Australia’s humanitarian response to disasters in the South Pacific

Abstract

Australian involvement in humanitarian affairs in the South Pacific is indicative of tensions that can arise between ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’ and ‘humanitarian diplomacy’. Australia aims to play a leading role in relation to the Pacific island countries (PICs), and its humanitarian involvement can assist in that respect. However, despite Australia’s attempts to prevent or mitigate climate-related disasters, tensions have arisen because of Australia’s cautious climate change policies. The main influences on Australia’s involvement in humanitarian affairs in the South Pacific are political and bureaucratic factors within those parts of the Australian government concerned with relations with the PICs, and humanitarian affairs in particular; Australian interactions with the PICs themselves and other relevant international actors also play a role. The ‘lessons learnt’ from Australia’s humanitarian involvement in the South Pacific region focus on organizational effectiveness rather than the tensions between ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ and ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’.

Keywords

Australia climate change disasters humanitarian affairs humanitarian diplomacy humanitarianism as diplomacy Pacific island countries South Pacific

The aim of this article is to assess Australia’s humanitarian involvement in response to disasters occurring in the South Pacific, focusing particularly on disasters occurring in the natural environment. In assessing the humanitarian involvement of any state in this respect, a broad distinction can be made between ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’ and ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ (O’Hagan, 2016). ‘Humanitarianism as diplomacy’ refers to the way in which a state uses humanitarian involvement to further its broader diplomatic objectives, such as enhancing its strategic position or improving or protecting its economic situation. ‘Humanitarian diplomacy’ refers to the way in which humanitarian operations are conducted in practice. In this article, the overarching argument is that Australia has a geopolitical motivation for taking a lead in humanitarian affairs in the South Pacific (‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’); humanitarian sympathies are in play but the priority in this respect is a region that is geopolitically important to Australia.

An important general point is that there is a range of disasters that might lead to humanitarian involvement. In this article, the focus is on disasters occurring in the natural environment, particularly climate-related disasters such as cyclones; there can also be geophysical disasters such as earthquakes and volcanoes. Since early 2020, we have seen a major pandemic with the global spread of novel coronavirus (COVID-19). War and state failure or a collapse of public order can also be viewed as ‘disasters’, sometimes leading to humanitarian involvement by external powers (a South Pacific example is the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 2003–2017).

Keeping in mind that we are assessing Australia’s humanitarian involvement in relation to certain types of disasters (but not all), we can take the geopolitical context as background to that involvement. Our emphasis, however, is on assessing the character of the humanitarian operations in the South Pacific carried out under Australian auspices in response to disasters occurring in the natural environment (‘humanitarian diplomacy’). Even though ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ and ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’ can be complementary, there can also be tensions between the two (O’Hagan, 2016: 664); the pursuit of geopolitical objectives (perceived ‘national interests’) might complicate or even impede an involvement based on humanitarian objectives alone. Domestic politics and bureaucratic factors within Australia are the main influences on Australia’s humanitarian involvement in the region; this involvement is also shaped by the way in which Australia interacts with the Pacific island countries (PICs) and other actors such as the United Nations (UN) and significant powers in the region (such as New Zealand, France and the United States (US)). Given the impact of global warming on disasters in the natural environment, conflict over climate change policies in Australia has negative consequences for some aspects of Australia’s humanitarian involvement (the preventive aspect most obviously). On the whole, however, Australia’s humanitarian assistance has the advantage of enhancing Australia’s position in the region. Organizationally, it is important to note the role assigned to relevant departments and agencies in the conduct of humanitarian affairs, and political leadership in that setting; the involvement of non-government organizations (NGOs) can also be important. More broadly, it is Australia’s political leadership that determines the overall shape of Australia’s humanitarian contribution, taking into account also the perceived need to maintain Australia’s leading role in the region. Beyond the overall shape, the specific dynamics of any interaction between the Australian government and the South Pacific island countries in relation to humanitarian affairs are determined by the way the Australian government is organized to conduct that interaction, with influences coming also from the NGOs involved, the island governments and civil society in the islands, as well as other external actors (both governments and international organizations such as the United Nations).

While O’Hagan has contributed significantly in pointing out the distinction between the two aspects of Australian involvement, drawing also on more general appraisals of humanitarianism and disaster relief (for example, Barnett, 2011; Haroff-Tevel, 2005; Kelman, 2012; Régnier, 2011), her article gives less attention to the actual politics of that involvement. Bullard (2017) provides a very detailed assessment of that aspect from an historical perspective, and there are also studies that discuss the involvement of Australian defence forces (Newby, 2020; Ryan, 2013); Stevenson and Envall (2019) have discussed humanitarian assistance in the context of Australian relations with Japan. To understand the political dynamics of Australia’s humanitarian involvement, an approach similar to that employed by Jack Corbett (2017) in relation to Australia’s development assistance policies would be helpful; however, this would entail a much more ambitious methodology than that used in this article, with a strong focus on interviews with leading figures within the various Australian government departments and agencies, as well as important figures in the PICs. While situating my analysis in relation to the broader literature concerning Australia’s humanitarian involvement, I have mainly relied on Australian government documents (especially from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)) as my source material.

Evaluating Australia’s objectives and practice means not just understanding the impact on regional geopolitics but determining the effectiveness of that involvement in practical terms. From the perspective of effectiveness, the ‘lessons learnt’ include the need for better planning ahead of disasters occurring, and improved liaison between the Australian bodies concerned and local actors in the PICs. Given that many of the disasters that have occurred or are likely to occur relate to global warming, this study of Australian involvement in the South Pacific highlights the need for urgent action in relation to climate change (including by Australia).

The first part of the article provides an overview of Australian involvement in the South Pacific in terms of the geopolitics of that region, including climate change politics (‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’). The rest of the article focuses on Australia’s humanitarian diplomacy in the region, covering both regional and bilateral levels, and giving particular attention to climate action. I also examine in more detail Australia’s response to some recent disasters in the natural environment in the South Pacific. The evaluation of Australian involvement covers both general aspects (the extent to which Australian objectives have been achieved) and the effectiveness of that involvement in relation to specific disasters. In relation to Australian involvement, I highlight any tensions between humanitarian diplomacy and ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’; I also draw attention to the way in which domestic political and bureaucratic factors and relevant international interactions have influenced Australia’s humanitarian engagement in the South Pacific. A final section assesses the lessons to be learnt from the Australian experience with this issue. A postscript examines the way in which the general Australian approach to humanitarian involvement in the South Pacific applies to the specific instance of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and beyond.

Humanitarianism as diplomacy: Australia’s role in the geopolitics of the South Pacific

From the perspective of ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’, the key point concerning Australia’s humanitarian involvement in the South Pacific is that Australia wishes to maintain its role as the leading power in the region; a particular concern is the perception that China is challenging that role. While there are many aspects to Australia’s involvement in the region, humanitarian affairs are one such aspect. Given Australia’s strategic objectives in the South Pacific, it is understandable that its main contribution to humanitarian affairs at the international level is in relation to the PICs. In the post-decolonization era, Australia has regarded itself as the leading power in the South Pacific, working closely with New Zealand in this respect. Both Australia and New Zealand were foundation members of the South Pacific Forum in 1971 (Pacific Islands Forum from 2000). Australia’s economic and political strength gave it a major influence on the affairs of the region. France and the US focused mainly on their own territories; the United Kingdom, a key player during the colonial era, reduced its involvement considerably, deferring to Australia and New Zealand as the regional leaders.

The PICs, while aiming to maximize benefits to themselves from the Australian connection, also sought to pursue their own independent policies. During the 2006–2014 period, there were tensions between Fiji and Australia and New Zealand over the sanctions imposed by the latter two powers against the military regime in Fiji. Fiji’s ‘Look North’ strategy was symptomatic of wider PIC concerns about maintaining their independence.

China’s increasing involvement in the region facilitated the ‘Look North’ strategy, giving the PICs more options in terms of how they engaged with powers outside the region. Most independent PICs recognize the People’s Republic of China rather than the Republic of China (Taiwan), the exceptions being Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu, all small in population. China is active through its diplomacy, being particularly close to Fiji; its aid is expanding, and Chinese naval vessels make regular visits. (On changes in regional geopolitics, see further Fry and Tarte, 2015; Tarte, 2014. For the long historical perspective on this issue, see Fry, 2019).

China’s more prominent role in the South Pacific (Herr, 2019), together with the PIC focus on maximizing their scope for independent policies, has highlighted the increasingly pluralistic nature of the region. The most recent Australian response has been the ‘Pacific step-up’ designed to re-assert Australian leadership, and to compete more effectively with China in the South Pacific (see Australian Government, 2017: v, 3, 101–104; Morrison, 2018).

One reason for the challenge to Australian leadership in the South Pacific is that Australia has pursued cautious (some would say ‘weak’) policies towards climate change, usually trying to modify PIC attempts to deal with the issue in a stronger way. While the Boe Declaration on Regional Security as adopted by the Pacific Islands Forum in September 2018 made the general point ‘that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’ (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2018), the then prime minister of Tuvalu (Enele Sopoaga) claimed that Australia had attempted to tone this statement down (Wroe, 2018). A similar situation arose at the Forum meeting in Tuvalu in August 2019, with Australia resisting PIC calls for stronger wording in relation to climate change (see Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2019, comparing the official communique with the PIC statement in the appended Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now). Australia’s position undermined PIC diplomacy ahead of the UN Climate Summit being held the following month. Australian governments would prefer Forum policies to align with Australia’s climate change policies, generally emphasizing direct action.¹ (On PIC climate diplomacy, see further Carter, 2015; Goulding, 2015.)

Humanitarian diplomacy (1): Australia’s involvement in regional and bilateral arrangements for responding to disasters in the natural environment, with particular reference to climate change

If Australia wishes to maintain its position as a regional leader, then clearly it needs to engage with the PICs in relation to climate change and disasters more generally (‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’). However, this engagement can also be motivated by genuine humanitarian concerns (supporting neighbours in need). ‘Humanitarianism as diplomacy’ provides the backdrop, but the specific nature of Australia’s humanitarian involvement can also be understood in terms of its own specific dynamics (‘humanitarian diplomacy’). These dynamics highlight the role of domestic political and bureaucratic factors, and the impact of relevant international interactions, including with the PICs, the Pacific Islands Forum, other engaged states and the UN.

Part of the background to Australian involvement in regional humanitarian affairs is the country’s participation in the global humanitarian system as articulated through the UN. The key body is the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), headed by the Under-Secretary General and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC). The coordination of UN agencies and programmes involved in humanitarian affairs is through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). A more specific body concerned with responding to disasters is the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), headed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction. Australia actively supports these bodies within the UN system, as well as subscribing to the Agenda for Humanity (adopted by the Istanbul Summit, May 2016) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (adopted by the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015). Nevertheless, Australian involvement in humanitarian affairs in the South Pacific would be much the same irrespective of the UN framework.

In the context of Australia’s humanitarian diplomacy in the South Pacific, it is important to note that many of the disasters in the natural environment in this region are the result of climate change. Extreme weather in the form of cyclones is the most obvious example (see Wallis, 2017: 139, for a list of recent disasters in the region). In this review of Australian engagement with the PICs in relation to disasters in the natural environment, I will focus in the first instance on climate action before turning to other aspects of disaster engagement. However well motivated Australia’s humanitarian diplomacy is in relation to issues arising from climate change, this is one area where Australia’s cautious climate change policies undermine gains it might make in relation to ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’; this complication does not arise with disasters where climate change is less relevant.

Climate action

To prevent and mitigate disasters arising from climate change, Australia engages with the PICs over climate action at both regional and bilateral levels. Before the Boe Declaration of 2018, the Pacific Islands Forum in 2016 had adopted the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management, 2017–2030 (FRDP) (Pacific Community et al., 2016). There was provision for governments and NGOs to participate in the FRDP as part of the Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP).

In 2016, Australia pledged AUD300 million to spend on climate change and disaster resilience in the PICs over four years; at the 2019 meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum, a further commitment of AUD500 million was made for the five years from 2020.

Australia’s main contribution to climate action at regional level has been through the Australia Pacific Climate Partnership (APCP; https://apclimatepartnership.com.au), with funding of AUD75million, 2018–2024, for the Australia Pacific Climate Change Action Program (APCCAP) to improve climate information and climate change governance, making climate action more gender and socially inclusive, and integrating climate action in Australian development assistance (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018a). Specific programmes supported include a Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific (Australian Government, Bureau of Meteorology, 2019), and the Pacific Risk Resilience Programme (involving also the UN Development Programme and various international NGOs) (United Nations, Sustainable Development, Partnerships, 2019). The former assists meteorological services in the PICs; the latter aims to improve climate change and disaster risk management by regional governments.

Bilaterally, Australia has negotiated partnership agreements as the basis of the development assistance it provides to the PICs. These agreements provide benchmarks for conducting performance evaluations of the development assistance provided by Australia. Reviewing the most recent agreements, climate action mostly features as a cross-cutting theme rather than being a specific goal. The main exception is the partnership agreement for Tuvalu, the PIC most threatened by rising sea levels. The Australia–Tuvalu Aid Partnership 2017–2021 lists climate change adaptation and environmental resilience as one of two main priorities, with Australia helping Tuvalu ‘particularly to achieve water security, coastal protection and food security…also [ensuring] that Tuvalu has a plan in place to prepare and respond to disasters’ (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019b). Australian bilateral climate and disaster funding for Tuvalu was AUD2 million, 2016–2019, with education and governance important areas of support. The Funafuti Classroom Building Project (AUD4 million in 2015–2020) aimed to cyclone proof school buildings. Australia is also helping Tuvalu to obtain global climate finance (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019k).

With Kiribati, Australian climate and disaster funding was AUD13 million, 2016–2019. As with Tuvalu, Australia is helping Kiribati obtain global climate finance. As well as providing vocational training to deal with climate change (Skills for Employment Program, AUD20 million, 2016–2020), there is a focus on developing more resilient infrastructure in areas such as school buildings and coastal protection (Kiribati Education Improvement Program, AUD35 million, 2011–2019; Kiribati Adaptation Project Phase 3, AUD5.9 million, 2010–2018) (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019h).

While climate action might not be a central objective in most of Australia’s partnership agreements with the PICs, the Australian government nevertheless highlights the way in which it engages with the various PICs over this issue; details of Australia’s climate action projects for each of the PICs are available on the DFAT website.

Tuvalu and Kiribati coordinate closely with other similarly placed low-lying island countries (the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau) in the Smaller Island States (SIS) group within the Pacific Islands Forum to advance a strong position on climate change.² Tensions between Australia and the PICs over climate change policies are most evident at the Forum meetings; Australia’s climate change policies undermine gains that might otherwise be expected through Australia’s climate action projects.

Other aspects of disaster response

While clearly many disasters in the South Pacific are related to climate change, there are also other kinds of disasters in the natural environment such as earthquakes (including tsunamis) and volcanoes. While Australia’s climate change policies vitiate gains in goodwill that might otherwise arise through climate action projects (a form of humanitarian diplomacy), Australian support in relation to other forms of disasters is generally beneficial for the country’s political position in the South Pacific. Regionally, the FRDP refers to an ‘integrated approach’ for addressing ‘climate change and disaster risk management’. All types of disasters are allowed for, not just those that are specifically ‘natural’ disasters. Similarly, from Australia’s perspective there is provision for bilateral engagement with the PICs not just in relation to climate action (as discussed previously), but across the range of natural and non-natural disasters. The different elements of Australian involvement are brought together in Australia’s Humanitarian Strategy as developed under the auspices of DFAT (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016). The Humanitarian Strategy covers guiding principles, strategic objectives, thematic priorities and a performance assessment framework; natural disasters are a strong focus in each of these areas.

Guiding principles include the following: local states have the primary responsibility for dealing with all aspects of risk; affected people should be central to humanitarian assistance; managing and planning ‘current and future risk profiles and drivers of risk’; applying ‘do no harm’ approaches; following the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donors (including reliable funding and the most effective forms of assistance); and aiming for ‘value for money’. The four strategic objectives can all be related to disasters in the natural environment: strengthen international humanitarian action; reduce disaster risk; support preparedness and effective response; enable early recovery. Among the thematic priorities, protection (covering the protection of the ‘rights and dignity of people affected by a crisis’) is perhaps most relevant to disasters in the natural environment. In practical terms, there is a complex performance assessment framework that attempts to focus on 20 measurable aspects relating to the guiding principles, the strategic objectives and the thematic priorities.

Organizationally, the Australian response to disasters in the Pacific islands is primarily through DFAT. As part of the ‘Pacific step-up’, Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the creation of an Office of the Pacific within DFAT in January 2019 (Morrison, 2019). This re-structuring was designed to strengthen Australia’s Pacific engagement, including in relation to disasters. The office was intended to provide ‘whole of government’ coordination, as well as making DFAT more effective in this area. Other groupings within DFAT such as the Humanitarian, NGOs and Partnerships Division and the Contracting and Aid Management Division are also relevant to aspects of disasters. The recruitment of staff from other departments and agencies through secondment and transfer would strengthen the role of the Office of the Pacific, with people coming from departments such as Defence, Home Affairs, Environment, Finance, Treasury, Agriculture and Water Resources, Attorney-General’s and Health, and also agencies such as the Australian Federal Police, the Infrastructure and Project Finance Agency and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019i).

While all of these departments and agencies could have some involvement in disasters in the Pacific islands, the Department of Defence is often prominent when an emergency response occurs. Referring to the 2016 Defence White Paper, there is a strong commitment for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to ‘undertake humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond’, with ‘enhanced maritime forces and amphibious capability’ contributing to this goal (Australia, Department of Defence, 2016: 34, para. 1.19; 75, para. 3.24). From this perspective, ADF involvement in humanitarian affairs in the PICs is akin to organizing a military operation.

Another organizational aspect of Australian involvement is through government partnership with NGOs. This adds further complexity to the way in which Australia engages with disaster issues in the PICs. DFAT identifies three components of NGO engagement (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019e). First, there is the Australian Humanitarian Partnership Disaster READY Program (AUD50 million budget, 2018–2022), whereby Australian NGOs (primarily Oxfam Australia, Plan International Australia and World Vision Australia) work with local partners in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu ‘to map risks, establish disaster committees and develop inclusive disaster plans’ (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019e; see also Australian Humanitarian Partnership, 2019). Second, the Australian Red Cross Partnership (AUD28 million budget, 2015–2020) enables the Australian Red Cross to work with Red Cross societies in the PICs to enable the latter ‘to provide life saving assistance’, including ‘collecting data on disaster risk, raising community awareness and investing in early warning initiatives’ (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019e; see also Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019g). Third, there is Australia Assists (budget of AUD82.2 million, 2017–2025, with 30 per cent committed to the Pacific), a civilian deployment programme placing technical experts with disaster management authorities in the PICs (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019e; see also RedR Australia, 2019).

While the organizational dimension is most salient to the way Australia conducts its humanitarian diplomacy in the South Pacific, this dimension is very much affected by both ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’ and Australian domestic politics. Australia focuses on humanitarian affairs in the South Pacific in part because this is the region where Australia considers itself to have a leading role (contributing also in other regions such as Southeast Asia where Australia has a prominent, if not leading, role). The need for Australia to maintain its overall high profile in the South Pacific is a strong incentive to do well in humanitarian diplomacy. However, as has been pointed out, Australia’s climate change policies undermine its leadership in the region. Conflicts within Australian politics are a large part of the explanation for the policies that have been adopted. The centre-right Liberal-National Coalition government (in office since 2013) includes some people who support more ambitious targets for reducing carbon emissions, but there are also powerful voices (particularly from Queensland and from the rural-based National Party) that support coal mining and are reluctant to move any faster.

As far as the international context of Australia’s humanitarian involvement in the South Pacific is concerned, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper included a commitment to ‘work with Pacific governments, the World Food Programme and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to improve early warning systems and access to pre-positioned humanitarian supplies’. This extended to ‘boost[ing] joint training with emergency services, police and defence forces to improve disaster preparedness’ (Australian Government, 2017: 104). A fuller treatment of the organizational aspects of Australian involvement in disasters in the PICs would involve an examination of the structures and dynamics of this engagement regionally, bilaterally and in reference to relevant aspects of the UN system. Coordination with non-PIC countries involved in the region occurs through both the FRANZ (France, Australia, New Zealand) agreement dating from 1992 and specifically focused on disasters (Vachette, 2013), and the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (known as the QUADs, and involving the US as well as the FRANZ partners) concerned more broadly with maritime surveillance (Bergin and Herr, 2011: 50–51, 60).

Humanitarian diplomacy (2): Australian involvement in disasters in the PICs – some recent examples

While the preceding discussion indicates that Australia engages with the PICs in preparing for and responding to climate change and other disasters in the natural environment, it is also instructive to examine the nature of Australian involvement when a disaster occurs. While I have suggested that tensions arise for Australia between humanitarian diplomacy and ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’ with issues relating to climate change, this is less evidently the case when Australia responds to an immediate crisis. An examination of Australia’s response in relation to the following disasters attests to this point: Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu in 2015, Cyclone Winston in Fiji in 2016 and the earthquake in Papua New Guinea in 2018.

Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu, 2015

In March 2015, Cyclone Pam, described at the time as ‘the most powerful cyclone to ever hit the Pacific’, left 75,000 people in Vanuatu homeless (over a quarter of the population) and at least 16 dead (Connors, 2016). Four of the country’s six provinces were affected, with 90 per cent of the damage in Shefa and Tafea provinces (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019d). The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment by the World Bank estimated total damage at AUD600 million (64 per cent of Gross Domestic Product), with recovery costs of AUD426 million (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019d).

In this context, Australian aid relating to Cyclone Pam amounted to AUD50 million, the largest single international contribution. AUD10 million went to immediate humanitarian support, half of this to UN agencies (UNICEF, World Food Programme, World Health Organization) and Australian NGOs (Australian Red Cross, Save the Children, CARE, World Vision), and half to teams organized through the Australian government (Australian Urban Search and Rescue team (USAR), Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMAT)) and to transport of relief supplies through the ADF. AUD5 million focused on early recovery, including school repairs and learning materials, health infrastructure and food needs. The largest component of aid (AUD35 million) was for long-term recovery, supporting Vanuatu’s own recovery plan and dovetailing with existing aid programmes. This included economic recovery (emphasizing the private sector and jobs), infrastructure for public administration, the rebuilding of health and educational facilities and supporting resilience and inclusion in relation to gender and disability (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017a).

Cyclone Winston in Fiji, 2016

In February 2016, Fiji experienced a cyclone that was even more severe than Cyclone Pam. Cyclone Winston was described as ‘the strongest tropical cyclone ever recorded in the southern hemisphere’, with 44 dead and about 540,000 people affected (over 60 per cent of Fiji’s population) (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019j).

Despite the larger numbers of people involved compared with Cyclone Pam, Australian assistance at AUD35 million was not much more than that provided in Vanuatu. The breakdown of the aid was similar, with AUD5 million for immediate relief, AUD10 million for early recovery and AUD20 million for long-term recovery. Immediate relief focused on providing food and temporary shelter, and ensuring access to water and adequate sanitation and hygiene; early recovery involved support for education and health (including the deployment of Australian AUSMATs); long-term recovery involved the rebuilding of schools, health facilities, marketplaces and water and sanitation systems (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019a). ADF involvement through Operation Fiji Assist was perhaps more prominent than in the case of Vanuatu, mainly in the emergency response and early recovery phases. With about 1000 ADF personnel deployed, early surveillance of the damage wrought by the cyclone involved P3 Orion aircraft; 60 tonnes of supplies arrived aboard HMAS Canberra and another 520 tonnes on C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft; seven helicopters assisted with the movement of supplies and personnel in Fiji. ADF engineers contributed to early recovery building projects (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019a).³

The Papua New Guinea earthquake, 2018

On 26 February 2018, a 7.5 magnitude earthquake struck the Highlands Region of Papua New Guinea. Although a sparsely inhabited region, over half a million people were affected and about 20,000 displaced; homes, schools and hospitals were destroyed, as well as roads and bridges. Clan warfare made recovery more difficult, as did the isolation of the region and its rugged terrain (OCHA Regional Office Asia-Pacific, 2020).

Australia committed AUD5 million in immediate humanitarian assistance: up to AUD3 million for immediate recovery (support for livelihoods, shelter, water and sanitation), up to AUD1 million for supporting vulnerable women and children, AUD400,000 for re-establishing power supplies, AUD200,000 for humanitarian supplies. An AUSMAT was sent, as well as elements of the ADF mainly to assist with the delivery of supplies (Operation PNG Assist 2018). For the longer term, Australia assisted in assessing infrastructure damage, with an Australian contribution to reconstruction being expected through the development assistance programme (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018c).

It is important to note that the Papua New Guinea government coordinated the response to the Highlands earthquake through its Disaster Management Response Plan. The Plan estimated that USD62 million were needed for the immediate response, with most of that amount being secured by 5 April. In addition to Australia, assistance came from Canada, China, France, Israel, Japan, New Zealand and the US, as well as the European Union and the Asian Development Bank; most of the funding came from private companies operating in Papua New Guinea (USD43 million). The UN through its Central Emergency Response Fund provided USD9.2 million, with various UN agencies operating in the Highlands; the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies were also active.

The common thread across these case studies is the way in which Australia’s positive response led to gains in its standing in the region: ‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’ benefits from the way in which humanitarian diplomacy is conducted.

Humanitarian diplomacy (3): Evaluation of Australian involvement in responding to disasters in the natural environment in the PICs

Studies of the effectiveness of Australia’s humanitarian involvement in the South Pacific focus less on possible tensions between geopolitical and humanitarian considerations, and more on whether an engagement helped the country overcome the disaster that had occurred. DFAT has commissioned relevant studies whose assessments I outline here. The emphasis is on how well the Australian engagement worked from an organizational point of view, and what might be done better in the future. The way in which the studies are framed indicates the importance of the bureaucratic dimension in the delivery of Australian assistance, also giving attention to the interaction with PIC actors and other external agents. The DFAT-sponsored reports cover both general aspects of involvement in responding to disasters, and more specific episodes such as Cyclone Pam and Cyclone Winston. Given the previous overview of specific disasters where Australia has become involved, it is helpful in the first instance to consider the specific reviews, and then to turn to the general recommendations for improving Australia’s performance.

For Cyclone Pam, there is an evaluation from the Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) in DFAT (including a brief version) and a report from an independent evaluator commissioned by DFAT (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018b; Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2017a, 2017b; Crawford and Donaldson, 2018). From the brief report, the positive points were Australia’s ‘whole-of-government’ approach, the support for ‘local ownership’ (i.e. fitting in with local priorities) and the focus on ‘the most severely affected provinces’ and ‘key needs for shelter and food’. On a more critical note, the evaluation suggested a need to slow down assistance after the initial rapid phase ‘to align with the speed of local systems’. Despite the emphasis on local ownership, there was scope for utilizing local private sector and civil society expertise more fully. Additional assistance for the more vulnerable of the disadvantaged communities and individuals was lacking. A broader range of needs, including livelihood recovery, could have been supported. There were not suitable mechanisms for cash transfers as a form of assistance, and similarly the lack of appropriate funding mechanisms constrained linking Australia’s response to its development programmes in Vanuatu. (These points are from Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2017a: 3.)

Arising from this evaluation of Cyclone Pam, there were five recommendations for improving ‘the effectiveness of future humanitarian responses to rapid onset crises in the south Pacific region’. These involved better support for nationally led responses and localization; better targeting to assist those most in need; better bridging of the humanitarian-development divide (including capacity for emergency response in the development programme); improvement in communication and accountability with relevant partners; and strengthening of DFAT’s internal capacity for humanitarian action (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2017a: 3–4).

For Tropical Cyclone Winston in Fiji, there is an evaluation by DFAT of Australia’s response in relation to the education sector (keeping in mind that Australian involvement covered several sectors). Australian involvement in the education sector was primarily through the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children Australia, working in conjunction with Save the Children Fiji. The DFAT evaluation found that Australian assistance helped greatly in returning the education sector to normal within a relatively short time. However, that involvement was less successful over a longer period when one would expect more attention to ensuring resilience in relation to possible future cyclones. The recommendations overall suggested that more attention be given to contextualizing Australian assistance, dovetailing where possible with Australia’s development assistance. (Based on Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017b.)

Following on from these specific evaluations and in the context of Australian involvement in responding to disasters in the South Pacific more generally, there have been two broad reports more recently recommending an overall approach for Australia (and New Zealand also in the case of the first report). In December 2018, there was the MFAT-DFAT Humanitarian Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the Pacific (MFAT standing for Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in New Zealand) (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). The starting point in this case is six principles to ensure that the humanitarian response is ‘appropriate and relevant’, ‘timely and effective’, ‘efficient and well managed’, ‘engage[d]’ and ‘accountable to affected communities and vulnerable people’ and ‘coordinated and complementary’, ‘reinforc[ing] national and local leadership…and engag[ing] international actors where necessary’ (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018: 3).

In February 2019, a specifically Australian report on protection in Australia’s disaster responses in the Pacific highlighted the need for ‘timely access to a comprehensive protection risk analysis’ (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019f: iv). To achieve this goal, there were specific recommendations in the report to DFAT management, covering the recruitment and support of ‘senior protection champions’ within DFAT and investment in staff capability, more strategic engagement with relevant national stakeholders, identification of ‘the most appropriate mechanisms and partnerships’, reviewing and updating of DFAT’s humanitarian commitments and means of implementation, more consistent prioritization of protection, greater investment in protection activities (together with a more strategic approach regionally and bilaterally) and a commitment ‘to donor leadership on advancing protection on humanitarian action and in the Pacific’ (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019f: iv–v).

Assuming a high level of Australian commitment to humanitarian affairs in the PICs from the geopolitical and humanitarian perspectives (but allowing for Australia’s position being undermined by its climate change policies), the key points arising from these specific and more general evaluations are as follows. Advanced planning and preparedness (strengthening resilience) are very important. There is need for the Australian actors to work closely with local governments and agencies, considering also the capacity of the latter to act (the need to avoid being overwhelmed). From the Australian perspective, a ‘whole of government’ approach maximizes effectiveness. While DFAT has the leading role in terms of the involvement of the Australian government, the point about having ‘senior protection champions’ or advocates is well taken. The establishment of an Office of the Pacific within DFAT helps to make Australian involvement in Pacific affairs more effective, but humanitarian affairs also need champions within that context. Linking this area to Australian development assistance provides an important means of building resilience ahead of disasters occurring.

Concluding comments: ‘Lessons to be learnt’ from Australia’s humanitarian involvement in the South Pacific

Whatever the mix of motives, there are lessons to be learnt from the way in which Australia has engaged with the PICs on the issue of humanitarian involvement. These lessons include the way in which humanitarian affairs are prioritized and organized within government. Having advocates and organizational capacity clearly helps, as does a ‘whole of government’ approach. Then there is the issue of working closely with PIC governments and other local agencies, avoiding paternalism and misjudging the local context. Attention needs to be given to planning and ‘being prepared’ as well as to responding when an emergency occurs and rebuilding thereafter. Linking engagement to broader development programmes is helpful in achieving resilience.

The salutary lesson from the Australian experience is that however good Australia’s motivation in assisting its neighbours, its leading role is undercut by its climate change policies. As we have seen, this complication is the outcome of Australian domestic politics, with a consensus on a more ambitious approach lacking. From the PIC perspective, particularly that of the Smaller Island States, global warming is an existential threat, and these countries are sorely disappointed by Australia’s unwillingness to go further in reducing carbon emissions. Australian support for climate action projects in the PICs is good as far as it goes, but to Australia’s critics in the Pacific it might appear as ‘too little, too late’.

On the whole, Australia’s humanitarian diplomacy in the South Pacific enhances its geopolitical position (‘humanitarianism as diplomacy’); however, Australia’s climate change policies cause some weakening of its standing with the PICs. Australia’s humanitarian diplomacy occurs in a certain geopolitical context, but is driven largely by the perceptions and commitment of government leaders and other political-bureaucratic factors within Australia (including the role played by relevant NGOs), and the interaction of those factors with the various indigenous and external actors in the South Pacific.

Postscript: Australian support for the PICs during the COVID-19 pandemic

Although this article has focused on Australian support for the PICs in relation to disasters within the natural environment such as cyclones and earthquakes, the same dynamics have been at work during the COVID-19 pandemic, beginning in early 2020. As with the natural disasters previously discussed, Australian assistance to the PICs arose in the context of an Australian perception that for geopolitical reasons it had a responsibility to play a special role in helping its island neighbours. Australia needed to compete with China’s COVID diplomacy in this region, involving the provision of relevant medical equipment and some medical staff during the first phase of the pandemic (see Zhang, 2020), with offers of vaccine supplies (to Papua New Guinea in particular) in early 2021. The perceptions of leading Western countries such as the US that Australia should play a major role with the PICs (New Zealand also being expected to be active) also influenced the Australian approach.

Fortunately for the independent island countries, the number of cases of COVID-19 was limited, except in Papua New Guinea (see Herr, 2021).⁴ The relatively isolated situation of the PICs proved an advantage in this respect. To mention some leading PICs, the cumulative number of COVID-19 cases as of 14 April 2021 was 68 in Fiji, 19 in the Solomon Islands, three in Samoa and three in Vanuatu (two deaths in Fiji and none in the other countries) (Worldometer, 2021). With Papua New Guinea, the number of cases also appeared limited for some time but by early 2021 there had been an explosion, with 8984 reported cases as of 14 April 2021 (Worldometer, 2021); people involved with the situation saw this figure as a gross underestimate, with the PNG Epidemic Response Group (a coalition of medical research institutes, Australian churches and development and humanitarian NGOs active in PNG) warning on 1 April 2021 that the true number of cases was about 100,000, with a jump to one million likely within weeks (Cornish, 2021). Apart from its geopolitical and humanitarian concerns, Australia had a very direct interest in preventing the spread of the virus from Papua New Guinea to the adjoining Australian state of Queensland.

Together with the health impact of COVID-19 in the PICs, there was a severe economic impact, especially where an island country was heavily dependent on tourism (Connell, 2021). In Fiji, the PIC most dependent in this respect, tourism before the pandemic had contributed some 40 per cent of Gross Domestic Product and employed 45 per cent of the work force (Connell, 2021: 150). PICs were expecting a significant decline in GDP as a result of the pandemic; in addition to tourism, there was an impact on commodity prices, global supply chains, remittances from diaspora communities (especially important in Tonga and Samoa) and some aid programmes (World Bank Group, 2020: 15).

Given the dual impact of COVID-19 on the PICs, the Australian response involved both health and economic dimensions (see Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2021; Australian Government, 2020). In terms of health, the early response to the pandemic entailed the provision of relevant medical equipment and some medical staff through AUSMAT, as well as a promise to contribute AUD80 million to the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation COVAX Facility Advance Market Commitment to assist with vaccines for the PICs and Southeast Asia when they became available. Economically, Australia committed to a COVID-19 Response Package of AUD304.7 million over two years, including support for essential services and regional aviation; this package involved restructuring previous aid arrangements. In relation to the latter point, Australia established a Corridor to ensure the flow of essential medical and humanitarian supplies to the PICs (and Timor-Leste), complementing the Pacific Islands Forum’s Pacific Humanitarian Pathway for COVID-19. In relation to remittances, there were attempts to revive the schemes allowing short-term labour migration to Australia from some PICs (Pacific Labour Scheme and Seasonal Worker Programme) (especially important for agriculture).

In relation to the vaccine rollout, Australia committed a further AUD500 million in October 2020 to assist the PICs and Southeast Asian countries with this process (Harris, 2020). From April 2021, 10,000 doses of the Australian-produced AstraZeneca vaccine were to be distributed each week to neighbouring countries, focusing initially on Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste, with Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu to follow (SBS News, 2021).

In understanding the dynamics of Australian involvement, while the starting point might be geopolitical, the unfolding of that involvement derived (as it did with the natural disasters previously discussed) from the perceptions and commitment of the government leaders (especially the prime minister, foreign minister and health minister), the political-organizational structuring of the involvement and the interaction with NGOs, the PIC governments and other parts of the island context, as well as with relevant international actors (other powers involved in the region, international organizations such as the World Health Organization).

As with the evaluations of Australian responses to natural disasters in the PICs, so it is important to evaluate Australia’s response to COVID-19 in the South Pacific. The major focus relates to effectiveness. Essentially, the model followed with COVID-19 is similar to that used with the natural disasters, focusing on political leadership and the political-bureaucratic arrangements in Australia, liaison with NGOs and other international actors and interaction with the local governments and other actors. With the exception of Papua New Guinea, COVID-19 has been well contained in those PICs where Australia is directly involved. However, Australian involvement is a relatively minor explanation for this situation; that is not to say that this involvement has not been helpful. Nevertheless, some critics argue that Australian support has been ‘too little, too late’. For example, Jennifer Tierney (2021) has argued that Australia needs to prioritize health care workers in Papua New Guinea over low-risk Australians in the vaccine rollout. Other commentators suggest ways in which Australian engagement could be developed further, for example through the ADF expanding its focus on health security in the South Pacific (Brewster, 2021). As with the natural disasters, it is a case of ‘two cheers’ for Australian involvement: helpful but needing to be constantly monitored and improved.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, particularly Drs Alistair Cook and Lina Gong for the invitation to participate in the project on ‘Asia and the Humanitarian World’, and for the support and encouragement provided subsequently. He also wishes to thank Associate Professor Richard Herr (School of Social Sciences, University of Tasmania), Dr David Envall (Department of International Relations, Australian National University) and Ms Wendy Atkinson for helpful feedback on an earlier version of the article. The author remains responsible for the final version.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore assisted with research funding.

ORCID iD

Derek McDougall

Notes

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