Abstract
This book grows out of a doctoral dissertation written at Harvard University. It is unusual in providing a modest liberal philosophical and political argument in support of religious schools and their being publicly funded. No doubt this moderate position is due in part to the author’s having lived in two worlds, his native Britain, where religious schools are supported by the state, and America, where there is strong opposition to religious schools.
The two chapters of Part I deal with the question of whether religious schools can do justice to civic education. To his credit, MacMullen is fair in acknowledging that religious schools can educate children in civic virtues. However, there are limits to achieving these goals, given the rather homogenous character of the student body in religious schools. Unfortunately, MacMullen fails to do justice to some empirical studies suggesting that religious schools might even do a better job of making good citizens than do state-maintained public schools. He simply declares empirical considerations beyond the scope of his book, and he does so repeatedly (pp. 30, 140, 161).
In Chapter 2, MacMullen explores the tension between the central civic values of political liberalism, and the ideal of autonomy which he sees as central to a liberal education. Here he rejects two extremes—making liberal political interests primary in education (Gutmann and Macedo), and making the free exercise of religion a compelling state interest (Dent). MacMullen adopts instead a “balancing position” which he finds expressed in the writings of Bill Galston (p. 44). Liberal democracies require citizens who can think for themselves, and so civic values must be balanced with the value of autonomy in education.
Part II explores autonomy as a public value. In chapter 3, MacMullen gives us what he variously describes as a “nuanced,” “realistic,” and “non-perfectionist” account of autonomy (pp. 88, 162, 211). He defines autonomy as “the capacity for critical-rational reflection about one’s ethical beliefs and values, including those that are foundational, and the commitment to practice this reflection on an ongoing basis” (pp. 23, 67). MacMullen goes out of his way to critique some caricatures of rational autonomy, like the suggestion that autonomy involves criterionless choice. He also draws on Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntire to show that all choice is rooted in a particular identity and tradition. Despite his qualifications, some problems remain. What does it mean to engage in critical-rational reflection on an ongoing basis? MacMullen’s ideal of autonomy also rests on an assumption of “ethical pluralism,” which is problematic for Christians (p. 68). There is also an annoying conflation of “ethics” with “ways of life,” that runs throughout the book.
Chapter 4 deals with the justification of autonomy as an ideal. MacMullen rejects autonomy as an intrinsic value (Mill and Raz). Instead, he justifies autonomy as an instrumental good. The exercise of ethical autonomy helps persons to find and lead better lives by detecting false beliefs, identifying the presence of inconsistent values, and guarding against manipulation by others (pp. 102, 111). Of course, does this not presuppose that truth and consistency are intrinsic goods? Further, does such a justification not violate MacMullen’s assumption of ethical pluralism? Chapter 5 considers possible objections to his position. MacMullen argues that the state is justified in mandating education for autonomy, and that parental rights to direct their children’s upbringing are superseded by children’s interests, which include being educated for autonomy.
Part III is entitled, “Religious Schools and Education for Autonomy.” It is therefore rather odd that the first chapter in Part III focuses on a defense of secular public schools. I found MacMullen’s arguments that such schools are better at educating for autonomy than are religious schools to be rather hasty, and again, contrary empirical data are ignored. The remaining chapters in Part III provide a qualified defense of religious schools and the public funding of such schools. The case for the support for primary religious schools is stronger, according to MacMullen, because children need to grow up within a primary culture, which then becomes the foundation for educating towards autonomy (chapter 8). But even here, there are minimal standards that such schools must satisfy in order to receive public support. The case for support of religious secondary schools is weaker, and the regulations are more stringent because it is in adolescence that education for autonomy must become a dominant feature of schooling (chapter 7).
What are the hallmarks of acceptable religious secondary schooling? They include the following: “a commitment to secular reason-giving inside and outside the classroom,” balancing religious instruction with critical perspectives on the faith, “insulate significant parts of the school curriculum from the religious ethos of the school,” teaching of other religions and ways of life, and the inclusion of teachers and students outside the community of faith (p. 175). MacMullen admits these requirements are demanding, but he feels that schools could fulfill them while still retaining their religious character. I’m not so sure! MacMullen is really demanding that religious schools become secular—hence the demand for “secular reason-giving,” whatever that might mean. The use of this phrase points to a weakness that runs throughout the book—MacMullen’s notion of rationality is desperately in need of nuancing.
This book does a credible job of dealing with the literature in political and educational philosophy related to religious schools, though there are some gaps. Unfortunately, the book still has the feel of a dissertation. I further believe liberal principles can be used to make a stronger case for religious schools and the public support of such schools.