in the most idiomatic way. The Hebrew text within brackets is added by me. The italics are Peacock’s.

Under heading number (4), “want/desire,” Peacock mentions Deut 14.26; Prov 21.10; and Ps 42.1[2]. Deuteronomy 14.26 is translated, “whatever you desire [אשׁר־תאוה נפשׁך‎].” For Prov 21.10, NEB translates, “the wicked man [נפשׁ רשׁע‎] is set on evil,” and Ps 42.1[2] is translated, “so do I [נפשׁי‎] long for thee, O God.” Peacock comments on Ps 42.1[2]: “Even in many passages where the object of the desiring is God, it is not some part of man which longs after or thirsts for God. Rather, the word for ‘soul’ is used to express man’s total desiring; it is man himself who longs for God” (218).

For heading number (5), “the center of man’s feelings” / “his state of mind,” Peacock uses the examples of Exod 23.9; 2 Sam 5.8; and Jer 13.17. Exodus 23.9 reads in the NEB translation: “you know how it feels [ידעתם את־נפשׁ‎] to be a stranger.” In 2 Sam 5.8, according to Peacock the נפשׁ‎ is “thought of as the center for all kinds of feelings, including such things as hatred and mourning” (218). Thus, the translation of KJV, “who are hated by David’s soul [נפשׁ דוד‎],” is misleading, as compared to that of NEB, “David’s bitter enemies.” Peacock comments, “You will note that NEB changes the focus and translates the idea without using a word for some inner part of man. The whole man is involved in the feeling” (218). This also goes for Jer 13.17, “I [נפשׁי‎] can only weep.”

Under heading number (6), Peacock discusses instances where it is reasonable to translate נפשׁ‎ with “life”: Ps 30.3[4]; Prov 7.23; and Deut 12.23. For Ps 30.3[4], NEB gives the translation, “thou has brought me [נפשׁי‎] up from Sheol,” for Prov 7.23, “he was risking his life [נפשׁו‎],” and for Deut 12.23, “the blood is the life [הדם הוא הנפשׁ‎].” In all three passages it is, according to Peacock, clear that “the word for ‘soul’ can only mean life itself” (218). Next, heading number (7) is dedicated to instances where נפשׁ‎ should be translated “person/being.” Two examples are given: Gen 2.7 and Lev 17.10. NEB translates, “man became a living creature [נפשׁ חיה‎]” and “set my [i.e., YHWH’s] face against the eater [בנפשׁ האכלת‎].” In Lev 17.10, when translating נפשׁ‎, “some word like ‘person’ must be used in translation if the meaning is to be made clear” (219). Finally, under heading number (8) are found instances of נפשׁ‎ that according to Peacock should be translated “man/mankind” or “animals.” The examples given are from Lev 24.17-18 and Gen 46.15. NEB renders, “when one man [אישׁ‎] strikes another [כל־נפשׁ אדם‎] and kills him” (Lev 24.17), “whoever strikes a beast [נפשׁ־בהמה‎] and kills it” (Lev 24.18), and “his sons [כל־נפשׁ בניו‎]” (Gen 46.15). A concluding example of an instance when נפשׁ‎ should be translated as a personal pronoun is given: “that I [נפשׁי‎] may give you my blessing” (Gen 27.4 NEB).

Under these five different headings, Peacock has gathered a number of נפשׁ‎ instances from different biblical books of different genres and ages. In the instances discussed, there is, according to Peacock’s interpretation, no differentiation whatsoever between the נפשׁ‎ and the person that is connected to or with the נפשׁ‎; they are one and the same. Peacock’s discussion of all of these instances is thus a good summary of the exegetical consensus of his time, namely that נפשׁ‎ refers to human beings as such, and not to some kind of entity or essence that can be separated from the human body. However, as I will argue in the next section, this is precisely the case in a number of נפשׁ‎ instances in the Hebrew Bible.

3. Peacock’s examples reconsidered

In recent years, the monistic “totality” interpretation of נפשׁ‎, taking this term to refer to human beings as such, has been called into question by a number of scholars. Already in the beginning of the 1990s, James Barr questioned the monistic “totality” interpretation of נפשׁ‎ in a number of psalms where the supplicant is addressing his own נפשׁ‎ (Barr 1993, 38–39; he contends that the נפשׁ‎ in these cases may be understood as “an entity which is associated with [the supplicant’s] psychosomatic unity but in some sense is also outside it, independent of it”). Over against the idea that the anthropology of the Hebrew Bible is solidly monistic, in several recent publications Christian Frevel has discussed a number of instances where there seem to be “traces of dichotomic conceptualization” (Frevel 2012, 224 n. 106; 2016, 191–92). ² Furthermore, in his 2015 book Disembodied Souls, Richard Steiner makes a strong case that the ancient Israelites could perceive of the נפשׁ‎ as being in some respect separated and separable from the human body, thus the very opposite of the נפשׁ‎ being identical to a person. As argued by Matthew Suriano (2018, 136), in a number of instances the body and the נפשׁ‎ seem in fact to be “separable entities.” In the following, I will reconsider the examples given by Peacock, drawing on the recent scholarship mentioned above, trying throughout to suggest new renderings for נפשׁ‎ that better reflect the recent insights of scholarship. In the discussion, I will follow Peacock’s own order (cf. above).

What Deut 14.26, Prov 21.10, and Ps 42.2 ³ have in common is, according to Peacock, that נפשׁ‎ refers to the “want” or “desire” of the whole person in question. Thus, it is not any part of the person that desires. I want to contest this view. The most obvious of Peacock’s examples is, to my mind, Ps 42.2. Here, there are in fact good reasons to posit that נפשׁ‎ is some kind of entity residing within the person, and that it is this very part of the person that “desires” (ערג‎) YHWH (cf. Steiner 2015, 79–80). ⁴ This is posited not on the basis of Ps 42.2 as an isolated instance, but by comparing it with similar instances. The immediate context of Ps 42 is a good example. Each of vv. 2-3 and 5-7 contains an occurrence of נפשׁ‎. There is no reason to posit that the function of נפשׁ‎ in v. 2, syntactically or semantically, is different from its function in any of the other verses. Put differently, it is the same נפשׁ‎, as it were, that acts in all of these verses. In v. 6, the psalmist cries out, “Why do you despair, my נפשׁ‎, and why are you disquieted upon me [עלי‎]?” ⁵ And in v. 7, we read, “(O God,) upon me [עלי‎] my נפשׁ‎ is downcast.” Where one might be willing to agree with Peacock on his interpretation of v. 2, the ambiguity that the preposition על‎ introduces in vv. 6 and 7 makes the equation between the נפשׁ‎ and the psalmist (in his “totality”) much less reasonable. ⁶ Thus, we would need a target-language equivalent to נפשׁ‎ that suggests a distinction between it and the supplicant’s “person” or “self.” Perhaps “spirit” would be such an equivalent in this case.

Often, as in Ps 42.2, the expression “my נפשׁ‎” is interpreted as a personal pronoun, which thus can be translated “I.” Under heading number (5), Peacock mentions Jer 13.17 (NEB “I can only weep”) as another example of this. This figure of thought is frequently connected to the idea that different anthropological terms are interchangeable, since they stand only for aspects of the same “psychosomatic unity” (e.g., Janowski 1999, 133). Hence, constructions with anthropological terms such as בשׂרי‎, נפשׁי‎, and לבי‎ can all equally well be translated “I”—especially when they are juxtaposed in a single verse. Take Ps 41.5 as an example: “I [אני‎] said: YHWH, show mercy to me [חנני‎], heal my נפשׁ‎, for I have sinned against you.” Because אני‎, נפשׁ‎, and the first-person suffix of the verb are juxtaposed in the same verse and thus work in a sort of parallelism, they basically denote the same thing, it has been argued (cf., e.g., Wolff 1974, 7). There is, however, no reason to automatically assume this kind of parallelism, since, as has been noted by Fabry and Tengström (2004, 374), “it is not necessary for elements of a parallel construction to be synonymous.” This is because, in addition to being synonymous, parallelism may also, of course, be contrasting. In the words of Barr (1993, 39), “Parallelism in itself does not prove whether the two elements are seen as closely associated, or as at the opposite ends of the spectrum.” Thus it is possible that נפשׁ‎ and אני‎ (and the verbal suffix) in Ps 41.5 signify different things—אני‎ the whole person, and נפשׁ‎ some part, dimension, or quality of the person. ⁷ This should be reflected in a translation, perhaps with a target-language equivalent such as “life principle” or the like (this translation of נפשׁ‎ is given by Clines 1989, 295).

Under heading number (6), Peacock discusses instances where נפשׁ‎ would mean “life,” with Ps 30.4 as one example. Here, נפשׁ‎ is taken synecdochally to refer to the whole human being. However, Richard Steiner has presented convincing evidence for interpreting נפשׁ‎ in a number of instances as something that refers to “an entity that can be located in space” (Steiner 2015, 82)—which is not the case with the more abstract “life.” ⁸ One of the instances Steiner discusses is precisely Ps 30.4, which he translates, “You have brought my נפשׁ‎ up from Sheol” (120). As is well known, those residing in Sheol are often referred to in the Hebrew Bible as רפאים‎, “spirits” or “shadows.” Steiner posits that instances such as Ps 30.4 show that a נפשׁ‎ (or several נפשׁות‎) could also be located in Sheol. ⁹ But this is by definition not the case with “life,” since life is not an entity “that can be located in space.” ¹⁰ Furthermore, there is clear-cut evidence for conceptions of a נפשׁ‎ being separated from the body at the time of death in surrounding cultures, such as in Ugarit (the corresponding Ugaritic term being npš). According to Oswald Loretz, the idea that נפשׁ‎ in instances such as Ps 30.4 would refer to the whole person and not to an entity that has some form of independent existence, is a “misconception” and a “misunderstanding of the West Semitic conception” of נפשׁ‎ and corresponding terms or concepts (Loretz 2006/2007, 475). ¹¹ Rather, in these passages it is a “soul” of sorts that lives on after death. The idea of post-mortem existence of the “soul” is attested as well in an East Semitic (Mesopotamian) setting (see Scurlock 2002). As Virginia Herrmann notes, “Throughout the region, some part of the living person was believed to survive death: a ‘soul,’ ‘spirit,’ or ‘ghost’” (Herrmann 2014, 20; see also Steiner 2015, 124). Thus, in instances where the “soul” (נפשׁ‎) is thought of as leaving the body at the time of death, in translation we would do better to opt for a target-language equivalent that reflects this. Such an equivalent could be “defunct soul” (on this term as a translation of a post-mortem existing נפשׁ‎, see Suriano 2014; cf. also Loretz [2006/2007], who has the German equivalent “Totenseele”). ¹² This translation may also fit in instances where mention is made of a נפשׁ מת‎, “a dead person’s נפשׁ‎” (Lev 21.11; Num 6.6; 19.11, 13). ¹³

Under the same heading (נפשׁ‎ meaning “life”), Peacock mentions Deut 12.23. This makes for a complicated case, not at all as straightforward as Peacock has it. The second part of the verse—the one not quoted by Peacock—introduces the same kind of ambiguity as Ps 42.6-7 (see above). Deuteronomy 12.23 reads in its entirety, “Only be sure not to eat the blood [הדם‎], for the blood it (is) the נפשׁ‎; and you shall not eat the נפשׁ‎ with the flesh [הבשׂר‎].” The second half of the verse introduces a differentiation between the נפשׁ‎ and the “flesh,” whereas in the first half of the verse the נפשׁ‎ seems to be identified with the blood. Moving back in the Pentateuch to Lev 17.11, where the same prohibition against eating blood is discussed, ¹⁴ we find the three words נפשׁ‎, בשׂר‎, and דם‎ combined: “For (the) נפשׁ‎ of the בשׂר‎ (is) in (the) דם‎” (repeated twice in Lev 17.14). The נפשׁ‎ is said to reside in (ב‎) the blood, and the נפשׁ‎ is in its turn connected to the flesh or the body, which may be said to be the “context” for the נפשׁ‎ (Suriano 2018, 136). ¹⁵ Thus, the נפשׁ‎ seems here to be a component of the body, a component that resides in the blood—but it is hard to see that it could be equated with the body or the person. Frevel therefore says that we find “roots of a dichotomic conceptualization” precisely in Lev 17.11 (Frevel 2012, 224 n. 106). The blood and the נפשׁ‎ seem to form “a homogenous mixture,” as Steiner (2015, 82 n. 3) has it, which together constitute the life of the human being in question. ¹⁶ There is, to my mind, no reason to assume that the function of נפשׁ‎ in 17.11 is any different from that of Deut 12.23. Thus, the equation between נפשׁ‎ and the abstract meaning “life” merits questioning. We should try to find some target-language equivalent that matches the idea of נפשׁ‎ as a component or essence that together with the blood upholds human life, in these particular instances perhaps “blood force” or “blood stuff” (cf. the German terms “Lebenskraft” or “Lebensstoff” used by Gerstenberger 1993, 220, 222). These suggested translations may not be very idiomatic, but at least they convey something of the function of נפשׁ‎ in the passages in question, which, to my mind, the translation “life” obscures.

The last example given by Peacock is from Gen 27.4, where נפשׁ‎ is used as a pronoun (as in Ps 42.2 and Jer 13.17; see above): this is “very obvious,” according to Peacock (1976, 219). As is well known, the story in Gen 27 tells of Isaac’s blessing of Jacob, a blessing originally intended for Esau. In Gen 27.4, Isaac tells Esau to prepare a meal for him to eat, “so that my נפשׁ‎ may bless you before I die.” Importantly, the blessing of Esau by Isaac’s נפשׁ‎ is supposed to happen after Isaac has had the meal (this was noted already by Dussaud 1935, 270, 276). Later on in Gen 27, Jacob deceives Isaac into blessing him instead of Esau. In Gen 27.23, it is said that “he [Isaac] blessed him [ויברכהו‎].” Isaac then says that after having his meal, his נפשׁ‎—which, it should be noted, is not mentioned in Gen 27.23—will bless Jacob: “bring (the meal) to me, that I may eat of my son’s prey, and that my נפשׁ‎ may bless you [תברכך נפשׁי‎]” (Gen 27.25). If the נפשׁ‎ only works as a personal pronoun in each of these instances, it becomes impossible to explain its presence in some of the verses, while it is absent in the other verses. Instead, we may agree with Andreas Wagner, who says regarding נפשׁ‎ that it “never neutrally denotes a person, and therefore always performs more than a personal pronoun” (Wagner 2019, 115), which to my mind is why the addition of the נפשׁ‎ introduces a differentiation in the chain of events in Gen 27. Perhaps we could say that when Isaac has been fed, his נפשׁ‎ has gained strength for the blessing it is supposed to perform. ¹⁷ If the נפשׁ‎ here is indeed more than just a personal pronoun, the translation “I” is untenable. Again, “spirit” may instead be a fitting target-language equivalent (cf. Ps 42 above).

Concluding remarks

As I hope to have shown in the section above, drawing on a number of recent publications by different scholars, several of the examples given by Peacock in his article do not easily fit into a monistic way of interpreting נפשׁ‎. Rather, a number of them seem to contain notions or conceptions of the נפשׁ‎ as being separable and separated from the human body. This means that in these cases, נפשׁ‎ cannot be equated with a human being to the extent that it be simply translated “I”, “life,” or “person.”

To me, it is obvious that the idea of נפשׁ‎ as a monistic unity, “circumscribing man as a whole,” as Wolff (1974, 8) once put it, had at the time of Peacock’s article developed into as strong a tradition as was once the way of translating every instance of נפשׁ‎ with “soul.” The partly new interpretation of נפשׁ‎, reflected by a number of scholars discussed above in dialogue with Peacock’s paper, is a reflection of a perceived need to nuance this discussion. It can be summarized the following way: The ancient Hebrews differentiated between the נפשׁ‎ and the person connected to it. Thus, the נפשׁ‎ is perceived in a number of instances in the Hebrew Bible as an entity separable, and indeed separated, from the human body. Hence, in these instances it cannot be equated with the human person, as the monistic interpretation argues. This conception is reflected in both earlier and later strata of the Hebrew Bible.

If all this is true, that is, if our way of understanding the Hebrew conception of נפשׁ‎ is changing, then our way of translating this term should also be changing. Admittedly, the insights from recent scholarship are sometimes hard to apply in translation. It is after all only when we try to translate that certain problems arise, and some of the suggested equivalents to נפשׁ‎ are not very idiomatic from a target-language point of view. Yet, if we want translation to be based on, and reflect, exegesis, there is no option but to try. Thus, it is my hope that this paper has inspired some new thoughts on how to translate the term נפשׁ‎.