The young and the hawkish: Generational differences in conflict attitudes in Israel

Abstract

How do generational patterns affect public opinion in prolonged conflicts? While considerable research has addressed the effects of conflicts on children and adolescents, understanding the broader generational divides in public attitudes towards conflict resolution remains an area with both theoretical and empirical gaps. Such understanding is crucial, given its potential to significantly shape aggregate public opinion and the trajectory of conflicts. This paper focuses on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, examining how support for conflict resolution varies across Israeli–Jewish cohorts. It employs longitudinal survey data (1981–2019), using both descriptive methods and age-period-cohort (APC) regression models. The findings indicate that generational differences in public opinion were relatively small until the early 2000s. Post this period, younger Israelis have increasingly displayed more hawkish attitudes than older generations, coupled with a stronger inclination towards right-wing identification. These trends pose important questions about the changing nature of support for compromise within Israeli society and its implications for the future of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The factors driving these emerging generational gaps are complex and merit in-depth exploration. While this article touches upon potential explanations, including demographic shifts and hope for peace, they do not entirely clarify the observed generational differences, highlighting the need for further research.

Keywords

Conflict generations cohort analysis political attitudes public opinion conflict resolution Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Introduction

In the Israeli 2022 elections, the extreme right-wing alliance of the Jewish Power and the Religious Zionism parties won 14 seats in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. Polls have shown that it was exceptionally popular among young voters and that, in general, a large majority of young Israeli Jews identify as right-wing (Maltz, 2022). Are these age-related differences a novel trend indicative of expanding generational divides, or do they reflect a consistent lifecycle effect? Given that Israeli politics heavily revolves around the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, these developments prompt an examination of generational differences in attitudes toward conflict resolution. What can be anticipated about the nature and extent of generational differences in such settings? While vast literature scrutinizes the impact of growing up in conflicts among children and adolescents (e.g., Byrne, 1997; Niwa et al., 2016), little is known about aggregate generational gaps in public opinion on conflict resolution. This article aims to set out theoretical predictions drawn from socialization theories, followed by an empirical exploration into the effects of age, period, and cohorts on popular support for compromise in Israel.

Theoretical expectations about generational differences in support for conflict resolution are complex and have only been studied to a limited extent. One rather naïve view suggests younger generations might favor resolution more, as it might be easier for them to leave the shadows of the past behind. However, research indicates that growing up in conflict environments often preserves conflict-related beliefs and biases, even in children, potentially causing long-lasting collective traumas (Bar Tal et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2020). This implies negligible if any, generational differences in support for conflict resolution. Conversely, another theory argues that the specific conditions during one’s formative years significantly shape political attitudes (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991). This should presumably lead to varying views on conflict resolution depending on the conflict phase experienced during these years.

This study analyzes longitudinal data from the Israel National Elections Studies (INES) from 1981 to 2019, based on representative samples of the adult Jewish population in Israel. Findings show that generational differences did not characterize public opinion in Israel until the early 2000s. Since then, a notable trend has emerged: younger Israeli Jews have increasingly shown more hawkish attitudes and tend to position themselves further to the right than older generations. The complexity of the factors behind these generational gaps requires extensive exploration. In this article, I briefly examine two potential explanations: demographic shifts and variations in hope for peace across generations. While the latter receives some support, it does not fully account for all observed generational differences, suggesting the need for further in-depth research.

The article’s contributions are twofold. Firstly, it sheds light on the generational aspect of public opinion in conflict zones, which has been understudied thus far. Identifying generational patterns is crucial for understanding the conflict’s dynamics, as generational replacement is a powerful mechanism that can shift the public’s support for negotiations and compromise in different directions. Secondly, this article addresses the limited focus in existing literature on the generational differences in political attitudes within Israel. Analyzing behavioral data spanning nearly four decades offers a comprehensive view of age and generational trends among the Israeli–Jewish population. The findings have broader implications, indicating that support for the two-state solution in Israel could decrease as older generations pass away. This insight is vital for understanding the region’s future, especially considering the war which broke out in October 2023.

Generational theories in the context of conflict

The predominant theory linking age and political attitudes in conflict zones focuses on political socialization and its role in transmitting political beliefs and worldviews across generations (Reidy et al., 2015; Sears and Levy, 2003). However, an alternative view highlights how generations develop distinct attitudes based on the specific conditions of their formative years. While this perspective has been widely applied to studying political attitudes (see below), its application to conflict attitudes remains underexplored. Next, I outline the key assumptions of each approach.

Replicated perceptions along generations

Socialization in intractable conflicts is a complex process often described as contributing to the perpetuation and escalation of these disputes by replicating the same world views, societal beliefs, and narratives among young people (Bar Tal, 2007). In these conflicts, “children grow up breathing the reality of conflict from the moment they are born and are dramatically affected by it throughout their life” (Nasie et al., 2021: 1258). Bar-Tal (2000, 2007) conceptualized this set of shared societal beliefs that shape individuals’ attitudes and behaviors as “the ethos of conflict”. These beliefs are transmitted through political socialization by agents such as family members, teachers, and media, and personal experiences of conflict. They provide a psychological infrastructure that enables a society to cope with the challenges and threats posed by the conflict, while also serving to justify and legitimize the conflict itself (Bar-Tal et al., 2017; Uluğ et al., 2017). The processes of socialization described here should not lead, eventually, to intergenerational differences in conflict attitudes, emphasizing instead intergenerational similarities.

Formative experiences and generational differences

Broader generational theories highlight the unique socialization circumstances of each cohort (Sears, 1981). The era in which a cohort matures significantly influences its future political attitudes, potentially leading to intergenerational differences in political attitudes. This impact of formative years is evident across various regions and contexts. Inglehart (1977) shows that economic prosperity in industrialized nations led younger generations to value post-materialistic ideals over materialistic ones. Formative conditions have also been found to affect later economic attitudes (Neundorf and Soroka, 2018), political preferences (Tilley, 2002), participation (Grasso et al., 2019), and voting (Lichtin et al., 2023).

Can these theories apply to the context of conflicts? Most research focuses on the immediate effects of events like violence and terrorism on public opinion, highlighting their role in increasing intolerance and reducing the willingness to compromise (Canetti et al., 2017; Kam and Kinder, 2007; Peffley et al., 2015). Some studies suggest long-term impacts due to post-traumatic stress disorder (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016), but broader cohort effects remain underexplored (see Kim, 2024). Special attention has been given to long-term effects of significant atrocities, leading to narratives of collective victimhood passed through generations (Balcells, 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Wayne and Zhukov, 2022). Beyond violence, peace negotiations and leadership changes can affect public opinion (Yakter and Harsgor, 2023). Additionally, the “Zeitgeist,” or spirit of the times, reflected in political discourse and culture (Mitts, 2019) and among political elites (Oren, 2019), can influence generational perspectives. Regardless of the nature of the formative years, the hypothesis suggests that distinct generational experiences within a conflict will result in notable differences in attitudes across generations.

The Israeli context

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a common case-study for analyzing political behaviors in conflictual contexts (e.g., Berrebi and Klor, 2008; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014). Characterized by its prolonged existence, this conflict has experienced variability, from fluctuating intensities of violence, terrorist attacks, and rocket launches to phases of relative tranquility and peace negotiations. Such dynamics may theoretically contribute to generational differences in attitudes, influenced by the specific historical contexts during which individuals were socialized. However, given the conflict’s entrenched and inflexible nature in shaping political identities, it is plausible that the process of generational transmission may result in only marginal gaps in political attitudes across generations. A recent study by Hasler et al. (2023) indicates that younger Israelis are less hopeful about peace and, as a result, show diminished support for conflict resolution. However, their study primarily addresses differences by age, not by cohorts. While it is possible to draw inferences about cohort effects from age differences over time, my research explicitly examines these cohort effects, distinguishing them from mere lifecycle effects. Furthermore, Hasler et al.’s longitudinal analysis centers on the perceived probability of peace rather than on attitudes toward the conflict itself. In this article, I bridge this gap by analyzing the generational aspect of Israeli public opinion on the two-state solution over time.

Empirical analysis

The analysis utilizes 12 Israel National Election Studies (INES) surveys between 1981 and 2019.¹ Four recent surveys—September 2019, March 2020, and 2021 and 2022—were excluded due to limitations: the September 2019 and 2020 surveys had small sample sizes and limited questionnaires, while the 2021 and 2022 surveys lacked a continuous age variable. All surveys used a stratified random sampling technique. As Arab citizens may display different attitudinal patterns regarding the conflict, their generational trends merit a separate framework outside the scope of this research.

Dependent variable

The long-term nature of this study limits the availability of more sophisticated measures for support for compromise (Canetti et al., 2017). Consequently, the analysis relies on a single item: “Do you think Israel should agree or not agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip as part of a permanent settlement?”² Therefore, the findings should be interpreted cautiously, as they reflect support for a two-state solution rather than a broader range of compromise scenarios.

Methods of analysis

In the absence of long-term panel data, this study relies on cross-sectional repeated surveys to track different individuals from the same birth cohort, as if representing a sample of their cohort at each point in time. To analyze the data, I used descriptive methods and statistical APC regression models. The descriptive approach highlights the total outcomes for each generation at different times, revealing periods of similar or dissimilar generational behavior (Firebaugh, 1997; Glenn, 2005). However, it does not account for variations in period, age, and other factors across cohorts. APC regression models are thus employed to estimate cohort effects across all periods and ages. Due to the perfect collinearity between survey-year, age, and birth-year (Mason and Fienberg, 1985), strategies are needed to mitigate this dependency. This study adopts different categorizations for these three variables to address this issue (Kritzer, 1983).

Cohort

There is debate on the most crucial years for political socialization. Bartels and Jackman (2014) suggest that the formative years are focused mainly in late adolescence, in the years leading up to age 20; this fits in with ideas about attitude crystallization towards the period of coming of age. As there is not much literature dealing with generations in Israel, I use the categorization of 5-years birth-year intervals to detect cohort effects easily.

Age

Israel has mandatory army service at 18, 2 years for women and 3 years for men. The effect of this period of military service is hard to determine. Recent research among ex-combatants found that military service made them more hawkish and right-wing (Grossman et al., 2015). However, many soldiers are not combatants and do not serve in the occupied territories. Therefore, I coded age so that the first category covers the ages of military service (18–21). The other categories are 22–30, 31–50, and 51 and above.

Results

First, I descriptively explore generational trends over time. Figure 1 presents the level of support for establishing a Palestinian state, with each line representing a different birth-cohort. The left side of the graph, the period until 1999, is characterized by a rather messy pattern of generational differences. While older cohorts tend to be a bit higher than younger cohorts, the differences are inconsistent across all survey years. Among all cohorts, there was an apparent increase in the level of support for a Palestinian state between the 1980s and the 1990s. This trend reflects the change in Israeli public opinion following the first Intifada (Arian et al., 1992) and the period of the Oslo peace process (1993–1999).

Figure 1.

Support for a Palestinian state by cohorts over time. Note. Source: INES 1981–2019.

Gaps between cohorts are much more pronounced in the following period. It starts with the 1980–1984 birth-cohort. The members of this cohort, some of whom already came of age in 1999, exhibit lower levels of support in a Palestinian state compared to the older cohorts in that year. This cohort remains with lower support than others for over a decade. The following birth-cohorts entered the electorate as even more hawkish than their predecessors. While the second Intifada (2001–2004) was said to move public opinion toward the right, the graph shows that for those who were born before 1980, the level of support in a Palestinian state did not change considerably and remained around the same level all over the 1990s and the 2000s. The decrease in support for a Palestinian state has been mostly pronounced among the newer cohorts who only came of age after the second Intifada. The youngest among them were too young to remember these events. This goes against the idea that exposure to violence is key to understanding the hawkishness of the youngest cohorts.

To analyze net cohort effects, I ran APC models using OLS regressions, including age, cohorts, and survey-years. I also include education, religiosity, ethnic origin, and income to control for compositional effects (Model 3). Table B1 in the SA shows the results of this analysis, indicating negative and significant effects for the four youngest birth-cohorts, that is, those born from 1980 and later. The members of these cohorts are less likely to support a Palestinian state than the first cohort (base category). Figure 2, panel A, presents the predicted level of support for a Palestinian state for each cohort. The graph shows that the level of support does not change much between older cohorts, and only with the birth-cohorts of 1980–1984 did the level of support decline. Then, the two successive cohorts, born in 1985–1989 and 1990–1994, show even lower levels of support for a Palestinian state. The youngest cohort (1995–2001) shows similar levels of support compared to the previous cohort.

Figure 2.

Cohort effects on attitudes and self-position on left-right scale. Note. Source: INES 1981–2019. Panel A is based on Table B1, Model 3. Panel B is based on Table B2, Model 3. Left-right position is measured on a 1–7 scale with 1 signifies Right and 7 signifies Left.

Another way to gauge the hawkish tendencies of younger cohorts is through their political orientation on the left-right scale. In Israel, the conflict is the primary ideological dimension in politics, making left and right indicative of a citizen’s stance on the hawkish-dovish spectrum (Arian and Shamir, 2008; Shamir and Arian, 1999). This relationship is evidenced by a significant correlation between these variables in the data (r = 0.49, p < .01). The results from an APC model that predicts self-placement on the left-right scale (Figure 2, Panel B) demonstrate a declining trend in left-wing identification among younger cohorts, starting with those born between 1980 and 1984.³ This pattern indicates that younger cohorts identify as more right-wing than their predecessors, reflecting a broader trend in the political socialization of the young generation.

Are there lifecycle effects?

Figure 3 presents age effects based on Model 3 in Table B1. Most of the differences between age groups are not significant. Yet, the oldest age-group (51 and above) has higher levels of support in a Palestinian state than the youngest group. Even when controlling for cohort, period, and demographic factors, older people are more dovish than younger people. Note, however, the particular structure of the data: young birth-cohorts are observed only at young ages. Whether their relative hawkishness is a cohort effect or will change as they age remains to be seen.

Figure 3.

Lifecycle effects on support for a Palestinian state. Note. Source: INES 1981–2019. Results are based on Table B1, Model 3.

Explaining the young cohorts’ hawkishness

Delving deeply into the factors that have led to the above cohort effects is beyond the scope of this article. Yet, to promote further investigation, I propose and examine two examples that could serve as a basis for future research.

A demographic change?

A prevailing notion is that the young cohorts are more religious due to higher fertility rates among the religious and ultra-orthodox sectors. As religiosity is a strong predictor of hawkishness in Israel (Shamir and Arian, 1999), this can explain why newer cohorts are more to the right. One way to deal with this argument is to control for the level of religiosity, as has been done in the main analysis. Another option is to test whether the above cohort effects hold for both religious and non-religious people. Figure 4 shows the results for two regression models performed on two sample subsets.⁴ Respondents with low levels of religious observance are generally more dovish than respondents with higher levels of religious observance. However, the inter-cohort pattern is similar among both groups, indicating that young cohorts are less likely to support a Palestinian state among religious and secular people.

Figure 4.

Cohort effects on support for a Palestinian state by the level of religious observance. Note. Source: INES 1981–2019. Results are based on Table B3.

A greater sense of pessimism among the young cohorts?

Research indicates that expectations about the likelihood of peace influence support for conflict resolution (Shamir and Shikaki, 2002). Indeed, the period during which young Israeli cohorts reached adulthood is marked by skepticism about the possibility of peace between Israel and Palestinians (Yakter and Harsgor, 2023). Hasler et al. (2023) demonstrate a remarkably lower level of hope among younger age-groups, with the negative association between age and perceived probability of peace significantly increasing over time. The INES data, available from 2006 onwards for this specific item, suggests that these trends may reflect cohort effects rather than lifecycle ones. As shown in Figure 5, each successive cohort appears more pessimistic than the one before.⁵ Do these variances in hope for peace account for the differences in hawkish attitudes across cohorts? Comparing two APC models—one including and the other excluding the variable of hope for peace (Table B4 in the SA)—reveals a reduction in the magnitude of cohort coefficients when hope is considered, with some even losing statistical significance. This finding underscores the necessity for further research to ascertain the interplay of hope and hawkishness among young Israelis.

Figure 5.

Cohort differences in hope for peace over time. Note. Source: INES 2006–2019.

Conclusions

Prolonged conflicts tend to perpetuate their core perspectives across generations, prompting public opinion scholars to prioritize the effects of collective identities and ideologies rather than generational cleavages in such contexts. Consequently, the impact of generational factors on attitudes towards conflict resolution has been underexplored. This article, however, demonstrates the importance of generational differences in shaping public opinion in Israel. Findings show that despite experiencing different stages of the conflict, older generations exhibit similar levels of support for the two-state solution. A noteworthy change has occurred with the introduction of newer cohorts, particularly those born since 1980. These younger generations demonstrate less inclination toward the two-state solution. Additionally, they tend to identify as right-wing more than their older counterparts.

These emerging generational trends necessitate a deeper investigation of their origins. Yet, the analyses presented here point towards a key factor: the socialization of younger cohorts in a context marked by deep skepticism about the prospects of peace between Israel and the Palestinians and the rejection of the two-state solution by prominent political actors. The dominant narrative, which posits the absence of a viable Palestinian peace partner, might have significantly influenced younger individuals who have not experienced substantial peace negotiation efforts in their lives. Additionally, these formative years have been influenced by the rise of security-driven populism in Israeli politics (Levi and Agmon, 2021) and the implementation of right-wing policies that eschew compromise. While a multifaceted set of factors could account for the younger generation’s more hawkish views, their impact on Israel’s electoral outcomes is already noticeable. As time progresses and generational replacement unfolds, these trends could profoundly impact the aggregate attitudes of Israeli Jews. Given the current state of intense violence and conflict in the region, the distinctive political views of these younger generations could play a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - The young and the hawkish: Generational differences in conflict attitudes in Israel

Supplemental Material for The young and the hawkish: Generational differences in conflict attitudes in Israel in Liran Harsgor in Research & Politics

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I thank Alon Yakter, Orit Kedar, and Michael Shalev. I also thank the Research & Politics editor and reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Yaniv Shapira and Iaara Asaf for excellent research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Generations and Political Change” workshop of the ECPR Joint Sessions (2023).

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (Grant No. 2976/21).

ORCID iD

Liran Harsgor

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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