Accounting for “the social” in contact tracing applications: The paradox between public health governance and mistrust of government's data use

Abstract

This essay adopts three accounts (sociological, neoliberal, and cybernetic) of “the social” to get a clearer picture of why there is a barrier faced by the government when implementing contact tracing mobile applications. In Hong Kong's context, the paradox involves declining trust of the government's protection of data privacy and growing concern about data surveillance since the 2019 social unrest I argue that exploring the idea of sociality is valuable in that it re-reconfigures the datafication of pandemic control by revealing different sets of social relations, particularly the asymmetrical power relation between the government and its people. The refusal to download or use the mobile app also shows that the public has a faith in human agency and human resistance in data-saturated cities.

Keywords

The social contact tracing health governance privacy surveillance COVID-19 government (mis)trust

The “social” aspects of LeaveHomeSafe: Three accounts

Contact tracing mobile applications have been widely adopted by governments around the world to better monitor the source, disease diffusion, and contact history of individuals (Liu and Graham, 2021; Milan, 2020). Yet, ethical concerns about digital surveillance have arisen, particularly in regards to personal data privacy and confidentiality (Basu, 2021; Fahey and Hino, 2020). Such concerns have pointed to the paradox between “data-first” (out of public interest—public health governance) and “privacy-first” (concerns about surveillance and government's misuse of data as a way of controlling its citizens) (Fahey and Hino, 2020). Research has also discussed the Chinese state's surveillance that operates behind Hong Kong's city-wide fear (Chen and Barber, 2020), along with the public's mistrust of the government's top-down surveillance of social unrest (including the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019 Anti-ELAB Movement). Using the contact tracing mobile app “LeaveHomeSafe” in Hong Kong as an example, this essay argues that concern about data privacy is proceeded and escalated. To explain why and how there is a contradiction between public health concern and mistrust of the government's data use, I argue that understanding the concept of “sociality” is important. In the following, this essay adopts three accounts of “the social” (Rose, 2020) to explain the paradox.

Similar to other contact tracing applications, “LeaveHomeSafe” records users’ travel histories of entering different places. The travel records could help the government to trace and inform close contacts. In Hong Kong, however, people are hesitant about recording their visits due to privacy concerns (Chau, 2021), and instead they prefer to write their name, phone number, date, and time of entry on a slip of paper. In 2021, the Hospital Authority Employees Alliance (HAEA) even called on the public to boycott the app over privacy concerns (Lau, 2021). The objections to using such apps involve issues such as data privacy, digital surveillance, and degrees of (mis)trust of the government (Eck and Hatz, 2020; Praveen and Ittamalla, 2020). To understand the objections and negative sentiments of using contact tracing applications, examining the context and idea of “the sociality” is key. Rose (2020) proposes the importance of addressing sociality in discussing smart cities. She argues that existing studies only focus on digital infrastructure and smart citizens, while ignoring the specific understandings of “the social”—in particular, sociological, neoliberal, and cybernetic accounts of the social, which I will discuss in detail below, using LeaveHomeSafe as an example.

Sociological accounts of the social

Sociological accounts of the social highlight that social structures and the formation of social groups as well as their relations will mutually influence each other (Rose, 2020). They also relate to the everyday understanding of underlying institutions and policies that constitute people's daily lives. In this sense, power asymmetry between the powerful (the state, digital technology, and/or its designers, business groups) and the people is an important aspect, as the powerful may neglect the subjective needs of individuals. In the case of “LeaveHomeSafe”, the government claims that it is implemented out of public health concerns, yet the fact that not everyone can afford a smartphone makes the app equal to a design only for digital literate users and “the wealthy” (Milan, 2020). For example, although the number of smartphone users is very high in Hong Kong, the percentage drops (from over 90% to 68%) when it comes to the elderly.¹ The digital divide, especially among the elderly in Hong Kong, has also been noted (Ma et al., 2018).

In this sense, the implementation of such contact tracing applications could disconnect those who either do not have smartphones or refuse to use the app due to mistrust of the government. A typical case is that restaurants would require customers to scan a QR code by using the mobile app before they are allowed to dine in. It could also generate tensions between different groupings—government supporters or those who “trust in technology” (Liu and Graham, 2021), businesses, and those who refuse to use the mobile app. From the government's end, if only a limited percentage of the population downloads or uses the app, it could increase the difficulty of tracing people's travel histories and hinder public health governance. In other words, a successful implementation of health governance, such as requiring people to use contact tracing apps, heavily relies on the public's trust in state institutions and confirmed patients agreeing to share their travel histories completely and honestly (Milan, 2020). Another sociological concern is that receiving no notification from the mobile app could decrease the user's sense of concern regarding social distancing rules. In sum, the sociological accounts of the social emphasize various types of social relations and their consequences (e.g. the digital divide, state-society relations, and group relations).

Neoliberal accounts of the social

In a datafied society, neoliberal accounts of the social refer to the specific groups who are self-directed, self-improving, and autonomous (Rose, 2020). Digital/data literacy is particularly important here because with this knowledge, individuals can better connect themselves to government's health governance and prepare for the challenges faced under the pandemic (Nguyen, 2021). The Hong Kong government advertises using “LeaveHomeSafe” as a way to protect oneself and others, in the sense that once there is a confirmed case, the mobile app will “notify a user if he/she is later identified to have visited the same venue that a confirmed case has visited at about the same time or taken the same taxi that a confirmed case has taken on the same day.”² From the neoliberal perspective, “LeaveHomeSafe” highlights the benefits of public health and ensures the protection of data privacy. In April 2021, the government also made it clear that scanning the app is crucial to relaxing the social distancing measures for restaurants (allowing six people to sit at a table).³ Using the app can be seen as beneficial in that it gives people information about whether one has been exposed to places where infected cases had been. Yet, the socio-political backdrop complicates the neoliberal account. The declining trust of Hong Kong's government contributed to citizens’ unwillingness to follow the government's advice amidst COVID-19 nor see this advice as best practice of self-protection (Hartley and Jarvis, 2020). The mistrust stems from unprecedented social unrest in 2019. A subsequent crackdown on the protests by local authorities has further permeated political distrust in every sphere of Hong Kong life. Examples include a refusal to heed government calls to take the vaccine as a form of resistance (Marlow and Tam, 2021), even when knowing that vaccination is a good thing for oneself and efficacious for public health governance. The presence of citizens who do not support the government intentionally and take action against what the government tells them to do has shown that Hong Kong is now in fact a “low-trust state.” (Hartley and Jarvis, 2020; Yuen et al., 2021).

“LeaveHomeSafe” has contributed to more compulsory testing for people who received COVID-19 exposure notification. Yet, half of the respondents (50.4%) did not use or had not installed the mobile app,⁴ leading some pro-democracy restaurants (i.e. “yellow” retailers⁵) to publicly resist implementing the “LeaveHomeSafe” app and even to suspend their dine-in service (Ho, 2021). The yellow retailers calculate the risks of opposing the app, particularly with the government's enforcement of requiring customers to use it. From the neoliberal account, however, the retailers noticed that many customers are unwilling to use “LeaveHomeSafe”, and thereby see opposition to implement the app as a way to express their concerns as well as promote political consumerism—attracting customers with like-minded political values.

Cybernetic accounts of the social

Different from assumptions that social groups have innate needs, cybernetic accounts of the social highlight the problems of big data collection and the idea that digital technology may lead to a “society of control” (Rose, 2020: 526). Such a concern is directly related to digital surveillance. In the case of “LeaveHomeSafe”, the concern is unsurprisingly about personal data privacy (Lau, 2021). Although the Hong Kong government has reaffirmed that there is no issue of data privacy because the data would just be stored in the person's phone (Chau, 2021), it was nevertheless believed that “LeaveHomeSafe” is a similar practice to the “Health Code” implemented in China (Liu and Graham, 2021). Since the mobile app gathers personal details such as name, phone number, travel history (including date, time, and location of visit), personal data collection and digital surveillance could be performed in the name of pandemic prevention and public health governance. Furthermore, as the personal information collection statement on the app mentioned,⁶ the data of visit records submitted can be retained for seven years to fulfill legal obligations. It also stated that the information may be transferred to other authorized departments/organizations/persons, including law enforcement agencies.

The paradox between “data-first” and “privacy-first”, or whether data privacy is a tradeoff for public health governance (Liu and Graham, 2021), again, shows the importance of a cybernetic account of the social. In Hong Kong's case, even knowing that contact tracing is important for public health or can be understood as the state's expression of care—to prevent the disease from spreading further—the fear over data misuse still has resonance for citizens.

In fact, during the 2019 Anti-ELAB Movement, in response to datafication and surveillance carried out by the state, Hong Kong protestors engaged in anti-surveillance practices such as wearing masks, destroying CCTV cameras, and disabling the facial recognition login on their phones to disrupt the government's ability to collect biometric information (Hui, 2019; Jacobson, 2019). Beraldo and Milan (2019) claim a paradigm shift has occurred in datafication—from data politics to the contentious politics of data. In addition to “data as repertoires” (or modular tools for political struggle), data can serve as “stakes” (as issues and/or objects of political struggle in their own right). At the individual level, for example, Hong Kong people have been adopting different practices to evade mandatory contact tracing, including adopting anonymous techniques, not using “LeaveHomeSafe” to avoid surveillance, or even using fake versions of the LeaveHomeSafe app to scan QR codes at restaurants, or putting down fake names or blank forms in the collection boxes (Chan, 2021).⁷ In this sense, the data practices of individuals is a “heuristic tool” that can be used to explore how citizens respond to big data surveillance (Milan and van der Velden, 2016: 66); it also shows that from the cybernetic account, contact tracing mobile apps have generated concern about how one's data will be used and analyzed by the government.

Conclusion

Using the contact tracing mobile app “LeaveHomeSafe” in Hong Kong as an example, this essay highlights the powerful accounts of sociality that are operative during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly with regard to sociological, neoliberal, and cybernetic accounts of “the social.” (Rose, 2020) It contributes to the field of big data and public health governance in demonstrating that in addition to the dominant power of technology in health governance (how technology can prevent the spread of disease), “the social” and understanding sociality remains important (Milan, 2020).

When the government aims to appeal to the public to use “LeaveHomeSafe”, it needs to consider various socialities. In fact, each sociality has its unique sense of the ontology of social groupings and presents the dynamics of state-society relation in a specific context. Understanding sociological accounts of and concerns about contact tracing mobile apps is valuable in that it re-reconfigures the datafication of pandemic control by challenging its technological and sociological exclusion of different groups and highlights the asymmetrical power relations between the government and its people. It demonstrates that mistrust of the government is the reason why there is an inherent paradox between public health governance and concerns about personal data privacy, and why people refuse to use the app (Chan, 2021; Chau, 2021). The refusal to use the app (or using a fake one) also shows that from citizens’ perspective, there is a faith in human agency and human resistance in data-saturated cities (Beraldo and Milan, 2019; Rose, 2020).

Empirically, the government and app creators should consider different accounts for “the social” when implementing pandemic-preventing policies. For example, sociologically, the government should consider those who do not have easy access to smartphones (e.g. the elderly) or refuse to use the app due to mistrust of the government. The authorities should also consider neoliberal accounts that “yellow” retailers also encourage customers to not use the app. Lastly, the government should make sure to address the public's concerns about data privacy and state surveillance.

The three accounts of sociality need to speak directly to the government bodies. Citizens in Hong Kong have demonstrated their concerns about personal data protection through the resistance of downloading/using the app as well as providing feedback through official means. After collecting the feedback from its citizens, the Hong Kong government made statements that the app does not have the function of tracking users’ movements nor collect personal data during the process of download. It also highlighted that visit records are kept on users’ mobile phones only, not in any Government systems.⁸ Understanding the accounts of “the social” allows the powerful to be more aware of why there is hesitance to comply with the government's public health practices. Addressing citizens’ reluctance or passive acceptance is important because it directly influences the effectiveness of health governance.

To address the mistrust problem, the government could provide more encrypted practices such as generating unidentified codes through applications without linking to personal information. For example, another equivalent contact tracing mobile app in Taiwan (Social Distancing App) leverages Bluetooth device signals to estimate the physical social interactions with strangers.⁹ In other words, there is no need for users to register or fill in personal information as the app functions through calculating physical distance via the strength of Bluetooth signals rather than by location records (Wu, 2021), which may help address the concerns about data privacy.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Yao-Tai Li

Notes

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