Direct and inferred influences of the Silk Roads on the ‘golden age’ of the Abbasid Caliphate

The Silk Roads prior to the Abbasid Caliphate

Generally, political communities on the Silk Roads tried to ensure routes were fairly open, secure, and relatively comfortable to traverse, given their revenue. Consequently, centuries of exchange along the Silk Roads generated expertise and familiarity between people, where traders and caravan guides facilitated movement and guarded travel security. Such exchanges generated a rich repository of information, especially for functional purposes, including knowledge of wind patterns, high and low tide durations, the monsoon, and water currents – all of which allowed for navigation predictability (Ziadeh, 1982: 201–204). Over time, the importance of the camel as a medium of transport on the land route emerged, given the animal’s endurance and carrying capacity. Also important were meticulous sets of calculations of travel requirements, measurements and standardization, optimal cargo sizes, as well as profitable types of tradeable goods (favoring, for example, trading what is not easily perishable). Skills and expertise were important to arrive in promised timeframes, and with as full a stock as possible. Such information was important for the expansion in trade, as it would help organize domestic production in exporting communities, and build regulatory institutions (Ziadeh, 1994: 133–135).

Prior to Islam, Silk Roads had tied China to what today are the Levant, Gulf, North Africa, and Central Asia. Land routes connected China with Central Asia and ended in two main locations: the first was a general area which some refer to as Bilad al-Sham (or simply al-Sham) in what today would be the Northern Gulf and Levant, i.e. Iraq and Syria including Jordan and Lebanon; the second reached today’s Turkey. Goods moved between east and west Asia during the Hellenic era, especially silk to be sold in Beirut and Tyr (Ziadeh, 1982: 205); indeed, incense was exported globally from Yemen (and Oman) starting as early as the 15th century BCE. Moreover, in pre-Islamic times, tribes from Arabia migrated seasonally to Yemen and al-Sham (greater Syria, including Iraq), where they obtained several goods, especially weapons and spices, traded from Persia, India, and China (Kamal, 1986: 98). Decline in east-west exchange intersected with the economic and military decline that hit the Roman Empire in the third century CE, but trade did not stop, and continued until the appearance of Islam and its expansion (Ziadeh, 1994: 133). By the sixth century CE, inland trade with China (as well as India) was a set route, and the knowledge and skills to navigate it were widely shared.

Under conditions of conflict and competition around the eighth century, the overland Silk Road was negatively impacted, and trade almost ended. Two reasons help explain this retreat. First, and critically, volatile security conditions, military activities, and nomad raids (especially Turkish nomads) were all disturbing settled areas and the pathways of caravans (Kennedy, 2004: 121). Second, and pertinent to the most important traded commodity – silk – by the sixth century CE, raw materials and production technology for silk were common in the Levant, thus offsetting the need for large imports. It should be noted, however, that trade did not end since Chinese silk was of a superior quality, in addition to the fact that Levantine production did not meet local demand (Ziadeh, 1994: 148). A revival in exchange occurred under the Abbasids, especially a growth of the maritime route, and traded goods were increasingly diversified.

In the first century of Abbasid rule (at least), the Silk Roads, especially the maritime route, had important meeting and trading posts. On the Gulf, important ports were located in Siraf (Persia) as well as in Qatar, and Suhar and Masqat (Oman); ships sailed from these locations toward west India. Meanwhile Aden (Yemen) and other countries connected trade with east Africa; on the Red Sea, ports were developed in cities like Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), to move goods from the east up towards Egypt. The goods which came to be traded had been seen before in markets along the Roads, and consisted mainly (not exclusively) of silk, fabrics, musk, wood materials, and various oils (Ziadeh, 1994: 45–46).

Islamic contacts with China prior to the Abbasids

After al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun’s rule during the first era of Islamic government, Umayyad rule (c. 661–750 CE) commenced against a backdrop of swift military successes in the Ridda Wars that were launched to entrench central authority and eliminate internal opposition. These dynamics imprinted on Umayyad foreign policy an important worldview that “nothing is impossible” (Kamal, 1986: 181–185). Military successes, especially in territorial expansion, shaped a strategic idea which guided campaigning eastwards: that border territories of the realm should not be a barrier to advancement, but should be considered launching pads from which to reach out further into new territory. Therefore, an emphasis on the offensive made military campaigning a regularized process, and elevated the status of military leaders of such (successful) campaigns (Abu Zeid, 1996b: 8–9).

In civilizational terms, Muslim-Chinese contacts date back to Islam’s Sahaba (companions of the Prophet), and include a plethora of stories about conversions to Islam in China, diplomatic missions, and exchanges of gifts. However, with a momentum for military expansion set under the Umayyads, Muslim campaign leaders setting eastwards conquered for the glory of spreading religious ideas, to showcase their strengths, and for material spoils; these factors were more defining of the China-Islamic competition than it being a civilizational conflict (Abu Zeid, 1996a: 48–51, 73; Kamal, 1986: 98). Moreover, on a background of successful military expansion, especially in Iraq, campaigning directed energies of military leaders and politicians externally. Emerging power struggles within Umayyad military and political circles made campaigning more attractive. Umayyad expansion east with sustained military campaigns was rather successful in controlling some areas, especially Sindh (in modern day Pakistan), but faced fierce resistance in Central Asia where tribes and cities there sought alliances with China – albeit unstable ones (Abu Zeid, 1996b: 40).

One Islamic expedition aimed to reach China; however, during its eastward move, heightened domestic power struggles in Damascus forced a lull in expansion momentum. Campaigning resumed and reached Kashgar (in China’s western Xinjiang) around 711 CE; short of occupying the city, Umayyad armies halted to a defensive posture. In the interim, the Umayyads were overtaken by the Abbasids. During moments of transition within the Islamic leadership, ties with China were stable and constituted a mix between diplomatic cordiality and seeking military control of Chinese lands (Saqr, 2011: 21–25).

Tang China and the Abbasid Caliphate

Intent on consolidating its borders, especially in Central Asia, the Abbasid Caliphate sent troops to ensure that goal; they “collided with the westward expanding Tang Dynasty. This first full-scale contact between the Chinese and Islamic societies took the form of clashes over political and military supremacy in Central Asia” (Park, 2012: 7). Chinese and Abbasid armies clashed around Talas – roughly in modern day Kyrgyz Republic – around 751 CE. One important implication of that battle was Islam gaining a solid foothold from which it spread into Central Asia; another (discussed below) was the weakening of Chinese presence in Central Asia.

A turnaround in Abbasid–Tang relations from battlefield rivals to political and economic partners occurred after the Talas battle, when during General An Lushan’s rebellion the Tang leadership asked for the Abbasids’ assistance. The latter approved and sent troops around the year 755 CE to help quell the rebellion, thus starting a positive turn in Tang–Abbasid relations (Saqr, 2011: 46–48). With the rebellion interrupting land trade, the maritime route flourished. On this route, political and economic interests incentivized Abbasid investments in growing eastward ties, especially with China; under the Tang Dynasty who reciprocated such enthusiasm, exchange expanded.

The backdrop to such convergence of interests had occurred in previous years. The Chinese-Islamic confrontation for control in Central Asia (especially at the Talas battle) had forced the exit of Chinese troops, leaving areas that were taken over by nomadic political communities. These communities, Tibet in particular, established greater authority and came to challenge Chinese and Abbasid rule simultaneously (Park, 2012: 29). Conflict between China and Tibet, and the danger that Tibetan militancy posed to Abbasid interests in Central Asia, led to the crafting of a Tang–Abbasid alliance around 787 CE. The Abbasids sent soldiers to aid the Tang rulers, and thus commenced an era of warm diplomacy (Imamuddin, 1984: 175–176).

In imagining a globally-oriented set-up for their Caliphate, Abbasid decision makers profited from the Silk Roads, and concurrently from ties with China, in two important dimensions: forming and realizing the Abbasid idea of an Islamic Caliphate, and the material and ideational capabilities necessary for setting up such a Caliphate.

Preparing for an Abbasid golden age

The shape of the Abbasid Caliphate and its domestic and foreign policy (e.g. vis-à-vis China) during its first century emerged from the confluence of a variety of material and ideational factors.

The Abbasids had fashioned their rule to be one where Arab ethnic identification was not a central feature around which to rally support, but rather they actively brought in people of different backgrounds, especially Persian; this contrasted to the Umayyad rule which placed emphasis on Arab identity markers. Abbasids, in essence, saw themselves in cosmopolitan terms. The Abbasid pursuit of ethnic diversity under an Islamic umbrella co-constituted their spread eastwards into Central Asia, especially in Iran and Khurasan (an area which today extends across Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). To that end, Abbasids (particularly in the period studied here) selected governors close to local centers of power as a means to stabilize government and win support (Kennedy, 2004: 133).

The Abbasid strategic outlook was more defensive than militarily-expansionist, and had opted to not develop via a war economy. In complementary terms, the first Abbasid century was defined by fiscal discipline, including reliance on taxation from local governments, in addition to a process of bureaucratic expansion and professionalization. The need for revenues necessitated security and economic stabilizing measures; here, maintaining the openness of Silk Roads was an imperative in foreign policy. Moreover, Abbasids sought power consolidation and growth via sedenterization with clear government frameworks, rather than military conquest and physical control. Most importantly, under Harun Al-Rasheed (r. 786–809 CE) the Abbasids invested in consolidating borders and establishing defensive capacities to protect the realm (Abu Zeid, 1996b: 9). Trade with China was an imperative to provide money to set up a strong and global power from Baghdad, with the Silk Roads being main conduits.

On the other hand, military calculus also factored in Abbasid investments in the Silk Roads. Maintaining connectivity along land roads meant easier access to battlefields when necessary; securing them also meant better mailing systems. Thus, rest stops and physical safety guarantees served economics and trade, but also ensured the court’s reach to outer areas and peripheries (Ziadeh, 1994: 103). In critical ways, the mobility of the Silk Roads and their economic (and cultural) potential helped realize (and in ways co-constitute) the Abbasid vision of their Caliphate.

After settling conflicts in the first few years of rule, the Abbasids strategically chose Baghdad to be the capital of a new era of Islamic governance and religious orthodoxy. Upon moving the capital of the Caliphate to Baghdad, Caliph Al-Mansour stated in 762 CE that “now nothing will stop in our way to reach China” (Mustafa, 1973: 337–338). In Baghdad, the Abbasids emphasized Sassanid influences in their state-building (in economics and politics). The Sassanid Empire was noteworthy for its close ties with China in terms of trade, political diplomacy, exchange of emissaries, and alliances, and had established secure roads, rest stops, and legal exchange parameters (Farrokh, 2007: ch. 19). In addition to having Baghdad serve as a medium to consolidate ties with Persian speakers who had converted to Islam and who would come to dominate the Abbasid court and Arab culture in the east, access to the Tigris allowed the Caliphate an important maritime navigation route.

Moreover, it made material sense to look towards China, given political and economic costs from existing tensions in the west and north. Hostility between the Caliphate and Byzantium had emanated largely from the takeover of Levantine cities by Muslim campaigns. Unstable relations developed between the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates and European powers, where rivalry and militarized conflicts cohabitated with exchanges of embassies and emissaries. Under these broad conditions, decades of warfare and battles of attrition defined Byzantine-Abbasid relations in the years around 750–860 CE. Meanwhile, a subdued east after the fall of the Sassanid Empire had facilitated Islamic expansion into Central Asia. The Abbasids, therefore, saw higher, and more certain, prospects for peaceful and stable relations eastwards than those with Western Europe and Byzantium. In effect, while westward trade was limited, especially via the Mediterranean, the Abbasids had a positive outlook of the economic payoffs of the established routes and trading skills eastwards – all the way from Egypt through Central Asia to China (Abu Zeid, 1996a: 73–75).

With foreign relations eastwards generally stabilized, mutual interest in China developing, and caravan movement facilitated and guarded, commerce “enjoyed the great benefits of an extended peace which the caliphate was able to ensure within its own domains” (Hodgson, 1977, vol. 1: 235). Along the Silk Roads, institutions relevant to trade were improved and organized. Inns provided safe residency for traders, as well as maps and guides; security improved for travelers; legal frameworks protected business and worked to prevent monopolies; and measurements and quality controls were instated and improved (Saqr, 2011: 32, 98–106). In addition to local skill sets in navigation, solicited external assistance augmented the travelling capacity (in terms of expertise and cargo ships for example) from the Levant, Egypt, and India (Kamal, 1986: 96–97). It should be noted here that in as much as these maritime and land routes were important for trading in goods, they also served an ideological purpose which was to allow a more fluid trip to the Hajj (the Islamic pilgrimage).

In sum, a positive disposition towards the Silk Roads and confidence in future dividends cemented Baghdad’s centrality in global trade. In essence, perhaps the single most important factor which made contacts and exchange possible was the role of interventionist political leadership (Al-Ish, 1991: 44–47). It was political leadership which built Baghdad, oriented east, and chose to create and sustain a non-war economy (and foreign policy orientation) – all of which facilitated an Abbasid–Tang strategic partnership.

China and the Silk Roads in the making of an Abbasid golden age

Prior to the Abbasids, the Umayyad Caliphs had constructed Bayt al-Hikmah (the House of Wisdom) in Damascus; it was a court library which invested in translation to Arabic (from Greek and Syriac texts in particular) as well as providing research facilities, where Muslim scholars built on the abundance of Greek, Roman, Indian, and other repositories of knowledge. In Baghdad, the Abbasids built on the Umayyad project and significantly expanded investments in the natural sciences, philosophy, history, and the fine arts.

The establishment of (another) Bayt al-Hikmah in Baghdad by Harun Al-Rasheed was arguably influenced by a Chinese counterpart: the Han-Lin Academy built by the Tang emperor in 754 CE. With the infrastructure and motivation for such an institution carrying over from Damascus, the form it took in Baghdad had echoes of the Chinese project. The Chinese institution was to train bureaucrats, manage and control the literary activities of the court, and serve as an incubator of foreign scholarship (especially by hosting scholars). Imamuddin (1984: 173) contends that:

there was great similarity between the aims and object of the two, the ‘Abbasid and T’ang institutions, and they were so close in the fates of their establishment as well as in their aims and objects that one can easily deduce that ‘Abbasid Bayt al-Hikmah might have followed the example of the T’ang Academy.

Paper was critical for the robustness of the scholarly project of the Abbasids (especially the flourishing of Bayt al-Hikmah). Paper actualized this scholarly project as it facilitated transcription and copying, compiling data, and information sharing, given that it was more suited than previously existing materials. During the Battle of Talas, the Abbasids captured Chinese troops, many of whom were skilled craftspeople, especially in paper making, and placed them in Samarkand. During their stay there, they brought to the locals the craft of making paper. Before this Battle, paper had been known in the region but not really its craft. The first “modern” paper mill was built in Baghdad around 795 CE and gave a massive push to the knowledge production project (Saqr, 2011: 43–46, 169–170).

In reference to other forms of material contributions, released prisoners who returned to China after the Talas battle spoke of an imprint they left on Abbasid economic activity. Particular mention was of “weavers who made light silks (in the Arab capital [Kufah]), the goldsmiths (who work) gold and silver (there) and the painters; (the arts which they practice) were started by Chinese technicians” (Needham, 1954: 236). Such information has been amply supported by historic records, especially of travelers to China. Superior Chinese technical skills in industry and artisanship, for example, were documented in the “Al-Rasail” (Letters) of the renowned poet and philosopher Al-Jahiz (c. 776–869 CE); in them he refers to the unique traits of the various cultures encountered in the land at the time, including what he himself witnessed. To the Chinese, he particularly attributes industry and craftship, including jewelry and metal casting, coloring and dying, sculpture and molding, and copying and calligraphy, and their general dexterity in whatever they seek to produce (Al-Jahiz, 1964: 67–69). This “stereotype” came to dominate much literature on China by travelers from the Caliphate. That Chinese technology and skills influenced counterparts in the Abbasid Caliphate is, therefore, present in studies of the era (King, 2017: 51–53; Park, 2012: 5–6).

In the making of the Abbasid golden age, two weaknesses in the volume and form of influences from China are noteworthy: first relates to governance practices, while the second regards epistemological knowledge, which the following explains.

In governance, the Abbasids used the functionaries of conquered lands (and eliminated political leadership) and invited skills from Persia as well as Levant; such a policy allowed the Abbasids to govern more efficiently via established knowledge. What came to constitute a bureaucratic class kept varied languages, such as Greek or Farsi, while Roman, Byzantine, and Sassanid practices were adopted in taxation, legal structuring, revenue administration, erection of religious monuments, and standardization of exchange regulations (money, coinage, weights, etc.) (Gibb, 1958). From an Abbasid perspective, therefore, Chinese administrative practices faced local dissonance to varied logics in governance and models of the state (see Huff, 2003: 258–260, 302; see also Kamal, 1986: 146–152). Thus, the challenge to exchanging (or integrating) governance skills related to a lack of fit rather than strategic exclusion.

Also noticeable was feebleness of direct knowledge exchange, despite the fact that from the seventh century CE ample opportunities existed for contact between Abbasids and Chinese (Needham, 1954: 215–223). In general the Abbasids were less tolerant of contesting Islamic views (that risked challenging religious authority) than of non-Islamic ones. Thus, the Abbasids were open to integrating into their philosophical and epistemological repertoires and natural sciences information from other sources (e.g. the Greeks), as long as Baghdad was in full control of what could have had a bearing on its religious orthodoxy (Al-Ish, 1991: 67–96). Here too, an explanation of the feebleness of exchange seems to be more a question of fit or knowledge levels, rather than strategic exclusion or civilizational conflict. In mathematics, astronomy, engineering, and other sciences, achievements in Baghdad were “the most advanced in the world” (Huff, 2003: 52); hence, epistemological transfers from China to the Abbasids were minor. Another factor influencing exchange was the varied structure of scholarly authority in the process of knowledge generation:

Educational certification in the Islamic world was the polar opposite of that in China: in the former case it was always (and only) the scholar himself who certified a student’s competence, whereas in China it was always (and only) the state, never the corporate scholarly group, which conferred certification of educational competence. (Huff, 2003: 78)

The Abbasid Caliphate and the Silk Roads from a Chinese perspective

Two sets of factors help explain Tang overtures towards the Abbasid Caliphate: the first relates to a broader Chinese worldview on international relations, while the second relates to positive political and economic assessments of strategic relations.

More broadly, the Tang Dynasty’s external affairs were defined by tolerance, and for a good domestically-driven politico-cultural reason:

The Tang unification created a great empire that became not only a geopolitical center, but also a cultural center. As a cultural center, however, it was not based on the superiority of a particular ethnic culture, but on a world culture comprehensive enough to encompass all associated ethnicities. As a result, Tang culture became well known for its cosmopolitanism, as different cultures and religions vied for prominence in Tang society. (Wang, 1999: 299)

In foreign policy, pragmatism had defined Tang rule prior to (and on the verge of) the rise of the Abbasid rule. Chinese pragmatism translated into significant decision making authority delegated to local military and administrative offices; this was an expedient policy during times of domestic political competition as well as attempts at external expansion, such as towards Central Asia. Pragmatism allowed Tang rulers to minimize losses, which was important after the An Lushan rebellion (explained earlier in the article): “seriously weakened by the fragmented internal situation, the Tang rulers were forced to turn to accommodation in their dealings with neighboring people” (Yihong, 1997: 349). This helps us appreciate how in addition to a convergence in Tang–Abbasid worldviews, foreign policy considerations and tactical military interests actualized and cemented ties.

In their economic outlook, Tang governments valued the trade potential with the west. After the An Lushan rebellion interrupting land travel and shifting emphasis to the maritime route, improved and growing Tang-era economic activity “was directly reflected in the trade in the Southern Seas (the Indian Ocean and seas afterwards), where Chinese ports became an important terminus for Muslim vessels” (Hodgson, 1977, vol. 1: 233). This was concurrent with the fact that China’s growth and urbanization under the Tang (as well as later the Sung) Dynasty meant increased consumer demands and diversified tastes, especially for imported goods; such a dynamic galvanized the economics of the Abbasids’ state-building in Baghdad with the expansion in eastward trade. “Chinese contact with Muslim merchants grew, and as it grew, Chinese came to regard the Muslim homeland as the richest of all foreign countries” (Park, 2012: 21).

A Tang–Abbasid convergence around supporting the Silk Roads had larger implications on trans-regional international relations: “Maritime trade and large-scale exchange of bulk commodities constituted the first steps toward a genuine world economy, an integrated economic structure that transcended all defined political units” (Lewis, 2009: 163). Yet, the ninth century witnessed weakened official diplomacy from both the Tang and Abbasid sides; people-to-people trade exchanges and cultural curiosity sustained the relationship, which is what the following concluding section attends to.

In lieu of concluding: Exchanges despite the odds

The Abbasid Caliphate did not sustain a strong central authority past its first century; the Caliphate and figure of the Caliph remained highly symbolic. Disputes had emerged as to the appropriateness of keeping revenue in distant areas or moving it to Baghdad. The Caliph Harun Al-Rasheed (r. 786–809 CE) issued policies that gave peripheral regions more fiscal independence, whereby generated income via taxation was to largely remain there to be spent rather than sent to the central treasury; these measures ensured high levels of autonomy to these areas – something which continued later (Abu Zeid, 1996b: 40). Despite contestation, decentralized governing continued and defined the Caliphate in the centuries to come. Nevertheless, ensuring Silk Roads’ functionality (thus revenue) remained high on the Abbasid agenda, as well as on the agenda of various emerging regional leaderships (Khalil, 2014: 167–169).

With Baghdad losing its position as the final political arbiter, regional diplomatic and trade ties between locales in western Asia and China (or the east in general) proliferated. Under such arrangements, for example, central authority in Baghdad worked with local leaders to maintain safe and calm borders, in return for a degree of independence while they themselves benefited from the Silk Roads. The Tahiri government (820–872 AD), for example, worked as a proxy for the Abbasids in Khurasan: it ended revolts and ensured political stability and security (Sabra and Kira, 2009: 13–16).

The reason for the persistence of ties throughout turbulent and tranquil times for both the Chinese (Tang and after) and the Abbasids (post the ninth century) was the people-to-people exchanges and cultural curiosity. During and after the Tang–Abbasid eras, “because of the peaceful atmosphere prevailing on the commercial route despite its being long and tedious, China and Iraq had become commercially and culturally very close to each other” (Imamuddin, 1984: 174). Bretschneider (1871: 11–12) notes that under the Sung Dynasty (c. 960–1280 CE):

[m]ention is made of twenty Embassies from Ta shi [i.e. Arabs – as agreed upon to be the translation by most accounts] having come to China in ships during this past period. But it seems that most of them bore no official character and have to be reduced to mercantile expeditions.

People-to-people exchanges were more robust than official political diplomacy and had the discernable effect of sustaining and expanding east–west connections. Most of these exchanges were led by travelers and explorers as well as traders who benefited from relations that had been established in the eighth and ninth centuries CE, and from better document travel guides/techniques. Just as the Chinese admired what they saw on their travels west (Bretschneider, 1871: 3), so did those who went to China (during and after the ninth century CE). More pointedly, travel to China allowed for the expansion of understandings of the world’s various regions, and sharpened the practice of anthropological observation and documentation, and of wedding geography and history; these “paved the way to the rise of an Arab school of geographic studies” (Farjani, 2017: 31).

With the Tang rule embroiled in conflict on multiple fronts, especially domestically, its contribution to the maintenance of the maritime route towards the end of the ninth century CE declined. By the time that a new strong government rose in China under the Sung Dynasty in the 10th century CE, the Islamic Caliphate had witnessed the rise of regionalized centers of power outside Baghdad (Imamuddin, 1984: 180). The Silk Roads declined; they were revived under the Mongols.

In sum, this article argued that the Silk Roads and a positive Tang–Abbasid disposition allowed for the creation of the conditions of possibility for a golden age during the first century of the Abbasid Caliphate. While intensity of influences from China varied, knowing the potential of these Roads had a stabilizing effect on the government in Baghdad. Tang rule did not feel compelled to share its scientific production with external actors. However, by the same token, the Tang did not extend “imperially” (i.e. in an imposed fashion), which might have been precisely the reason why the Abbasids appreciated the relationship. The same argument can be made about the Tang Dynasty reciprocating their positive view of ties with the Abbasids. The lack of hegemonic project(s) helps explain why it was not only at the decision making but also at the societal level that no impending sense of political or cultural threat from the other was imminent. Indicators are to the contrary – that of mutual benefit and respect; this helps explain why despite the emergence of several challenges facing official ties, relations were sustained by people-to-people exchanges.