Populist political ideation and communication of gubernatorial candidates in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections: Anti-establishment views,secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements

Abstract

Populism has been evolving across the globe. Knowledge of the ways and degree to which political actors in Asian democracy exploited anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational elements when they established populist political communication strategies for local elections has, however, been under-developed. Focusing on such issues, this work selects gubernatorial candidates who ran in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections as cases, using extracts from materials they posted on their Facebook pages. The findings are as follows. Candidates did not merely advocate anti-establishment views, but also adopted secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements for developing populist political communication strategies. Those who exploited anti-economic elites favoured establishing secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies inclusively. Those who propagated anti-economic, anti-political and anti-bureaucratic elites instead greatly preferred advancing an Islamic populist political communication strategy. However, through employing such efforts, only few succeeded in these elections.

Keywords

anti-establishment Islamism populist political communication populist political ideation secular nationalism

Introduction

Along with people-centrism, sovereignty and the exclusion of others, anti-establishment strategies have been widely seen as primary components that constitute populism (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008: 3; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 323–324; Laclau, 2005: 150; Panizza, 2005: 4). However, while such components have been recognized as empty signifiers (De Vreese et al., 2018: 4; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 323–324; Laclau, 2005: 13), controversial debates regarding the structural elements that underlie anti-establishment approaches have been unresolved (Barr, 2009; Rooduijin, 2019; Schedler, 1996). Whilst such issues remained, we lacked knowledge regarding the ways and degrees to which political actors in Asian democratic countries, which have been populated by substantial numbers of secular and conservative Muslims, such as Indonesia, signified and exploited such components while establishing populist political communication strategies in facing the elections.

Within the last couple of decades, populism has been investigated robustly in Asian democracies, such as Pakistan (Mulla, 2017), Thailand (Brown and Hewison, 2005), the Philippines (Curato, 2016, 2017; Hedman, 2001; Thompson, 2010) and also Indonesia (Hadiz, 2016, 2017; Mietzner, 2015). Focusing on Indonesian politics, some authors have examined transformations of secular nationalist and Islamic populisms in the post-Suharto regimes, and structural conditions that propelled such transformations (Aspinall, 2015; Hadiz, 2016, 2017; Hadiz and Robison, 2017; Mietzner, 2015; Ziv, 2001). However, whilst most of them commonly adopted an actor-centred perspective (Aspinall, 2015; Mietzner, 2015; Ziv, 2001), none explored the ways that those who ran in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections adopted anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational populist elements in facing these elections, and the degrees to which they did this when they established populist political communication strategies to win in such elections.

So far, most of those who have studied populism in Asian democracy in general, and Indonesia’s democracy in particular, have favoured adopting actor-centred, economic and structural perspectives and focusing on transformations of populist actors and organizations in the national political system (Aspinall, 2015; Brown and Hewison, 2005; Curato, 2016, 2017; Hadiz, 2016, 2017; Hadiz and Robison, 2017; Hedman, 2001; Mietzner, 2015; Mulla, 2017; Thompson, 2010; Ziv, 2001). None of them, however, explored the populist political communication models advanced by political actors and organizations in the local politics, although a subsequent author examined transformations of populist actors that emerged in Indonesian local politics (Hamid, 2014, 2019). Nonetheless, we lacked knowledge regarding the ways and degrees to which those who ran in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections strategically exploited anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational populist elements in political communication practices they performed when facing these elections.

This work argues that these elections would be a good case to evaluate such issues. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, as imposed by the local election regulation (Law No. 10/2016), gubernatorial candidates who run in such elections should be voted for directly by the Indonesian electorate. Those who obtain the highest number of votes in the provincial area wherein such elections are organized would be granted rule in the provincial government. To achieve such numbers, each candidate needs a workable political communication strategy.

Secondly, such elections were conducted a year before the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections were held. Such elections were organized in 17 Indonesian provinces and involved nearly 79% of the total of eligible Indonesian voters. The results of such elections, therefore, were seen as a crucial factor determining the chances of Indonesian political parties and national politicians associated with these parties who ran in the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections accumulating the political and economic resources needed to achieve their goals in these elections (Warburton et al., 2018: 5).

Thirdly, such elections were conducted a year after the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. A few months before this election, not only had various secular nationalist populist narratives been manufactured and robustly spread by supporters of an incumbent candidate, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama or Ahok who was nominated by a secular nationalist party – the PDIP and its coalition – but also diverse Islamic populist narratives had been produced and distributed widely by supporters of his challenger, Anies Baswedan, who was nominated by a coalition of secular nationalist and Islamist parties (the Gerindra Party and the PKS) to run in this election (Lim, 2017). In this election, Baswedan gained substantial endorsement from plenty of hard-line Islamic groups who successfully organized an anti-Ahok campaign (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2018). Such a campaign model has been seen as being effective to help him become elected. This stimulated political leaders associated with the opposition parties and with a coalition of political parties endorsing Jokowi’s government to adopt this campaign model as ‘a tactical blueprint’ to win in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections (Power, 2018: 311).

Having considered the background, this work raises the following questions: how did gubernatorial candidates who ran in such elections establish populist political ideation and communication strategies in facing the elections? And to what degree did they adopt anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements when they established such strategies? To answer these questions, this work suggests the following propositions. In facing these elections, most candidates are likely to consider the following components that constitute anti-establishment views (anti-political, economic and bureaucratic elites and anti-experts), secular nationalism (secular nationalist people-centrism, sovereignty and exclusion of non-secular nationalist people as others) and Islamism (Islamic populism, which is Islamic people-centrism, sovereignty and the exclusion of non-Islamic people as others). They are likely to exploit these components strategically as ideational elements in their political communication strategies. Such strategies include secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies. The ways they exploited the components that constitute the anti-establishment are likely to determine the modes and degrees of these secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies.

Populist political communication: A communication-centred perspective

This work adopts a communication-centred perspective posited by Stanyer et al. (2016) and De Vreese et al. (2018). This perspective focuses on characteristics of populist political communication advanced by political actors and organizations rather than populist actors. It concerns populist political communication practices performed by any political actor rather than labelling some political actors as populist. Instead of focusing on these populist actors, this perspective considers all relevant political actors as empirical objects of study to a much greater extent (Stanyer et al., 2016).

This perspective considers populism as ‘features of political communication’. It realizes ‘populist messages as independent phenomen[a]’, inseparable from ‘a particular party family or type of politician’ (De Vreese et al., 2018: 3). It concerns the ways and degrees to which political actors exploited these components as ‘a communication frame’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 322) when they established their populist political communication strategy.

Being slightly different from an actor-centred perspective, it realizes components that constitute populism as a ‘thin’ ideology that are likely to be exploited by any political actor when he/she establishes populist communication contents/messages delivered to audiences/voters/electorates. Such components include anti-establishment views, people centrism, sovereignty and the exclusion of others (De Vreese et al., 2018; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Stanyer et al., 2016).

Populist political ideation and communication

This work argues that political actors, especially those who run in elections, are likely to exploit the following components that constitute populism as ideational elements in populist political communication. These components include anti-establishment views, people-centrism, sovereignty and the exclusion of others. Such a proposition is detailed as follows.

Anti-establishment views as an ideational element in populist political communication

Anti-establishment practices have been realized as politically appealing when advanced by populist political actors opposing the ruling elite or wielding power (Barr, 2009; Mudde, 2010, 2016; Schedler, 1996: 31–32; Ucen, 2007: 54), the ‘cultural establishment’ and ‘economic establishment’ (Moffit and Tormey, 2014: 395). However, while controversial debates regarding components that constitute it prevail (Barr, 2009: 32), scholars have lacked an agreement in defining such components and how to evaluate them comprehensively (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Rooduijn, 2019).

In consideration of such conditions, this work adopts the ideas of the following authors and defines anti-establishment practices as follows: a populist (political communication) appeal established by political actors, which is specified to attack the ruling elites (Ucen, 2007: 54) or those who have been labelled as the established elites (Barr, 2009: 37). While attacking such elites, these actors are likely to establish ‘an anti-political identity’, ‘build up an image of externality and antagonism vis-a-vis the political elite’ (Schedler, 1996: 298) and deploy ‘aggressive language, confrontational styles of opposition’ and popular and attractive ‘anti-political-establishment rhetoric’ (Schedler, 1996: 299) to make them appear ‘different’ from mainstream political actors (Schedler, 1996: 300). They are likely to be reluctant towards political establishment and opposing the political elite, but unlikely to reject the liberal democratic system (Schedler, 1996: 302).

Those who advance such an appeal advocate a view that highlights that such elites should be replaced by anti-establishment politicians or those outside the political system (Barr, 2009: 37; Laclau, 2005: 150). They formulate ‘anti-establishment sentiments as a mobilization of emotions’ (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: 524). Such sentiments are deployed not merely to criticize the ruling elites who ignored ‘societal demands that are shared by the majority of the population’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018: 1680). but also to attack the established elites who have failed in fulfilling the needs and interests of the people (Barr, 2009) and who live in ivory towers (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 324). Such elites include ‘political elites (parties, government, ministers, etc.), the media (media tycoons, journalists, etc.), the state (administration, civil service), intellectuals (universities, writers, professors) and those who controlled the economic powers (multinationals, employers, trade unions, capitalists) (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 324). Such elites are also grouped as “political, economic, legal, supranational and media elites and experts” (Engesser et al., 2017: 14).

People-centrism, sovereignty and the exclusion of others as ideational elements in populist political communication

The existing literature also indicates that populism is a thin ideology that includes the following components: people-centrism; sovereignty; and the exclusion of others. The latter incorporates the ‘political elite’ (Schedler, 1996: 298) or ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2004: 543), and ‘dangerous others’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008: 3). Within either election or non-election contexts, political actors might exploit these components as ‘a strategy to mobilise support’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 323). In this respect, those who favour taking up people-centrism and sovereignty as primary ideational elements to advance such a strategy could be called thin populists (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 322–323), while those who combine these elements with the exclusion of others could be named as thick populists (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 323–324).

Political actors who adopted these elements to establish such a strategy are likely to frame populism as a ‘colourless thin ideology’, which ‘can be of the left and of the right’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 322–323). They consider this ideology as an ‘empty shell’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 323), an ‘empty signifier’ (Laclau, 2005: 150) or an ‘empty vessel’, that can be ‘filled in different ways’ by these actors (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013: 151). This ideology is likely to be compatible with any political ideology, ranging from the Left to the Right, and possibly emerging from various social bases (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008: 4; Mudde, 2004: 544; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013: 153).

This work argues that these actors might also exploit and select the material, political and symbolic dimensions that constitute populism to formulate either inclusionary or exclusionary populist political communication features (Filc, 2015: 266–267; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013: 158–164). While doing so, they might use diverse communication channels, ranging from the mainstream media to the Internet and social media platforms (Block and Negrine, 2017; Stanyer et al., 2016: 514). They might exploit these social media platforms to autonomously ‘produce and circulate populist messages that reach people directly’ (Casero-Ripollés et al., 2017). Nonetheless, they might attach the ideational populist elements ‘to some host ideology’ (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: 514). Within the specific context of Indonesian politics, such ideology incorporates secular nationalist, Islamic and Islamist ideological orientations (Hadiz, 2016, 2017, 2018; Hadiz and Robison, 2017).

Transformations of secular nationalist, Islamic and Islamist ideological orientations in Indonesian politics

Since the post-Indonesian Independent era, such ideological orientations have been widely adopted not merely by civil society organizations but also by political parties. Indonesian political parties that adopted the first (secular nationalist), second (Islamic) and third (Islamist) as an ideological principle have been, respectively, acknowledged as secular nationalist, Islamic and Islamist parties (Ambardi, 2008). Within the specific context of Indonesian politics, the nationalist party is seen as being quite dissimilar to the nationalist party in (Western) European politics. It is commonly considered as a political party that strongly advocates the Five Principles (Pancasila) as a primary ideological foundation and upholds ‘a principle of religious pluralism’ (Epley and Jung, 2016: 55). Being slightly different from this party, the Islamic party is instead realized as a political party that accepts Pancasila but strongly promotes Islamic values. In contrast, the Islamist party is defined as a political party that does not accept Pancasila but prefers advocating Islamic values (Ambardi, 2008).

While the extreme multi-party system evolved in the Old Order Soekarno era, the following secular nationalist, Islamic and Islamist parties emerged and obtained substantial numbers of votes in the 1955 general election: respectively, PNI, NU and Masyumi. As the Old Order Soekarno regime collapsed and the New Order Soeharto regime ruled the country, this regime gradually established ‘a tightly controlled three-party system’ (Fionna and Tomsa, 2017). Such a system evolved since ‘a fusion policy’ was forcefully installed by this regime in 1973. Imposed on by this policy, the existing nationalist parties were united as the PDIP (the Indonesian Democracy Party), and the existing Islamic parties were amalgamated as the PPP (the Development Unity Party). The first includes PNI, Murba, IPKI, Parkindo and the Catholic Party, while the second consists of PNU, Parmusi, PSII and PERTI. From 1977 to 1997, development of these parties was controlled tightly. This made them turn into the opposition parties. Golkar was instead endorsed by this regime and its bureaucratic and military apparatus. This allowed this party to get the majority of seats in the Indonesian House of Representative/Indonesian Parliament and evolve as a quasi-state hegemonic party (Fionna and Tomsa, 2017: 4).

Since this regime ruled the country, Soeharto launched the anti-Communist campaign and banned the Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI). This made the left-wing tradition of Indonesian nationalism become weaker, but gave a robust chance for advocates of the conservative tradition of nationalism, especially the armed forces elites, to evolve as dominant political actors (Hefner, 2002: 756). Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah supported Soeharto when he managed such efforts. In the 1970s and 1980s, Soeharto marginalized such organizations from political arenas. This took place once he had successfully consolidated the military forces in his government. The use of any religion, including Islam, as an ideological principle by any political party or civil society organization was prohibited (Buehler, 2013: 65).

In the late 1980s, while the power of a quasi-state secular nationalist party, which was Golkar, kept increasing and started to accommodate conservative Islamic groups (Van Bruinessen, 2002, 2013), the role of Islam in Indonesian politics gradually increased (Hefner, 2002). This occurred soon after he was criticized by Benny Moerdani, a conservative Catholic commander of the armed forces, for ‘his new habit of awarding lucrative state contracts to his young-adult children’ (Hefner, 2002: 758). He gradually ‘promoted several Islamist generals over conservative nationalists in the armed forces command’ (Hefner, 2002: 758). He not only supported an association of reformist, neo-modernist and conservative Islamic leaders to establish Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) (Van Bruinessen, 2002, 2013), but also developed several policies allowing Islamic society and organizations to express Islamic norms and values in the public sphere (Hefner, 2002: 758). Such developments remained when Habibie replaced him as Indonesian president on 20 May 1998 (Hefner, 2002: 760).

Soon after Habibie began ruling the country, democratic political and election laws – Laws No. 2/1999 and No. 3/1999 – were enacted. Implementation of these laws led to an extreme multi-party system evolving in the country. As imposed by these laws, the first democratic general election was conducted on 7 June 1999. A few months before this election, more than 200 political parties were established, but only 48 of them successfully emerged as political contestants and only 20 obtained parliamentary seats. They are commonly categorized as secular-nationalist, secular-Islamic and Islamist parties. The first includes the PDIP and the Golkar Party. The second consists of PKB and PAN, while the third incorporates PPP, the PK/PKS and PBB.

In the 1999 general election, while secular nationalist parties as a political entity collected a majority number of votes, Islamic and Islamist parties collectively obtained 33.76% of votes. In the 2004 parliamentary election, these Islamic and Islamist parties collected 35.00% of votes. However, the total number of votes they collected in the subsequent parliamentary elections declined, from 31.41% in 2009 to 29.26% in 2014.

Some authors have argued that while these secular nationalist parties successfully mobilized Islamic electorates, these Islamic parties ‘have been incapable to dominate Indonesian electoral politics’ (Epley and Jung, 2016: 54). These parties failed to differentiate themselves from secular nationalist parties, consolidating the fragmentation of Islamic authority in Islamic civil society organizations (Buehler, 2009: 54) and establishing ‘a unified Islamic centre’ (Buehler, 2009: 59). Whilst Muslim electorates are disengaged from these parties, they are no longer interested in casting their votes based on Islamic identity (Liddle and Mujani, 2007). This not only makes them become increasingly disconnected from Islamic voters, but also Islam, as a religious identity, becomes insufficient ‘for political mobilisation’ (Epley and Jung, 2016: 58).

The following authors instead argued that Islam prevailed as an influential force in Indonesian politics due to the following reasons (Buehler, 2013; Menchik, 2016, 2019; Menchik and Trost, 2018; Tanuwidjaja, 2010). Firstly, as democratization of politics took place, the total number of sharia/Islamic laws enacted by the local governments also increased substantially in this country since 1999 (Buehler, 2013; Buehler and Muhtada, 2016). From 1999 to 2012, the total number of sharia/Islamic laws proposed by secular nationalist political parties’ local politicians in 33 Indonesian provinces was 169 (Buehler, 2013: 70). This number increased to 433 in 2013 (Buehler and Muhtada, 2016).

Secondly, since 2005, there has been a ‘conservative turn’ in mainstream Indonesian Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Conservative views have been increasingly adopted by such organizations, and any liberal and moderate views advocated by their leaders have been gradually rejected (Van Bruinessen, 2013). Though they continued to accept (liberal) democratic principles, these organizations advocated non-democratic behavioural orientations such as a willingness to defend Islam, oppose blasphemy and restrict non-Muslims from controlling majority-Muslim regions (Menchik, 2016). Members of these organizations have been much more intolerant compared to the leaders (Menchik, 2019; Menchik and Trost, 2018). While such developments prevailed, these organizations favoured establishing an alliance with anti-democratic actors and radical Islamic groups, especially once ‘the state crosses red lines by putting in place policies that are against Islamic civil society’s material and ideological interests’ (Menchik, 2019: 7).

Thirdly, there has been increasing support for Islamism among Indonesian electorates. Such tendency is confirmed by Fossati (2019) based on survey data collected by the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia) in May 2017 using a face-to-face interview technique on a randomly selected sample of 1620 Indonesian citizens. This showed that 41 percent of Indonesian electorates agreed that Islam should be prioritized over the other religions, and 31 percent said that Islamic leaders should have important roles in Indonesian politics. Furthermore, 39 percent advocated that sharia/Islamic law should be implemented throughout Indonesia, and 41 percent that it should be implemented at the local level. Additionally, 58 percent highlighted the need to vote for a Muslim leader in elections, and 63 percent stated that blasphemy against Islam should be punished more severely (Fossati, 2019: 125).

Fourthly, there was a consistent decline in intolerant and radical attitudes among Muslims between 2010 and 2016, and a shifting of ‘the epicentre of conservative-radical attitudes’ within Indonesian electorates (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2018: 483–484) from the lower classes to the middle classes and elites. Though Islamic conservativism has penetrated less in the whole of Indonesian society, these middle classes and elites have increasingly advocated Islamic conservatism in the Indonesian political sphere since 2016 (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2018: 484).

Secular nationalist, Islamic and Islamist populisms in Indonesia’s democracy

This work argues that, along with secular nationalist ideological orientation, Islamic and Islamist ideological orientations keep evolving in Indonesian politics. Adaptations of these ideological orientations by Indonesian political organizations and actors are likely to lead to secular nationalist, Islamic and Islamist populisms taking place in Indonesian politics (Hadiz, 2016, 2017, 2018; Hadiz and Robison, 2017). We now briefly chronicle the characteristics of these populisms.

Firstly, those who followed secular nationalist populism advocated Pancasila as a unitary Indonesian state ideology (Hadiz, 2017: 274). Moreover, while strongly promoting the importance of national sovereignty and nationalist and anti-foreign sentiments, they highlighted the need to secure the value of harmony ‘from a range of influences, including that of radical forms of Islamic politics’ (Hadiz, 2017: 275). Additionally, they developed ‘direct appeals’ to the people using ‘the rhetoric of nationalism and social justice’. They favoured attacking on the ‘selfishness of established politicians’ who failed to tackle issues of social inequality, and on politicians, in securing Indonesia’s natural resources for the good of the people, resolving foreign debt and dealing with ‘international agreements’ that ‘serve multinational corporations and their backers’ (Aspinall, 2015: 18; Hadiz and Robison, 2017: 493).

Secondly, similar to advocates of secular nationalist populism, those who endorsed Islamic populism also accepted Pancasila as an ideological principle. However, they favoured causing antagonism between the marginalized Islamic people and the elites, especially those who ignored these people’s interests and undermined their sovereignty. They realized these people as a ‘peripheralized ummah’ (Hadiz and Robison, 2017: 496). They promoted not merely the importance of their sovereignty and social justice, but also the need to protect their interests and attack the ‘selfish and established politicians’ and elites (Hadiz, 2016, 2017, 2018).

Thirdly, those who advocated Islamist populism instead did not favour accepting Pancasila as an ideological principle. They not merely preferred advocating Islam as a primary ideology, but also favoured encouraging antagonism between the marginalized Islamic people and the elites, especially those seen as having ‘secular, ethnic Chinese or foreign origin’ (Hadiz and Robison, 2017: 498). Following this ideology, they advocated anti-pluralist and liberal views through ‘cultural idioms’ to mobilize these people as ‘a distinctly ummah-based political identity’ (Hadiz, 2018: 566–567; Hadiz and Robison, 2017: 498), and formulated ‘a common narrative about perennial marginalisation’ of these people (Hadiz, 2018: 567).

Proposed hypotheses

Informed by the ideas of these aforementioned authors, this work assumes that within the specific context of non-elections, Indonesian political actors might consider such secular nationalist, Islamic and Islamist populisms as ideational elements when they discuss, advocate and formulate public policies and regulations. However, within the specific context of elections, instead of advocating Islamist populism, they are likely to prioritize secular nationalist and Islamic populism much more as a primary ideational element when they establish their populist political communication strategy.

Within the specific context of Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections, this work argues that all gubernatorial candidates who ran in such elections were unlikely to favour adopting Islamist populism as ideational components when they established populist political communication strategy through their Facebook pages. The main reason is as follows. As imposed by Article No. 7, point 2 of Law No. 10/2016, they must accept Pancasila as a primary ideological principle. This means they should consider ‘religious pluralism’ as a principle and are also prohibited from advocating Islamist ideological orientation if they want to be legally nominated by a political party or a coalition of political parties as gubernatorial candidates in such elections.

This work assumes that most of these candidates are likely to adopt the ideational elements underlying not merely secular nationalist populism but also Islamic populism when they attempt to advance secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies in such elections. While doing so, they are also likely to exploit anti-political, economic and bureaucratic elites and experts who constitute anti-establishment views as ideational components. The ways and degrees to which they adopted and prioritized these components are likely to determine the modes and degrees of both secular nationalist- and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies they established in facing these elections.

Research method and design

To evaluate these hypotheses, this work adopts a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods as a methodological research approach. Following this approach, this work extracts the materials posted by these candidates and their teams on their Facebook pages¹ from 16 February to 25 June 2018. Such materials are analysed using qualitative content analysis. Moreover, following the ideas of Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011: 1272), this work also deploys a classical quantitative content analysis,² considering each of these materials as a unit analysis and all of these candidates as a population³ and selecting 50 of them as a set of samples. Adopting the idea of Jagers and Walgrave (2007: 326) and employing two trained coders, this work counts the intensity of populist elements included in these materials, and codes and evaluates them using statistical descriptive, Spearman’s Rho correlation and linear regression analyses.

Before undertaking this, this work formulates anti-establishment, secular nationalist and Islamic populist political communication indexes based on the ideas of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013), Ernst et al. (2017), Engesser et al. (2017), Hadiz (2016, 2017, 2018) and Hadiz and Robison (2017). The first one includes the anti-media, political, economic and bureaucratic elites and expert indexes. The second one consists of secular nationalist people-centrism and sovereignty, and exclusion of non-secular nationalist people as others. The third incorporates the indexes of Islamic people-centrism and sovereignty, and exclusion of non-Islamic people as others.

Measurements of such indexes are detailed in the supplemental appendix.⁴ Absolute scores of such indexes are, respectively, transformed into z scores and converted into the 0 to 100 range/percentage. The elements that constitute people-centrism and sovereignty and exclusion of others indexes are considered as dependent variables (DV1-DV3),⁵ while components that constitute the anti-political, economic and bureaucratic elites and anti-expert indexes are deployed as independent variables (IDV1-IDV4). The findings are given below.

Gubernatorial candidates’ anti-establishment populist political communication in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections

Extractions from the Facebook pages’ materials posted by gubernatorial candidates who ran in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections reveal the following findings. They strongly attacked the political elites (M = 6,12; SD = 7,07), and moderately condemned the economic (M = 1,52; SD = 2,40) and bureaucratic elites (M = 3,36; SD = 4,46); the experts were less diminished (M = 0.06; SD = 0,314). Some of them, however, such as Nurdin Hallid, a gubernatorial candidate who was nominated by the Golkar Party, a secular nationalist party running in the 2018 gubernatorial election of South Sulawesi Province, strongly criticized the economic elites using what Schedler (1996: 299) labelled a ‘popular and attractive anti-political-establishment rhetoric’. He said that economic and natural resources in this province should generate welfare for all people in the province, and not be ‘continuously exploited by few individuals and groups, as we have seen for the last few years’ (Facebook Page Nurdin Halid, 11 June 2018). He also stated that:

I would not allow ‘cukong-cukong’ [Chinese economic elites] to endorse my candidacy in this election. [Because] I would not serve their economic and business interests as was commonly done by the other gubernatorial candidates who ran in the gubernatorial elections. My brothers, I only hope to be your servant, not their servant. (Facebook page Nurdin Halid, 19 June 2018)

Those who attacked such elites have been commonly recognized as advocates of Islamist populism (Hadiz and Robison, 2017: 498). However, though he condemned such elites, he did not favour advocating Islam as a primary ideological orientation as was usually done by proponents of Islamist populism.

Despite attacking political and bureaucratic elites, some of them, such as Edy Rahmayadi, who ran in the 2018 gubernatorial election of North Sumatera Province, favoured criticizing economic elites. While addressing the electorates in Pangkalan Brandan, Langkat District, he made the following statements:

We all knew Pankalan Brandan⁶ as a place wherein oil explorations have been carried out for more than a hundred years. But, in this place, economic disparity between the rich and the poor peoples remained. We should make the people living in this place get much more benefit from such exploration. (Facebook Page of Edy Rahmayadi-Musa Rajekshah Satu, 4 June 2018)

Such statements hint that he not merely advances an anti-economic elite’s populist political communication ‘using the rhetoric of social justice’ (Hadiz and Robison, 2017: 493), but also adopted secular nationalism populist political communication by highlighting people-centrism and sovereignty (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008: 3; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 323–324; Laclau, 2005: 150; Panizza, 2005: 4).

Meanwhile, instead of condemning economic elites, some of these gubernatorial candidates, as detailed in Figures 1 and 2 of the supplemental appendix, criticized political elites much more. They include Sutarmidji of the PPP and Edy Rahmayadi of the Gerindra Party and also his rival, Djarot Syaiful Hidayat of the PDIP, who were, respectively, running in the 2018 gubernatorial elections in West Kalimantan and North Sumatera Provinces. The first and the second favoured attacking both national and local political elites, especially those who supported the Jokowi government, while the third preferred criticizing local political elites, especially those who are seen as failures in managing the local government. Only a few of them attacked local economic elites. They include Agus Arifin Nu’mang and Sudirman Said of the Gerindra Party and the latter’s rival, Ganjar Pranowo of the PDIP, who were, respectively, running in the elections in South Sulawesi and Central Java Provinces. They, as displayed in Figures 2–5 of the supplemental appendix, launched an attack not only on political and economic elites, but also on bureaucratic elites.

Figure 1.

Secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies Indexes. R2 value of regression line between secular nationalist and Islamic online populist political communication strategies indexes is 0.158.

Instead of condemning the experts, most of them launched many more attacks on these bureaucratic elites. Some of them strongly attacked both the former and the latter. They include Sutarmidji of the PPP, Major General (ret) Sudrajat, Firdaus, Sudirman Said and Edy Rahmayadi of the Gerindra Party and his rival, Djarot Saiful Hidayat of the PDIP who were, respectively, running in the elections in East Kalimantan, West Java, Riau, Central Java and North Sumatera Provinces. Instead of condemning the latter, a few of them, such as Ganjar Pranowo of the PDIP and Zulkieflimansyah of the PKS and his rival, Ahyar Abduh of the Gerindra Party, who, respectively, ran in Central Java and NTB Provinces, favoured attacking the latter much more.

The statistical results show that those who criticized political elites attacked economic elites (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.487; p value < 0.001) and bureaucratic elites (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.731; p value < 0.001), but the experts were criticised less (Spearman’s Rho correlation: -0.024; p value = 0.869). Similarly, those who launched attacks on economic elites attacked bureaucratic elites (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.445; p value = 0.001), but the experts were attacked less (Spearman’s Rho correlation: -0.081; p value = 0.575).

Overall, those who attacked bureaucratic elites did not favour undermining the experts (Spearman’s Rho correlation: -0.129; p value = 0.371). Attacking political elites significantly encouraged them to attack economic elites (R2 = 0.231; t = 3.796; η² = 0.480; p < 0.001) and bureaucratic elites (R2 = 0.445; t = 6.209; η² = 0.667; p <0.001), but did not significantly encourage them to criticize the experts (R2 = 0.004; t = -0.436; η² = -0.063; p = 0.665). Attacking economic elites induced them to undermine bureaucratic elites (R2 = 0.139; t = 2.786; η² = 0.373; p = 0.008); but attacking such elites insignificantly instigated them to criticize the experts (R2 = 0.010; t = -0.707; η² = -0.102; p = 0.483; R2 = 0.024; t = -1.077; η² = -0.154; p = 0.287).

Gubernatorial candidates and establishment of inclusive populist political communication strategy based on secular nationalist and Islamic populisms

The findings also indicate that gubernatorial candidates who ran in Indonesia’s 2018 elections favoured establishing an inclusive populist political communication strategy based on the ideational elements that constitute secular nationalist and Islamic populism.

In facing such elections, most of these gubernatorial candidates promoted not merely secular nationalist- but also Islamic people-centrism. Some of them strongly advocated both the former and the latter, as exhibited in Figure 6 of the supplemental appendix. They include Zulkieflimansyah, who ran for the election in NTB Province, Nurdin Halid of the Golkar Party who ran in the election in South Sulawesi Province and Sudirman Said of the Gerindra Party and his rival, Ganjar Pranowo of the PDIP, who ran in the election in Central Java Province.

Though widely acknowledged as a politician associated with the PKS, an Islamist party, Zulkieflimansyah favoured religious moderate and tolerant values. While attending a meeting with some Hindu religious leaders (Pedande) in Mataram city, he made the following statement: ‘I am so glad having meeting and being supported by my wonderful friends, Pedande in Mataram city and hope we could be good brothers forever’ (Zulkieflimansyah Facebook Page, 17 June 2018). Similarly, Nurdin Abdullah, who ran in the election in South Sulawesi Provinces, while addressing electorates in North Luwu (Luwu Utara) district, said that ‘North Luwu and South Solawesi should be maintained as a place for tolerant religious [Islamic] people. We need to manage religious pluralism in this place under a foundational principle of the Unitary State of Republic Indonesia (Pancasila)’ (Facebook Page, Nurdin Abdullah 19 May 2018). Such evidence indicates that these candidates advocated ‘a principle of religious pluralism’ (Epley and Jung, 2016: 55). In Indonesian politics, it is seen as a fundamental element that constitutes secular nationalist ideological orientation, which is specified to secure the value of harmony (Hadiz, 2017: 275).

Some of these candidates instead endorsed Islamic people’s sovereignty much more. They include Edy Rahmayadi, Major General (ret) Sudrajat, Isran Noor and Ahyar Abduh of the Gerindra Party and his rival, M Ali Dahlan who, respectively, ran in North Sumatera, West Java, East Kalimantan and NTB Provinces, and Syaifullah Yusuf and Muhamad Lukman Edy of the PKB who, respectively, ran in East Java and Riau Provinces. While addressing the voters, the first stated the following points: ‘we should protect all Indonesian people regardless of their ethnicity and religious backgrounds, but we should not tolerate those who have blasphemed against our religion [Islam]’ (Facebook page of Edy Rahmayadi-Musa Rajekshah Satu, 23 June 2018). This hinted that he did not favour advocating anti-pluralist and liberal views, which are commonly taken by advocates of Islamist populism (Hadiz, 2018: 566–567; Hadiz and Robison, 2017: 498). Instead, he merely highlighted the importance of Islamic people’s sovereignty and the need to protect these people’s interests, which are usually advocated by proponents of Islamic populism (Hadiz, 2016, 2017, 2018).

Overall, these candidates advocated not merely secular nationalism, but also Islamic people-centrism and sovereignties. Two of them, as displayed in Figures 6 and 7 of the supplemental appendix, promoted these elements strategically. They include Saifullah Yusuf of the PKB and his rival, Khofifah of the Democratic Party, who ran in the election in East Java Province. Some of their counterparts instead preferred advocating the latter much more. They include Major General (ret) Sudrajat of the Gerindra Party, Mustafa of the Nasdem Party and Firdaus of the Gerindra Party and his rival, Syamsuar of PAN, who were, respectively, running in the elections in West Java, Lampung and Riau Provinces. Most of them favoured advocating the former much more. They include Dedy Mizwar of Democratic Party and his rival, M Ridwan Kamil of the PPP who ran in the elections in West Java Province, and Wempi Wetipo and Karolin Margret Natasya of the PDIP, Arinal Djunaedi of the Golkar Party, Khofifah Indar Pawansa of the Democratic Party who were, respectively, running in the elections in West Borneo, Lampung and East Java Provinces. Similarly, Nurdin Abdullah of the PDIP, Nurdin Hallid of the Golkar Party and Agus Arifin Nu’mang of the Gerindra Party who ran in the election in South Sulawesi Province and Zulkifiemansyah of the PKS and his rival, Ahyar Abduh of the Gerindra Party, who ran in the election in NTB Province, also exploited the latter.

Though advocating these populist elements, they were less interested in excluding those who are different from either secular nationalist or Islamic people as ‘others’. The indexes regarding this point, as displayed in in Figure 8 of the supplemental appendix, overall are quite low. Only two of them significantly excluded them as ‘others’, while only three of them substantially excluded the non-Islamic people as the ‘others’. The former includes Marianus Sae and TB Hasanuddin of the PDI and Muhammad Ridho of the Democratic Party who, respectively, ran in NTT, West Java and Lampung Provinces, while the latter consists of Edy Rahmayadi of the Gerindra Party and his rival, Djarot Saiful Hidayat of the PDIP, who ran in North Sumatera Province.

The statistical results show that those who advocated secular nationalist people-centrism preferred advocating Islamic people-centrism (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.326; p value = 0.021). Advocating the former significantly encouraged them to develop the latter (t: 2.967; = 0.394; p = 0.005). Those who endorsed secular nationalist people sovereignty were less likely to advocate Islamic people’s sovereignty (Spearman’s Rho correlation: -0.109; p value = 0.450). Prioritizing the former insignificantly discouraged them to establish the latter (t: -1.579; η² = -0.222; p = 0.121). Those who excluded those who are different from secular nationalist people did not significantly exclude non-Islamic people as ‘others’ (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.258; p value = 0.071). Excluding the former insignificantly encouraged them to exclude the latter (t = 1.733; η² = -0.243; p = 0.089).

The statistical results overall indicate that those who ran for these elections advanced not only a secular nationalist populist political communication strategy (M = 47.90; SD = 27.945), but also an Islamic one (M = 46.81; SD = 27.158). Those who advocated the former were likely to advance the latter (Spearman’s Rho Correlation: 0.367; p value = 0.009). Adopting the former also significantly encouraged them to develop the latter (R2 = 0.158; t = 2.997; η²= 0.397; p = 0.004). This shows that while developing such strategies, most of them were unlikely to realize such elements as a conflicting entity (Hadiz and Robison, 2017). Instead, they were likely to exploit them as a fragmented entity (Engesser et al., 2017: 1112).

Anti-establishment appeal and its effects on gubernatorial candidates’ secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies

In assessing these elements holistically, this work uncovers that most of these gubernatorial candidates favoured adopting the components that constitute not merely anti-establishment but also secular nationalist or Islamic populisms when they established secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies. The statistics reveal that those who criticized political elites insignificantly favoured developing a secular nationalist populist political communication strategy (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.197; p value = 0.171), but significantly preferred advancing an Islamic populist political communication strategy (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.364; p value = 0.009). Similarly, those who undermined bureaucratic elites significantly advanced the latter (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.299; p value = 0.035), but insignificantly developed the former (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.084; p value = 0.561). In contrast, those who condemned the economic elites instead were strongly interested in establishing both the former (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.351; p value = 0.012) and the latter (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.385; p value = 0.006). Slightly differently, those who launched attacks on the experts were insignificantly engaged in establishing either the former (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.191; p value = 0.183) or the latter (Spearman’s Rho correlation: 0.182; p value = 0.205).

As summarized in Table 1, attacking political elites insignificantly encouraged them to develop a secular nationalist populist political communication strategy (R2 = 0.039; t = 1.400; = 0.397; p = 0.168). This, however, did significantly encourage them to advance an Islamic populist political communication strategy (R2 = 0.109; t = 2.420; η² = 0.330; p = 0.019). Undermining the economic elites significantly motivated them to advance both the former (R2 = 0.115; t = 2.496; η² = 0.339; p = 0.016) and the latter (R2 = 0.117; t = 2.521; η² = 0.342; p = 0.015). Criticizing the bureaucratic elites did not significantly motivate them to establish the former (R2 = 0.002; t = 0.270; η² = 0.039; p = 0.788). This, instead, quite significantly encouraged them to develop the latter (R2 = 0.076; t = 1.992; η² = 0.276; p = 0.052). However, condemning the experts did not significantly instigate them to advance both the former (R2 = 0.040; t = 1.406; η² = 0.199; p = 0.166) and the latter (R2 = 0.026; t = 1.126; η² = 0.160; p = 0.266).

Table 1.

OLS regression results.

Anti-establishment elements	SNOPPCS (β value)	IOPPCS (β value)
Attacking the political elites	0.219	0.355**
Attacking the economic elites	0.414**	0.406**
Attacking the bureaucratic elites	0.041	0.280*
Attacking the experts	0.488	0.383

SNOPPCS = Secular Nationalist Online Populist Political Communication Strategy; IOPPCS = Islamic Online Populist Political Communication Strategy; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10.

The ways these candidates advanced and prioritized such strategies varied. Overall, however, most of them, as seen in Figure 1, developed such strategies not as an exclusive but as an inclusive populist political communication strategy. While doing so, they were unlikely to consider the elements that constitute secular nationalist and Islamic populisms as a competing entity (Hadiz and Robison, 2017). Instead, they were likely to exploit them as a fragmented entity (Engesser et al., 2017: 1112). This allowed them to advance such strategies inclusively.

Meanwhile, some of them preferred advancing a secular nationalist populist political strategy much more than developing an Islamic populist political communication strategy. Those who did so include Sudirman Said and Ganjar Pranowo, who ran in Central Java province, Saifullah Yusuf who ran in East Java province, Isran Noor who ran in East Kalimantan province, Nurdin Halid who ran in South Sulawesi province, Edy Rahmayadi who ran in North Sumatera province, M Lukman Edy who ran in Riau province, Zulkieflimansyah and Ahyar Abduh who ran in NTB province, Sudrajat, and TB Hasanuddin and Dedy Mizwar who ran in West Java province.

Those who organized such efforts did not automatically collect a substantial number of votes and win these elections. As seen in Table 2, only a few of them, such as Edy Rahmayani, Zulkieflimansyah and Ganjar Pranoowo, were elected. They, respectively, collected 57.58%, 31.80% and 58.78% of the total votes. Surprisingly, those who advanced such efforts in South Sulawesi and West Java, historically acknowledged as homes for influential radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, such as Darul Islam (Bruinessen, 2002, 2013), and regions where a substantial number of sharia/Islamic laws were enacted (Buehler, 2013; Buehler and Muhtada, 2016), failed in these elections. Nurdin Halid gained merely 27.32% of the votes in South Sulawesi Provinces, while Sudrajat, TB Hasanuddin and Dedy Mizwar, respectively, collected 28.74%, 12.68% and 25.77% of votes in West Java Provinces.

Table 2.

Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections results.

No.	Gubernatorial candidate	% of votes	Elected (E) or non-elected (NE)
1	Djarot Saiful Hidayat	42.42%	NE
2	Herman Hasanusi	25.73%	NE
3	TB Hasanudin	12.62%	NE
4	Ganjar Pranowo	58.78%	E
5	Wayan Koster	57.68%	E
6	Marianus Sae	25.64%	NE
7	Karolin Margret Natasa	41.79%	NE
8	Rusmadi	24.32%	NE
9	Nurdin Abdullah	43.87%	E
10	Murad Ismail	40.22%	E
11	Wempi Wetipo	32.46%	NE
12	Abdul Gani Kasuba	31.79%	E
13	Arsyadjuliandi Rahman	24.83%	NE
14	Dodi Reza Alex Noerdin	30.96%	NE
15	Arinal Djunaidi	37.78%	E
16	Ida Bagus Rai Dharmawijaya Mantra	42.32%	NE
17	Moh Suhaili Fadil Thohir	26.42%	NE
18	Andi Sofyan Hasdam	21.62%	NE
19	Nurdin Hallid	27.32%	NE
20	Said Assagaff	31.48%	Ne
21	Edy Rahmayadi	57.58%	E
22	Firdaus	19.77%	NE
23	Saifudin Aswari Rivaí	11.42%	NE
24	Mayjen TNI (Purn) Sudrajat	28.74%	NE
25	Sudirman Said	41.22%	NE
26	Ahyar Abduh	24.95%	NE
27	Esthon Leyloh Foenay	19.92%	NE
28	Isran Noor	31.33%	E
29	Milton Crosby	6.65%	NE
30	Agus Arifin Nu’mang	9.85%	NE
31	Ishak Mekki	21.66%	NE
32	Muhammad Ridho	25.46%	NE
33	Khofifah Indar Parawansa	53.55%	E
34	Deddy Mizwar	25.77%	NE
35	Benediktus Kabur Harman	18.85%	NE
36	Syaharie Ja’ang	22.73%	NE
37	Rusda Mahmud	31.58%	NE
38	Lukas Enembe	67.54%	E
39	Mustafa	11.04%	NE
40	Herman Deru	35.96%	E
41	Viktor Bungtilu Laiskodat	35.60%	E
42	Ali Mazi	43.68%	E
43	Syamsuar	38.20%	E
44	Asrun	43.73%	NE
45	Saifullah Yusuf	46.45%	NE
46	Muhamad Lukman Edy	17.67%	NE
47	Mochamad Ridwan Kamil	32.88%	E
48	Sutarmidji	51.55%	E
49	Zulkieflimansyah	31.80%	E
50	Muhammad Kasuba	11.50%	NE
51	Moch Ali Bin Dachlan	16.84%	NE
52	Ichsan Yasin Limpo	18.97%	NE

Source: Indonesian General Election Commission, 2018.

Conclusions and recommendations

As informed by the existing literature, this work highlighted that adaptation of anti-establishment strategies as a political appeal by politicians in Asian democracy in general and in Indonesia in particular, and the impacts of such adaptation on populist political communication strategies performed through online platforms, has been under-researched. In consideration of this, this work examined gubernatorial candidates who ran in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections. It extracted the campaign materials they posted in their Facebook pages using qualitative and the quantitative content analyses and reported the findings.

The findings indicated that candidates favoured exploiting the ideational elements that constitute secular nationalist and Islamic populism to establish secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist communication strategies. They did so by strongly advocating centrism and sovereignties of not merely secular nationalist, but also Islamic people. However, they favoured excluding either the non-secular nationalist or the non-Islamic people less than others.

The findings confirmed that they also adopted the components that constitute anti-establishment views as ideational elements. The ways and degrees to which they adopted and prioritized the components significantly determined the modes and degrees of secular nationalist- and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies they performed. Those who criticized political elites preferred attacking economic and bureaucratic elites, but did not favour criticizing experts; those who condemned economic elites favoured condemning bureaucratic elites, but were less engaged in attacking experts; and those who undermined bureaucratic elites denigrated experts less. Attacking the political, economic and bureaucratic elites significantly stimulated them to establish an Islamic-based online populist political communication strategy. In contrast, attacking political and bureaucratic elites and experts insignificantly encouraged them to advance a secular nationalist-based online populist political communication strategy. However, attacking the economic elite significantly instigated them to develop such strategies inclusively. Such evidence indicates that anti-economic elites take place as an influential factor that encouraged them to develop a bipolar but inclusive populist political communication strategy based on the ideational elements that constitute secular nationalist and Islamic populisms. This hints that most of them were unlikely to consider these populisms as a competing entity (Hadiz and Robison, 2017). Instead, they were likely to exploit them as a fragmented entity (Engesser et al., 2017: 1112).

Reflecting on such findings, this work proposes the following points. Firstly, within the specific context of Indonesia’s democracy, political parties’ politicians who run in local elections are likely to adopt the components that constitute anti-establishment views as an ideational element to inform the political appeal they establish in facing such elections. Such components include anti-political, economic and bureaucratic elites and experts. They are likely to criticize political, economic and bureaucratic elites, but less likely to undermine the experts. The more they criticize the political and bureaucratic elites, the more likely they are to favour developing an Islamic-based online populist political communication strategy. The more they condemn the economic elites, the more likely they advance such a strategy and combine it with a secular nationalist-based online populist political communication strategy inclusively. Attacking political and bureaucratic elites makes it likely to encourage them to develop the former, but is unlikely to motivate them to advance the latter. Attacking economic elites significantly instigates them to develop the former and the latter inclusively.

Secondly, political parties’ politicians in democratic countries that share similarity with Indonesian politics, such as Turkey, are likely to prefer not to merely attack the political, economic and bureaucratic elites and experts, but also develop an online populist political communication strategy based on people-centrism and sovereignty – ideational elements that constitute populisms. While developing such strategy, they might consider not merely the left- right ideological orientations (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008: 4; Mudde, 2004: 544; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013: 153), but also the secular nationalist and Islamic ideological ones (Hadiz, 2016, 2017, 2018; Hadiz and Robison, 2017). Adopting such ideological orientations strategically might make them much more capable in developing both secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies and advancing these strategies as an inclusive populist political communication strategy. Anti-establishment attitudinal and behavioural orientations they perform might influence the ways they develop such strategy.

This work is an exploratory study. It is among the first that explores the impacts of anti-establishment appeal on the populist political communication strategy of political parties’ politicians who run in the local elections in emerging Asian democracies. In consideration of it being an exploratory research, this work suggests the following recommendations. Firstly, comprehensive and comparative researches need to be conducted to explore the ways and degree to which leaders and politicians of political parties in democratic countries, especially those that share similarities with Indonesian politics, select and exploit the material, political and symbolic dimensions that constitute inclusive or exclusive forms of populisms (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013: 158–164) when they attempt to develop populist political communication strategies and styles using mediated and social mediated platforms (De Vreese, 2018; Ernst et al., 2017) in facing the local/federal elections. Such researches also need to be taken within the contexts of not merely the national, but also the supra-national elections, such as European elections.

Secondly, subsequent investigations also need to be conducted to examine the ways and degree to which national and local political parties’ politicians in emerging Asian, Latin American and European democracies who have been widely recognized as (the left or the right) populist (actors and) oligarchs took up anti-establishment appeal and adopted the ideational elements that constitute populism and exploited the material, political and symbolic dimensions that underlay it when they advanced such strategies and styles in facing these elections. In consideration of these points, this work calls for exploration not only of these developments, but also of the effects of the structural systemic and the party- and party candidates-related factors on these developments holistically.

Supplemental material

Supplemental Material, Appendix_I_30032020 - Populist political ideation and communication of gubernatorial candidates in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections: Anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements

Supplemental Material, Appendix_I_30032020 for Populist political ideation and communication of gubernatorial candidates in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections: Anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements by Nyarwi Ahmad in Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

Supplemental material

Supplemental Material, Appendix_II_31032020 - Populist political ideation and communication of gubernatorial candidates in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections: Anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements

Supplemental Material, Appendix_II_31032020 for Populist political ideation and communication of gubernatorial candidates in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections: Anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements by Nyarwi Ahmad in Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Nyarwi Ahmad

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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