Abstract
Economic security in southeast Asia is often connected to the survival and security of states. This macro definition can be contrasted with a more people-centred approach to economic security. This article focuses on this aspect. Of particular concern is how men and women are affected differently in unstable times. We witness this now in this global pandemic. The current economic insecurities of women are not a reflection of historical gender norms but more a creation of contemporary neoliberal economics as practised in the region. While southeast Asia does well as a global economic hub, women do not have a fair share in its gains. By examining issues of power, liberating policies and women's rights and the right to decent work, the article ultimately posits greater intervention in narrowing economic inequalities. This will be a vital step in rebuilding national economies in southeast Asia, post-pandemic and in the years to come.
Individuals and institutions must become allies in the common cause of enhancing life opportunities—for present and future generations. (United Nations Development Programme, 1994)
Let us begin with a basic understanding of economic security. There is no universal definition of the term. As Christopher Dent states, as important as the concept of economic security is, attempts at growing the scholarship around it have not kept up with its importance (Dent, 2001). Dent comes close though, in his work on economic security in Singapore, and by extension the southeast Asian region, connecting it with the survival and security of states (Dent, 2001). His is a macro and singular idea. But the idea of state security is not a monolithic concept. Dent himself gives a brief nod to this on his way to expounding economics and state security (Dent, 2007). Picking up from Alan Chong's critique of Dent's thesis (this volume), economic security is also very much people-centred. Here is where this article and Dent part ways. Simply put, from a people-centred perspective, economic security can be defined as procuring a sufficient income for an individual now and into the future, for the basic fulfilment of her/his needs. But, economic security would also include ideas of resilience and stability. These are concepts that are important to an individual's wellbeing, especially in times of crises, as in the global COVID-19 pandemic. Resilience and stability as cornerstones in an individual's life are also two important principles outlined in the doctrine of human security.
In discussing economic security, I place it within the broader discourse of human security and its ideas of survival, security and stability. Human security is not a new concept, its debut being in the Human Development Report of 1994 (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). The concept itself has been studied in academic and policy circles extensively but actual studies of how human security can be achieved (or not), in the everyday lives of people, are few and far between. Human security often winds up as an alternative to what one might term ‘national’ security – as in two separate elements – security of people and security of state. Also, in most human security discussions, we see more discussion on ‘security’ than ‘human’. There is another point of contention: can we really equate ‘human’ to all human beings? As Des Gasper writes, ‘human’ can refer to the human species as well as ‘whatever in human persons and collectivities is considered to be most important, most worthy, most ‘human’ and at risk …’ (Gasper, 2013: 28). So the concept of human security, then, would mean little if divorced from its social or cultural contexts within which human lives are organized and lived. In order to better understand the economic security/insecurity of people, we need to place it within a particular socio-cultural context, which would then give greater meaning to what we are trying to explore. The human security framework provides an excellent platform for this given that it is about the protection and preservation of human survival, human dignities and daily life, as the former Japanese Prime Minister, Obuchi Keizo, articulated in initiating the discussion on human security in Japan and elsewhere (Obuchi, 1999), making the concept transcend cultural and geographical barriers and allowing for local interpretations. It becomes a powerful tool to study barriers to human development, protecting human dignities and sustaining daily lives. It is used in this article with this discourse in mind where gender and economic security is examined. With the understanding that the human security framework embraces freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom from indignities, we go deeper into the lived experiences of women workers to investigate how gender has become a basis for economic discrimination.
Economic security is the gateway by which other human securities such as food, water, environmental and even political securities, are realized. But it is also the way by which inequalities are magnified. These inequalities are not only of wages and classes but also of genders. Inequality between men and women in particular is the most obvious because it is the most discussed. Such inequalities are also exaggerated when one considers the intersectionalities between race, genders, especially those that are non-binary, and ethnicities. The study of such intersectionalities is of equal import but is beyond the scope of this article. Here, I aim to discuss economic inequality between men and women with a focus on southeast Asian nations.
Of the seven aspects of human security outlined in the Human Development Report of 1994, economic security has stood out as a key variable in establishing sustainable peace and progress for nations in southeast Asia. Heralded for its miraculous growth and drastic reduction in poverty within a decade or so in the 1980s and 1990s, with governments heavily backing aggressive export-oriented economic growth together with investment-friendly bureaucratic and infrastructural arrangements that promoted exports, the region very easily transformed into the economic miracle it is known for today.
There certainly is enough scholarship surrounding the wonders of the region's economic trajectory yet very few examine the more nuanced underpinnings of this region's meteoric rise. As exciting as southeast Asia is to global financial and economic networks, there remains an unpleasant underbelly of inequalities that needs further investigation and exposure. Here, I highlight some issues that prevent inclusive economic development policies that, if eradicated, will steer the region towards greater economic security for the vast majority of people. This is especially so in light of global challenges facing southeast Asia, not least from a distorted view of human securities (in particular women's securities) and economic growth and integration.
As the levels of development across member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN,1 henceforth) vary, there can be no universal solution to empowering and activating the region's female workforce. The highest levels of active female workers are in emerging economies such as Cambodia and Laos (OECD/ASEAN, 2017). However, let us not assume that high levels of female participation in the workforce are indicative of female agency; instead, they reveal stark economic necessities that compel women to work. The middle-income economies in the region have relatively lower levels of female participation in the workforce, which are indicative of another set of problems: career development and promotion opportunities, wage differentials and an increasing burden of care that takes up women's time. Here my focus is on the emerging economies of southeast Asia, saving a comparative study across the 10 member states for a larger body of work, which it will inevitably lead to, given the vast differences in terms of women's empowerment and quality of participation in the labour force.
The progress of societies and the global economy in the 21st century depends on creativity, innovation and intelligence. These are not gender-specific attributes. Southeast Asian countries should focus attempts to achieve economic security for all and it would be prudent to harness the creativity, innovation and intelligence of both men and women to maximize the productive potential of the full labour force. There are two ways of examining this: that such an understanding, unfortunately, has not been a key motivating force of member states of ASEAN simply because a gendered understanding of labour and the factors that affect participation in the labour force has not been fully considered, or, they have indeed been considered but to the detriment of the female worker. Hence the increased burden on women, which will be explained shortly. Yet another factor that needs to be dissected is the understanding of whether economic and labour policies that encourage women to join the workforce are liberating or just liberal policies. This is tied to notions of empowerment and power dynamics within the neoliberal economic order. I take the opportunity in this article to briefly examine how the adopting of neoliberal policies has moulded both pastoral and punitive forms of governance around women's labour participation and how this has continued to deny women certain rights and equal status in the workplace. Such forms of governance have resulted in economic as well as other (human) insecurities for women. I say ‘to briefly examine’ given that there is a dearth of such scholarly studies to draw from and more attention to these aspects of the governance of feminized labour is certainly warranted. In addition, we also need to consider ideas of resilience and stability through women's rights and decent work when discussing the economic security of women in the region. The COVID-19 pandemic and its assault on global economies have highlighted the instability of several types of jobs, many of which are held by women. Here an opportunity to study the barriers to women's (human) securities presents itself. I will return to these three points towards the article's conclusion.
The idea of women's equality in general and their economic security in particular has been under-securitized in the region due to several factors, some of which will be discussed in this article. Women, of course, are not completely ignored in southeast Asian scholarship. There is research on the topics of women's equality, their rights, their victimization and their economic and political participation, for example, but these do not cohere well to reveal closely the socio-cultural and institutional machinery that drives this inequality. Frankly, there has been no attempt to coalesce these wide-ranging studies under a more coherent conceptual framework, which will allow an examination of interlinkages and deep-rooted causes of genuine disenfranchisement that create economic, as well as other, human insecurities for some. This is what is missing in terms of gender scholarship in southeast Asia (and perhaps elsewhere too). This article is a humble contribution to this end.
A decent introduction to the issues concerning women and economic security requires an historical as well as a contemporary context. The next section aims to do this. Following this, I discuss some reasons for this inequality while also highlighting how the impact of economic (gender) inequality is magnified during crises. I end with a coda – a hope to move forward, to utilize the opportunities created by the current global crises to try and address gendered economic inequalities in the emerging economies of southeast Asia.
Gender, inequality and the nature of work
The economic growth of southeast Asia, both in a historical context2 and in recent times, has been on the backs of female workers. In precolonial times, female labour was highly valued. Given the dependence of early societies in southeast Asia on small-animal husbandry and also rice cultivation, which is a highly labour-intensive activity, women's labour was as valued as that of men's (Hudson and den Boer, 2005). For example, in pre-colonial Sumatran rice cultivation the men were responsible for the clearing of jungles and felling of trees and the women and children, whose work stretched out over longer periods, tended to the crops, transplanting, growing and harvesting (Andaya, 1995). This economic value of women accounted for the low female infant mortality rates in the region, compared to those in other regions, namely south and east Asia (Hudson and den Boer, 2005).
There is also the rarely explored study of the role of women's labour in precolonial and colonial southeast Asia. For instance, the trade of Piper nigrum or black pepper was common in southeast Asia in the 16th and 17th centuries and the growing and marketing of the spice was managed by women. Trade in black pepper was common in Cambodia, Borneo, Western Java and the Malay Peninsula but international trade in the spice was focused on Sumatra (Andaya, 1995). Early European and Chinese merchants in southeast Asia often dealt with women in trade. In his work on female roles in precolonial southeast Asia, Anthony Reid cites the following writings of traders who visited the region: In Cambodia, it is the women who take charge of trade (Chou Ta Kuan, 1297: 20). It is their [Siamese] custom that all affairs are managed by their wives … all trading transactions great and small (Ma Huan, I433: I04) … [M]oney-changing is a great profession here [Tongking]. It is managed by women, who are very dextrous and ripe in this employment (Dampier, 1699: 47) … [W]omen in the Birman country …manage the more important mercantile concerns of their husbands (Symes, 1827, I: 255). It is the women [of the Moluccas] who negotiate, do business, buy and sell (Galvao, 1544: 75). (Cited in Reid, 1988: 634)
The role of women in the economies of southeast Asia today cannot be understated either. In the case of the Philippines, personal remittances from overseas workers reached a record high of US$33.5 billion in 2019, 3.9% higher than the US$32.2 billion recorded in 2018 (Rivas, 2020), and a large percentage (more than 50 percent) of these workers were female and younger than their male counterparts (Philippines Statistics Authority, 2019). In agriculture and food production, especially the cultivation of rice, a vital crop in the region, women's contributions vary across countries, totalling about 50 percent in Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand, and more than 50 percent in Vietnam and Laos (Maslog, 2015). In the Philippines, women's participation in rice production is lower but their participation in farm management decisions and inputs and in hiring of labour is higher than in other countries of ASEAN (Paris, 2000).
East Asia's (China, Korea, Japan and southeast Asian nations) gains in economic growth, poverty reduction and welfare outcomes have been associated with a trade expansion over the last four decades and the region's support for labour-intensive and low-technology export manufacturing is credited for a rapid transformation from a predominantly agrarian region in the 1950s and 1960s to an established manufacturing-based economic powerhouse by the 1990s (Menon and Melendez, 2020). Even within agricultural developments, a sector where women have always worked in some capacity, women's involvement in rural transformation and modernization during this time was limited even though women accounted for a large number of unpaid family workers and were direct food producers, wage workers on other farms and providers of care and food in agricultural homes (Park and White, 2017). What has been largely ignored from an agrarian political economy perspective is the role played by patriarchal power relations in land rights, decision-making and accordance of agency that may have had a decisive influence on the inclusion or exclusion of actors from ‘corporate agriculture and capitalist smallholder agriculture’ (Park and White, 2017: 1105).
The rise in productivity and economic growth that characterized southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s has lifted many from poverty and for the most part was somewhat inclusive in gender terms, drawing out significant numbers of women from their homes and into the workforce (EAF Editors, 2019). During this time, economic and political demands of women's participation, including labour mobilities, flexible labour and social reproductions, took on new expressions by which gender relations are lived and imagined (Martin and Dragojlovic, 2019). There was a shift in the gendered roles of ‘mobile men’ and ‘stationary women’ when women, primarily young single women, moved from rural to urban settings or even overseas to work as low-paid assembly workers or domestic helpers (Mills, 1997; Ong, 1987; Wolf, 2006, cited in Martin and Dragojlovic, 2019: 280). Aspiring domestic workers were subjected to homogenizing training before departure, aimed at producing hardworking and obedient, albeit cheap labour, reminiscent of colonial categories of subservient Asian femininity (Constable, 1997) of low economic value. This mode of out-migration of female labour was so important that it led to pastoral forms of governance in countries such as the Philippines where entire institutional and legal frameworks were set up to assist in the process (Yeoh et al., 2020). As a counter-point, when Indonesia saw the importance of women's labour migration as a reliable source of external finance, it employed a specific strategy to keep wages low for unskilled workers (a large number of them women) to gain a comparative advantage over the Philippines (Yeoh et al., 2020). Such punitive measures do little to advance women in the labour force. Inclusion into neoliberal economic systems (or exclusion from them) has always been a gendered process. It is shaped by historical and existing gendered relations (Park and White, 2017) and heteronormative understandings of the division of labour.
The growth of labour-intensive industries in the southeast Asian countries in the early 1980s and into the 1990s was also seen as a way of getting as many people as possible into the labour market to reduce unemployment, with corporations happily co-existing with the state to take advantage of global flows and networks (Rimmer and Dick, 2009). This development, although somewhat understandable at that point in history, disregarded the gender implications of mass employment, which paved the way for systemic discrimination and structural violence inflicted upon women. Women were seen as secondary in the labour force due to their temporary (or permanent) withdrawal from the economy due to childbirth, and a structural undervaluation of conventional women's work (for example tailoring or assembly work), which resulted in women getting lower wages than men performing the same tasks (Birdsall and Sabot, 1991, cited in Bui et.al. 2018: 396). The more technical and higher-skilled jobs went to men who were trained for them. Women remained in production lines, with limited upward mobility in terms of skills and pay (Sundaram, 2009). Clearly, class relations brought out of capitalist manoeuvrings and their intersection with other social categorizations, like gender, have been insufficiently investigated.
Creating physical and political distance between policymakers and corporations on the one hand and female labour on the other has worked well in southeast Asia. There is limited opportunity for women workers to organize and demand better wages and working conditions. In reducing these empowering opportunities for women to look after for themselves, governments were complicit in retaining the low-wage production jobs that women took in the early 1980s and 1990s. The constant low wages of female workers, especially those employed in manufacturing, remain an incentive to attract companies into the region, especially in light of increasing wages in manufacturing giants like China (Tan and Tang, 2016). For example, in Cambodia, the minimum wage for the textile industry, where the majority of workers are women, was just US$61 per month in June 2010 (ILO, 2012). Unfortunately, despite proving their competencies, women find it difficult to translate their human capital into economic empowerment. This is because gendered economic relations have not been established as a zone of engagement, especially when it comes to economic planning, and it has served states not to do so. Thi Mai Hoai Bui et al., in their analysis of gender inequality and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into developing countries, found that although the connection between gender inequality and FDI is ambiguous, their empirical data from countries in the Asia-Pacific suggest that, given the importance of FDI in economic growth, some countries consider maintaining wage discrimination as a comparative advantage in attracting FDI and that foreign investors do favour countries with low levels of economic and political rights (Bui et al., 2018).
Even in the course of later economic restructuring, women's employment opportunities may be discussed but usually there are explanations crafted to justify low female participation in the economy, mostly burden of care, and often the solution for this is to propose reforms – as if nothing is to be gained by exploring prevailing power (of masculinities) dynamics (Enloe, 2014) that exist in international and national business and political relationships between corporate and political elites. Women have often been ‘invisibilized’ in the neoliberal economic development model that is the standard in southeast Asian economies. The pastoral and punitive forms of governance around women's labour that have arisen as a result of the pursuit of neoliberal economic order have locked in heteronormative ideas of women's place in the labour markets. Paying closer attention to what the model entails and requires and being aware of the feminine lives that are altered as a result of being immersed in this model are important if the intention is to establish forms of stable and resilient economic security for the region. This is especially so in terms of low wages for tens of thousands of female workers.
No one person's labour is inherently of low value. Women's labour is deemed ‘cheap’ by particular structural inequalities and persistent narratives on women and girls’ abilities and economic worth, outside of the domestic sphere (Enloe, 2014). When we do not pay specific attention to the experiences of low-wage female workers, we remove them from conversations surrounding labour, employment and economic policies, which then leaves us at a loss to fully comprehend and explain why women's wages are low and why women's labour is cheap. According to feminist IR scholar Cynthia Enloe: the international political economy works the way it does in part because of the decisions that have cheapened the value of women's work, making it either unpaid or low paid. These decisions are made invisible, however, when they are dismissed as being not decisions at all but merely the result of ‘natural’ processes. Imagining anything as ‘natural’ takes it out of the realm of politics. (Enloe, 2014: 263)
This would also explain why increased male unemployment is more of a cause for concern for policymakers and leaders of states than high levels of female unemployment. The natural understanding is that males are breadwinners and ‘heads of households’ and therefore their economic status and empowerment are extremely important for the family, which is the pillar of society. The woman's role is still seen, in this day and age, as domestic or mostly domestic and their fundamental importance is seen as lying within homes and perhaps within the communities they live in as carers and nurturers. For example, a 2015 study by Indochina Research found that out of 200 Lao women, 47 percent (married, with children) saw childbearing as affecting their work life and vice versa (Indochina Research Ltd, 2015). Yet another report stated that the Indonesian female labour force was extremely low as women were more engaged in household responsibilities (Romain, 2015).
It is naive to assume that large numbers of female workers entering the workforce is a natural progression of neoliberal economic development in countries. Women who work in these low-paying jobs have to very carefully weigh the advantages of keeping these jobs against the inequitable nature of these jobs and being in an exploitative conspiracy between global companies, local factory owners, politicians and men in their homes. Many will argue about the wonders of the neoliberal economic model and the creation of hundreds and thousands of jobs in the region for women. They are not wrong but there is very little understanding or interest in women's experiences in these jobs. So, on the outside it looks almost too good to be true; a perfect model of growth and development with the creation of employment opportunities and with earning potential for everyone. But the setting and retaining of cheap labour, in particular women's cheap labour, is not a natural phenomenon of any development model that promises growth and development for all. Yet we see women's wages in the region continue to stay low so that businesses are attracted to the provision of cheap labour and are encouraged in their ‘race to the bottom’. In addition, while the manufacturing industry with their low wages and unsafe working conditions continue to feed the economic development and growth of emerging southeast Asian economies, the women who form the backbone of this industry very rarely get to enjoy the fruits of that growth. There are a few key reasons for this inequality. I highlight three of them below.
Power, liberation and rights: Three reasons, explored
Power and policy-making
Numerous individuals, including French philosopher Michel Foucault, have dedicated time to the study of power as a concept. Power is everywhere and it operates at many levels, both horizontally and vertically. When you study the gendered impacts of politics, economics or socio-cultural phenomena and almost any other kind of gendered investigation, you are investigating power. Basically, who has it and how is it used? Insufficient political will to break barriers for gender equality, limited vision as to what needs to be done to empower women, entrenched cultural views of women that lag behind workplace realities; all these happen because of power dynamics – how power operates between subjects. Power also explains deep-rooted mindsets on the roles of men and women in the family and in society. I have to qualify and add that this is not only a southeast Asian phenomenon but a global one, and in almost every sphere of human life.
The emerging economies of southeast Asia have policies in place to advance gender equality, gender mainstreaming and capacity-building for women and girls. Even so, there is often a disconnect between national policies on human rights, gender equality and social development, on the one hand, and economic policies, on the other. There are two main reasons for this disconnect. First, policymakers often feel that they have sufficiently met established international standards to protect women. A lot has been done – especially since the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, which all ASEAN member states have ratified, and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995. ASEAN governments also made specific commitments to advance the rights, living conditions and safety of women and girls through the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. However, women's economic ‘empowerment’ has been more instrumental – since through their economic advancement the family/community benefits – rather than empowering. Much less emphasis has been placed on advancing women's participation in national economic affairs and national security policy, which are directly connected to humanitarian crisis situations like the COVID-19 pandemic or natural disasters, which the region faces regularly. The second problem is that gender inequality at policy and decision-making levels is not problematized. The reasons for excluding women's experiences vary. In some cases, the experiential knowledge women have from their daily work lives is not valued as much as the technical or scientific knowledge that men might have due to their educational advantages.
These obstacles account for the limited understanding and inclusion of gender in economic policies. First, economics is a male-dominated field. Economic policy formulation and implementation are undertaken by (male-dominated) national governments, often drawing very heavily on (male-dominated) national agencies. The focus on masculinized knowledge – with an overriding emphasis on technology, science, logistics and management – puts aside social factors in general, and gender issues in particular. This also highlights the power of particular types of knowledge over others. It would be untrue to state that women are never invited to participate in discussions on economic policy. After all, inviting women in such high-level deliberations makes for great optics in politics. However, they are not invited to redefine the problem or examine closely its causes. Therefore, female labour and the actual nature and environment of work within which they are placed have very little connections. As Enloe (2014: 34) writes, ‘rarely are they made visible as thinkers and actors’.
Second, many people and certainly many policymakers have a generalized, pervasive idea of ‘human’ behaviour derived from decades of gender-blind economic research and policies. This too is an issue of power reflected in a lack of curiosity in women's experiences. This simply meant research and studies on economic crises hardly scrutinized how impacts might uniquely affect women. This way of thinking fails to examine issues from women's points of view, to consider the specific nature of women's suffering in economic crises or to differentiate between the experiences of men and women. This understanding of ‘human’ behaviour, moreover, is knowledge gained through men's eyes and derived from men's experiences. These knowledge-formation and policy-formation processes are highly problematic at best, and they can be dangerous in crises such as a global pandemic, a global financial downturn or even a more localized natural disaster, leaving women with little social and financial capital to cope. Despite having several economic ‘empowerment’ strategies for women in southeast Asia, they still face insurmountable inequalities in remunerated work. This is a result of the actual nature of these policies. Do they simply fit into existing systems or are they truly empowering? This is explored next.
Liberal vs. liberating economic policies
Another issue the region faces is that most of the ‘economic empowerment’ policies very simply try to fit women into an existing liberal economic environment. Building skills for women and girls that match market demand so they eventually find jobs in the existing economic environment seems to be the go-to strategy for low- and middle-income countries in the region. So it is ‘empowerment’ insofar as it fits into a neoliberal economic understanding of the term. The error of such thinking is starkly revealed when one examines the role of women in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). It is generally understood that greater economic integration will benefit labour markets in the region. But the opportunities that come from greater economic integration are not necessarily shared equally between men and women workers. A study on the gender impacts of the AEC states that the predominance of men in trade, investment and the skilled labour sectors – where women are not well represented – ‘contribute[s] to the inability of women to fully benefit from the AEC’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016). The report concludes that the AEC will exacerbate existing inequalities in the absence of counteractive measures.
Women's role as the primary caregiver of the family is not in the national economic calculations even though it is an important part of the social and economic life of a nation. This does not fit into the neoliberal idea of work. It is often overlooked even when women invest a large proportion of their physical energy and financial resources in the family. Since this contribution has been overlooked, it becomes a huge problem particularly in the context of the decline of the welfare state and the descaling of government spending during structural adjustments. The COVID-19 pandemic has made this gross miscalculation in economic and development planning more obvious, especially in terms of the reduced spending of governments on healthcare in developing countries (Goodman, 2020) and disinterest in women's specific role in the health and safety of communities, (McLaren et al., 2020) both as caregivers and financial supporters.
There are still issues with women's access to the means of production like land and capital. For example, Indonesia's agriculture sector accounts for 14 percent of the country's gross domestic product and is the second biggest source of employment (Hassan, 2019). Around 40 percent of family smallholder farmers are women, amounting to 7.4 million according to the latest available data, but female farmers continue to struggle as they lack access to land, credit and other services (ASEAN Post, 2019). We do see several well-meaning groups that represent women farmers, and even financial institutions like the Asian Development Bank or the World Bank critique cultural norms as a reason to control and subordinate females. Seemingly, they adopt the discourse of liberal/liberating feminist thinking. However, scholars such as Thomas Frank and Jim McGuigan have identified this as an interesting phenomenon known as ‘capitalism's paradoxical ability to co-opt leftist language and imagery’ for its own end (cited in Hickel, 2014: 1363). The question still remains: how liberated are these women to make decisions that impact their work and lives and to be able to act upon those decisions?
The term ‘work’ has come to be defined as intended by the predominantly capitalistic economic model – labour, employment and its connection to the production of goods, resources and money – and involvement in the formal labour market constitutes the de facto definition of work (Meleis and Lindgren, 2001). This definition limits work to the public sphere, effectively ignoring all work performed in the private sphere (ILO, 2015). Women do not get to decide how they would like to divide their time between remunerated work and work in the private sphere. The practice of outsourcing ‘women's work’ to domestic workers – an active economy on its own – merely transfers the inequities and does little to reduce the mental load of women in the labour force. Moreover, the fact that these domestic workers get paid so little highlights the value placed on women's work in the private sphere.
In excluding the emotional and psychological costs of worry, stress, the overload of the burden of care and oppressive systems that lay upon women both in the public and private spheres, economic policies that aim to get women in the labour force remain liberal economic policies and not liberating ones. To have greater resilience and stability in times of crises, liberating policies allow women to maintain a form of economic security even in the worst of times. That reduces burdens on states through reduced social welfare interventions. But such economic security must be in line with conditions of decent work and not be a violation of women's (human) right to earn a decent wage.
Human rights in human (economic) security
The COVID-19 pandemic has forced the attention of leaders and decision-makers on the issues of public health and the economic fallout as a result of lockdowns around the world, and rightfully so. But COVID-19 has also laid bare ongoing violations of human rights, especially the right to earn a decent living and to do so under decent work conditions. According to the ILO, decent work: sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men. (ILO, 2015, emphasis added)
What the ILO describes as ‘decent work’ is, in fact, all aspects of achieving human security – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom from indignities. Many low-wage female workers, crises aside, do not necessarily operate under decent work conditions. Their freedoms are compromised. The garment industry is a significant employer in southeast Asia. Many women, especially from Cambodia, Myanmar and Lao PDR, travel illegally (and sometimes legally) under the supervision of ‘agents’ whom they pay to get them across the international borders of neighbouring countries. The adoption of neoliberal capitalism in these post-conflict societies, along with the capitalist fervour of their leaders, has made their traditional livelihoods of, for example, small-scale market gardening or fishing, almost redundant. These women move to where the jobs are. Popular fashion or sportswear companies that outsource their manufacturing to southeast Asia (Loomis, 2015) are their potential employers. Irregular pay, fines for ‘sick days’ and harassment are all part and parcel of these women's lives away from home, including those with legal employment status (ILO, 2012). In light of limited options at home and very little skills or education to fall back on, these women trudge on. While companies in the global North do some soul-searching and realize their dependence on the global South, the cheap labour provided by the women in the global South particularly makes them overly vulnerable to supply chain disruptions in times of crises. Thousands of female workers in the garment industry in the global South would prefer their jobs even under horrendous conditions rather than to be without any work at all.
Human rights are abstract ideas, but they are also reflected in human insecurities such as economic insecurities, food insecurities, health insecurities and lack of personal safety (Enarson, 2014). COVID-19 has brought to the forefront, especially for women, the instability of the three fundamental freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from indignities and freedom from fear – including unacceptable state action in denying livelihoods. These can only be realized if governments respect and promote the full range of human rights of their populations, without discrimination of any sort, including systemic gender discrimination. State negligence, both before and after a crisis, contributes greatly to human insecurities. Legal scholar Vasselin Popovski argues that when this happens, state negligence constitutes a human rights violation (Popovski, 2014). I have extended this argument to women's insecurities in times of economic hardships such as in the aftermath of natural disasters, a common occurrence in southeast Asia (Nair, 2018) and the current COVID-19 lockdowns and the resulting economic fallout. It is not always a conscious act to undermine women. Rather, it can be a form of institutional neglect on the part of decision-makers, once more pointing to the skewed power dynamics between men in power and everyone else. As a result, policies about women – including economic policies – can be inherently discriminatory.
In the 1990s, for example, a labour force survey conducted in Uganda showed that, when people were asked to include a ‘secondary’ activity or job in addition to their ‘primary’ activity or job, the number of workers soared from 6.5 million to 7.2 million, revealing 700,000 ‘missing’ workers – the majority of whom were women (MacDonald, 2016). If complete data that reflects real-life situations are not collected before the occurrence of any crisis, the extent of post-crisis damage cannot be accurately estimated. Women, in particular, might not be recognized for their work, including in informal sectors. This means that some groups of workers may not be sufficiently compensated or may be left out of economic rehabilitation processes. Similarly, social safety nets might not be well-designed; women, again, might be disadvantaged as a result. The development of effective crisis policies depends on having comprehensive, inclusive pre-crisis data on economic and other matters. Governments need to have a complete picture of economic losses for all victims – men and women. However, if data collection is incomplete and discriminatory, then economic rehabilitation policies based on incomplete data will create and compound human insecurities and constitute human rights violations. Women are especially likely to be discriminated against and harmed in this regard.
Women's rights are human rights. The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO, 2020) recent report, The COVID-19 response: Getting gender equality right for a better future for women at work, outlines key points on how the pandemic has affected female workers around the world. The report states that 41 percent of women are employed in sectors at higher risk of job losses and decline in working hours compared to men. Also, women informal workers are under even greater threat. A recent report by the Asian Migrants’ Coordinating Body (or AMCB) stated that hundreds of women from the Philippines and Indonesia could lose their jobs as families let go of their domestic helpers and nannies as the economies have slowed and many face economic hardships (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2020). In addition, COVID-19 has increased women's unpaid care work and unfortunately has also been a grim reminder that violence and harassment are a reality everywhere, including in the world of work (ILO, 2020). The violation of women's rights, especially during this pandemic, has manifested itself in many ways, including the disruptions of already precarious livelihoods.
Coda
The COVID-19 pandemic and resultant economic upheaval present a brilliant opportunity for us to start anew; to change prevailing systems with different intentions and different main actors. That we might face significant challenges in economic growth and development in the near future, both globally and at national levels, is not a new revelation. This is especially so during the time of this global pandemic and in the coming post-pandemic years. But that it would take some 100 years for the gender gap to close and 202 years to achieve some form of economic parity between men and women (World Economic Forum, 2018) should not be an acceptable premise for leaders and should be of great concern to countries looking to build more resilient economies and stable societies. By not addressing the gender gap in the workforce, countries around the world stand to lose a potential boost to global employment by 18.9 million workers, and the vast majority of these gains are said to be in emerging countries (ILO, 2017) like those in southeast Asia. Gender equality, then, is a business imperative.
As the above discussion has alluded to, some form of transformational action is required to take on board a gendered understanding of how economic security works as a people-centred concept. But, how is that to happen if we do not seek to expand the framing of the problem? We understand issues within particular conceptual frameworks to have meaningful changes and imagine alternative futures. The correct (or even multiple) framing of an issue is vital for this in any issue. To not have a proper framework or a singular framework for a complex issue leads to a loss of precious input into policy-making. In the case of this article, put simply, a reframing of the understanding of what economic security in the region means is in order. A human security framework adds greater rigour to policy debates and research simply because it is a concept that is centred on people and their social interactions. These interactions are steeped in power dynamics. A human security framework helps to draw attention to the present and emerging vulnerabilities as a result of this dynamic that are created through various social, economic, cultural and political interactions. But how does human security do this?
Human security is about the protection and fulfilment of people's vital freedoms and the development of capabilities to create satisfying lives for all (Sen, 1999). These freedoms, in addition to what Amartya Sen discusses as positive and negative freedoms (Sen, 1999), also cover the three freedoms in human security – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom from indignities. In very simple terms, freedom from want illustrates the desire to live a life of one's own values; freedom from fear dictates some form of independence and capability to ensure one's own survival and the stability of life-sustaining activities in the event of downturns; and freedom from indignities upholds the individual's rights of self-expression and even their very existence as a member of society and as a citizen, complete with its own set of rights attached, encompassing the state's role as a duty-bearer to ensure those rights are not curbed in any way.
For the emerging economies of southeast Asia, attempts to incorporate more women into the workforce, which will be necessary to ‘ride out’ the economic downturn post pandemic, should be carefully calibrated. This means that there must be ‘brave souls’ that seek to investigate power differentials in economic planning and policies. Funding for such evidence-based research will be extremely valuable for well-informed and empowering policies to be put in place. More broadly though, I go back to the ideas of neoliberal economic policies. Although this model of development has marginalized many women from economic empowerment, it can still be argued that it has lifted several from poverty. But a fundamental dynamic under the watch of neoliberal guards has been the change in the relationship between people, women in particular, and the state. With the scaling back of the state, it has fallen upon non-state actors to shore up social protection and capacity-building among ‘vulnerable’ women. We see this in southeast Asia through the works of NGOs, micro-credits from banks and ‘projects’ from institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, hoping to ‘empower’ women and build capacity. For all the rhetoric, the idea here was protection of these women from discrimination, appalling working conditions and unfair wages, more than their participation in decision-making and the prevention of structural violence inflicted upon them. That would require an investigation of the power dynamics at play. If non-state actors are the key nodes for intervention, how can the lived experiences of women ever influence the state in economic and national security planning? It is in these areas where a gendered understanding of issues can make the most impact. Here is where we can see both the micro and macro understandings of economic security merging.
Women are a vital force in the economic restructuring of many, if not all, southeast Asian nations. The resilience and stability of their economic security will indicate how well the country is doing in getting back on its feet. Women play key roles in a nation's very DNA. After all, social reproduction and social capital – both vital to the survival of the state – reside in the hands of women, in addition to their production of financial capital. So, it may be time for states in the region to act as points of intervention for gender equality and economic security.
A human security framework, employed to understand economic security vis-a-vis women in southeast Asia, brings together aspects of survival, security and stability of daily lives from multiple and inter-related perspectives – those of wants, fears and rights. Under such a framework, we can bring together a multitude of studies and research areas to get a more holistic, but more importantly realistic, perspective on the lived experiences of women.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
