Challenges to state control of territory: Comparative analysis of Yemen,Afghanistan and Myanmar

Abstract

States around the world have lost control over their territory to armed non-state actors, including states like Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar in the Asian region. This article aims to understand why these states are unable to exercise control over all of their territory. The study identifies and examines four major challenges faced by states in maintaining control over their territory – lack of state legitimacy and effectiveness, strategic motives of armed non-state actors, socio-economic motives of armed non-state actors and external intervention. A comparative analysis of the cases of Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar illustrates the wide relevance of these challenges faced by the states with respect to territorial control.

Keywords

Afghanistan armed non-state actors external intervention failed state insurgency Myanmar state legitimacy territorial sovereignty Yemen

Introduction

A state is considered to be made up of four main components – population, territory, government and sovereignty (Grant, 1998). All of these four elements are crucial in defining a state. In this article, I focus on the element of territory. Territory is defined as a geographical area that is controlled or over which the state exercises its power (Moore, 2020). But as seen around the world in contemporary times, many states do not have control over all of their claimed territory. They have ‘lost’ parts of their territory to other states as well as non-state actors.

In this article, we look at three countries from the different regions of Asia – Yemen from West Asia, Afghanistan from South Asia and Myanmar from Southeast Asia. All of these states have lost control over significant parts of their territory to various armed non-state actors. The present situation in Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar all demonstrate that when states have lost control over parts of their own territory instability sets in, leading to the ‘malfunctioning’ of a state. These states are often termed as ‘failed states’ or ‘failing states’ because they are incapable of carrying out their affairs as an ideal ‘state’ should.

This study does not delve into examining whether the states of Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar are failed states or not; it rather focuses on understanding the reasons why these states fail in the territorial aspect of statehood. The primary objective of this article is to understand why these states are unable to exercise control over all of their territory. To do so, the article will identify certain common challenges faced by states in controlling their territory. It will then examine and compare these challenges in the cases of Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar.

In addressing the research question of why the state is unable to control its territory, the study has used a comparative approach. The cases of Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar are compared and analysed in the context of an analytical framework. The author has applied the qualitative research method by analysing existing data on (a) the various challenges that hinder the state from controlling its territory, and (b) the three cases – Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar – carefully selected from the three areas of West Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia respectively. The data analysed has been collected extensively from two major sources – primary and secondary sources. Primary sources used in this study include data from reports, datasets, agreements, memoirs, press releases, joint statements, letters and other communications by government agencies, non-profit organizations, research institutes and news agencies. Secondary sources used include books, monographs, news articles, journal articles and other scholarly articles by research organizations, news agencies and think tanks.

Analytical framework

In Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar, the state has lost control over significant parts of its territory to insurgents or armed groups who now govern those areas. Despite the prolonged efforts and struggle by the states for stability, these states continue to fail in regaining control over their ‘lost’ territories. We can identify four important determinants which contribute to the question of a state’s failure in exercising control over all of its territory:

lack of state legitimacy and effectiveness;

strategic motives of armed non-state actors;

socio-economic motives of armed non-state actors; and

external intervention.

Lack of state legitimacy and effectiveness is a key factor which contributes to a state’s failure in controlling all of its territory. State legitimacy can be understood as popular acceptance of the state’s right to rule over the people (Mcloughlin, 2015). That is to say, a state derives its legitimacy from the support it receives from its population and this popular support is dependent on two important criteria for a good government – effective functioning of state institutions and political inclusivity (Mcloughlin and Haider, 2016). Therefore, if the state is unable to effectively carry out its functions such as that of service delivery, while the same is being provided by an alternative authority – the armed non-state actor – then the state’s legitimacy and popular support could come into question. In addition, state legitimacy also depends on the extent of political representation it gives to all sections of its population – that is, whether all sections of the population are part of the state’s political community (Unsworth, 2010).

State effectiveness refers to the effective functioning of the state institutions. The ineffective functioning of state institutions like the government, political leadership and the security apparatus (state military and police forces), through corruption, closed and unfair political processes, marginalization, political usage of the security apparatus and a general loss of confidence, can delegitimize them (Fragile State Index, 2018). Service delivery entails the state’s responsibility to address and provide for the needs and demands of the people. Service delivery is a crucial aspect of the state–society relationship where public goods are seen as facilities provided by the state in exchange for citizens’ contribution to the state in the form of taxes (OECD, 2011). When the state fails in doing its part by providing public goods with respect to security, justice, infrastructure, education, health, electricity, water, etc., it loses popular support. This forces the deprived groups to look for alternative sources to fulfil their basic needs; these are fulfilled by armed non-state actors who rise to challenge the state’s territorial sovereignty (Unsworth, 2010). The state fails in controlling such parts of its territory because it has lost its legitimacy in those areas.

Besides providing basic services to citizens, the state is, more importantly, required to prevent and drive away any threats to the state’s territorial sovereignty – that is, provide security. The state fails in controlling its territory when its security institutions are not effective enough to ward off the insurgents who have captured parts of its territory. When state institutions such as the national military or police forces or the political authorities or political systems are weak, corrupt and politically unstable, they will not be able to withstand and overcome the strong forces of insurgencies and uprisings which then come to acquire parts of state territory.

Furthermore, when a state discriminates and marginalizes a certain section of its population, whether on the basis of ethnic or religious grounds, it loses trust and acceptance from that section of the society. This in turn makes the state lose its legitimacy in the eyes of those people who find themselves excluded from the state’s political community (Unsworth, 2010). The marginalized people will then either look up to non-state actors or they will themselves revolt against the state to fight for their political representation. When this takes the form of territorial aspiration, the state finds itself unable to exercise control over that part of the territory since it has already lost support and acceptance by those people.

Besides lack of state legitimacy and effectiveness, the presence of armed non-state actors with territorial aspirations challenges the state’s ability to control its territory. The territorial aspirations of an armed non-state entity are material manifestation of their political, religious and strategic motives or goals. Effective control over territory by armed non-state actors establishes their authority, helps gain popular and socio-economic support for their cause, brings them international recognition and helps them establish relations with other state or non-state entities and gain many other advantages that a state usually enjoys. Therefore, armed non-state actors consider controlling territory as vital to fulfilling their primary goals.

These political, religious and strategic goals include, but are not exclusive to, establishing a state based on a particular religious ideology, gaining political representation, autonomy, secession and so on. Besides goals which directly involve control of territory, armed actors could also aspire for territory as a way of demonstrating power in order to coerce the state into fulfilling their demands. Therefore, in order to achieve any of these goals, the non-state armed entities look at controlling territory not only as an end in itself but also as a means. As a result, in these ways, the strategic motives and goals of armed non-state actors could pose a challenge to the state’s control of its territory.

Apart from strategic, political and religious motives, armed non-state entities also aspire for territory to fulfil the socio-economic requirements of their various motives. It is common knowledge that territory comes with other elements like resources, population, etc. which can help generate revenue. These are very beneficial to the armed non-state actors who want to gain power to achieve their political objectives. Therefore, controlling territory means recruiting the local population, taxing them, extracting resources, conducting illegal business with those resources, etc. to achieve their goals and objectives.

The local population is an important source for fulfilling the human resource requirements of any movement. Non-state actors conduct recruitment drives to increase their armed forces or to fill any administrative vacancies in their movements.¹ Moreover, taxing the local population also generates large revenues which can be used to sustain the armed non-state actors and their political motives.

Additionally, a territory’s worth is also measured by the rich resources it has. Resources of such territories provide great material support to the state. This material support, consisting of economic resources, human resources or natural resources, is essential for the armed non-state actors to sustain themselves and to increase their material strength. As a consequence, when the armed non-state actors acquire such resource-rich territory in order to support and achieve their organizational objectives and political motives, the state finds itself losing its territory. Therefore, social and economic motives of the armed non-state actors also create obstacles to the state having control over all of its territory.

External intervention, as support for either the armed non-state actors or the state, is an important factor which can determine the state’s control over its territory. Armed non-state actors often rely on external support, either politically or materially, to sustain themselves and to increase their power, authority and territorial presence. When the cause of these armed non-state actors appeals to or is in line with the interests of state actors, non-state actors and private actors from outside the state in question, they receive their support in challenging the state’s territorial sovereignty. This external support could be financial, military, diplomatic or political.

Similarly, a state is expected to be capable of defeating the armed non-state actors who threaten and challenge its territorial sovereignty. However, if a state is weak or is overpowered by the armed groups, it becomes unable to exercise control over all of its territory. Therefore, it will require political and material support from external powers, such as other states or international bodies, to overthrow the armed non-state actors and regain its lost territory. If this external support is not given when required or gets withdrawn, then the state falls into a compromising position and would fail to fully exercise its sovereignty. In severe cases, this could even lead to the armed non-state actors taking over the entire state itself. Therefore, in these ways, intervention by external state or non-state actors could also affect the territorial question.

As seen above, these four determinants – lack of state legitimacy and effectiveness, the strategic motives of armed non-state actors, the socio-economic motives of armed non-state actors and external intervention – can all contribute to the determination of a state’s control over the contested territory. All of these four factors, directly or indirectly, can affect a state’s ability to exercise authority and control over its own territory. Therefore, they are critical in the study when examining the reasons for a state’s loss of control over its own territory.

Overview of cases

Yemen

Houthis emerged in the 1990s as a movement led by Hussein al Houthi in opposition to the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Houthis sought autonomy for the Sa’dah governorate which was dominated by the Shi’ite minorities, especially the Zaydi sect. They also opposed the increasing friendship between the US and the Saleh-led government during the Iraq War in 2003. When in 2004 Saleh sent troops to capture Houthi leaders, the Houthis began an official insurgency against the government. In 2009, the government launched a military campaign to put an end to the insurgency; however, this failed and the fighting continued.

The Houthis joined the large-scale protests during Arab Spring in 2011 in Yemen which led to a transition in the political leadership of the Yemeni government from Ali Abdullah Saleh to the former Sunni Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. However, the Houthis were not pleased with a Sunni-led government and continued to fight the government forces. They made significant territorial gains including the capture of Yemen’s capital Sana’a in 2014 which led to the resignation of Hadi in 2015. Hadi’s parliament was dissolved, and a Houthi-led interim government called the ‘Supreme Revolutionary Committee’ took its place.

Taking advantage of the political instability in the country, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took over various cities in the central part of Yemen. Moreover, a secessionist movement in the south-western region of Yemen rose up and has come to control important cities in areas under its influence.

In 2016, former President Saleh joined the Houthi forces and created the ‘Supreme Political Council’ which replaced the ‘Supreme Revolutionary Committee’. However, this alliance did not last long and broke in 2017 when Saleh decided to side with Saudi Arabia. Despite multiple efforts from the United Nations and the US to broker peace negotiations between the Houthis and the Saudi Arabia-led forces, no agreement has been reached and the fighting has continued with increased violence.

Afghanistan

During the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), the US and Pakistan supported the uprising of Afghan mujahideens against the USSR. After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, these Islamic fighters were joined by young Pashtun tribesmen to form the Taliban in the early 1990s. With the promise to end the armed conflict within the country and to bring stability in Afghanistan, the Taliban rose to prominence and overthrew President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was viewed as anti-Pashtun, from power in 1996. The Taliban established an ‘Islamic Emirate’ in Afghanistan with Mullah Mohammad Omar as its supreme leader, implementing a strict Sharia law across the country.

After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the US demanded the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders who were the masterminds behind the attacks. However, the Taliban refused to entertain the demands of the US, which led to the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 which completely toppled the Taliban rule in the country. Many Taliban leaders fled to Pakistan where they formed the ‘Quetta Shura’ in 2003 which began to oversee the military and political operations of the Taliban. Under the leadership of Mohammad Omar, an insurgency was launched against the US-backed Afghan government and the NATO led forces in Afghanistan. In the following years, the Taliban managed to set up structures and consolidate power to expand the insurgency throughout the country. The Taliban now has significant territorial control in Afghanistan where it now runs a ‘shadow government’. In February 2020, the US and the Taliban signed Peace Agreements to bring stability to the country; however, the Taliban continues to exert great influence in the country (Maizland and Laub, 2020).

Since 2014, another player, the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), has emerged in Afghanistan. Being the South and Central Asian branch of the Islamic State, it began taking control of various areas in the Afghan–Pakistan border area (Johnson, 2016). The ISKP, along with the dominant Taliban, have posed challenges to the territorial sovereignty of the country.

Myanmar

Ethnic tensions in Myanmar date back to the pre-independence colonial rule, when multiple anti-colonial groups, such as ethnic communities and communist groups, were formed in opposition to the British and the Japanese control in Myanmar. The Panglong Agreement of 1947 was signed by the interim Myanmar government and ethnic groups like Shan, Chin and Kachin people to allow for a form of federalism within the country with autonomy given to ethnic groups over governance. However, the agreement fell apart as the post-independence government did not accept it. This caused the ethnic groups to rise in opposition as they felt that the government was not respecting their rights and was segregating them from political participation.

From Myanmar’s independence in 1947 to the 1990s, more than 53 ethnic armies and parties formed out of Kachin, Karen, Mon, Pa-Oh, Karenni, Shan, Akha, Palaung, Wa, Kokang, Mongla, Arakan, Lahu, Chin, Kayan and Naga ethnic groups who claimed their rights were not fully delivered by the majority Bamar government (Nyien, 2019). There were also communist rebel groups led by members of the majority Bamar and non-indigenous Muslim and Rohingya groups during this period. Despite multiple attempts to make peace between the armed groups and the central government, the subnational conflict continued.

The elections in 2010 brought the country closer to democratization and federalism. The new constitution also provided for ‘Self-Administered Areas’, and for the ethnic armed groups to join the Myanmar army and seek political roles in the government (Jolliffe, 2015). Ceasefire agreements were negotiated between various ethnic armed groups and the government in 2011. This was further consolidated into a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015 which has greatly reduced conflicts in many areas. However, many ethnic armed organizations continue to fight the government while controlling a large part of Myanmar territory today.

Comparative analysis

In this section, we look at the four parameters that were identified previously in the ‘Analytical framework’ and then compare them in the contexts of Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar.

State legitimacy and effectiveness

State legitimacy and effectiveness are crucial in determining a state’s control over its territory. In this regard, we look at the effectiveness of state institutions and the political inclusivity aspect in each of the three cases.

In Yemen, the failure of the central government (previously under Saleh and now under President Hadi) to deliver services and maintain political stability and required governance standards, followed by the visible collapse of the state judicial system, the state security and military apparatus and the economy, have contributed to the loss of state legitimacy in Yemen (Salisbury, 2018). This sort of ineffectiveness of state institutions is a significant cause for the state’s inability to control its lost territory. Presently, the internationally recognized government of Yemen led by President Hadi is temporarily based in Saudi Arabia, while the Houthis along with multiple other non-state actors such as the AQAP and the Southern Transitional Council have taken active roles in claiming various parts of Yemen and in administering them (BBC, 2020). Houthis are reported to have created some form of a governance system in areas under their control, that is, in North Yemen and in eastern parts of Yemen. They perform various functions of the state such as providing security, providing judicial services through courts, handing out justice through prisons and executions, arbitrating local conflicts between tribes, curbing arbitrary power abuses by influential sheikhs and so on (Wikileaks, 2009). This has only contributed to the further loss of state legitimacy, as the Yemenis now have alternatives for fulfilling their basic needs which the state is supposed to provide.

Similarly, in Afghanistan, especially in parts under insurgents’ influence, the Taliban’s ‘shadow government’ carries out various functions that a normal government is responsible for. Service delivery is one of these (Clark and Bjelica, 2018). It provides and administers services to people in areas like education, healthcare, judiciary, taxation and revenues, telecommunications and other utilities, at the provincial and district levels (Jackson, 2018). Existing alongside the legitimate government of Afghanistan, this ‘shadow government’ often overpowers and even replaces its counterpart in administering districts and provinces. This is due to the failure of state institutions such as the Afghan central government and its administrative institutions to provide good governance (due to reasons such as corruption, lack of an efficient service delivery mechanism and lack of a centralized bureaucracy) and the failure of the Afghan state security apparatus to maintain law and order or provide security (Murtazashvili, 2016; see also Fragile State Index, 2018). The ineffectiveness of state institutions in addressing all the needs and demands of the people reduces the legitimacy of the state government, allowing people to accept and depend on alternatives like the Taliban rather than the state.

In Myanmar, the political involvement of the state military (Tatmadaw), the political instability of the central state institutions and the inefficiency of the administrative and security institutions (whether under military or civilian control) in providing proper service delivery and corruption-free governance to all sections of the diverse population have contributed to the loss of state legitimacy in Myanmar (Egreteau and Mangan, 2018). This sort of state failure has facilitated the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to thrive and has contributed to the state’s loss of legitimacy and territory in various parts of Myanmar as seen today. We also see that the EAOs have established their own sub-national administration system in the areas under their control. These often work in parallel to the administration system of the Myanmar government in many of the contested areas where they remain as the primary civil authorities as the government has no access to these areas (Jolliffe, 2015). The EAOs provide basic services such as education, justice, health, development and security to the people in the areas under their control (Burke et al., 2017). This, along with state inefficiency, lends legitimacy to the EAOs rather than to the state.

Politically exclusive policies of a state or the presence of politically and economically marginalized groups also contribute to state loss of territory because such marginalized groups rise up against the state demanding greater representation, political participation, even autonomy and self-determination. While we can clearly see this happening in Yemen and Myanmar, this factor does not account for much in the case of Afghanistan.

In the case of Yemen, the Houthis in North Yemen, who are predominantly Zaydi Shi’ite Muslims, became a target of the Sunni Islamists in power. The Zaydis were being forced to accept the nationwide Sunni agenda of the al-Islah and Salafist groups (Minority Rights Group International, 2018). Moreover, the overall economic underdevelopment of North Yemen and lack of representation of the Zaydis in the mainstream politics of Yemen were important factors to the Houthis rebellion in the late 1990s. The Houthis are said to have resorted to expansionism as a strategy to gain proper political representation in Yemeni politics (Picard, 2011).

Similarly, in Myanmar, the EAOs rose up to oppose the political marginalization and discrimination practised by the state since independence. The political exclusivity of the Myanmar state has encouraged these ethnic-based political movements to seek autonomy and recognition of their rights (Burke et al., 2017). This is their primary motive in controlling territories and defending them against government control.

In the cases of both Yemen and Myanmar, we can clearly see that the lack of political inclusivity has led to loss of the state’s legitimacy in these areas, which then resulted in the rise of insurgencies who have taken away territories from state control.

Strategic motives of the armed non-state actors

In Yemen, many parts of the territory are controlled by non-state actors like the Houthis, AQAP and the Southern Transitional Council, as seen in Figure 1. North Yemen, which is located in the north-western region of Yemen, is currently under the control of Houthis (Ansar Allah). This includes areas in Sa’dah, Al-Jawf, Amran, Hajja, Mahwit, Sanaa, Hudaydah, Rayma, Dhamar, Ibb, Ta’izz and Al-Bayda provinces; and the de jure capital of Yemen, Sana’a (Sharp, 2020). Another non-state actor, AQAP, has prominent control over areas in the central and southern provinces of Hadramawt, Shabwa and Abyan (Sharp, 2020). In August 2019, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was able to secure cities like Aden and Mokha under their control (Sharp, 2020). The rest of the remaining territory is under the control of the Republic of Yemen Government.

Figure 1.

Line of control in Yemen (September 2019). Reprinted from Sharp (2020).

The Houthis (officially, Ansar Allah) are an Islamic political and military group, composed mainly of Zaydi Shi’ite Muslims, that emerged in the 1990s to oppose corruption and foreign backing of the then government led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The group’s main goals include fighting corruption, economic underdevelopment, foreign intervention and political marginalization in Yemen (Riedel, 2017). Houthis also seek greater autonomy in areas with a Houthi majority in Yemen. AQAP is a regional branch of the Al-Qaeda network operating mainly in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Taking advantage of the Houthi insurgency and the Yemeni Civil War, the group has come to control small territories in the country. It seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate and implement Sharia law (Australian National Security, 2018). The STC is a secessionist movement that started in 2007. It seeks the secession of South Yemen from the State of Yemen.

On the other hand, in Afghanistan, according to the January 2019 Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, out of the 407 districts in the country, insurgents have direct control and influence over 50 districts, while in 138 districts there is contention over who has the dominant control (SIGAR, 2019). The remaining 219 districts are under the control or influence of the government.

The Taliban’s objectives for acquiring territory are clear – jihad against the foreign presence and establishment of an ‘Islamic state’ based on the previous model of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ (Roggio, 2019). Presently, it runs a ‘shadow government’ meant to resemble the democratically elected government of Afghanistan by performing various state-related functions of providing services to the people. Similarly, the ISKP also has territorial objectives in Afghanistan in line with the larger goals of establishment of an Islamic Caliphate which would be based in Central Asia and would eventually expand to other parts of the world (Katawazai, 2020). It is also to be noted that ISKP rejects the Taliban for neglecting Sharia law, for their lack of focus on targeting Shi’as and for their leniency in practising Islam (Jones, 2016).

In the case of Myanmar, out of the 330 total townships, 118 are contested areas with the presence of EAOs, which challenge the authority of the Myanmar Government in the areas under their control (Burke et al., 2017). These areas have been host to sub-national conflicts and violence. The main ones are in areas connected to Myanmar’s borders with China and Thailand, such as parts of northern Kayin State, areas of northeastern Shan State, areas of Mon State and southern Kayin State and areas of eastern Kachin State.

Most of the territories in Myanmar which are not under state control are under the control of EAOs – the military divisions of ethnically charged political movements in Myanmar. The ethnic diversity in Myanmar has encouraged these ethnic-based political movements to seek autonomy and recognition of their rights (Burke et al., 2017). This is their primary motive in controlling territories and defending them against government control, which has led to the sub-national conflicts in Myanmar.

In these three cases, we can clearly see that the presence of armed non-state actors with their varying strategic motives and territorial aspirations have caused the states to lose control over their territories. These actors also vehemently oppose any state action to regain these territories.

Socio-economic motives of the armed non-state actors

As seen in the ‘Analytical framework’, the socio-economic benefits that a territory provides encourage the armed non-state groups to acquire territory belonging to the state. The Houthi insurgency in Yemen relies on its acquired territory for various socio-economic requirements to sustain themselves. For instance, the Houthis depend on the local population, especially those from the northern provinces of Yemen, for recruitment into their armed and administrative forces. They carry out recruitment drives to build up their armed forces who are continually engaged in war with the Saudi-led coalition forces, and go so far as to conduct forced recruitments and recruitment of minors (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2020). Houthis also recruit the local population, including young girls, to serve in various administrative and specialized roles, e.g. as spies, medics and so on (Al Jazeera, 2020a).

The Houthis also depend on the local population in areas they control for financial support – they conduct fundraising campaigns and forced donations, as well as collecting taxes and duties on goods, services and natural resources (extracted from land, sea and livestock) (Arab Weekly, 2020; see also New Arab, 2020).

Similarly, in Afghanistan, the Taliban depends heavily on the local resources to sustain its insurgency and to acquire an edge over the Afghan state forces. Firstly, the Taliban and the ISKP in Afghanistan heavily rely on the local population for recruitment into their forces. Secondly, to fulfil the financial requirements of managing an insurgency, the Taliban derives its primary revenue from sources such as the illegal drugs trade (opium cultivation, manufacturing and trafficking), and mining and extraction of minerals from resource-rich regions it has control over (O’Donnell and Khan, 2020). Therefore, the Taliban insurgents try to maintain a stronghold over such areas where there are possibilities to reap high incomes. Besides tapping the natural resources, the Taliban also derives its revenue by taxing the local population. The taxation system of the Taliban extends to electricity, telecommunications, logistics and various other services provided by the its shadow government (Azami, 2018). The ISKP are also known to resort to illegal revenue-generating activities such as taxation, extortion and exploitation of mineral resources (Katawazai, 2020). Therefore, acquiring and maintaining territory is not only an end in itself but is also a means to support their respective movements.

In Myanmar as well, the EAOs and other armed non-state actors gain economic and social benefits from the territory they are holding. These benefits help the armed non-state actors to sustain and self-finance their various activities and development plans in the areas they control. Firstly, these armed groups and their parent organizations primarily rely on their local ethnic communities for recruitment into their armed forces and to serve in various administrative and managerial positions.

Besides this, these armed groups also rely on the territory for revenue and income. They engage in various revenue-generating economic activities and businesses such as livestock breeding; natural resources mining; logging; real estate and ownership of hotels, gas stations, etc; illicit activities of drug production, trade and trafficking (especially opium/poppy which is abundantly cultivated in Myanmar); and taxation (Buchanan, 2016; see also Crisis Group, 2020). The socio-economic benefits that territory provides them helps them sustain their movements and oppose the state forces.

Territory can provide numerous socio-economic benefits to the armed non-state actors which directly impacts their ability to control territory and overpower the state forces.

External intervention

Support by external actors to the armed non-state actors in order to promote their own strategic interests can also undermine the state’s ability to control its territory. In Yemen, Houthis receive not only political and financial support from Iran but also technical know-how and military support including weapons such as missiles, drones etc. (Sharp, 2020). This has drastically increased their ability to counter any opposition to their endeavours in Yemen. AQAP receives some support in the form of military aid from external armed actors like Al-Shabaab (CNN, 2012). On the other hand, the STC is backed by the UAE (Al Jazeera, 2020b). The external support that these armed non-state actors receive is crucial for their sustenance and for maintaining the territories they have acquired.

On the other hand, the Yemen state has been fighting the armed non-state actors with the help of the Saudi-led coalition of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states since 2015. This coalition previously received support from various other states such the US and the UK, but this seems to have changed now as the new US administration under Biden has halted all support to this coalition (Al Jazeera, 2021). However, the US continues its assistance in eliminating AQAP. This external support from the GCC countries, the US and other international bodies such as the United Nations has been crucial for the survival of Yemen state in its fight to regain its lost territory.

The Taliban in Afghanistan also receives significant external support. Prior to 2001, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by the Taliban was recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to be the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and received wide financial and military support from these countries. While this changed after the collapse of the Taliban under the US-led ‘War on Terror’ operation in Afghanistan, it continues to receive external support secretly even today. There are various sources which provide evidence to the continued Saudi and Qatari financial and ideological support of the Taliban (Giuztozzi, 2017). The Taliban has also been alleged to have continued links with Pakistan through its national intelligence body, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) (Chaudhuri and Shende, 2020). Besides support from these states, significant support also pours in from individuals (hailing from Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, etc.) who fund the Taliban in their private capacities (Azami, 2018). A 2020 report by the Operation Freedom’s Sentinel to the US Congress stated that groups like the Taliban were being harboured by Pakistan (Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, 2020).

The ISKP is also known to have received significant financial and political support from the core Islamic State in Syria and Iraq to gain acceptance among Muslim followers, and to build networks and organizational structure (Jones, 2016). Such external support to armed non-state actors undermines Afghanistan’s sovereignty and its ability to control its territory.

On the other side, international assistance and intervention into Afghanistan are what has greatly helped the Afghanistan state so far. The responsibility of security and development in Afghanistan was handled by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) between 2003 and 2015. Beyond this, Afghanistan continues to receive financial, technical and military support from NATO, especially the US, through Resolute Support Mission and other non-NATO states. The fragile situation in Afghanistan, with respect to the armed non-state actors, has made the withdrawal of military support from Afghanistan a potential risk. Despite the Afghanistan Peace Agreement which was signed in February 2020, external support to the Afghan government remains crucial in maintaining its territorial sovereignty considering its lack of military strength.

In the case of Myanmar, the country neighbours China and Thailand in the north-east and south-east respectively. Their proximity to EAOs and insurgents near the border area have allowed these countries to significantly contribute to Myanmar’s internal conflicts. During the Cold War era, Thailand and the US benefited from harbouring and supporting EAOs like the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar (Brouwer and Wijk Jvan, 2014). While Thailand has reversed its position on supporting various EAOs in Myanmar, the support they had previously lent helped establish a greater stronghold by these EAOs. Military, logistical and financial support has also flown into north-eastern EAOs from China (United States Institute of Peace, 2018). At present, while it is not clear whether the Chinese state or private Chinese entities have been behind these acts of support, what is clear is that it has helped these EAOs increase their strength and hold out in the fight against the Myanmar army, Tatmadaw. Besides state actors, the EAOs also receive support from private entities and individuals externally, depending on ideological and political causes (International Crisis Group, 2016). However, it is unclear what the extent of this external support to the EAOs is, and therefore it is hard to conclusively say what the role of external support is in the case of armed groups in Myanmar.

Unlike the case of Yemen and Afghanistan, where external support to the state has been crucial in their fight with armed non-state actors, the state of Myanmar has been single-handedly dealing with the EAOs for control over all of its territory. While it does receive political support from China in solving its internal conflicts with the north-eastern EAOs, it does not receive any military or direct financial support for the same (Yhome, 2019). It also does not receive any significant external support to take care of the internal conflicts in other parts to regain its lost territory. Therefore, in Myanmar’s case, external support received by the Myanmar government is minimal and does not greatly affect its quest for absolute control over its territory. However, whether Myanmar would be better able to resolve its internal conflicts if it received significant external support needs to be seen and analysed.

Consequently, what is understood from these cases is that external support in the form of financial, military or political support to armed non-state actors, as well as external support to the state, is an important factor while considering the state’s problem of ensuring control over all of its territory.

Conclusion

It is clear from the analysis that the three selected cases – Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar – not only share a common problem of losing control over their respective territories (to armed non-state actors) but also share common factors responsible for their territorial loss. Identifying and examining these common factors will contribute to the general understanding of the challenges faced by states in controlling their territory and will enhance the knowledge of decision-makers faced with similar cases in the contemporary world. The common factors thus identified in the study are: the ineffectiveness and lack of legitimacy of the state, the presence of armed non-state actors with territorial ambitions (for various political, strategic and socio-economic reasons) and the involvement of external factors. The presence of these common factors makes the selection of these three cases even more suitable for the study.

The effective functioning of state institutions and a politically inclusive state are both vital for maintaining a healthy relationship between the state and its territory. On the other hand, a lack of state legitimacy can pave the way for a state to lose control over its territory, especially when alternatives (like non-state actors) exist that fulfil the requirements of the people that the state has failed to provide, whether it is effective delivery of services, better protection or political inclusivity.

The three cases examined here all evidently show that lack of state legitimacy is an important contributor to the state’s loss of control over its territory. All three cases share a similarity in having an ‘eroded’ state legitimacy. The ineffectiveness of state institutions in Yemen and Afghanistan, along with discriminatory and politically marginalizing policies in the states of Yemen and Myanmar, has greatly eroded state legitimacy in these countries. This finding strengthens the argument that lack of state legitimacy is a determining factor in a state’s loss of control over its territory.

Strategic motivations and territorial aspirations of armed non-state actors are another important determinant for the state’s loss of its territory. All the three cases studied have the presence of multiple armed non-state actors in their states. These armed non-state actors have occupied significant parts of the state territory in order to achieve their respective political and strategic goals. In Yemen, we see armed non-state actors whose primary goals are political representation (the Houthis), formation of an Islamic ideological state (AQAP) and secession (STC). In Afghanistan, we see the presence of insurgents who aim to form ideological states based on their respective interpretation of Islam (the Taliban and the ISKP). In Myanmar, we see the presence of a variety of armed groups or EAOs whose primary objectives include autonomy or political representation. Although the primary political and strategic aims of these armed groups might vary from case to case, their territorial aspirations are what bring out the similarities between these cases. When such actors mobilize and overthrow the state forces, the state loses its control over its territory.

Apart from political and strategic motives, territory also provides many socio-economic benefits to the armed non-state actors. These socio-economic benefits can propel the armed non-state actors to acquire territory in order to achieve their political and strategic goals. The armed groups in all the three states of Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar depend on the local population for supplying manpower to their insurgencies. They also rely on the concerned territory to finance their movements and their armed forces. Many armed non-state actors in these three states also engage in revenue-generating activities such as illegal trade, taxation and so on. A comparative analysis of these three cases shows that armed groups in these states acquire territory not only for the sole purpose of controlling a territory, but also to extract socio-economic benefits from it. Such benefits strengthen these armed groups in the fight against the state forces. Therefore, socio-economic motives of armed groups also indirectly contribute to the state’s inability to maintain control over its territory.

Moreover, the conflict for territorial control between the armed non-state actors and the state is often heavily influenced by external intervention. External intervention, either as a support to non-state actors or as a support to the state, can play a significant role in gaining control over a territory. In the case of Yemen and Afghanistan, external intervention is an important determinant. Both the armed non-state actors and the state receive significant and crucial support from external actors. However, external factors play a very unclear role in the case of Myanmar. While Myanmar has been able to make significant improvement in its territorial control without any significant external help, the role of external factors in supporting the armed groups in the country is not very clear. Myanmar may not offer a helpful understanding of the role of external intervention in the territorial problem; however, we can conclude from the other two cases that external support plays a vital role in determining who remains in control of the territory.

It is important to understand the causes behind the state’s loss of territory before attempting to look for solutions. This study provides a holistic approach in understanding the causes for a state’s failure in exercising control over its own territory. Political, socio-economic and external factors have all been examined to identify the challenges faced by the state in exercising its territorial sovereignty. This study has selected three countries from different regions of Asia to explain and observe how these challenges play out in their respective territorial conflicts. While most of the literature related to the topic focuses primarily on individual cases or only on single aspects (whether political, socio-economic or external), this article has combined all these factors and cases to provide a comparative perspective. Such a broad perspective would better assist policy-making and contribute to the overall theoretical understanding of a state’s failure to control its territory. Based on the study, the author provides two broad practical recommendations:

1. A multi-dimensional approach

It is evident from the cases of Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar that their respective states have a one-dimensional approach to tackling the issue of territorial loss. They focus on recapturing territory through counter-insurgent military operations or negotiations with the armed non-state actors only. However, since the causes of this territorial problem are many, as analysed in the study, the author is of the opinion that the solution has to be multi-dimensional. The policymakers must focus not only on recapturing lost territory but also on building the legitimacy and efficiency of state institutions such as those of service delivery and security, and they must also assess the impact that external actors have on the state, on the armed non-state actors and on the territorial problem in question.

2. Focus on a long-term solution

The author does not discourage military confrontations or peaceful negotiations aimed at recapturing territory, but emphasizes that the policymakers need to focus on a long-lasting solution. This long-term solution would come in the form of:

building state legitimacy from the grassroots;

strengthening and reforming state institutions by eliminating corrupt practices, ensuring political representation and political participation of aggrieved groups and regaining popular trust by gradually making state institutions more efficient in their respective state functions;

ensuring protection and safety of civilians in recapturing efforts;

keeping in check and controlling the extent of external assistance pouring into the country, so as to not let the armed non-state actors benefit from it.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Sumedha Korishetti

Note

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